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Abstract 
The state has increasingly played a dominant role in the development of Malaysian 
industrial relations. Earlier researchers have shown that since the beginning of the 
relationship between employers and employees, economic considerations have been 
significant, and especially so during the British colonial era. This has therefore been a 
consistently important factor that has influenced the role of the state. The British 
policy of bringing in immigrants of the Indian and Chinese origins into Malaya 
created the plural society that was later further divided according to their economic 
activities. The Malays, in comparison to the immigrants, partly because of the 
'protection' policy of the British, and partly because of their culture, became the least 
educated and economically unadvanced. 
This study looks into how the demarcation between ethnic groups has been used as 
one factor to determine the national development plans in Malaysia, which ultimately 
affected the development of industrial relations. The Malay-dominated government 
tried to ensure the Malays had a better place in the economy by introducing the 
National Economic Planning (1971-1990), originated after the l3 th May 1969 race 
riot, and which legitimised the MalayslBlilniputeras 'special position' in the country. 
This study suggests that the government has given a high priority on economic growth 
as an instrument to achieve the status of a developed country, with the ultimate 
objective being 'national unity'. 
However, there were other non-economIC factors, such as social and political 
considerations, that influenced the role of the state in the Malaysian economy that 
later dictated its role in industrial relations. The NEP was an affirmative action taken 
11 
to correct the economic imbalance between the ethnic groups in Malaysia, especially 
between Malays and non-Malays, or later tenned as Bumiputeras or non-Bumiputeras 
on the ground that they were the indigenous people, protected under the Malaysian 
Constitution. Other policies adopted by the government, including that of industrial 
relations, were developed to ensure that the objectives of NEP were met. Therefore, 
legislation, administration and other policies regarding the industrial relations were 
developed along this line. Meanwhile, as an employer to the public sector, the 
government ensured the sector played its role according to the bigger national agenda, 
the NEP. This continued during the National Development Planning (1991-2000), 
when it retained some of the NEP's objectives, but with new strategies that suggested 
Malaysia was ready to move on into another era that was barely based on ethnicity 
preference. However, the ethnic issue still persisted, and the social and political 
systems still influenced Malaysia in its quest to a fully developed and industrialised 
country by the year 2020 at the latest. 
This study examined how Malaysia tried to move forward, but at the same time still 
concerned with issues of the past. As long as this is the case, this study argues that 
Malaysia will preserve its old industrial relations policies. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.1. Introduction 
Aminuddin defined industrial relations (IR) as 'the relationship between workers and 
their employers within the work environment', but argued that such a relationship 
existed only when employees were unionised (Aminuddin, 1996: 2). Wu (1996: xvii) 
defined IR as 'the subject which deals with the manner in which the relationship 
between an employer or groups of employers and employees is carried on, and the 
methods which they use in their relationship with each other'. Ayadurai (1998) went a 
step further: 
'IR refers to the relations created by employment between the parties who are 
concerned with employment. Depending on how broadly or narrowly it is 
defined, it can embrace every aspect, or be confined just to some aspects 
(perhaps only one) of these relations. Similarly, it can also embrace all the 
parties who are concerned (however marginally) with employment, or be 
confined only to the principal ones'. 
This study refers to IR as relationships centred in workplaces between employee 
unions, employers' associations and the state. This is in accord with the definition 
given by Dunlop (1958), who popularised the 'systems approach', with managers, 
employees and their respective representatives, and specialised government agencies 
as the three actors. In the Malaysian context, this study argues that the state is the most 
dominant actor in Malaysian IR, judging by the effects of the \'arious roles that it plays 
in the system. Ayadurai (1998) claimed that the state plays four roles, as employer, 
legislator. administrator and participant. As a participant, the govemment, with the 
help of the central employer and employee organisations, fomlUlates appropriate IR 
policies, and promotes 'sound' IR practices (Ayadurai, 1998: 231). To understand 
Malaysian IR it is therefore necessary to understand how and \\hy the state plays these 
various roles. The first and foremost understanding that one should have of \lalaysia 
is that the state was always the prime economic actor or initiator, c\'en when 
privatisation was intensified in the 1990s. 'Nation building' and 'national unity' 
became the ultimate goals of both the New Economic Policy (NEP) (1971-1990) and 
the National Development Policy (NDP) (1991-2000). 
The areas embodied by IR include the laws and rules concerning employment, terms 
and conditions of work, rights of employers and employees and the decision-making 
process where rules and terms and conditions of employment are made and defined. 
respectively (Aminuddin, 1996: 2). While the definition of IR in Malaysia and the 
West does not differ, there is a need to formulate or re-construct conceptual 
frameworks of analyses and understandings of the IR systems of non-Western 
industrialising countries (Sharma, 1985: 1). Sharma argued that some researchers into 
Eastern cultures and IR applied their values and convictions in their search for 
relevant information and the selection of variables for analysis of the IR systems of 
the more developed Western countries, thus imposing serious limitations on their 
work (Sharma, 1985: 1). Some views are not valid anymore, even in the West or at 
least in many Western countries. These include the assumed alliance between political 
parties and trade unions, or the labour supply as a key determinant in the evolution of 
the labour movement and IR in newly industrialising countries (Sharma, 1985: 9). He 
quoted Wipper (1964) who argued that instead of a 'wealthy entrepreneurial class' 
that provided both capital and know-how in British and American industrialisation, in 
the developing societies the state was the prime agent of industrialisation. Since the 
1 
development of IR tends to be related to industrialisation, when the prime agent of 
industrialisation is the state, it occupies central stage in IR. 
In Malaysia, it is the Federal Government of Malaysia and not the state governments 
that govern its IR system. This power of jurisdiction falls under the Ninth Schedule in 
the Federal Constitution that puts it under the 'Legislative Lists' List I-Federal List, 
under the grouping of 'labour and social security' which reads: 
, 15 .Labour and social security, including-
(a)Trade unions; industrial and labour disputes; welfare of labour including 
housing of labourers by employers; employer's liability and workmen's 
compensation; 
(b )Unemployment insurance' health insurance; widows', orphans' and old age 
pension; maternity benefits; provident and benevolent funds; superannuation; 
and 
(c )Charities and charitable institutions; charitable trusts and trustees excluding 
wakafs; Hindu endowments. ,\ 
The preliminary findings show that the most prominent actor in Malaysian IR is the 
government, and that it was responsible for developing IR according to its ideals, 
particularly as a system that supports the national agenda, and this was more evident 
after the 13th May 1969 racial riot. It was this realisation combined with other factors 
that triggered my interest in this segment of the study. 
There was also a scarcity of debates on the role of the state in Malaysian IR, despite 
its significance, as highlighted by previous scholars.2 At least one, Kuruvilla (1995, 
1996 and 1998) highlighted industrialisation as the point of departure for exploring 
Malaysian IR, although this actually belies the significance of the state as a key force 
I See Federal Constitution: Incorporating All Amendments Up to 1 ~Iarch 1997. 1997. Kuala Lumpur. 
Percetakan Nasiollal Berhad. 
2 See for example Arudsothy ( 1994); Jomo and Todd (1994); Parasuraman (1999): Kuruvilla (199S); 
:\nantaraman (1997); Aminuddin (1990 & 1996) and Ayadurai (1992 & 1998). 
behind the industrialisation strategy itself. Previous researchers have also mentioned 
certain political, social and historical factors that influence the role of the state, but 
they have generally failed to elaborate on them, apart from highlighting the economy 
as the main influential factor. 3 Furthermore, when Malaysia experienced further 
economic and political turmoil in the last decade of the twentieth century it was time 
again to examine whether the same factors, which had affected its decisions in the 
past, were affecting it in the same way now. 
This study is also encouraged by the fact that no previous scholars have compared the 
state's different policies towards private and public sector JR. The 'Public Service' 
today refers to the public services and the statutory authorities (whether federal or 
state) and the local authorities. Article 132 in the Federal Constitution defined it as the 
armed forces; the judicial and legal services; the general public service of the 
Federation; the police force; the joint public services; the public service of each state; 
and the education service (Malaysian Federal Constitution). The Chief Secretary to the 
Government is the Chief Administrator, the head of the Civil Service and the 
Secretary to the Cabinet. All public employees in the various services above are 
appointed by the five Services Commissions, namely the Commission for The Judicial 
and Legal Services; the Commission for the Public Services; The Police 
Commissions' Education Services Commissions; and the Anned Forces Council. The , 
Constitution does not categorise the Statutory Bodies and Local Authorities as part of 
the public services because both are appointed by the board of directors of the 
:1 See for example lomo and Todd (1994), \\'U (1995) and Kurunlla (\998). 
respective agencies, formed under the federation or the state's laws. Howe\'er, in the 
Malaysian administrative context, both are considered part of the public sen'ices since 
both rely on the government financially, whose salaries and conditions of service are 
determined in the same manner as with the public sector (PSDAR, 199111992). 
As Ozaki (1988) observed, the systems of labour relations in the public service of 
developing countries today are 'extremely diverse'. This makes it difficult to draw any 
general conclusions from, for example, all developing countries. While there are 
systems in which public servants are treated on an almost equal footing with private 
sector workers, there are those who are denied the right to organize, and their pay and 
conditions of employment are determined unilaterally by the government. In the 
middle of these there are the 'intermediate system' which provide machinery for joint 
consultation between public servants and the government, in the absence of the 
recognition of the worker's right to bargain collectively. This study looks into this 
realisation in the Malaysian public sector, especially during the ten years under the 
National Development Planning (NDP) (1991-2000). The contention here is because 
there were other socio-political reasons behind Malaysia's affirmative development 
planning, the public sector was developed in ways that enabled the government to 
achieve those objectives. 
The discussion below explores the background to the important issues in Malaysian 
IR for the period under study, the significance of the study, the research objectives, the 
scope of the study and an outline of the chapter organisation for the whole thesis. 
1.2. Background to the Malaysian IR Issues 
As discussed below, there are some deficiencies in the existing literature on \1alaysian 
IR that highlighted the need for this study. At the same time, there was limited 
analysis on the relationship of history, economic plans and politics with the Malaysian 
IR. The discussion below provides an insight into these two issues, pinpointing the 
fact that they need to be examined and deserve a central position in Malaysian IR. 
Previous researchers have claimed that there are other factors that influenced the role 
of the state in Malaysian IR. For example, Jomo and Todd (1994) offered insights into 
the development of the role of the state in the present Malaysian IR, but more from the 
angle of the history of the trade union movements. Interestingly, they highlighted an 
'antagonistic attitude' of the government towards labour, with imbalance attention 
towards 'the interests of particular fractions of capital' that brought 'important 
consequences for workers' (lomo and Todd, 1994: 168). Both hinted at 'various other 
factors and the inertia of history itself, plus 'political considerations' that influenced 
the government's policies towards the trade union movement (Jomo and Todd, 1994: 
168). However, they did not address these 'various other factors' that were said to 
influence the role of the state in Malaysian IR, but focused more on the economic and, 
in part, the political forces behind the state's roles. Nevertheless, they agreed that the 
'economic, social and political history of Peninsular Malaysia have also had a 
significant impact on unionisation' (lomo and Todd, 1994: 21). 
Kuruvilla (1995) argued that it was the shifts from one industrial strategy to another 
that were important for understanding IR system transfomlation and not simply Ic\l~ls 
of industrialisation per se, as emphasised by Kerr et al (19()4), Shamla (1985) and 
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Deyo (1989). Kuruvilla (1995) argued that economic development strategies and IR 
policies were intertwined and mutually reinforcing (Kuruvilla, 1995). \Vhile these 
views are true, it is too simple to study Malaysian IR with the industrialisation stage 
as the starting point because it distorts a comprehensive examination of the Malaysian 
experience. Malaysian IR have been shaped by the government's broader \'iews of 
what Malaysia and Malaysians should be in the future, having experienced many 
changes since colonial times. There are many internal and external forces that ha\'e 
influenced the state, but the contention here is that the underlying influences, such as 
history and ethnic issues, need to be examined at all the stages of Malaysian IR. The 
national development policies were consistently based on Mal£iysian history as well as 
what politicians assumed its people's economic, political and social needs to be. 
Therefore it is important to identify these factors and to understand how and why they 
affect the state's policies, legislation, and administrative actions and behaviour, and 
Vlce-versa. 
Arudsothy (1994) probed part of the development of Malaysian IR, focusing on the 
1980s. He explored the role of the Ministry of Human Resources (MoHR), which 
promoted policies such as in-house unions to help impose government control over 
labour. However, although he touched on the questions of 'employment re-
structuring', which he called 'positive discrimination in favour of the majority ethnic 
group', he did not explore it in detail (Arudsothy, 1994). There are a number of works 
that have mainly focused on the legal aspects of Malaysian IR, like those of 
Aminuddin (1996), Ayadurai (1998), Wu (1995) and Anantaraman (1998). Wu (1995) 
wrote that Malaysian IR was 'characterised by a high level of governmental 
intervention' and noted that it is 'a product of very Malaysian circumstances', without 
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offering any explanation for this claim. He briefly referred to the position of :'lalays 
and aborigines as the indigenous peoples of Malaysia, a perception that was 'a 
significant element' in Malaysian politics, and admitted that Malaysia was still '"erY 
much a plural society' (Wu, 1995). While earlier writings on Malayan IR, like those 
of Gamba (1962) and Josey (1958), largely consisted of descripti\'e accounts of 
Malayan trade unionism, Ungku Aziz (1967) explored the various roles of the 
government, but did not examine the underlying forces had shaped the role of the 
state. However, among these works on Malaysian IR, there is general agreement on 
the significance of the role of the state as compared to the other two actors, employers 
and employees. 
Sharma (1996), in his work on comparative IR in ASEAN countries, discussed how 
national IR systems are the products of interaction between the main actors and their 
environments. The main actors are labour, management, and government, while the 
four environmental sub-systems are economic, legal, political, and socio-cultural. 
These four environments contribute to the shaping of the emerging patterns of IR, 'but 
the economic environment plays a predominant role' (Sharma, 1996). The 
significance of the economic environment, according to Sharma, is due to the nature 
of IR itself, which is fundamentally a product of economic development, or 
industrialisation. The researcher argues in this study that in Malaysia, the other 
environmental sub-systems are just as important in shaping Malaysian IR. In 
Malaysia, its history, which influenced its political and socio-cultural environment, as 
well as its economic development, or industrialisation policies, are intertwined, to 
form what Malaysian IR is today. Thus, to study the de"clopment and the role of the 
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state in Malaysian IR, the researcher argues, one should not study it separately from 
the factors that shaped it over the years. 
As mentioned earlier, the Malaysian national development policy plays a yery 
important part for Malaysian economic growth, especially since Independence. In fact 
two years before Independence, Malaysia had begun its First Malaya Plan (1956-
1960), which was the first of its Five-Year Development Plans (Nik Hashim, 1994). 
After the fonnation of Malaysia in 1963, there was the First Malaysia Plan (1966-
1970), and today Malaysia is already into its Eighth Malaysia Plan (2001-2005). So 
far, Malaysia has implemented two major national development plans, the New 
Economic Policy or NEP (1971-1990) and the National Development Planning or 
NDP (1991-2000), each a deliberate, comprehensive and time-specific effort made by 
the central government to create and maintain conditions to accelerate economic 
growth and social development. However, it is their ultimate objective that needs to 
be highlighted here. Under the NEP and the NDP, the question of 'national unity' was 
stressed as the ultimate objective, or the long-tenn goal. Both the national 
development plans that spanned thirty years were regarded as the main tools to 
achieve this obj ecti ve. In fact, after the racial riot on 13th May 1969, the government 
became more focused on issues of 'national interest', 'national harmony' and 
'national unity'. 4 
4 See for example Means (1991: 23). When the parliamentary government was restored in February 
1971, the National Operations Council (NOC) that took over after the b~oody not between the \talays 
and Chinese drafted the New Economic Policy (NEP) that became a turnmg pomt m ~1alayslan history. 
The government also issued a White Paper entitled 'Towards National Harn10ny' in 1971. 
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The NEP, which was sparked off by the 13th May 1969 racial clash between the 
Malays and Chinese had two-pronged objectives. The first was to eradicate poverty. 
the second, which is significant to this study, was the re-structuring of \lalaysian 
society to correct racial economic imbalances (Lin, 1994). In this context. the 
economic imbalance referred to the Bumiputeras and the non-Bumiputeras.5 This 
national development planning became the foundation of Malaysian economic 
progress and it encapsulated other policies, such as IR ones. Following 13 th May 1969, 
the NEP brought to the fore the position of the Malays, who were later called 
Bumiputeras, so as to include the indigenous people of Sabah and Sarawak into 
Malaysia in 1963. It was during the British colonial era, as a way of recognising the 
position of the Malays as the indigenous people, that the policy that was based along 
racial lines first began. The effect during that particular period was the segregation of 
the multi-ethnic society in terms of work and demography. After the Japanese 
occupation, the British tried to impose the Malayan Union, which eroded the Malay 
rulers' power and the position of the Malays by offering a liberal citizenship to the 
immigrants. For the first time, the Malays displayed a united nationalism, which saw 
the birth ofUMNO as a party representing them. When the 1948 Federation of Malaya 
was established, the 'special rights' of the Malays were restored, with functions of the 
Malay rulers re-instituted (Milne and Mauzy, 1983: 23). In return, the Malays 
accepted a Federal citizenship offered to those 'who owed undivided loyalty and 
allegiance to the federation (Comber, 1983: 33-34). This is the famous 'ethnic 
bargain', which later became the basis of the independent constitution in 1957. The 
5 Bumiputeras are considered 'sons of the soil'. The concept became common after the 13
th 
\13)" 1969 
incident, referring to Malaysian population as 'Bumiputeras' or 'non-Bwnipuleras' . ~he Bumiputeras 
basically comprise the Malays, Malay-related and indigenous or aborogmal groups. ~on-BU1n1puterCl.l 
refer to Malaysians of Chinese and Indian ethnic origin and other small non-\ 1 usltm groups (Hng. 
1998: 220). 
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Malays' special position now is securely protected under Articles 152 and 153 of the 
Malaysian Constitution.
6 
Looking back, this was the most defining moment for the 
Malays since it marked the legitimisation of their position as the indigenous people 
and therefore deserving of the 'special position', a clause underlying the NEP and 
NDP. 
This 'social pact' was further enhanced in the recent, independent Malaysian 
Constitution, where the position of Malays, Malay Sultans, Islam and the Malay 
language are protected and cannot be questioned.7 In other words, history was a major 
factor directing the future of Malaysia. Inhabitants of Malaysia from virtually all their 
various ethnic backgrounds were to be expected to integrate. The significance of this 
matter for IR seemed indirect, but as will be explained later in this study, it is highly 
pertinent. Yet, although Malaysia made a move forward, at the same time it sought to 
hold on to its historical past, leading to its present dilemma. Malaysian history is laced 
with ethnic questions, which began with the British colonial policy of the late 19th and 
6 Article 152( 1) The national language shall be Malay language and shall be such script as Parliament 
may by law provide. 
Article 153 (1) It shall be the responsibility of the Yang Dipertuan Agong to safeguard the special 
position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and the legitimate 
interests of other communities in accordance with the Provisions of this Article ..... 
Article 153 (2) .... necessary to safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives of any of the 
States of Sabah and Sarawak and to ensure the reservation for Malays and natives of any of the States 
of Sabah and Sarawak of such proportion as he may deem reasonable of positions in the public 
service( other than the public service of a State) and of scholarships, exhibitions and other similar 
educational or training privileges or special facilities given or accorded by the Federal Government and, 
when any permit or licence for the operation of any trade or business is required by federal law, then, 
subject to the provisions of that law and this Article, of such permits and licences .... 
7 Refer to article 3 of the Malaysia Federal Constitution, which states Islam as the religion of the 
Federation, while other religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation. 
Article 32-38 on the rights and powers of Agong or the King as the Supreme Head of the Federation. 
Article 152 on the position of Malay language as the national language, and article 153 on 'the 
reservation of quotas in respect of services, permits, etc. for Malays and natives of any of the States on 
Sabah and Sarawak'. 
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early 20
th 
centuries of bringing in large numbers of labourers from China and India. 
particularly to work in its tin and rubber industries. After Independence, the 13 th ~lay 
1969 racial riot gave the political leaders legitimacy for drafting the :\EP that brought 
the clauses concerning the position of MalayslBumiputeras in the constitution into 
effect. The cause of the tragedy was claimed to be the economic imbalance between 
Malays and non-Malays, although earlier reports of the riot also stressed 'political and 
psychological factors' as contributing to the conflict (Means, 1991: 23). Thus, 
accepting the position that the Malays were the 'sons of the soil', the NEP sought to 
find fast and effective ways to redress the balance. When the NEP did not achieve its 
target, another national economic plan, the NDP was established to continue the 
policy, though in a subtler manner. Both these policies had direct and indirect effects 
on IR, as discussed in Chapter Seven and after. 
Malaysia went on investing in various efforts to catch up with developed nations, and 
to become fully industrialised 'in its own mould', as intended in its Vision 2020 
policy (Ahmad Sarji, 1995). It adopted its industrialisation strategy, relied on Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) and Multi-National Corporations (MNC) to help pursue it, 
and diversified its ventures into manufacturing, rather than into primary commodities 
(Lin, 1994). The interesting question here is, 'in the quest to become a fully developed 
nation, did Malaysia develop the kind of IR system adopted in the industrialised 
nations?' This study explores the paradox of Malaysia's eagerness to become an 
industrial nation, adopting various strategies that has brought it closer to its economic 
objectives, while at the same time remaining reluctant to change certain aspects of its 
IR policies and practices. The independent government was consistent in its beliefs 
that Malaysia must achieve the de\'eloped nation status, by 2020 the latest. but in their 
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own mould, with their own set of moral and ethical values, even if it meant preserving 
some laws viewed by the West as undemocratic. 
This study traces and explains the role of the state from the colonial era until the end 
of the NDP era in 2000. The end of British colonial rule actually propelled the Malays 
into a prominent position in Malaysian politics under the UMNO, a racially based 
party encouraged by the British. Together with the Malayan Chinese Party (MCA) and 
the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), these racial parties have become the major 
influence on Malaysian policies until the end of this study. Malaysia's political 
culture, especially under Mahathir Mohamad, the country's longest serving Prime 
Minister (from 1981 to the present) who was responsible for both part of the NEP and 
the whole of the NDP era came to the fore. During his administration, Malaysia has 
faced and overcome many challenges. During the 1990s, the economic downturn in 
1997, and the political turmoil in 1998, with the controversial dismissal of Malaysia's 
third Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, saw the Malays divided as never before. 
Moreover, they withdrew their support of the UMNO during the 1999 general 
election. In the past, political instability has seen the government reacting negatively 
towards labour, strengthening its position and weakening the labour movement 
through legislation and various administrative and other policies. As discussed in 
Chapters Nine and Ten, for each of the private and the public sectors, the 
government's roles were analysed to see whether all the forces that influenced it 
before the NDP influenced it again during this period. 
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1.3. Statement of the Problem 
The present literature on Malaysian IR regards economy as the dominant factor that 
influenced the state in the IR system (Shanna, 1996; Jomo and Todd, 1994; Kuruvilla, 
1995). Therefore, an understanding of the state's roles in the economy is vital before 
analysing its roles in IR. This study uses the framework based on Jomo's (1999) 
analysis, which divides the economy into four stages. 
The first stage is tenned 'late colonial priorities' and refers to the period 1950-57. 
Stage two is called 'alliance laissez faire-ism', and describes 1957-69, the era of the 
first Prime Minister (PM), Tunku Abdul Rahman (hereinafter known as the Tunku). 
This was when generally laissez-faire policies with 'mild' import substituting 
industrialisation (lSI), agricultural diversification, rural development and 'mild' but 
increasing ethnic affinnative action policies were implemented. The third period, 
called 'growing state intervention' applies to the second PM, Abdul Razak's era 
(1969-7 6), as well as the third, Hussein Onn (1976-81), and fourth, Mahath i r 
Mohamad (1981-85), when there was increasing state intervention and public sector 
expansion. This was especially when there was inter-ethnic redistribution, export-
oriented industrialisation (EOI); the Look East policy, and public expenditure cuts 
from 1982, but there were government joint ventures with the Japanese to develop 
heavy industries in the face of declining foreign investment. The stage from 1986 to 
now, Jomo tenned the 'economic liberalisation era, whereby there was massive 
ringgit (Malaysian money, or RM) depreciation, economIC liberalisation, 
privatisation, improved official support for the private sector, increased investment 
incentives, regressive 'supply side oriented' tax refonns and the Vision 2020 policy. 
1~ 
Each of these eras featured the state as the prime economic actor in the ~1alaysian 
economy, therefore stressing the importance of analysing the situation from that angle. 
However, the approach used in this study is different. E\"en though the dri\"e towards 
economic growth is accepted as the most prominent force that always influenced the 
state in its roles in the Malaysian IR, the contention is that other factors stated below 
also influenced the state. These include the history of Malaysian people, the social and 
political environment, the culture and the ethnic issue as well as the leadership of the 
political leaders and the trade unions. The degree of the influence might differ from 
time to time but as discussed further in this study, they were always present. This 
study also argues that the state adopted different policies towards the private as 
compared to the public sector, especially during the NDP in the 1990s. Therefore, 
there is a separate analysis for each sectors in Chapters Nine and Ten. In Chapter 
Eleven a comparative analysis is made of the two and the similarities and differences 
of the government approaches are discussed. Apart from exploring the directions 
taken in both sectors as part of the national development programme, the different 
government expectations of each are seen. 
1.4. Research Objectives 
The main purpose of this study is to analyse the development of the role of the state in 
Malaysian IR, and to discuss the many factors that influenced it O\"er the years. This 
study acknowledges Ayadurai's (1998) identification of the state's roles as legislator. 
administrator, participant and employer in the public sector. Howcvcr. instead of 
exploring aspects of Malaysian IR as previous scholars did, this study explores and 
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highlights the underlying factors that influence the state's roles and tries to explain 
how and why it has played them. 
In more detail, the objectives are: 
a) to analyse the state's roles in the IR system, from the earliest period with the start 
of wage labour tradition in Malaya until the end of 1990s and to explore its 
development; 
b) to examine all the factors, such as historical, socio-political, leadership, as well as 
economic that helped shape the role of the state in Malaysian IR; 
c) to explore whether there are changes in the role of the state under the period 
studied and to test whether these could be attributed to the historical, socio-
political, leadership and economic factors, or whether there are external factors; 
d) to examine the state's policies towards the private as compared to the public 
sector's IR and relate this to the factors that influence the state; 
e) to determine certain factors that have changed or remained over the years and to 
discuss their significance in Malaysian IR; 
f) to examine the relationship between the state, capital and labour, determining the 
balance of power between them, their respective motivations, how these were 
formed and how any of these may have changed over time. 
1.5. Significance of the Study 
The significance of the study IS, primarily, that it will provide a comprehensive 
analysis of Malaysia's IR system which covers the most important period/turning 
point period in Malaysia, namely from the colonial period, ending with Independence 
in 1957, and the NEP (1971-1990) and NDP (1991-2000) eras. The main themes 
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emphasised are based on the state's most important roles as legislator, administrator. 
participant and employer. It contributes to an understanding of the state's roles in 
Malaysian IR and the underlying factors that influence them. This approach should 
therefore offer a nearly complete overview how the state functions and of how it 
influences the Malaysian IR system. An examination of the influences on the state's 
roles gives some insight into processes of government and IR in general in a fast 
developing nation. 
1.6. The Scope of the Study 
This is a partly historical study, usmg both secondary and pnmary data, and 
comprising interviews with people prominent in the Malaysian civil service and trade 
union leaders as well as employers' representatives. It covers the colonial period from 
1874, when Great Britain officially started its advance policy towards inland Malaya, 
until the end of the NDP in 2000. The time frame is chosen to enable an examination 
of the development of Malaysian IR from its beginning to the end of the second major 
period of national development planning, focusing on the turning point periods in 
Malaysian history. Since the study covers a long period, the discussion is based more 
on themes and issues than on chronology, although the analysis is roughly in 
chronological order. Therefore, the whole of Chapter Six focuses on the British 
colonial period with the intention of explaining the birth of IR in Malaysia. Chapter 
Seven onwards addresses issues and themes that concern Malaysian IR, based on the 
state's roles in the four categories noted above. In various subsections of these 
chapters, topics that have specific effects on the development of IR in Malaysia are 
explained. 
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1.7. Chapter Organisation 
The chapters are arranged to provide a sense of continuity, which from the 
Independence period focuses more on themes and issues that most enveloped 
Malaysian IR. 
Chapter Two reviews the relevant literature on the role of the state in the economv and 
analyses the most general arguments on the topic. Chapters Three and Four explore 
the role of the state in IR, and the role of the state in IR in Malaysia, respectively. The 
relevance of each stage of the review is highlighted, with reference to issues and 
events that are to be more deeply probed in the study. Chapter Five discusses the 
research methods used. Chapter Six investigates the colonial government and the 
labour movement in pre-independence Malaya, both of which have influenced the 
present Malaysian IR. Chapter Seven, on the evolution and the development of IR in 
independent Malaysia from 1957 to 1970, shows that Malaysian history and internal 
turmoil affected the state's roles and policies very much. Chapter Eight analyses the 
twenty years of Malaysian IR under the NEP, which again highlights the significance 
of internal forces on the state's roles. Chapters Nine and Ten explore the private and 
the public sector separately since under the NDP each sector was given a specific role 
in the economy, thus creating a different IR policy for each sector. Chapter Eleven 
offers a comparative analysis of the private and public sector IR in Malaysia. Chapter 
Twelve summarises and concludes the main findings and arguments, noting the 
limitations of the work and indicating directions for future research. 
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Chapter Two starts with the review of the evidence and arguments surrounding the 
role of the state in the economy. As noted earlier, understanding this should provide 
insight into the role of the state in IR. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE ECONO!\IY 
2.1. Introduction 
In discussing the role of the sfate in the economy, the objective of this chapter is to 
enable us to relate to its role in IR in Chapter Three. As discussed later, the state's 
roles in the economy is dominant in Malaysia and it relates closely to its role in IR. 
Understanding that role is therefore the key to understand Malaysian IR. 
This chapter starts with a discussion on the basic understanding of 'the state' as a 
concept in general, and in the context of this study. It examines the theories of the 
state before reviewing literature on the role of the state in the economy and other 
related theories that concern a developing country. As Malaysia was considered one of 
the Third World nations, debates on the role of the state in the economy in the Third 
World are also analysed, before being narrowed down to the role of the state in the 
economic sector in the East Asian countries. The whole discussion aims finally to 
highlight the role of the state in the economy in general and in the Malaysian context. 
2.2. A General Definition of 'State' 
Jordan (1985:1) described the state as: 
'a system of relationships which defines the territory and membership of a 
community, regulates its internal affairs, conducts relations with other states ... 
and provides it with identity and cohesion. It consists of institutions and 
processes which are extremely various and complex, presiding over different 
spheres of the community which distribute different social goods according to 
different principles ... the state is society's way of controlling itself, and of 
making sure that others do not control it. From another, it is sort of protection 
racket, which claims a monopoly over the use of force'. 
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The state's importance can be seen as a system that detennines the boundaries and 
rules of all other systems of activity in a community (Jordan, 1985: 1). It is where the 
political authority is used to regulate the community's different spheres of life, and 
these spheres themselves have production and distribution systems of their own. 
which are ultimately defined and defended by the state. Jordan notes that: 
' ... political authority also has a sphere of its own, whose shape, size and 
scope varies between societies [it is about] the power of some people to 
control and regulate the activities of others on behalf of a central authority 
(Jordan, 1985: 1)'. 
He argued that the state seeks its own legitimation in tenns of the common interests of 
the community and should be able to define a common culture and a common goal. 
The state, therefore, is a nonnative, regulative as well as self-preserving system, 
setting standards of what society ought to be like, and procedures on how to achieve 
it. To some extent, Jordan's view could be used to explain the situation in Malaysia. 
where the state promotes its own system of rules and legislation, culture and beliefs 
and tries to preserve these from outside influences. This is especially true after the 
1969 racial riot, just twelve years after Malaysia achieved its Independence from the 
British. 8 Means (1991: 4-16) highlighted the significance of this on the future of 
Malaysia quite clearly. The government, after losing a two-thirds majority in the 1969 
general election, sought new legitimacy through expanding the Alliance Party to 
Barisan Nasional (National Front), to include of more parties into its coalition. 
However, the political authority was still the most powerful central authority of the 
state as it controlled the rules and regulations of the system through \'arious avenues. 
g Comber (1985) gives a comprehensive picture of the 13 th May 1969 racial riot. 
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Jordan's view though may simply reflect that the ideal model of a state still has its 
basis. Even though the ruling government is not free from other influences that have 
challenged its strength, it is still able to seek legitimacy through the democratic system 
every five years. As is discussed further in this study the government used all 
available avenues to ensure the continuation of its political authority. 
Jordan's view on a state that is able to define a common culture or a common goal 
also needs a re-analysis. The state itself is not static, as over time it changes its actions 
and specific goals. There are internal and external forces that continuously influence 
the state in its quest for authority over its community. As Wu (1995: xxii) hinted 
about the plural society in Malaysia, there are many barriers to 'racial integration'. 
Therefore, Malaysian culture is a diverse one, with each ethnic group maintaining its 
own. The majority of Malaysian people come from at least three different ethnic 
background with different cultures, religions, and languages. This comprise the 
Malays, who are now categorised politically as the Bumiputeras. the Chinese and 
Indians.9 Milne and Mauzy (1978 and 1999) and Means (1991) best explained the 
development of Malaysian politics and its relations to the ethnic issues from its early 
period until the 1990s. The current ruling coalition party, Barisan Nasional, is not a 
single party as argued by Jordan, as it comprises many others. The dominant three 
(UMNO, MCA and MIC) each presents one ethnic group in Malaysia. However, it is 
true that Barisan Nasional has been the dominant force in Malaysia since 
independence, serving what it thought to be the mutual needs of the plural society. 
Organised activities that conflicted with the interest of the state are not encouraged but 
l) Abraham (1997) explains the complexities brought by the British colonialism towards race relations 
in Malaysia. 
are, to a certain extent, prohibited, particularly when the government percei\'es those 
activities as upsetting the status quo and bring in destruction to the stability of the 
plural society. However, though discouraged, they are certainly not absent. Jordan also 
says: 
' ... the political authority of a single party can alone provide reliable 
knowledge of the common good, and therefore of the real needs of individuals 
and groups who would otherwise be blinded to these by the pursuit of their 
selfish interests. Hence, the central authority prohibits any definition of social 
needs which might conflict or compete with its own, and allows no organised 
activity through which such alternative definitions could be formed and 
expressed (Jordan, 1985:2),.10 
This argument has some basis if applied to Malaysia. As discussed in this study, either 
as a single affiliating party in the Barisan Nasional, or as a concerted effort under the 
identity of the Barisan Nasional, the government promotes policies and administers 
the country, moulding it into their own desired nation. 
Miliband (1969:49) defines the state as a number of particular institutions, which only 
then constitute reality and which then interact as parts of the state system. On its own, 
'the state' does not exist. One of the institutions in a state is the government, over 
which, according to Miliband there has always been confusion. There is the difference 
between the government and the state, though both often appear synonymous. The 
government usually speaks as the representative of the state. It is the state that can 
claim the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. 
But 'the state' in this context could not claim anything, while the govemment of the 
day can. People may give their allegiance to the state, but it is to the govemment of 
10 Jordan (1985: 1-15) also explains the system of modem nation states and the characteristic of the 
modern system of inter-state relationships, His analysis on the relationship between political power and 
economic power is discussed in the later part of this chapter. 
the day that people are actually obedient. It seems that the government alone can 
speak as the representative of the state, but it does not necessarily control the state 
power, particularly if it is a weak government (Miliband, 1969: 49). 
In Malaysia, the state is in fact synonymous with the government and \'ice \'ersa, at 
least according to Malaysian people and Malaysian politics. However, there are few 
incidences that demonstrate any weakness in the Malaysian government in the way 
that Miliband argues. There were a few times during or after elections when the 
Malaysian government was challenged, but never to a degree where it was to be 
changed. Means (1991) described the period from 1969 unti I 1974 when the weak 
government worked to seek new legitimacy from the Malaysian people by bringing in 
more political parties into the Alliance Party after the racial riot in 1969, and changed 
its name to Barisan Nasional in June 1974. 11 In fact, only recently has the government 
shown signs of being threatened, especially when both economic and political 
problems appeared at the same time, as in the late 1990s (see Chapters Nine and Ten). 
However, it is true that the state in the Malaysian case represents established 
particular institutions that constitute a reality and interact as parts of the state system. 
The second element of the state system, as argued by Miliband, is the administrative 
body. This encompasses a large variety of ministerial departments, which sometimes 
enjoy a greater or lesser degree of autonomy, and are concerned with the management 
of the economic, social, cultural and other activities in which the state is involved. 
II See Means (1991: 30). The Barisan Nasinal opted for dacing, a traditional beam scale, as its election 
symbol, replacing the Alliance former one, the sailboat. The dacing was definitely a politi~al gimmick 
to win over Malaysians, showing the government's enthusiasm towards equal opportumtIes tor all. 
According to Miliband (1969: 49), the relationship between the government and the 
administrative body has a certain impact in determining the role of the state. Though 
formally the administrative body has to obey the government of the day, it actually 
contributes a significant role in the political process as well. Whether a regime is 
weak or powerful, top administrators are capable of playing a key role in the 
government, especially in critical areas of policies, which government usually find 
hard to ignore (Miliband, 1969). Miliband's interpretation of part of the state system 
might not necessarily explain the Malaysian case, especially in the later years. As 
discussed later, the top administrators in Malaysia's bureaucratic system are actually 
the backbone of the government. They have unfailingly supported the government's 
agendas since Independence, partly due to the training of Malaysians towards their 
role as administrators, which was inherited from the British system, and because the 
job demands their total loyalty. This loyalty is expected through the General Order, a 
document of regulations for government servants. However, this study contends that 
lurking in the background is again the racial issue. As the Malays are more politically 
dominant (UMNO being the dominant party in the Barisan Nasional government, its 
President, though not prescribed by the Constitution always becomes the Malaysian 
Prime Minister), and as the majority of the public service employees are Malays, their 
loyalty was expected. 
Miliband (1969) claims the same applies for the relationship between the government 
and the third elements: the military, security and police forces. In most democratic 
countries, the fourth element is the judicial system, which is supposed to be 
independent of the political executive and is there to protect the citizen against the 
latter and its agents. The fact is, however, the judiciary is an integral part of the state 
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system. The fifth element is the sub-central government, which is an extension of the 
central government and administration. This is clearly seen in federal go\'ernments as 
in the United States and, in this research context, Malaysia itself. Miliband's vie\\s 
partly reflect Malaysia, a country that has a strong executive, though there exists by 
theory the practice of the 'separation of power' between the three entities. Debates 
that highlight the imbalance of power in Malaysia have been numerous, some 
highlighting the helplessness of the judiciary, especially during the present Prime 
Minister's reign. 12 
Salamon (1987: 219) stresses that the state could be defined as 'the politically based 
and controlled institutions of government and regulation within an organised society', 
In Britain, this includes the monarchy, Parliament, the government, the civil service, 
the judiciary, the police and the armed services. It should be emphasised that the 
elected government of the day is the most active and important element within the 
state because it determines the direction, policies and actions of the state machinery 
(Salamon, 1987: 219). In Malaysia, it is a federal state, that emulates the 'Westminster 
model' (Hickling, 1997: 19). Three primary components of Malaysia's government 
systems are the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary (Malaysia Kita, 1991: 
543). The Legislative contains three elements; the Yang diPertuan Agong (the elected 
head among the Malay Rulers); Dewan Negara (the Senate) and Dewan Rakyat (the 
House of Representatives). The Executive is the governing body that includes the 
Yallg di Pertuall Agong, Cabinet Ministers, Ministries, departments and government 
12 See for example Rais (1995), Hickling (1997) and Lee (1995), Rais and Lee highlight the 
constitutional conflicts faced by Malaysia during Mahathir Mohamad's administration. altering the 
equilibrium in the balance of powers, eroding the influence of Rulers and the Judiciary. and 
strengthening the executive aml of government. 
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bodies (including the armed forces and police). The judiciary consists of the Federal 
Court, Court of Appeal, The High Courts of Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak, Sessions 
Courts, Magistrates Courts (1st, and 2nd class), Juvenile Courts and Penghu!u's Courts 
(Malaysia 1997 Yearbook, 1997: 433). Crouch (1982: 146) argues that the state's 
importance derives from the fact that it is the only actor that can change the rules of 
the system by virtue of its law-making role. Lewis (1983: 361), however, argues that 
the pluralistic nature of the state and the potential transient existence of any 
government will allow organs of the state to pursue individual strategies. In the 
context of Malaysia, Lewis's view is debatable. Scholars like Crouch (1996) and 
Khoo (1995) have argued that since 1981, Malaysia has become more and more 
authoritarian. 
Thus, the term 'state' is purposely used in the topic of the research, and not 
'government'. 'State' cannot be identified totally with 'government', as structured 
changes and the removal of governments may happen but they might not change the 
social order that constitutes the state. If the government were totally identified with 
the state, then the removal of governments would entail a crisis in the state. When a 
government is in power, it carries the authority of the state, and this authority is 
continuous, above both ruler and ruled, 'which provides continuity and coherence' to 
the political organisation (Vincent, 1987:31). 
To a certain extent, the terms above apply to Malaysia. However, the differences 
might depend on how much political power exists in Malaysia that enables the state to 
control or regulate the activities of members of its society. Internal or external factors 
and roles played out by other actors might influence the nature of the state, and 
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Malaysia's history and experience. The separation of power bet\veen the Executive. 
Legislative and Judiciary in Malaysia is implemented according to \1alaysia's own 
interpretations. For example, one may doubt from the beginning that Malaysia is a 
pluralistic state that allows different elements/organs of state to pursue specific 
strategies for particular spheres in the society. 
2.3.Theories of the State 
The next discussion below examines theories of the state, as debated by a number of 
scholarsY Contemporary views are numerous, but the prominent ones are discussed 
below. Sometimes these theories overlap with the types of state, as mentioned earlier. 
Vincent (1987: 218), in discussing the theories of the state, argues that it is 'a public 
power above both ruler and ruled which provides order and continuity to the polity'. 
He suggests several theories of the state that each has a certain interesting 
characteristic relating to the current study. In 'absolutist theory', the public power is 
the absolute sovereign person (whether fictional or real) embodying divine right and 
owning the realm. The sovereign's interests are the state's interests, while 
'constitutional theory' means the public power is the complex institutional structure. 
Through historical, legal, moral and philosophical claims, it embodies self-limitation 
and the diversification of authority and power and a complex hierarchy of rules and 
norms, which act to institutionalise power and regulate the relations between citizens, 
laws and political institutions. 'Ethical theory' means the public power is the modus 
operandi of the citizens, groups and institutions of a constitutional monarchy, directed 
1.1 For example. see A vineri ( 1972). Jessop ( 1982). Miliband (1969). \' incent ( 1987) and King ( 1986). 
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to the maximal ethical self-development and freedom of the citizen body. It is the 
unity of the cognitive disposition of the individual with the purposes of institutional 
structures and rules. Meanwhile, 'class theory' refers to the public power as the 
institutional form of the condensation of dominant class interests which is ultimatelv , . 
directed at the accumulation of capital and the defence of private property. While 
'pluralist theory' is when public power is, in general terms, the synthesis of living 
semi-independent groups (understood as real legal persons). Groups are integrated not 
absorbed. Narrowly focused public power implies a government that acts for the 
common good of groups (Vincent, 1987: 222-223). 
Other scholars have identified different types of state. 14 In this respect, the type of 
state is partly determined by their chosen practices in both the economy and the 
politics. The discussion below is the extension of the debate above, and again explores 
all the existing major types of states. The purpose is to highlight the main 
characteristics of these types of states and relate them to the research topic. One of the 
major types of states is the capitalist state. In this regard, Miliband (1969) contributes 
to an understanding of the role of the state in the capitalist society. Advanced 
capitalist states have certain similarities, especially in economic terms; the societies 
have: 
' ... a large, complex, highly integrated and technologically advanced economic 
base, with industrial production accounting for the largest part by far of their 
gross national product, and with agriculture constituting a relatively small area 
of economic activity, and they are also societies in which the main part of 
economic activity is conducted on the basis of the private ownership and 
control of the means to such activity' (Miliband, 1969: 8). 
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There is then 'the public sector', where the state owns and administers a wide range 
of industries and services, mainly to the infrastructure, and which are of \'ast 
importance to its economic life. The state in capitalist economies plays an ever-greater 
economic role in regulating, controlling, co-ordinating, 'planning', and so on. It is also 
the largest customer of the 'private sector'. Moreover, certain major industries would 
not survive without its help. It is to be stressed that both state intervention and the role 
of the public sector are nothing new in capitalist societies, until it was claimed that 
'capitalism' is a misnomer (Miliband, 1969: 9; King, 1986: 75-76). 
Work by Gramsci (1971) offers a more satisfactory approach in understanding the role 
of the state in a capitalist society. To Gramsci: 
'the complex relations among a plurality of social forces, rather than the pure 
mode of production, determined the state power. Economic effects were 
regarded as always mediated by political and ideological factors which were 
relatively independent of productive forces. Economic crises may politically 
debilitate states but do not by themselves create revolutions ..... the state secures 
the consent of the dominated in parliamentary democracies' (King, 1986: 74). 
Gramsci identified two basic strategies, force and hegemony. The latter refers to the 
successful mobilisation and reproduction of 'the active consent' of dominated groups 
by the ruling class through their exercise of intellectual, moral and political 
leadership. It later involves the bourgeoisie claiming popular sentiments for its 
'national' goals. Hegemony operates through the ideological practices of institutions 
and groups in civil society, such as schools, media, the churches, or political parties. 
However, Gramsci's analysis is criticised for his tendency to assume that the state 
14 For example, see chapter two of King (1986), pg. 31- 58, who gave details about the development of 
the modern nation-state, starting from the Standestaat, and the Absolutist State. to the de\'elopment of 
capitalism and parliamentarism. 
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includes all agencIes involved in hegemonic mediation, and thereby blurring the 
necessary distinction between state institutions and civil society (King, 1986: 75). 
Another analysis, by Poulantzas (1978), views the state as the basic source of ruling 
class cohesion, and like Gramsci, regards hegemony as a strategy for unifying the 
ruling class as a means of mobilising popular support for it. The state should be 
regarded as a neutral system serving the national community. To Poulantzas, though 
the liberal state may be the best structure for consolidating the political power of 
capital in its competitive phase, a more interventionist state is required for the more 
organised state of monopoly capitalism. Poulantzas further argued that 'authoritarian 
statism' best characterises a recent form of normal capitalist state, with a drift from 
legislative to executive power, a growing indistinctiveness in the separation of 
legislative, administrative and judicial agencies, and an increase in functional 
corporatism at the expense of parliamentarism. 
Other theories of state as the 'corporatist state' are discussed here. Cawson argues that 
still there is confusion over corporatism as a concept (Cawson, 1986: 22). Three 
meanings of corporatism can be discussed here, first as a novel system of political 
economy, different from capitalism and socialism, an idea by Winkler (1976); second, 
as a form of state within capitalist society, where corporatism is seen as emerging 
alongside, and then dominating, a parliamentary state form, (Jessop, 1979); and third, 
a distinctive way in which interests are organised and interact with the state 
(Schmitter, 1974). 
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The most significant change from capitalism, according to Winkler (1976), is the shift 
in the role of the state, which became more directive over economic-producti\'e units. 
According to Lembruch (1982), under capitalism, production takes place \\"ithin a 
market system, although one with increasing state interventionism. Under 
corporatism, the freedom of private capital to operate is replaced by a state direction, 
not unlike Lenin's concept of state capitalism. The state develops a considerable 
degree of independence from economic interests, and is able to impose its will upon 
producers. To Winkler, 'the state is no longer capitalist because rights over private 
capital have been ended by the state, and the market mechanism has been superseded 
by oligopolistic power' (Cawson, 1986: 23). According to Jessop, corporatism is: 
'a form of state in which representation and intervention are institutionally 
fused in the form of 'corporations' constituted on the basis of their member's 
economic functions. Thus corporations both represent the interests of their 
members and act as a means of implementing government policies' (cited in 
Cawson, 1986: 24). 
While to Schmitter, corporatism is: 
' ... a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are 
organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, 
hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or 
licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational 
monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain 
controls on their selection ofleaders and articulation of demands and supports' 
(Schmitter, 1974:93-94). 
Corporatism is thus to Schmitter a way of understanding the relationship between 
society and state in capitalist democracies, rather than a way of portraying a whole 
system which is in some sense 'post-capitalist' as proposed by Winkler. With regard 
to Vincent's views on the pluralist state as described earlier, Schmitter conceives it as: 
'A system of interest representation in which the constituent units are 
organised into an unspecified number of mUltiple, voluntary, competitive, non-
hierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) 
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categories which are not specially licensed, recognised, subsidised, created or 
otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state 
and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activitv within their 
respective categories' (Schmitter, 1974: 96). . 
The discussion above reveals that it is not simple matter to determine what type of 
state each country practices. In fact, it is difficult at this stage to categorise Malaysia 
under a state 'label'. It is however, arguable for Malaysia to be categorised as 
capitalist, as proposed by Miliband, or pluralist, as argued by Vincent and Schmitter. 
As will be discussed Malaysia is still a developing country that lacked 'the highly 
integrated and technologically advanced economy' as argued by Miliband or, the 
'non-hierarchically ordered and self determined' system that was free of the control of 
the state. Instead at this stage, Malaysia resembles more of a corporatist state, that saw 
corporations that were constituted to represent both the interests of members of 
society and at the same time act as a means of implementing government policies, as 
proposed by Jessop. There are however, many factors affecting the practices of social, 
political and economic aspects of a country. It is possible that one country is in fact a 
combination of a few theories/types of states, based on their social, cultural, political 
and economic history/realities. These are among the issues that this study intends to 
investigate. 
2.4. The Role of the State in the Economy: An Introduction 
The discussion below examines the role of the state in the economy 111 general. 
According to Jordan (1985: 2), the relationship between the state and the economy in 
a modem society is 'quite obvious' since money is used as the measure of equivalence 
between the exchange of good and services. To quote his understanding on the 
relationship: 
33 
'The state is seen as the only system of relationship powerful and pervasive 
enough to control the dominance of commercial interests· the commercial 
. , 
system IS seen as the only one powerful and pervasive enough to limit the 
dominance of the state' (Jordan, 1985: 3). 
While the first half of the sentence is considered true of Malaysia, the second half is 
still debatable. There is the influence of the commercial system towards the Malaysian 
state, but whether it is powerful enough to limit the dominance of the state is another 
question that will be addressed in this study. 
Two classical views may facilitate the understanding of this relationship between the 
state and the economy. The views of Adam Smith and Karl Marx dominated theories 
of economic thought from the mid-late nineteenth century to the early twentieth 
century. Smith warned of the political and economic dangers, of government 
interference. He says it is the system of natural liberty that permits change and 
development, while government intervention would handicap the positive forces of 
growth. Individuals should be left free to pursue their self-interest, and competition, 
and market forces would act as an 'invisible hand' to bring self-interest into harmony 
with public interest (Meier, 1994: 21). Smith sought the establishment of appropriate 
institutions that would increase both the motivation and the capacity of the human 
agent. He opposed apprenticeship laws that diminished the incentive to industry and 
hard work. He advocated certain systems of land tenure, argued that the ideal unit of 
agricultural organisation is the small proprietorship, and opposed the joint-stock 
company. Individuals should be freed from governmental policy that had the 
distortionary effects of limiting capital formation, using capital unproductively, 
conferring monopoly privileges, and sapping the vitality of competitive forces. To 
Smith, public spending should be kept to a minimum, and production in the public 
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sector should be limited to the small share that can not be supplied by priyate 
enterprise. Smith narrowed down the role of the state to defence, administration of 
justice, and the maintenance of certain public institutions and certain public works 
(Meier, 1994: 22). 
The central issue of political economy during this period relates to the role of 
uncontrolled 'market' forces versus 'political' or government intervention (Alt and 
Chrystal, 1983). The questions to ask are to what extent should individuals be 
allowed to pursue their own self-interest, and to what extent should the political 
authorities of the state direct areas of economic behaviour? According to Smith, the 
proper role of governments is when there exists an economy that is made up of 
individuals who can each pursue his or her own self-interest. In this laissez faire 
economy, economic transactions will be voluntary for both the buyer and seller of any 
good or service. Voluntarism means no exchange should take place which does not 
benefit both parties. Since transactions are presumed to affect only those directly 
participating, a trade which is good for the parties involved and harms no one else can 
only be socially beneficial. The more such trades there can be, the better off more 
people must become. Central direction is unnecessary since the distribution of 
available resources is achieved by a vast number of decentralised exchanges between 
mutually benefiting individuals. 
Smith insists the free market economy led to an 'optimal' or 'efficient' allocation of 
resources. The status of this result and the interpretation of 'optimal' in this context 
are, of course, at the heart of the controversy. There was no direct role for the 
government in private economic relations, but that did not mean that there was no 
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need for central government. Again, he stressed that the government has three 
functions, defence, law and order, and public works and public institutions. But 
Smith's restrictive definition of the job of governments still leaves considerable scope 
for justifiable expansion. The recent arguments are 'what is the appropriate level of 
public works' and 'what is the proper role of public institutions?' (Alt and Chrystal, 
1983: 14-16). Karl Marx insisted on the importance of the 'dominant mode of 
production' in detennining broader social, political, and economic relations (Alt and 
Chrystal, 1983: 16). He stressed the role of modem government in increasing effective 
demand for production to ensure private accumulation of profits or to ensure 
profitability of the capitalist sector. The important point is that not everyone benefits 
in the free market system. Even if trade is voluntary for both parties, economic 
outcomes are not 'fair' because people do not start with equal endowments. He 
divided society into two classes, 'capitalists' and 'labour'. For Marx, the nature of the 
capitalist system was that the employers would inevitably exploit labour. A dominant 
idea was that labour should, by force if necessary, take over the means of production 
and run them in the interests of labour. Capital would thus become the property of 
society at large and all could share in the profits. 
There were also other debates, for example by Von Mises, Lange and Hayek, on what 
kind of economic system is 'the best'. For Von Mises (1920), a socialist system was 
impossible, for 'where there is no free market, there is no economic calculation.' In 
contrast, Lange (in Lange and Taylor: 1938) argued that the socialist solution was 
feasible, practical, and desirable. His hypothetical world contains four groups of 
actors: households, firms, socialist industrial managers, and central planners. Each has 
its own different responsibilities that complement the others. Critics attacked Lange's 
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scheme on several issues. For example, the planners might not act efficiently and the 
measurement of efficiency is unclear. Schumpeter (1966) argued that socially 
responsible planners would lack the ability to profit exploitatively from new 
inventions, stifling innovation. Hayek (1940) contended that Lange's scheme would 
be slower than a market economy to adjust to the ever-changing equilibrium of a 
constantly changing world. Moreover, Lange was aware that his socialism requires a 
large bureaucracy, and that there will problem of excessive power of the central 
planner. In Hayek's The Road to Serfdom (1944), he argues that a socialist system 
restricts the freedoms of individuals (Alt and Chrystal, 1983: 21). 
From the arguments above, it is clear that proponents of intervention stress the ability 
of government to produce net social benefits in terms of an equitable distribution of 
incomes and elimination of inefficiencies in production. Opponents argue that the 
bureaucratic cost of intervention would outweigh any benefits provided. Even in the 
context of the so called 'mixed economy', that is where there is government 
intervention, there continues to be serious disagreements about the appropriate extent 
of national ownership of industry, government regulation of monopoly, protection 
from foreign competition, and public expenditure on social services and welfare. A.C. 
Pigou with his 'welfare economics' called for intervention to offset the effects of 
specific cases of 'market failure' (Alt and Chrystal, 1983: 23-24). 
Intervention to redistribute incomes does not cure market failures but achieve 
something that markets can not (Alt and Chrystal, 1983). All governments in Western 
industrial economies have intervened to a certain extent, and since the end of the 
World War Two (WWII), intervention has led to a steady and substantial increase in 
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state activity. But there are those who think that government intervention has gone too 
far. Milton Friedman in Capitalism and Freedom (1962) said that the choice is 
between an imperfect but flexible market and an imperfect and rigid government 
agency. In his other book Freedom to Choose (Friedman and Friedman, 1980) he 
emphasised the value of freedom under the market by investigating cases of 
government inefficiency and points to the damaging cumulative effect of apparently 
well-meant interventions. 
According to Thomas (1992: 5-9), the part played by government in the economic 
system has been a major source of both political and economic controversy. At one 
extreme is what he called a 'command economy' where the allocation of resources is 
determined primarily or almost exclusively by the state. This was true in the 
communist countries of former USSR in Eastern Europe before 1989 and currently in 
Cuba, China, North Korea and Vietnam; at the other end of the spectrum is what has 
been described as a 'market' system. A 'free market' economy is one in which 
'market forces' or the 'laws' of supply and demand determine who gets what and 
under what conditions. In this capitalist system, private individuals own means of 
production, intent on achieving profits and the allocation of resources via the price 
system. 
This controversy has led to a school of both economic and political thought that is 
'laissez-faire', proponents of which believe that interference in the running of the 
economy by government is harmful except where it is necessary to ensure the efficient 
operation of the system. It is accepted that the state has a vital role in ensuring law and 
order, thus providing those social conditions of a peaceful life without which any kind 
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of economic transaction becomes virtually impossible, and a framework of contract 
and commercial law which is a necessary foundation of the market economy. In many 
respects, the maintenance of law and order is the most fundamental function 
performed by government in the economic sphere. 'Laissez faire' economists also 
accepted some additional roles for government, such as maintaining the value of 
money. Apart from these basic provisions, the role of government is negative. 
To summarise, the discussion above demonstrates that the state plays a major role, 
either directly or indirectly, in almost all societies, as it is the most powerful player, 
even though commercial interests can limit it. It is always about the balance between 
the market forces and government intervention, which will lead us to understand the 
Malaysian case, when the significance of the role of the government in the economy is 
analysed later. 
2.5. The Role of the State in the Economy: Some Development Theories 
The next discussion analyses some theories that relate to the role of the state in the 
economy in the developing world. The discussion aims to highlight characteristics of 
the development process in a developing nation, such as Malaysia. 
Hettne (1995: 21) called such theories and models 'Eurocentric development 
thinking', since they originated from the West and were structured by its experience. 
xWhile he admitted it is not advisable 'to read into the history of Europe into the 
future of the Third World', understanding these theories enables us to comprehend the 
reality of the region. The fact is the Third World has tried, and in fact is still trying to 
lcam from the experience of the developed world. It is also useful to remember that 
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until now, 'development' as a mainstream model still means as what was said by 
Hettne (1995: 22): 
'Development' has normally meant a strengthening of the material base of the 
state, mainly through industrialisation, adhering to a pattern that has been 
remarkably similar from one country to another'. 
The keyword here is 'industrialisation' as the tool to achieve 'development', one that 
has been consistently used by Malaysia, especially under its fourth and current PM. 
2.5.1 Modernisation Theory 
Hoogvelt (1997: 35) argued that modernisation theories are problem-solving and 
policy-oriented theories of social change and economic development. This became the 
policy of the US in 1949 when President Truman called for the Point Four Programme 
of Development Aid, which was intended to aid the efforts of the people in 
economically undeveloped areas to develop their resources and improve their living 
conditions. Modernisation theories accepted the structure of the relationship between 
the rich and the poor countries that had evolved during the preceding epochs of 
capitalist expansion. 
Such theories were criticised by the dependency theorists as masking the continuing 
imperialist nature of those relationships. To the US it was in their interest to keep the 
Third World from communist influence by means of economic and technological aid. 
However, it was realised that the transplantation of capital and technology alone 
would not succeed unless accompanied by wider and consistent social, cultural and 
political changes. Early theories of the modernisation school v,'ere often advanced by 
economists who had been hired by the US as practical advisers; people on aid 
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missions. They observed how cultural diffusion and the introduction of technolou \' b. 
from the outside were frustrated by the negative role that traditional culture played in 
'blocking' development, and thus called for 'comprehensive social and economic 
change' (Hoogvelt, 1997: 35). F. Hoselitz in 1957 (cited in Hoogvelt, 1997) became 
an early developer of a comprehensive all-encompassing theory of all the processes 
and structural changes required to transform non-industrial into industrial societies 
(Hoogvelt, 1997: 35-36). 
These modernisation theories were in tum embedded in abstracted, formal theories of 
societal evolution. Though these models had themselves been scripted from the 
historical experience of the West, they soon became normative and prescriptive to the 
rest of the world. As examples, modernisation studies have examined the processes of 
secularisation consequent upon the introduction of cash crops into traditional peasant 
communities, or the effect of industrialisation on the nuclearisation of family systems, 
or the need for multi-party democracy to support the division of labour. When these 
traditional institutions or values did not fit, they were considered 'dysfunctional' to 
the process of development and regarded as 'problems' which comprehensive socio-
economic planning could be designed to correct (Hoogvelt, 1997: 36). By highlighting 
the complementary aspects between compatible institutions and values, modernisation 
theorists came to advocate the convergence of less-developed societies to the Western 
world (Hoogvelt, 1997: 37). 
2.5.2. Dependency and Underdevelopment Theory 
Dependency theory, on the other hand, argues Hoog\'elt (1997: 38), concentrated on 
locating the cause of backwardness of Third World countries (initially Latin America) 
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within the dynamic and contradictory growth of the world capitalist system. The 
original version of the dependency and underdevelopment theory was outlined first by 
Paul Baran, and next more popularly by Andre Gunder Frank, then by T. dos Santos 
and others and akin to Trotsky's line of thought. 15 Underdevelopment as distinct from 
undevelopment is not due to some state of affairs, as modernisation theory had argued, 
but rather the result of the same world historical process in which the now developed 
capitalist countries achieved their status. 
Thus, from the very beginning, the dependency theory has been a world system 
approach, explicitly rejecting the concept of the unified state as actor and the notion of 
the global system as a collection of nation-states (Hoogvelt, 1997: 38). The essence of 
this theory argues that as a result of penetration by colonial capital, a distorted 
structure of economy and society has been created in the colonial countries. This 
reproduces overall economic stagnation and extreme pauperisation of the masses for 
all time. A distorted structure of economy implies the subordination of the economy 
to the structure of advanced capitalist countries; and external orientation, which 
meant an extreme dependency on overseas markets, both for capital and technology 
sourcing and for production outlets. At the time of Frank's writings, import-
substitutive industrialisation had begun on a large scale in Latin-America, but it lasted 
for a short while in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It is criticised as a form of 
industrialisation that was 'externally dependent' and constricted to produce lUXUry 
goods. This theory is said to cause the continued underdevelopment in the legacy of a 
15 Leon Trotsky had already in the 1920s fonnulated the unicity of the world system in his Law of 
Combined and Uneven De\'elopment. He argued that with the de\'elopment of capitalism as a world 
system due to the internationalisation of capitaL world history becomes a contradictory but concrete 
totality (Hoogvclt. 1997: 37). 
42 
distorted structure of economy and society; and it is this distorted structure that is 
referred to as peripheral economy or society. 
The peripheral nature of the economy and the society was said to create its O\\'n 
underdeveloping dynamics because it denied 'autocentric' development as has been 
achieved in the 'core' economies. The dependency theorists further argued the 
interaction between the centre countries of the capitalist system and the peripheral 
countries involved a transfer of value. It involved an expropriation of economic 
surplus by the centre countries from the poor countries, resulting in capital 
accumulation in the advanced countries, and in stagnation and impoverishment in the 
poor countries (Hoogvelt, 1997: 40). Frank argues that development and 
underdevelopment a two-way affair- just as development in one part of the world went 
hand in hand with underdevelopment in another, so underdevelopment in the 
periphery contributed to further development in the advanced, core, countries (Frank, 
1984: 297-322). 
The key mechanism for this dual outcome was unequal terms of exchange that relate 
to the deterioration of the prices for primary products in relation to those of 
manufactures. Labour emancipation in the advanced countries pushes up the price of 
their commodities in relation to those of the poor countries where no such 
emancipation had taken place. Since, in terms of historical social development, the 
periphery lags behind the advanced countries by at least 100 years, and there is no way 
one can bridge that gap (Hoogvelt, 1997: 41). 
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2.5.3. World System Theory 
Wallerstein (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1980: 167) argued that a capitalist world 
economy has existed since the sixteenth century, that is, since the beginning of 
European overseas expansion. According to Hoogvelt, the world system is: 
, ... a single division of labour, comprising mUltiple cultural systems, multiple 
political entities and even different modes of surplus appropriation' (that is 
feudal, slave mode and wage labour)' (Hoogvelt, 1997: 59). 
The essential feature of the capitalist world economy is production for sale in a 
market in which the object is to realise the maximum profit. Due to different wage 
levels in different regions and nations, exchange has become unequal. Political 
interference of the stronger states over the weaker ones has reinforced the situation. 
Wallerstein (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1980: 167) stratified the world economy into 
three layers: core, periphery and semi-periphery. Semi-peripheral nations or states 
have emerged as 'go-between nations' which perform the same function as the middle 
classes within national stratification system. They form a necessary buffer in a system 
that is based on unequal rewards and that would lead to rebellion. It is within this 
world system the go-between nations assume an economic role as well: they seek 
trade with both core and periphery, exchanging different kinds of products and 
achieving intermediate wage levels and profit margins. In the world system theory, the 
dynamic quality is it allows for the upward and downward mobility of nations. Not all 
states develop simultaneously; some rise at the expense of others. Successful 
strategies include 'promotion by invitation', self-reliance' and 'seizing the chance'. 
The successful strategy is said, however, to be 'unsuccessful from the point of yicw of 
the achieving of national economic independence, and the participation of the masses: 
marginalisation of the masses is a necessary condition for a country's upward 
mobility' (Hoogvelt, 1997: 61). Wallerstein's theory on the semi-periphery nations 
may explain the experience that has been faced by East Asian countries in the last 
decade. The upward movement may be enhanced by the dynamic quality of the world 
system, that is Wallerstein's 'seizing the chance' strategy, but it may also reflect the 
dominant role of the state in the economy in these particular nations. 
The discussion above shows us that modernisation theory is an explanation for the 
less-developed world. Both cultural diffusion and the use of technology are the 
instruments of change for the late developers. The so-called backwardness of the 
Third World was explained by the dependency theory. While the core economies have 
been blamed for taking the economic surplus from the periphery economy for their 
own benefit and thus stagnating and impoverishing the poor countries. 
2.6. The Role of the State in the Economy: 'the Third World' Experience 
The discussion below attempts to analyse the situation in the Third World regarding 
the role of the state in the economy. The sub-discussions are made on the relationship 
between the state and economic development and on the so-called 'East Asia 
economic miracle'. The purpose of this discussion is to focus on the realities that have 
occurred in this area of the world and to assess the extent of the role of the state. 
Where appropriate, a reference is made to the theories that have been previously 
discussed. 
The term 'Third World' in this analysis refers to Asia, Latin America and Africa, or 
'the developing world' though the use of these terms is widely debated (Frank, 1981: 
234-240, Hoogvelt, 1982: 26). Frank notes that there was substantial political-
economic repreSSIOn In the so called 'the Third World'. In describing the 1970s 
situation, he wrote: 
, .. .in one country after another during the 1970s martial law. states of 
emergency, and military governments have suppressed labour movements and 
union o~gan.isati?ns and repressed large sectors of the population through 
systematIc VIOlatIOns of their political, civil, and human rights ... '(Frank, 1981: 
188). 
2.6.1. The State and Economic Development 
Here, the relationship between the state's roles, both in the public and private sector, 
and economic development, is discussed. It aims to highlight the nature and 
significance of its roles by several scholars and relate to experiences in several 
regions/countries. 
Tanzi (1987) focused his work on the 'positive' roles of the state instead of the 
negative ones normally described by other researchers. More attention must be 
directed toward the positive role of the public sector, recognising that it is run by 
individuals who have biases and who make their own mistakes. Whether the 
performance of these economies is assessed by the rate of growth, by the rate of 
inflation, by the growth of their exports, or by the fact that by and large most of these 
economies have managed to avoid the economic crises that have afflicted other 
regions, the basic conclusion must be that the performance of these countries, taken as 
a group, has been quite good. He highlighted the role of the public sector, indicating 
that it must have been an important and positive one; or, at least, that it must not have 
been an obstacle to economic development (Tanzi, 1987: 31-32). Tanzi suggested that 
it is important for governments to provide stable laws and institutions where the 'rules 
of the game' arc clear to all citizens, lessening scope for corruption and arbitrary 
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application to benefit particular groups or individuals. As economies dc\'elop, there is 
progressively less need for intervention in, and regulation of, economic acti\'ities. 
Excessive intervention increases the costs of doing business and generates parallel or 
underground markets for, among other things, goods, credits and imports. Thus, a 
progressive and orderly dismantling of the many regulations that apply, for example, 
to investments' imports and credits should take place. The governments of the 
countries have been particularly active in regulating the allocation of credit. For 
example, net government lending reached almost 5 per cent of GDP in the Republic of 
Korea in 1981 while it reached almost 7 per cent of GDP in Malaysia in 1982, and 
was 2.1 per cent of GDP in Sri Lanka in 1984 (Tanzi, 1987). 
Ali (1990) agreed that the public sector in many Asian developing countries was given 
a key role in the development process. In discussing national policies in these areas, 
Ali noted that the adoption of a development strategy would determine the volume 
and allocation of investment among sectors. National and sectoral policies would be 
used to implement the strategies in terms of influencing the volume and allocation of 
investment. The countries need prudent macro-economic management that would 
ensure a sustainable current account position, a reduced rate of inflation and a 
manageable level of foreign debt. Overall, Ali also agreed that the Asian development 
experience has been characterised by strong state intervention caused by the belief of 
market failure. However, in the 1990s, he suggested that the role of the state should be 
designed with a view to integrating the lessons of the 1970s and 1980s in terms of the 
efficient use of resources, but with a renewed concern for social justice, poverty 
alleviation and protection of the environment (Ali, 1990: 23). 
47 
Rosen (1992) argues that government management and control of manufacturing 
enterprises, in which entrepreneurial, risk-taking behaviour is essential for rapid and 
flexible growth, is unlikely to be successful beyond the initiating phase (Rosen. 1992: 
44). He refers to China and India and three of the 'Four Little Tigers' of Asia 
(Singapore, Korea and Taipei). Rosen commented that there are major areas of 
infrastructure activity in which technology is not rapidly changing, which call for \'ery 
large investments, and which tend to be natural monopolies where government 
investment and control may be desirable. However, in those areas it is important that 
the government adheres to economic pricing policies, and private entry may be 
desirable to curb excesses of government monopoly. The government has major roles 
too in the provision of adequate social infrastructure in the areas where external 
benefits are high. These include education at high levels, especially in universities and 
research institutions, and health facilities. Industry-related policy, by establishing 
appropriate macro-economic institutions and policies, will set the framework for a 
smooth-working market and price system. Rosen quoted both Singapore and Sweden, 
where there are major roles for government in the economy with far less direct and 
hands-on government intervention. 
Meanwhile Cukor (1974), arguing on the close relationship between government and 
economic development in developing countries, says such countries, particularly 
Africa and Asia, prioritise fast economic growth with special emphasise on fast 
development. Economic planning became a necessity and related to circumstances 
whereby: 
' ... in the economy of the developing countries the state plays a greater role 
than it did in the now developed capitalist countries at the start of their 
economic growth. From the political point of \'icw it is a detemlinant 
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circumstance that economic growth is considered in the developing countries 
not only a condition of growing public welfare but as one of political-national 
independence as well. Therefore, it is the task of government to take the 
initiative and to control economic growth, which is also expected by public 
opinion' (Cukor, 1974: 111-112). 
Apart from political impetus for a government's controlling role in the economy. 
there were economic reasons as well. Cukor gave reasons such as low domestic 
capital formation and weak business community that make government participation 
and initiative unavoidable. Foreign trade, which has gained particular importance in 
the economy of the developing countries, has given considerable income to the 
economies and as such needs proper handling by the government. 
In comparing the planning of the two groups of economies between the developed and 
the developing countries, Cukor remarked that in the advanced capitalist countries, 
planning is the result of economic growth, in the developing countries it is the 
precondition of development (Cukor, 1974: 124). The spread of economic planning is 
related in both groups of countries to the economic role of the government. In the 
developing countries, the 'traditional' methods of industrial capitalism - when the 
influence of the economy is restricted to creating some general rules and to taking 
over such social tasks as, for example, education or road building - are not suited to 
modernisation and growth of the economy. Thus, the government necessarily plays an 
important role in the economy, and this role is bound to grow in the future owing to 
political, technological and economic factors. 
In the developing countries, there is no such tradition whereby free-competition 
capitalism would have brought economic growth; in fact their lagging behind is 
strongly linked with the period when this concept was dominant in the developed 
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world. There is no capitalist class strong enough to counter government action; indeed 
there is no influential capitalist stratum whose interest would be to reduce the 
economic role of the state. Obviously, government interference hinders the activity of 
capitalists. Also, Cukor commented on the difficulty faced by new enterprises as 
compared to old and larger ones, or those with good (mainly political) connections 
(Cukor, 1974: 25-26). He identified the lack of savings, foreign exchange and 
properly trained experts as problems faced by developing countries. The starting of 
some new productive activity or the introduction of a new technology may cause 
radical structural changes in the economy. Demands for materials or energy may 
create bottlenecks, making central planning necessary. The role of foreign enterprises 
in developing countries, though important, poses certain problems. First, their profits 
or part of them are transferred abroad, which reduces savings, and it always represents 
economic power, which may easily support political and economic tendencies 
contrary to the interests of the country. This can be dangerous because the foreign 
capital is backed by its own state, which can put political and economic pressure 
(through foreign trade, aid, etc.) on the government of the developing country. In 
order to attract foreign capital, the conditions suitable for this type of investment must 
be created. Such conditions, however, are not necessarily favourable for the economic 
growth of the developing economies and it is well known that foreign capital dislikes 
stronger and more determinate government control and any measures that accompany 
it (Cukor, 1974: 140). 
Dependency theory highlights the fact that the developing economies need foreign 
capital. The volume of savings (investment) in the developing countries is insufficient 
by comparison to their development requirements and needs. Foreign capital offers 
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expanding investment possibilities, it can expand imports that makes possible the 
importation of products, machinery and equipment which could not otherwise be 
purchased by the developing countries at all. Foreign enterprise also helps to procure 
the know-how necessary for technical progress. Finally, such enterprises are needed in 
many cases because they have the marketing organisation necessary for developing 
exports, and the necessary experience. This is why there is a clear tendency in most 
developing countries to stimulate foreign investment (Cukor, 1974: 140). To solve 
this contradiction, developing economies apply principles of nationalisatioll. 
However, in order not to lose all the advantages of foreign investment to other 
developing countries, and at the expense of its own people, only partial nationalisation 
is applied. Industrial enterprises, especially manufacturing ones, are integrated into the 
economies of the developing countries and produce for the domestic market. The 
government may control their activities with indirect measures such as import 
licences, customs duties, etc. Thus the strategy is diversification, partly in the sense 
that a single enterprise should not monopolise the domestic market, and partly that 
there should not be present capital from only one foreign country. In addition, 'joint 
ventures' come more and more to the fore, where foreign capital co-operates with 
private or domestic capital. 
The role of the state in developing the economy and industry also lies in developing 
the infrastructure. Such development has traditionally been, and is increasingly a 
government task, even in the now-developed countries. The development of 
infrastructure is indispensable for the growth of the whole economy, and thus for 
industry. In developing countries, infrastructural investment is almost exclusively 
financed from public funds, while in the advanced countries, private capital played a 
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great role at the start of industrialisation (as in the case of the United Kingdom, USA 
and Gennany). At that time, however, the role of the state in the now-developed 
nations was unimportant in productive investment, while in the developing countries. 
public funds have a major share in productive investment either directly or through 
official credits. Cukor highlighted the difficulty in measuring efficiency of, for 
example, infrastructural investment. However, it cannot be directly measured or 
compared with the efficiency of productive projects. The 'efficiency' or result of the 
infrastructural investment shows in its indirect effect on growth of national income, 
welfare, etc, according to the fonnula used for project evaluation. But there is always 
a certain usefulness in infrastructural investment, since education, road building, and 
so forth, are generally useful, though the best use is not necessarily made of the given 
funds. In addition, the developed capitalist countries, at least when granting official 
credits, and the international organisations which are strongly under their influence, 
like the W orId Bank, have shown a marked preference for infrastructural investment 
at the expense of productive industrial projects. A special problem is the indivisibility 
of a great part of infrastructural investment. Initially, the capacity of a road, a bridge 
or a railway line cannot be fully exploited, and this only happens in the course of 
economic development with the growth of this type of demand. Because of these 
difficulties we can often meet with an overemphasis on infrastructural investment, or 
its neglect. 
There are several arguments that arise from the discussion above. It highlights that the 
state's role in the economy, more so in the developing countries is important, and its 
intervention is more prominent for reasons argued by Cukor (197..f). Some scholars 
like Rosen argue that the involvement should only be at the initiating stage. If they 
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still interfere, they argued that they should do so in a far less direct and hands-on 
manner, as practised in Singapore and Sweden. National and development strategies 
will influence the volume and the allocation of investment among sectors. Other 
scholars, like Ali, suggest a mixture of instruments that need to be used by the 
state/ government in making sure there is growth. The fast development theory, or the 
'catching up' with the developed nations by the developing nations, makes economic 
planning a necessity in the developing world and the government is put to the task of 
making sure the economy of the country is sound. Among the setbacks are that 
monopolistic situations may arise and the concentration of economic power among 
small group of people may occur. Too much dependency on foreign capital or foreign 
investments could also cause other problems. Sometimes these countries, in order to 
solve current problems, resort to nationalisation, albeit often a limited one. 
2.6.2. East Asia 'Economic Miracle' 
The next discussion directly concerns Malaysia as geographically it belongs to East 
Asia. The World Bank's Policy Research Report entitled The East Asian Miracle: 
Economic Growth and Public Policy (1993) analysed the eight high-performing 
economies (HPAEs) in East Asia that have contributed to the 'miraculous' growth of 
the region between 1965 and 1990. These are Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, The 
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan. It is interesting to note 
that these countries are not homogeneous, but highly diverse in natural resources, 
population, culture and economic policy. 
Their rapid growth, according to the report, had two complementary elements, the first 
being the correct establishment of the fundamentals. There were high le\'els of 
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domestic savings, broadly-based human capital, good macro-economic management, 
and limited price distortions. Central policies to assist the financial sector capture non-
financial savings and increase household and corporate savings. Acquisition of 
technology through openness to direct foreign investment and licensing was crucial to 
rapid productivity growth. Public investment complemented private investment and 
increased its orientation to exports. Education policies stressed universal pnmary 
schooling and improvements in quality at primary and secondary levels. 
Second, and perhaps more significant in this context, is the very rapid growth of the 
type experienced by Japan, the Four Tigers (Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan), and more recently, the East Asian new industrialised 
economies (NIEs). These at times have benefited from careful policy intervention. 
However, all intervention carries costs, either in the direct fiscal costs of subsidies or 
forgone revenues, or the implicit taxation of households and firms, for example, 
through tariffs or interest rate controls. Unlike many governments that attempted such 
intervention, HPAE governments generally held costs within well-defined limits. 
Thus, price distortions were mild, interest rate controls used international rates as a 
benchmark, and explicit subsidies were kept within fiscally manageable boundaries. 
Given the overriding importance ascribed to macro-economic stability, interventions 
that became too costly or otherwise threatened stability were quickly modified or 
abandoned. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates 'the functional approach' to understanding growth in the HPAEs. 
The figure shows the interaction among two sets of policy choices (fundamentals and 
selective interventions); two methods of competitive discipline (market and contest 
based); the three central functions of economic management; and the outcomes of 
Figure 2.1: A Functional Approach to Growth 
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growth and equity. Institutions are also shown as critical to the successful definition 
and implementation of policies and to supporting high levels of competitive 
discipline. The solid lines show how policy choices contributed to outcomes via 
attainment of the three functions. Policies contributed simultaneously to two or three 
functions, for example, stable macro-economic management contributed to \'igorous 
accumulation, through higher rates of investment, and to improved allocation by 
reducing instability in relative prices. The arrows indicate that the system has 
55 
numerous self-reinforcing feedback. For instance, rapid growth and relatively equal 
income distributions contributed to the HP AEs superior accumulation by increasing 
savings rates and generating larger and more effective investments in human capital. 
Attempts to identify the policies that have created the 'East Asian economic miracle' 
fall into several broad categories. Within the neo-classical view, the market takes 
centre stage in economic life and governments playa minor role. Wolf (1988: 27) 
described it as a striking fact that the few relatively successful developing economies, 
such as Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, have 
greatly benefited from decisions and policies that limit the government's role in 
economic decision making. Instead he said these countries have allowed markets to 
exercise a decisive role in determining resource allocation. Similarly, Chen (1979: 
183-84) argued that in Japan and the Four Tigers, state intervention was largely 
absent. To him, the state has provided a suitable environment for the entrepreneurs to 
perform their functions. The neo-classical interpretation of the experience of the 
HP AEs, and especially of Korea and Taiwan, presents a coherent and powerful view 
of one path to successful industrialisation. In this view, governments in all of the 
HPAEs have provided a relatively stable macro-economic environment characterised 
by limited inflation (except at times in Korea). Real effective exchange rates are rarely 
appreciated, and such episodes have quickly been corrected. Interludes of intensive 
import-substituting industrialisation in Korea, Taiwan, China, have been brief. 
Manufacturers have thus been able on concentrate to improving productivity 
performance rather than coping with rapidly changing relative prices of inputs and 
outputs (World Bank, 1993: 82). 
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In the past six years, this interpretation of the sources of rapid gro\\1h has been 
criticised for its lack of factual validity. This revisionist \'iew systematically 
documented that governments in three economies, that is Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 
extensively and selectively promoted individual sectors. They have convincingly 
shown levels of protection and the variation of protection across sectors has been 
greater than recognised in the neo-classical view. According to this World Bank 
report, the governments in each of these economies at times forcefully intervened in 
markets. Korea, for example, strongly encouraged heavy and chemical industries by 
setting targets and offering a variety of financial incentives. Japan promoted the 
development of several weak industries in the first fifteen years after World War II 
(WWII), offering protective tariffs and financial incentives to encourage the 
introduction of advanced technology and to establish rationalisation cartels to 
facilitate the exit of inefficient firms. Taiwan used public investment in large-scale 
manufacturing enterprises to ensure input for predominantly small and medium-scale 
exporting industries. 
Capital markets have not been free in these three economies. Intervention may have 
declined in the 1960s particularly, as has been stressed by the neo-classical viewpoint, 
but it continued. All three economies have repressed interest rates and directed credit 
in order to guide investments. The revisionists see market failures as pervasive and a 
justification to lead the market in critical ways. Thus, the experience of these three 
economies provides evidence that governments can foster growth by 'governing 
markets' and 'getting prices wrong' and by systematically distorting incentives in 
order to accelerate catching up. To Amsden (1989), for example, all economic 
expansion depends on state intervention to create price distortions that direct 
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economic activity towards better investment. The World Report (1993: 84) argues that 
state intervention is necessary, even in the most plausible cases of comparative 
advantage, because the chief asset of backwardness, low wages, is counterbalanced by 
heavy liabilities. 
The World Development Report 1991 (World Bank, 1991), however, attempted to 
describe the policies needed for rapid growth, and falls in the middle ground between 
the neo-classical and revisionist views. It concludes that rapid growth is associated 
with effective but delimited government activism. In what is called the 'market 
friendly' strategy, it articulates that not only do governments 'need to do less in those 
areas where market works', namely the production sector, they also 'need to do more 
in those areas where market cannot be relied upon' (World Bank, 1991). The 
appropriate role of government in a market-friendly strategy is to ensure adequate 
investments in people, provision of a competitive climate for enterprise, openness to 
international trade, and stable macro-economic management. Beyond these roles, 
governments are likely to do more harm than good (World Bank, 1991). 
The report concluded that, in general, governments have been unsuccessful in 
improving economic performance through attempts to guide resource allocations other 
than by market mechanisms. Attempts to guide resource allocation in international 
trade, financial markets and labour markets have reduced competitive discipline, 
guided resources into low-productivity and internationally uncompetitive sectors, and 
resulted in widespread rent-seeking. In short, the report states that though market-
failure is an important impediment to rapid growth, so is government failure, - and 
this can incur high costs. The report further argued that sustained growth results from 
58 
the positive interaction of four critical aspects of economic policy: macro-economic 
stability, human capital formation, openness to international trade, and an 
environment that encourages private investment and competition. Effective policy in 
one dimension (such as human capital formation) improves the results from effecti\'e 
policies in others (such as openness or macro-economic stability). In this view, the 
success of many economies in East Asia has been a result of reinforcing policy 
feedback. No single policy has ensured success; strong and effective policies in all 
four critical areas, and over a sustained period, have been the key reasons (World 
Bank, 1991). 
The 'market-friendly' approach captures important aspects of East Asia's success. 
These economies are macro-economically stable, have high levels of human capital, 
are thoroughly integrated into the world economy, and are highly competitive among 
firms. Moreover, East Asian economic success sometimes occurred in spite of rather 
than because of market interventions. Korea's heavy and chemical industries' drive 
and Japan's computer chip push did not live up to expectations. Even so, other 
interventions combined with export targets apparently were consistent with rapid 
growth: quota-based protection of domestic industries in Japan and Korea; targeted 
industrial policies including directed-credit in Japan, Korea and Taiwan; heavy 
reliance on large state enterprises in Japan, Korea and Taiwan; and so on. 
Furthermore the successes of these three north-eastern economIes compares , 
favourably with the successes of Hong Kong, Malaysia, and more recently, Indonesia 
and Thailand, where policy choices have been less interventionist. All three views 
show the diversity of policies adopted by the HPAEs. One of the hallmarks of 
economic policy-making in these countries was the pragmatic flexibility with which 
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governments tried policy instruments in pursuit of economic objectives (\\' orId Bank. 
1994: 86). 
The World Bank (1993) also evaluates six key policy fundamentals adopted by the 
HP AEs. Getting the fundamentals right means ensuring low inflation and competitive 
exchange rates, building human capital, creating effective and secure financial 
systems, limiting price distortions, absorbing foreign technology, and limiting the bias 
against agriculture. Institutions were created to promote growth in almost all the eight 
HP AEs. Moreover, there were formal deliberation councils established in Hong Kong, 
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore to include government officials, journalists, 
labour representatives, and academics. The economic and political benefits of these 
councils, and of the more informal mechanisms in other HP AEs, are impossible to 
measure systematically, but it is likely that they have improved co-ordination among 
firms and enhanced the flow of information between business and government. 
Politically, they have helped establish a commitment to shared growth and reduced 
rent-seeking. Information-sharing made it more difficult for firms to curry special 
favours from the government and for government officials to grant special 
concessions (World Bank, 1993: 347-353). 
Most of the HP AEs, especially those in Northeast Asia, have intervened in markets in 
an effort to hasten growth. Understandably, this incurs costs, but interventions in the 
HPAEs have been carried out within well-defined bounds limiting the implicit or 
explicit costs. Thus, the presence of price distortions has not been excessive; interest 
rate controls generally have had as a benchmark international interest rates, and were 
binding at positive real levels. Given the overriding importance that each of the 
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HP AEs has ascribed to macro-economic stability, interventions that threatened to 
undermine that policy fundamentally, have been modified or abandoned, - such as the 
heavy and chemical industries drive in Korea or the heavy industrialisation push in 
Malaysia. These limits to intervention stand in sharp contrast to many other 
developing economies, where interventions have not been consistent with macro-
economic discipline. It is suggested that it has been the HP AEs' limited costs and 
duration of inappropriately chosen interventions that accelerated growth. Three sets of 
policy interventions have been evaluated:- the promotion of specific industries or 
industrial sub-sectors, directed credit, and the export-push strategy. The conclusion is 
that the promotion of specific industries generally has not worked, directed credit has 
worked in certain situations but carries high risks, and only the export-push strategy 
has been by far the most successful policy intervention and holds the most promise for 
other developing economies (World Bank, 1993: 354). 
In comparison to the World Bank's report, Todaro's (1989) work argues that there are 
seven critical components that show the structural diversity of the developing nations. 
These are: the size of the country; its historical and colonial background; its physical 
and human resource endowments; the relative importance of its public and private 
sectors; the nature of its industrial structure; its degree of dependence on external 
economic and political forces; and the distribution of power and the institutional and 
political structure within the nation (Todaro, 1989: 18). In addition, there are six 
common economic features that group these nations together. These are low levels of 
living, low levels of productivity, high rates of population growth and dependency 
burdens, high and rising levels of unemployment and underemployment, significant 
dependence on agricultural production and primary product exports, and dominance, 
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dependence, and vulnerability in international relations (Todaro, 1989: 27). Although 
development planning is the most visible aspect of public economic policy in Third 
World nations, the actual day-to-day policy decisions of these governments are 
typically unplanned and often bring ad hoc responses to emerging and unforeseen 
economic crises. Todaro claims that political leaders and decision-makers are 'human 
beings with all human idiosyncrasies, foibles, and weaknesses' (Todaro, 1989). They 
sometimes 'tend to take a parochial view, instead of a national one' (Todaro, 1989). In 
democracies, politicians will respond first to their political constituencies and the 
vested interest groups within their home areas (Todaro, 1989). However, Todaro's 
views are still debatable. Although political leaders are human, their decisions arc 
influenced by the various factors that surround them. The researcher agrees with 
Todaro that even in more autocratic forms of government, whether military 
dictatorship or strict one-party rule, political leaders will still have a natural tendency 
to respond to those groups to whom they owe their power or on whom their continued 
power depends. Economic policies are ultimately made not by economists or planners 
but by politicians, who may well be more interested in 'muddling through' each 
emerging crisis and staying in power than in instituting major social and economic 
reforms. Todaro insists it is more appropriate that discussion on the role and 
limitations of the state of the Third World governments is based on their conflicting 
forces, some elitist, others egalitarian. Their economic policies, therefore, are largely a 
reflection of the relative strength of these competing forces. Todaro suggests that 
governments in developing countries should not do less, but they should do what they 
are doing now more effectively than in the past. Although there are too many 
weaknesses, Third World governments seem not to have a choice: they ha\'e to 
assume a more active responsibility for the future wellbeing of their countries than the 
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governments of the more developed nations. Third World governments, Todaro 
argues, have to forge a new role that requires innovation and change, and institutional 
and structural reform (Todaro, 1989: 571-572). By comparison, Todaro's work started 
almost two decades before the World Bank Report discussed earlier, which explains 
the difference in their emphasis. Nevertheless, Todaro's work is more thorough and 
gives a somewhat holistic and realistic view on the economic realities of the 
developing countries, and could be used to analyse Malaysian's case later in the study. 
Cho Soon (1994) provides us with a different angle in his article, 'Government and 
Market in Economic Development' in which he stresses that rapid growth in Asia is 
not a miracle but the result of appropriate policies and hard work. His conclusion is 
more incisive than the World Bank's The East Asian Miracle, which seems to argue 
that government intervention is desirable if it works. He argues that the experiences 
of most developing countries show that the initial stage of development has to be 
engineered by the government. These governments are likely to adopt 'mercantilistic' 
growth promotion policies, which tend to be effective during the initial phases of 
extensive growth. Cho Soon (1994: 144) argues that it is important, even at initial 
stage, to adopt market-conforming type of growth promotion policies. The policy of 
industrial 'targeting' can achieve success in promoting the targeted sectors but, in the 
long term, it tends to create industrial imbalance and overall inefficiency in the 
economy. Cho Soon contends that the more interventionist a government is with 
respect to the real sector (real sector is all sectors as opposed to the financial sector, 
e.g. banking, manufacturing, agriculture) the more expansionary it is with money 
policy, and the more repressive with its financial policy. He maintains that this 
mani fests in chronic inflation, distorts industrial structure, discourages financial 
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saving and retards the development of financial entrepreneurship. Therefore, it calls 
for a set of policies aimed at macro-economic stability with macro-economic reform. 
Though extremely difficult to implement these policies, the developing countries are 
urged to conform as much as possible to the basic direction of economic policies in 
market principle (Cho Soon, 1994: 144). 
The diverse discussion above offers the view of the World Bank that agrees to 'market 
friendly' strategy, that is, allowing the government intervention in certain areas, but 
letting the market work itself where the government fails. Todaro also suggests other 
factors that affect the developing nations' achievements in their economy. Their 
historical and colonial backgrounds, physical and human resource endowments and 
several other factors contribute to the success or failure of their policies. Choo Soon, 
for example, suggests that as the private sector becomes more sophisticated and 
wealthy, the government should gradually withdraw from managing the economy. 
These views are to be analysed again in the Malaysian context. As already noted in 
Chapter One, this study aims to examine the historical and colonial background of 
Malaysia, in relations to the development of its IR, which as contended, much related 
to the role of the state in the economy. Interestingly too, all the views above in one 
way or another do not challenge the significance of the role of the state in the 
economy. 
2.6.3. The Malaysian Experience 
In highlighting the role of the state in the Malaysian economy, Ghosh and Salleh 
(1999: 16) argue that in the context of political economy, the state's roles is 'highly 
potent, powerful and effective'. He contends that Malaysian development has been 
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made possible by co-operation, competition and co-ordination between business and 
government. The Malaysian philosophy of development is based on marketism and 
where there was no market, one was created, as with the bonds and equity markets. 
Despite adopting the neo-classical market philosophy approach, the market has been 
modified (Ghosh and Salleh, 1999: 15). The state has co-ordinated the laws of market 
and removed market failure problems by introducing competition through 
multinational capitalism, giving guidance and fiscal-monetary directions. Ghosh and 
Salleh claim that Malaysia has remained a dependent economy. By this he refers to 
dependence on others, such as the multinational capitalism for technology, foreign 
direct investment (FDI), capital, market and also foreign labour. The growth of the 
capitalist system in Malaysia can be traced to the 1970s when extended capital 
accumulation process started. The movement of the labour force from the rural to the 
urban sector reduced the wage rate, thereby enabling the capitalist class to generate 
gains from labour. They describe the labour force as: 
' ... docile, disciplined and fully committed to the emerging LR system ... was a 
great help to the capitalist in having absolute control over the working class' 
(Ghosh and Salleh, 1999: 16). 
They also argue that this was a strong factor in the growth of capitalist system in 
Malaysia in subsequent years. On top of that, he claims that the public sector itself 
became capitalist and advocated profitability as a criterion of running the state 
enterprises. 
As stated in Chapter One, Jomo (1999: 85) outlines four different regImes that 
Malaysia has experienced, with disparate visions of developmental priorities, from the 
late colonial era to the 1990s. Under Mahathir Mohamad, there was a shift in policy 
when in 1996, the govemment adopted 'economic liberalisation' policies, but the state 
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undoubtedly still played the prominent role in the economy. Jomo argues that the 
political and economic interests of those with state power have influenced the nature 
of development strategy and these interests, coupled with the nature of the economy. 
shaped the nature of the economic planning and policy-making which post-colonial 
Malaysian governments have undertaken (Jomo, 1999: 86-87). The changing nature of 
the state has influenced economic planning but there are certain common features to 
all phases of planning in Malaysia, especially after independence. 
First is the development philosophy of 'the modernisation of peasant agriculture, 
through the diffusion of capital, modem technology, values and institutions' (Jomo, 
1999). J omo did not name the intended community but analyses of Malaysian history 
can confirm it as Malay.16 At the same time, the state keep the national economy open 
to international trade and capital, thus reinforcing the dependent nature of the 
Malaysian economy (Khor, 1983 cited in J omo, 1999). Malaysian development 
planning, according to Jomo, involves 'a limited sectoral programmed for public 
sector allocation with corresponding indicative projection for private sector 
investment and growth' (Jomo, 1999: 87). While under the British, authority over 
plan-formation and implementation rested with senior British officials. Following 
independence, planning became gradually more sophisticated. The post-colonial state 
has an enlarged role, and involves greater political and bureaucratic control over 
planning. In the seventies, the period under NEP saw greater state intervention and a 
considerably enlarged public sector, 'particularly to promote the growth of the Malay 
capitalist and middle classes' (Jomo, 1999: 87). However, this did not mean that the 
16 See for example Crouch (1996), Ratnam (1965) and Raff (1967). 
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state was immune to external factors. Jomo argues that since 1982, and especially 
since the mid-eighties, under pressure from international agencies and the influence of 
the conservative ideologies of privatisation, deregulation and 'state failure', efforts 
have been made to limit and even reduce the role of the public sector and state 
intervention (Jomo, 1999: 87). Under the present leadership of Mahathir Mohamad, 
the government has become more explicit in emphasising growth, modernisation and 
industrialisation as economic priorities. J omo argues that because of the Malay 
political elite's pre-occupation with 'constraining Chinese wealth accumulation and 
the limited entrepreneurial abilities of the nascent Malay rentiers who emerged under 
NEP, Malaysia's industrialisation strategy imitates Singapore more than, for example, 
Taiwan or South Korea. This means relying more on foreign rather than domestic-led 
growth, with the private sector given leeway for privatisation and other economic 
liberalisation, at the expense of the public sector (Jomo, 1999: 95). 
Jomo's view is vital in giving us the initial understanding of how the role of the state 
works in Malaysia. His view highlights the central issue of Malaysia's development 
planning, especially after NEP in 1971. It evolves around creating a Malay/ 
Bumiputera entrepreneurial community with state intervention and, from the mid-
eighties, changing the privatisation policy to a more economic liberalisation. Thus, 
this shows that the state is not static or immune to external or internal pressures. It 
also demonstrates, as will be discussed further in the study, how political leadership 
plays a role in the role of the state in the Malaysian economy. In understanding the 
role of the state in Malaysian economy from another perspective it is necessary to 
examine the impact of party politics on the formulation and implementation of policy, 
or on economic development. Though there were earlier studies, like Tan (1982), 
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Khor (1983) and Jomo (1988), Gomez and Jomo (1999) offer a thorough examination 
of the Malaysian situation, using the concepts of rent and rent-seeking, and they 
explore how political patronage influences the accumulation and concentration of 
wealth. This departure from the mainstream of exploration of Malaysian economy 
highlights how the government earned legitimacy and support, through the allocation 
of rents in various forms to 'promote social objectives' (Gomez and Jomo, 1999: x). 
The government also created rents to encourage industrialisation and to bolster 
investments. However, the dissipation of some resource rents has weakened potential 
accumulation. Political patronage caused inefficient allocation of rents. Moreover, 
Gomez and Jomo contend that governments can achieve many political and economic 
goals through deliberate creation, allocation and deployment of rents. They propose 
the minimising of abuse of rent creation and distribution, keeping processes 
transparent and accountable. 
2.7. Conclusion 
There are several key points discussed in the chapter. The state is a system with 
boundaries, rules and political authority that seeks its legitimation from the 
community. Its political authority, as the most central authority, hopes to define a 
common culture and common goal, but since the state is not static, this is impossible. 
This is particularly true of a plural society, such as in Malaysia. However, in Malaysia 
the state is synonymous with the government as it always speaks as mutually 
representative. Although, as argued by Miliband (1969), the relationship between 
government and administrative body has a certain impact in determining the role of 
the state, in the Malaysian situation, as will be shown in this study, if there are 
conflicts, they are not open ones. So far, conflicts between government and other 
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institutions of the state, as argued by Miliband (1969), seldom put the Malaysian 
government in a threatened position. Though practising the separation of powers, 
there are already scholars identifying an imbalance of power at least between the 
judiciary and the executive ann of the government. 
At this early stage, it is difficult to define the Malaysian state as a type. However, 
understanding the different types and theories of states has given glimpses of the 
situation in Malaysia. As an example, though Malaysia resembles a capitalist state it 
also practices corporatism. This was especially true when the state became more 
directive over economic productive units. This is on top of views held by other 
scholars that tenned Malaysia as authoritarian (Gomez and Jomo, 1999; Khoo, 1995), 
semi-authoritarian (Crouch, 1992 and 1993), semi-democratic (Case, 1993) and quasi-
democratic (Zakaria, 1989). 
There is no denying the significant role of the state in the economy. Though scholars 
have warned of the danger of interference from the government, as discussed above, 
the questions were more related to how far to pursue one's interest as compared to the 
extent to which the political authority should direct economic behaviour. At this early 
stage, the role of the state in the Malaysian economy was never really a laissez faire 
one, more so after the NEP in the seventies. Looking at the Third World, it shows that 
they evolved around the modernisation, dependency and the world system theories. 
However, while the modernisation and the dependency theories highlighted the 
helplessness of the Third World countries that adopted them, the world system theory 
gives hope that there is an 'upward and downward mobility' of nations. 
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The state particularly has a role in the economic development as it provides stable 
laws, and institutions, management and control of manufacturing enterprises as well 
as social infrastructure. The public sector also has an important role in this process. In 
the case of Asian countries, its economic growth has been characterised by strong 
state intervention. Since developing countries focused on fast development, the state's 
role became more important. Since developing countries also lack in free-competition 
capitalism, and demands for materials or energy may create problems, central 
planning by the state becomes inevitable. There are inevitably implications, but at the 
same time developing economies need foreign capital. To balance this with the dislike 
of foreign capital, the developing economies have adopted nationalisation, even if it is 
only partial. 
The World Bank, in commending the high economic growth of countries in East Asia, 
where Malaysia is one of them, attributed its success to having its fundamentals right 
and practising careful policy intervention. Scholars argued over the extent of the 
state's intervention in the economy, but agreed that these countries have allowed for 
market to exercise a decisive role in determining resource allocation. However, 
Todaro (1989) provides arguments based on the diversity of the nations, which 
actually is more applicable. These refer to the different nature of the country, with its 
different background, human resources endowments and the relative importance of its 
public and private sector, among others. This study emphasises Todaro's view 
because it best describes the situation faced by Malaysia, as will later be explored in 
this study. Todaro contends that the discussion surrounding the role and limitations of 
the state of the Third World governments is more appropriate if based on their 
conflicting forces, since economic policies are the reflection of the relative strength of 
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such forces. His view is pertinent when we look at the experience faced by :vialaysia, 
as argued by Ghosh (1999), lomo (1999) and Gomez and Todd (1999). Ghosh and 
lomo highlight the significant role of the state in the economy, which Ghosh referred 
to as the dependent nature of Malaysia. lomo looks deeper into the need for Malaysia 
through modernisation of a 'peasant agriculture' while maintaining its relationship 
with international trade and capital. Here, the paradox that has emerged since the 
racial riot 1969 becomes evident. This event triggered the implementation of the NEP 
in 1971, whereby the state tried to balance the influences of both internal and external 
factors. In other words, the state attempted to achieve fast development just like other 
developing nations, but at the same time tried to maintain its internal forces. This is 
further enhanced by the exploration made by Gomez and lomo (1999) over racial 
issues, especially in creating the Bumiputeras commercial community, the rent and 
rent-seeking and the political patronage that clearly exists in Malaysia. This study 
therefore examines whether the internal and external factors that influence the role of 
the state in the Malaysian economy also influence the role of the state in its IR policies 
and practices. Thus, the next discussion in Chapter Three focuses on debates that have 
emerged so far on the role of the state in IR. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIO~S 
3.1. Introduction 
The discussion in Chapter Two has highlighted that in the developing nations, the 
state plays a dominant role in the economy. Moreover, it has provided insight into 
how, for example, a corporatist state intervenes in a capitalist economy, and 
importantly, how in almost all societies the state plays a major role, albeit in different 
forms or levels. 
The current chapter discusses in more depth the role of the state in the IR system per 
se, both in industrialised and developing nations. Theories surrounding this are 
explored, and a comparative analysis of the state's role is made to determine 
differences and similarities in the state's approach to its role in industrialised and 
developing countries. 
3.2. The Role of the State in IR 
This discussion attempts to highlight the significance of the role of the state in IR in 
general, and determines what roles the state plays in the IR system, why and how. 
Since it explores the IR system as practised in many countries, a reminder of the 
definition ofIR is useful. Poole (1986: 4) in a study on origins and patterns of national 
diversity defines IR as: 
' ... a discipline concerned with the systematic study of all aspects of the 
employment relationship'. 
He argues that it is diversity rather than unifonnity that characterise the IR 
experiences of nations. Assuming that there the three main actors are present in every 
'industrial and industrialising' country, a degree of conflict is inevitable. However, he 
identifies three mechanisms to ensure it is accommodated, these being 'individual 
resolution', 'unilateral detennination' and 'plural modes of regulation' (Poole 1986: 
4). 'Individual resolution' means freedom of contract and the absence of any 
substantial restrictions to the operation of the labour market. 'Unilateral 
detennination' refers to employers, managers, the state, trade unions or workers: while 
the third one refers to situations under collective bargaining. This is where differences 
are 'expressed, articulated and defended' through independent associations of 
employers and working people and in which joint detennination and responsibility for 
tenns and conditions of employment have been instituted (Poole, 1986: 4). 
Many authors have written about the significance of the role of the state in IR.l7 Poole 
(1986: 99), for example, claims that 'the state is indisputably the "third force" in the 
IR system'. If previously it was more about legal regulation of hours and conditions of 
work, and the behaviour of trade unions, now the activities of the state have expanded 
to assume an overall responsibility for the economy. He argued that the two most 
powerful political movements of the twentieth century, socialism and corporatism 
have emphasised the influence of the state. Moreover, we can say that of late, the 
Third World or developing nations which embarked on 'late-development' campaigns 
17 See for example discussions on the significance of the role of the state in Poole (1986); Bean (1994); 
Carriere, Haworth and Rodick (1989); Crouch (1978 and 1979); Damachi (1976); EI\'ander (1974); 
Fulcher (1991); Giles (1989); Keller (1991); Kraus (1979); Miliband (1969); Muir and Bro\\11 (1978); 
Omaji (1993); Panford (1988); Poole and Jenkins (1990); Rirnlinger (1977); Rosa (1990); Sharma 
(1985); Siddique (1989) and Strinati (1979) among others. 
73 
have pushed the state further to play a greater role in the overall economy of the 
concerned nations. 
In analysing the nature of the role of the state in IR, it is important to highlight 
Dunlop's work (1958) because it was a first attempt to develop a comprehensive 
theory of IR. According to Jackson (1994: 3), Dunlop's theory on IR became a basis 
for analysis by authors and commentators alike. An economist, Dunlop modified the 
work of sociologists such as Parsons and Smelser (1956), and viewed the IR system as 
a sub-system of the wider society or the total social system (Jackson, 1994: 3). Dunlop 
(1958: 7) suggested three different actors in an IR system; the first being the hierarchy 
of managers and their representatives in supervision; the second, the hierarchy of 
workers (non-managerial) and their spokesmen; and third, specialised government 
agencies (and specialised private agencies created by the first two actors) concerned 
with workers, enterprises and their relationships. Though Dunlop used the term 
'specialised government agencies', there was no doubt it described the role of the state 
as meant in this study. 
On the role of these 'specialised government agencies', Dunlop noted that as actors 
they may have a function in some IR systems 'so broad and decisive as to override the 
hierarchies of managers and workers on almost all matters' (Dunlop, 1958: 8). Dunlop 
(1958: 121) then defined these roles in determining 'substantive rules directly or 
through determining the rules of the interaction between workers and managers'. He 
lays out three rules where one or more of them, or the full complex, take the form of a 
legislative enactment, an award of a tribunal, or a decision of an administrative 
agency. These detern1inations usually apply to all managers and workers or to those in 
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specified sectors, industries or other groupings. Occasionally, such a detennination 
may apply solely to a particular dispute. In such instances, governmental action may 
be used to settle it in an ad hoc fashion. A fonn of a rule may be specified as 
pennissive by government and then included in appropriate collective agreements or 
actual rules of employment when adopted by workers and managers. The rules may be 
fonnulated by managers and workers, and then may require the approval of 
governmental agencies before they are put into effect. 
The three types of governmental rule-fixing reflect a descending order in the 
directness of governmental prescription. However, behind these differences in the 
fonn of governmental rule-making lies the substance or the reality of the power of 
government in detennining decisions. The extent to which governmentally prescribed 
rules are, in fact, determined by managers and workers organisation and then adopted 
by the governmental agency is debatable. Even when no agreement is reached 
between managers and workers, governmental rules may arise from extended 
consultation and approach a consensus, or the government may not have accepted the 
precise agreement (Dunlop, 1958: 123). This argument just proves that government in 
fact has a bigger role in decision-making. 
As another example, disputes can be settled by government through procedure that 
may be formally incorporated in government enactment, awards or tribunals, decreed 
for incorporation in agreements, or submitted for governmental approval. Dunlop 
argues that the distinction between the formal status of such rules of procedures and 
the subtleties of their possible relations to managers and \vorkers must be recognised 
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(Dunlop, 1958: 124). In other words, who made the procedure incorporated In 
government enactment, and who has the authority to approve and disapprove? 
In stressing the same issue, Bean (1994: 102) pointedly highlighted the specific role of 
the government. He notes the other components of the state, but argues that: 
'Although the state also includes parliament and the judiciary, as well as the 
police and military, it is government, which is now the most significant 
element in determining the legal environment within which IR operate. The 
government can be regarded as an actor within IR, performing a number of 
distinct roles'. 
Bean outlines four major roles of the state/government in the IR system. The primary 
purpose is to act as a third-party regulator that promotes a legal framework which 
establishes general ground rules for union-management interaction. Second, is as a 
means of supporting and underpinning collective bargaining. Governments in this 
regard make statutory provisions relating to minimum conditions of employment, 
including health and safety and, in some countries, wages and working hours. The 
third function is to provide services for conciliation, mediation and arbitration in 
settling trade disputes, while the fourth aspect is as an employer within the public 
sector. In that respect, Bean proposes: 
'The greater the importance of government as an employer, the more pervasive 
is its influence likely to be on bargaining developments and the content of 
agreements, since it may then influence the pattern of IR by its own behaviour 
and example' (Bean, 1995: 103). 
In another argument, Salamon (1987: 219), who defines state as ' the politically based 
and controlled institutions of government and regulation within an organised society', 
also insists on the importance of the role of the state. According to him, the ultimate 
political governing body, as in the case of some countries, could be Parliament, but 'it 
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is the elected government of the day which is the most active and important element 
within the state: it detennines the direction, policies and actions of the state 
machinery' (Salamon, 1987: 219). Salamon proposed that the government not only 
has to consider the economic objectives but also the nature of society it is in. The 
government has what he called the 'representative position', which became the basis 
for its policies and legislation. In one, the government is regarded as the expression of 
an 'inherently distinct national interest', and in that position, it occupies a neutral 
position between the conflicting interests of employers and management on the one 
hand, and employees and trade unions on the other. 
In this regard, Farnham and Pimlott (1983: 185) argue that their intervention of 
government in IR is justified 'either to protect the interests of individuals in their 
employment when no other means are available, or to uphold the interests of the 
nation as a whole when these appear to be threatened by particular industrial pressure 
groups'. However, 'national interest' is an abstract concept which could be anything 
the government, mass media or anyone else perceives it as. It may be used as an 
apparently self-evident and acceptable justification for what in reality could be 
ideologically-based policies and decisions. The 'national interest' issue is discussed in 
this study, based on the frequent use of the tenn by the Malaysian government in 
justifying its actions and IR policies. 
Second, the government's representative position could be viewed as the expression 
of a sectional interest within society, which coalesces and expresses itself in a political 
party. In this regard Lewis (1983: 361) argues that 'legal policy cannot be divorced 
from the interests and ideology of the law-makers and from the \\·ider political and 
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industrial conflict'. It is indeed the ideological base of the political party which 
provides the foundation for a government's legislation and other policies. 
Third, the government could be just the 'democratic icing' on top of a political 
system, and irrespective of the political party in power, the government supports the 
'maintenance of the capitalist interest'. Hyman (1975: 125) argues that the possibility 
of any radical government initiative in economic policy or IR is restricted by 'policy 
constraints, which stem necessarily from the capitalist context of political life'. That 
would lead to the government's preoccupation with the need to maintain 'economic 
stability', 'the confidence of industry' and to 'curb excessive wage increases'. Debates 
on policy options are mostly constrained by a 'notion of national interest' which is 
closely bound up with the interests of employers. On the other hand, labour 
organisation, objectives and action, if they conflict with the employers' interests are 
called sectional, selfish, irresponsible, disruptive and subversive (Hyman, 1975: 145). 
Crouch (1982: 125) argues that it is a crucial institution 'which can change the rules 
of the system'. The trade unions to him are primarily defensive organisations, while 
employers are fragmented and competing with one another. Modem government's 
prime overall objective is economic in character, and therefore must fulfil four 
compatible goals of economic policy, namely 'full employment, price stability, a 
favourable balance of payments and protection of the exchange rates of the currency' 
(Crouch, 1982: 126). 
A study of the IR system in Bangladesh by Siddiq (1985) from a macro-based analysis 
of the past and present social, political and economic environment highlighted the 
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distinct features of the Third World IR system. He rejected the idea of 'convergence' 
between the IR system of the west and the Third World based on both the 'logic of 
industrialism' and the 'organisational-oriented late-development' theses. He found out 
that the IR system in most Third World countries during the colonial period was state-
dominated. He argued that even after independence, due to the limited change in the 
socio-economic-political situation in the majority of Third World countries, the basic 
structure of their system remained almost the same. He proposed that to evaluate the 
IR of the Third World, one needs to look into the dominant role of the state, not as a 
contemporary phenomenon, but from a historical perspective. 
Phipps (1989) examines the functioning of Nicaraguan trade unionism following the 
Sandinista Revolution in 1979. By using comparative analytical approaches he studies 
the internal functioning, perspectives and practice of the Sandinista federations, which 
'disclose a range of important secondary contradictions between state and trade 
unions, despite ideological affinities and shared strategic objectives'. He explores the 
interaction between the government and trade union, with the most important areas 
assessed are the legally inscribed rights of trade unions; the position of the 
government as an arbitrator in individual conflict; the input into a national wages 
policy and worker participation exercises by state and trade union; and the 
government's role as public sector employer. 
Lai (1993) examines how the role of a strong state shaped the development of labour 
politics in Taiwan during the period 1949-1989, with the authoritarian Kuomintang's 
(KMT) state that was never challenged by any social force until the second half of the 
1980s. The two interesting questions that Lai tried to answer were first; why was there 
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no labour unrest during the process of rapid industrialisation from the 1960s to 19877 
Second; what were the causes and the dynamics of the large-scale labour movement 
taking place in 1987-89 and why did it fail to persist? The phenomenon of an 
extremely acquiescent work force contradicted the expenences of early 
industrialisation in Western countries in Latin America, and South Korea, where it 
showed that some form of labour unrest is a necessary by-product of industrial 
development. The labour movement of Taiwan finally emerged to challenge the strong 
state and capital in 1987-89. Meanwhile, Barya (1990) describes and interprets the 
historical development of the legal regulation of the Ugandan trade union movement 
and assesses the relative importance of law in the determination of the character of 
trade union organisation in the post-colonial period 1962-1987. Though his research is 
based on the legal changes that shaped the IR in Uganda and the economic parameters 
within which trade unions exist and operate, Barya admits that it is the character of the 
state that has proved to be the most crucial element in Ugandan IR. 
As a conclusion to the discussion above, a few key points can be gathered. First is the 
state plays as important a role in IR as in the economy. Dunlop'S view justifies this 
notion in that even though government may not act directly through rules or 
determining the rules, they in fact have the final say in the IR system. What Bean says 
about the role of the state emphasises how powerful a state can be. It can be a 
regulator, make statutory provisions, provide services for parties in disputes and also 
become, in certain countries, the biggest employer. Or as Salamon argues, the 
government can be a neutral body which settles disputes between employers and 
employees. The government, since it is founded on certain political beliefs, could be a 
reflection of the beliefs of the political party in power. Or it may act in the interest of 
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the capitalist in the economy. While citation from four studies on Bangladesh, 
Nicaragua, Taiwan and Uganda all highlighted the significance of the role of the state 
in the IR system. The difference that emerged is how, in Taiwan, there was a dynamic 
process and development in the state-labour relations, which responded to changing 
social, economic and political circumstances. This is another area that will be 
explored in this study: whether or not there was a dynamic relationship between the 
state and labour in the Malaysian case. 
3.3. Theories on the Role of the State in IR 
The discussion below explores some relevant theories on the role of the state in IR. 
Kerr et at (1960) generally divide phases of the state's role into three stages of 
industrialisation process, an analysis shared by Bellace (1994). In the early stages of 
industrial revolution, the state is said to be hostile to the workers and the emerging 
labour movement. The working class that was created prior to World War I disrupted 
the settled social order of pre-industrial society, which was based on property. The 
state at this stage protected the interests of the upper and middle class in capitalist 
countries. The state also protected the property interests of the employers by creating 
new doctrines. Workers who were joining together in an association were regarded as 
an unlawful conspiracy, while the state became a 'legally sanctioned suppressor' 
(Bellace, 1994: 22 ; Bamber and Landsbury, 1993: 40). 
After WWII, there were some changes in form rather than substance, in the way the 
independent state reacted in newly industrialising countries. Bellace (1994: 22) notes 
that: 
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'During the drive for independence, the political parties that would 
subsequently govern were often aligned with nascent unions. Once 
independence was attained, these same persons faced the problem of creating 
an independent economy, a process that coincided with industrialisation. At 
this point strong, independent unions became the liability to the state's 
economic plan'. 
Therefore the state became hostile to labour, though there were differences in the 
degree of hostility based on different experience. In many newly industrialising 
countries, the state expected certain policies to be followed for economic growth. The 
groups in the society, which include workers, could not be allowed to interfere with 
the implementation of such policies (Bellace, 1994: 23). The welfare of the workers 
then became the responsibility of the state, with the unions as its adjuncts. 
In the middle phases of industrialisation, there is a 'paradigm break' in that the parties 
consciously change the system that is generally viewed as inadequate or unworkable 
in the new social realities. The state shifts from antagonistic employer-union relations 
to one of tolerance. This change of attitude usually happens after the involvement of 
militant labour unrest, including general strikes, or shutdown of parts of the economy. 
The working class is then regarded as important and valuable to the society, and 
unions have a useful role to play in the economic life (Bellace, 1994: 23). In the late 
stages of industrial societies, the role of the state varies greatly. The state tolerates 
unions, although the level of toleration might be quite low: 
'In all, the state seeks to protect myriad individual rights, through either 
legislation or administrative regulation. In some, however, the state can be said 
to encourage employee representation by erecting structures that require labour 
participation inside the firm. In others, very substantial managerial control of 
labour prevails, with workers compelled to seek individual redress through 
legal means outside the workplace' (Bellace, 1994: 24). 
These arguments by Bellace are worth examining in the case of Malaysia. 
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On the other hand, Shanna's (1996: 20-22) analysis on the same issue also merits 
discussion, though entirely bases his analysis on 'stages of industrialisation' in 
developing/industrialising countries or, as he prefers to call them, less industrialised 
countries. He divides these less industrialised countries into three major groups of 
least-industrialised, semi-industrialised, and newly industrialised countries and claims 
that the least-industrialised countries adopt a 'political-paternalistic pattern' of IR. 
Labour organisation in these countries functions as 'organs or collaborators' of the 
existing political parties, and the movement confonns to the classical pattern of 
political unionism. The close relationship between the political parties and the trade 
union has been built during the course of the country's independence. When they 
achieved independence without much struggle, the labour movement became less 
political. The paternalistic pattern implies dominance of workers and their unions by 
employers and/or the government. But this situation may change as a result of some 
factors, for example the industrialisation process may transfonn the political-
paternalistic pattern into a 'repressive-confrontative pattern'. This second pattern, as 
argued by Shanna, applies in semi-industrialised countries. In order to ensure national 
growth, policies for capital accumulation are implemented. This not-so-smooth 
transition involves structural adjustment by, for example, resorting to foreign direct 
investment (FDI). To attract foreign investors sometimes developing countries have to 
fight one another. One of the strategies is to repress wage growth and workers' rights. 
If, in the least-industrialised countries, supply of unskilled labour is abundant, in the 
semi-industrialised countries there are also the semi-skilled and the skilled labour. 
Being in demand enables them to ask for higher wages and a better invol\'ement in 
'new collective bargaining regimes' (Shanna, 1996: 21). To avoid this dilemma from 
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disrupting the industrialisation process, the government usually dissuades unions from 
making such demands. 
The transition from a semi-industrialised country to a newly-industrialised one again 
involved the reliance on foreign capital. After that process, multinational corporations 
(MNCs) settle themselves in the economic system. Domestic savings grow with 
national income, economic development hastens an upgrading in technology, and 
skills of workers improve. With this new development, the problems in maintaining 
high worker morale can appear. Yet, labour organisations are not considered (or not 
expected) to be 'negative' forces working against economic development. At this 
stage, the government may relax any repressive labour policies and define new roles 
for labour movement. This will actually allow the labour movement to continue in 
their welfare maximising roles but 'within the framework of state plans for national 
development' (Sharma, 1996: 21). However, one setback arises if the dependence on 
market forces makes the economy vulnerable. In that case, the government may 
tighten its hold on the labour movement and again, the labour organisation and 
employer's association 'will have no choice but to accommodate' (Sharma, 1996: 21) 
to the demands of the governing elite. Accommodation may become the dominant 
mode in such IR strategies, but the distinction between effective cooperation and 
defective cooperation needs to be looked into. Sometimes cooperation is genuine 
based on consensus building but frequently it is cooptation that is being imposed by 
the state. Sharma explained the main elements of the basic framework and the 
interrelationships between them in Figure 3.1. Sharma concludes that countries at 
different stages of structural transformation generate different requirements for capital 
accumulation, and it is these patterns of capital accumulation that affect labour 
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orientation and thus evolve IR strategies. Three separate patterns have emerged based 
on the stages of structural transformation and the capital accumulation. These are 
political-paternalistic, repressive-confrontative, and accommodative-cooperati\.e, 
which will emerge in least, semi-, and newly-industrialised countries, respectively. 
Sharma's conceptual framework has been used to examine the extent of the structural 
transformation in ASEAN and will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Figure 3.1: The Evolution of Patterns of IR in Industrialising Countries 
Capital 
Accumulation 
Requirements 
Level of Structural Public Labour Patterns 
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Source: Sharma (1996: 23). 
Poole (1986: 99) suggested two theories on the role of the state in IR, but he pointedly 
referred to them as the types of state intervention in the West. These are pI uralism and 
two types of corporatism, that is 'societal corporatism' and 'state corporatism'. 
Crouch (1977, 1982) and Strinati (1982) suggested an analytical framework of 
governmental relationship to IR which identifies four alternative forms of IR. These 
are dependent on the interrelationship between the nature of the dominant political 
ideology and the relative power and autonomy of trade unions. 
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Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 3.2, they actually describe the development of 
British IR. From 'market individualism' in the nineteenth century, based on a 
dominant liberalist ideology and weak trade unions, it moved to 'liberal collectivism' 
or 'voluntarism', encompassing the increasing power and autonomy of trade 
unionism. It then moved to 'bargained corporatism', particularly in the 1960s and 
1970s, by adopting a more corporatist dominant ideology to accommodate trade union 
power. Since 1979, the dominant political ideology has shifted towards a neo-
liberalist/laissez faire basis and trade union power has been weakened through 
economic factors. It is interesting to note that some scholars think that the basis of IR 
is returning towards either 'collective liberalism' or 'market individualism' (Salamon, 
1987: 222; Crouch, 1982: 28; Strinati, 1982: 41). 
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In 'market individualism', the market system balances competitiye interests and 
legitimises the notion of property rights and an objective basis to income inequalities. 
Labour thus becomes a commodity that can be bought or sold. The role of goyernment 
in market individualism is 'largely passive' but also 'highly coercive in so far as the 
law firmly upholds property rights against the countervailing power of subordinates' 
(Crouch, 1982: 28). This imperfect model makes labour weak, unorganised and 
subordinate to the employer. Because of the indirect control of the market system, the 
relationship between labour and employer is, at best, paternalistic, or at worst, 
exploitative. These imperfections bring in 'liberal collectivism', which saw the 
binding up of the concepts 'pluralism' and 'voluntarism' in the British IR system. 
Crouch (1982: 30) argues further: 
'The identity of dominant and subordinate interests remain distinct, and a 
separation of political, economic and ideological dimensions continues to 
exist, but authority usually comes to accept a strategy of indulgence as a means 
of absorbing subordinate pressure'. 
There is then the acceptance of autonomous trade UnIons, which represent and 
reconcile conflicting interests with management through the collective bargaining 
process. The same process, however, protects the dominant interest of managers 
through the delineation of agreed rights and the maintenance of a boundary between 
issues for collective bargaining and issues for determination by managerial 
prerogative. The government's role is to aid the reconciliation of dominant and 
subordinate interests. Crouch (1982: 30) argues again that 'action to enhance 
subordinates' rights will exist alongside the limited coercive measures which ensure 
the perpetuation of domination'. Through a legislative role, the government supports 
the extension of both individual and collective employee rights whilst at the same 
time constraining collective employee power (i.e. as expressed through the activities 
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of trade unions). This is under the guise of maintaining a 'balance of power' between 
the parties in their operation of the IR system and reinforces the image of the 
government acting in the 'national interest'. 
Then there is the increasing need for more governmental 'management' of the 
economy if the twin objectives of economic policy (full employment and price 
stability) are to be achieved. This is what has prompted the move towards a more 
'bargained corporatism' form of IR, whereby trade unions agree to restrain their 
pursuit of their members' sectional interests as part of a strategy to further the 
'national interest'. In return, however, the trade unions movement expects concessions 
from the government. Crouch (1982: 149) emphasised: 
'The government interposes itself between the unions and their bargaining 
partner; and the government is able to offer several things which cannot be 
achieved in bargaining ... such as social policy reforms, workers' rights, 
changes in economic and fiscal policy'. 
Crouch argues that after 'bargained corporatism', the British IR system shifted away 
from corporatism, and moved towards neo-liberalism/laissez faire ideology. The 
return to 'market individualism' suggested the removal of or significant reduction in 
direct governmental economic planning, and more of a reliance of 'free market 
forces' . 
According to the unitarist view, the state is the neutral guardian of the superordinate 
national interest (Gospel and Palmer, 1983: 169). Society is or should be 
hierarchically organised with 'leaders' directing affairs and the populace accepting 
state leadership. The state can or must be trusted to act in the best long-term interests 
of the people. Historically, this reflected medieval and early modem notions of the 
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organic state and government by rulers, enlightened or otherwise. In modem times, 
extreme unitarist states have existed in Fascist and Communist societies. 
Pluralism is described as a 'circumscribed state influence in a largely fragmented and 
decentralised political economy' (Poole, 1986 : 100). However, pluralist IR institutions 
are only available in a 'wider culture' where 'freedom of association and moral duty' 
are present. There must also be 'broad ideologies', an economic structure which has 
evolved from a pronounced laissez-faire stage, a democratic political structure which 
has two or multi-party systems, 'countervailing' powers among other actors and a 
durable collective bargaining system. Berger (cited in Poole, 1986: 105) states that it 
is about' a system of representation that supported political legitimacy and stability 
by fragmenting conflicts into specific, pragmatic, hence negotiable differences of 
interest'. Historically, pluralism evolved within countries which once experienced a 
pronounced laissez-faire stage, such as USA, Ireland, and the UK (Poole, 1986: 107). 
Poole divided corporatism into 'societal corporatism' and 'state corporatism' (Poole, 
1986: 100). By 'societal corporatism' he meant centralised or moderately centralised 
governments who reach agreements with strongly organised and usually centralised 
interest groups 'State corporatism', on the other hand, is when strongly interventionist 
governments are unchecked by independent organisations of labour (Poole, 1986: 
100). He describes the difference between societal corporatism and state corporatism 
in this research context as follows: 
'Societal' corporatism is the logical outcome of powerful, centrally organised 
interest groups and of open, competitive political systems. By contrast, state 
corporatism is facilitated by the concentration of powers in government, 
monopoly fom1s of capital, the absence of independent associations of labour, 
and political systems with a single party' (Poole, 1986: 100). 
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Poole argues that there are variations in the state's role in IR in the East or developing 
countries, which have encapsulated in the divergent experiences of 'command' and 
'market' systems. In all cases, the patterns of IR are affected by single-party 
government and by the public ownership of the means of production, ensuring the 
absence of an independent body of employers and a largely integrative function for 
trade unions. The role of the state in IR here is almost invariably substantial, 
suggesting that divergencies amongst nations stem in part from the timing of 
industrialism. Thus, in the predominantly corporatist societies countries of the Third 
World, laissez-faire policies in the economy and in IR are 'seldom considered and 
pluralism lacks a bedrock' (Poole, 1986: 101). 
Gospel and Palmer (1983: 169) argue that liberal collectivists, with their preference 
for a passive state, tend not to give the relationship between the state and other parties 
too close attention, merely assuming that, under systems of collective bargaining, the 
state can 'hold the ring' or establish some rules. They suggest that the state should act 
as a good employer and should intervene to help disadvantaged groups and to provide 
a supportive economic context. Liberal individualists promote less state intervention 
and advocate leaving employment relations to market forces and individual contracts 
of employment. However, in IR, they have been quite prepared to see the state 
intervene to enforce individual against collective rights. Also, despite their belief in 
market forces, they have been prepared to accommodate state intervention to remove 
impediments to market forces (Gospel and Palmer, 1983: 170). 
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3.4. Interrelationship between Economic Development and IR 
Many scholars have argued that there exists a strong inter-relationship between 
economic development and JR, as explained in discussions below. 
Kuruvilla and Venkataratnam (1996) claim that that economic development in South 
and Southeast Asia has been linked with the improving IR environment in these 
regions. Besides attributing this development to clearly defined industrialisation 
programmes, they highlight the role played by the government in their 
implementation. The industrialisation strategies include the successful integration of 
macro-economic policies with IR policies. Kuruvilla and Venkataratnam claim that 
though there is a certain uniformity in Asian development, the region is very diverse 
economically. Moreover, they argue that there are two competing explanations for the 
dramatic growth of Southeast Asia, one neoclassical, in that there is low inflation, a 
stable legal and political framework, open economic systems, and undistorted prices. 
The other, the revisionist explanation, is where deliberate state intervention occurs 
through protection and price distortions. However, the World Bank Report in 1993 
and other scholars claimed, as discussed in Chapter Two, which the success of these 
economies was due to IR and human resource policies of governments. Thus, 
Kuruvilla and Venkaratnam examined the interrelationship between economic 
development and IR in Asia. 
In their view, two aspects of Asian economic development formed the basis for the 
discussion on IR and labour policy in the region. First, there is the strong role played 
by the state in the economic sphere (Kuruvilla and Venkaratnam, 1996). Contrary to 
West em European and US economic development, which have been led by pri \'ate 
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enterprise, development in this region has been managed by the state. There are of 
course variations between these countries in the role played by the state, for example 
between Japan and Korea. In Japan, the state influenced the nature of investment , 
chose industries, and influenced the number of firms that could enter the economic 
sector. In Korea, the state financed private sector investment. In Southeast Asia, he 
claims, the state's role 'has been more facilitative, creating the conditions necessary 
for the attraction of foreign investment for economic development'. In South Asia, 
especially in India and Pakistan, the state took the responsibility for economic 
development through large public sector industries (Kuruvilla and Venkaratnam, 
1996). 
The second feature of the regIOn IS the existence of a 'clearly conceptualised 
industrialisation strategy', based on the Import Substitution Industrialisation strategy 
(ISI) and the Export Oriented Industrialisation strategy (EOI). Each of these strategies 
comprises two different levels. The simple stage of lSI is based on the development of 
low technology consumer and industrial goods for local consumption, while the 
second stage of lSI focuses on the development of heavy industries to create a 
diversified industrial base that fuels future growth. The first stage of EOI focuses on 
the low cost production of light manufacturing goods for exports financed by foreign 
investment. The second stage of EOI concentrated on the technological upgradation of 
the first stage, moving to higher value added products, and innovations. These 
strategies were adopted at different levels by various countries based on the individual 
stages of their development. 
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In another work, Kuruvilla (1995) argues that there is a close association bet',\"een 
industrialisation strategies and IR policies in Southeast Asia. Certain kinds of 
industrialisation strategies and certain kinds of labour policies go hand in hand. For 
example, under lSI, the focus of labour policy is largely pluralistic and voluntarist. 
Most Asian governments did not attempt to significantly regulate IR. However, under 
the first stage of EOI, the primary focus of IR policy at the national level was on cost 
containment. In all other countries, except Korea and Japan, export orientation has 
been based on the competitive advantage of low cost labour financed by foreign 
investment. Both Malaysia and Philippines enacted rules that restricted the amount of 
overtime, refused to legislate equal pay for equal work in export oriented industries 
where most of the labour was female, and exempted foreign investors from much 
labour and employment legislation. 
Gall (1998), on the other hand, argues that Kuruvi lla and V enkaratnam' s analysis 
failed to place enough emphasis on the contingencies of political economy and he 
made references to experiences of labour movements in Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. Gall disagreed that industrialisation 
strategies and IR are always or necessarily 'mutually reinforcing' as claimed by 
Kuruvilla and Venkaratnam. His view was that there needs to be further and balanced 
analysis on the relationship between labour movement and 'wider petty bourgeois 
democratic forces' to explain the limited extent of industrial reforms in these 
countries. Gall's view coincided with Deyo's (1989), who suggested that Asian 
industrialism has been based on some amount of labour subordination. Banning 
unionism, or restricting the ability of workers to form unions, happened at a certain 
stage in Malaysia, South Korea, Tai\\'an, Philippines or Indonesia, In another analysis, 
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Gall stressed that the dominant feature of IR in all these countries is the 'relativel\' 
high level of state intervention in regulating the context of the wage-effort bargain 
(compared to many west European countries) as a result of the deployment of state-
directed capital accumulation strategies' (Gall, 1998: 360). 
Kuruvilla and Venkaratnam (1996: 6) further argued that in the first stage of EOI, 
strategy investors were provided with cheap, flexible and highly compliant labour. In 
more advanced stages of EOI, based on higher technology, the focus of labour policy 
shifts to the development of highly-skilled, flexible and productive labour. Reforms in 
the education system and efforts to develop skills were made, for example in Malaysia 
and Singapore, through the existence of the Skills Development Funds. Employers 
pay a certain percentage of the payroll costs into the fund, and have to invest in 
training if they are to reclaim a part of their contributions. In Korea and Taiwan, 
vocational training centres played a part in this skill development. In India, there is a 
tremendous pressure on the IR system to change, because of the shift to an export-
oriented economy. However, in regards to Malaysia, this study will analyse Kuruvilla 
and Venkaratnam's claims that the government's moves into training and skills 
development through, for example, various vocational training centres, have 
succeeded in producing a 'qualitative shift in the focus of labour and IR and human 
resources policy'. 
Cho Soon (1994: 147) also argues that the economic development of most of the 
Asian countries has been engineered by paternalistic governments, whereby the 
government played a catalytic role for development. During the initial phase of 
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development, the effective policies are the 'mercantilistic approach,18 even though the 
governments still have to be market conforming. In the long run, the policy has to be 
changed, for if not, there will be an industrial imbalance and overall inefficiency in the 
economy. Thus, Cho Soon suggested that the developing countries conform as much 
as possible to the basic direction of economic policies to market principle, and 
improve the quality of human resources. 
Several lessons can be drawn from discussions above. While there is a strong 
relationship between economic development and IR, the state is again the significant 
force that determines this relationship. Industrial strategy is important and it is 
agreeable that certain kinds of industrialisation strategies and certain kinds of labour 
policies go hand in hand. However, to generalise that industrialisation strategies and 
IR are always or necessarily mutually reinforcing, as claimed by Kuruvilla and 
Venkaratnam, is misleading. As argued by Gall, the political dynamics factor in 
developing countries, such as those in South-east Asia, could not be ignored. It is the 
interest of this study to explore and highlight the argument that even though Malaysia 
does not experience changes in political regimes in the same way that Thailand does, 
the political influence, to quote Kuruvilla and Venkaratnam, has more 'explanatory 
power' than the variable related to industrialisation, as they claimed. 
IH Mercantilistic approach, originated from Adam Smith's thought. The 'mercantile system' or 'system 
of commerce' emphasised industrial development as much as commerce development. In today's 
context it means the governments tend to promote industries with a variety of industrial policies, 
intervene extensively in operations of financial institutions, promote exports and restrict imports: and 
hold down wage rates to help promote business (Cho Soon, 1994: 148). 
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3.5. The Role of the State in IR in Some Industrialised X ations 
The discussion below gives an overview of the role of the state in the IR systems in 
some industrialised countries, particularly Britain. A contention of this study is 
Britain's colonialism left a certain impact on Malaysian IR. By analysing the 
experience of these developed/industrialised nations, we hope to see the differences 
and if any, similarities, of IR practices as compared to the ones discussed under the 
developing nations. The brief discussions below highlight the experiences of Britain, 
France, Germany, Sweden, Spain, Italy and the US. 
Many writers have argued about what has been perceived as a minimal role of the 
state in IR in Britain, at least until the 1960s, on the act of 'voluntarism' that was said 
to be the trademark of British IR.19 However, voluntarism, as argued by Flanders, 
(cited in Jackson, 1994) has never existed in the British voluntary system since the 
state, as Jackson contends, always intervened on certain issues (Jackson, 1994: 296). 
Jackson stressed that 'it does not imply that the state did not take an interest in or 
intervene in IR in Britain; rather it implies that the state played a restricted role and, 
crucially, tried to keep IR and trade unions away from the courts' (Jackson, 1994: 
299). Blyton and Turnbull (1994: 141) analysed the role of the state in Britain from 
three aspects; as economic manager, legislator and employer. Through each of these, 
the different political projects, specifically voluntarism, corporatism and Thatcherism 
could be the centre of evaluation. 
1'1 See, for example, discussions on the role of the state in IR by Jackson (1994: 296-328), Bamber and 
Landsbury (1993: 27-54), Farnham (1993: 227-261), Salamon (1987: 219-242), Blyton and Turnbull 
(1994: U 1-165), Beardwell (1996: 37-65), Gospel and Palmer (1993: 154-173), Bean (1994: 102-129), 
among others. 
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Two political parties since 1945, Labour and Conservative (Bamber and Lansbury, 
1993: 28) have dominated Britain. The voluntary period started with the post-war era, 
under the Labour government (1945-1950) where it played a relatively limited role in 
the affairs of the British industry. Rising unemployment later forced the move towards 
a system of free collective bargaining, but this later led to rising wage demands and 
wage drift (Blyton and Turnbull, 1994: 143). Income policies initially were ad hoc. 
The formal restraint under Labour governments of 1964-70 marked a significant 
change, when government's role became a direct intervention. In the 1970s it was 
manifested as 'bargained corporatism', when again the trade union leadership 
promised wage restraint in exchange for a 'share' in the economic policy-making. It is 
interesting to examine the Malaysian case in this light, especially with the 
understanding of 'bargained corporatism'. Crouch (1979: 189) defines this as follows: 
'the acceptance of unions of several strategies, which compared with liberal 
collectivism (free collective bargaining), constitute a setback for (workers') 
interests. But it also holds out the chance of advances. Unions are tempted-and 
frightened- by corporatist developments to sacrifice some of their entrenched 
but narrow and unambitious achievements in exchange for the possibility of 
greater political influence and more and broader power for their members in 
the workplace, but at the same time to accept more restraint, a more obvious 
role for the unions in restraining their members, more state interference and 
fuller acceptance of the industrial order and its priorities' . 
According to Ruysseveldt and Visser (1996: 42), the past decade, however, saw 
Britain making 'the most radical break with corporatist tendencies'. 20 The power of 
organised interest groups, and in particular of the unions, has been driven back; the 
democratic influence on economic policy neutralised, and the role of the government 
in the economy reduced. The 'paradoxical' role of the state, argue Ruysseveldt and 
211 In the 1980s, 'the power of organised interest groups haw been driven back, democratic influence on 
economic policy neutralised, and the role of the government in the economy reduced' (Ruysseveldt and 
Visser, 1996: 43). 
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Visser (1996, 42-43) is that even though when the relationship between the employer 
and employee was so 'free of state interference', the government policies made such a 
mark on IR and have caused a turnaround. From 1974 to 1979, under the Labour 
government, the move was towards corporatism, through the 1980s and the 1990s, 
under Thatcher, there was a contradictory tendency towards either more or less state 
intervention (Blyton and Turnbul, 1994: 140). The role of the state in British IR thus 
was very much related to which party holds the political power. In this context, it is 
interesting, though still early, to note that since Independence, Malaysia has been 
administered by the same political party, and though the member parties might 
change, the government that rules Malaysia has always been the same. 
In France, the state's intervention is very important, in the sense that it reflects the 
traditional reluctance of unions and employers to use voluntary collective agreements 
(Ruysseveldt and Visser, 1996: 82; Goetschy and Jobert, 1993). The French 
government is also a major employer, with about a quarter of civilian employees 
working in the public sector, which French public embraces a wider range of 
nationalised industries than is usual in most Western countries. As an employer, the 
state exerts considerable influence on pay settlements in the private sector too 
(Ruysseveldt and Visser, 1996: 86; Goetschy and Jobert, 1993: 155). In the early 
1980s, the government intervened to fight growing unemployment, and succeeded 
through social policy rather than economic action or job creation (Goetschy and 
Jobert, 1993: 156). The government also initiated a variety of economic and fiscal 
measures to encourage employers to create jobs opportunities. A major feature of 
French IR in the 1980s was an active role played by the successive socialist 
govcrnments in cmployment matters. As in Australia and most European countries, 
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there has also been a trend towards the decentralisation of bargaining and the adyent 
of more practices to promote greater labour market flexibility (Goetschy and lobert, 
1993: 172). 
Unlike Britain, the factory system in Germany developed within a society which 
retained a legacy of paternalism (Fuerstenberg, 1993: 177). The country has an 
extensive framework of labour law, in which the Federal Constitution (1940) grants 
the freedom of association and the right to organise. Employer-employee relations are 
generally regulated by statutory law. Moreover, there is a division of labour between 
local courts, regional appeal courts and a Federal labour court (Fuerstenberg, 1993: 
181). Governmental interference in collective bargaining is rare. In addition, the IR 
has a dual structure. At workplace and plant levels there is no direct bargaining 
between unions and employers, instead, works councils and employers negotiate on a 
statutory basis. It is at industry-wide and regional levels that unions and the 
employers' federations enter into negotiations, which usually result in collective 
agreements (Fuerstenberg, 1993: 183). There is a long tradition of attempts to 
introduce industrial democracy in Germany. Work councils were first established by 
law in 1916, in industries which were important for the economy in the First World 
War. Since the WWII, the union's influence at the enterprise level has been enhanced 
by the various laws on co-determination (Fuerstenberg, 1993: 185). It should be noted 
that the relations between works councils and the unions are usually close, since co-
deternlination fosters a strategy of 'cooperative unionism'. In the 1980s, the Gem1an 
economy was faced with structural changes based on developing technology. 
Demands for government action usually focused on employment stabilisation, the 
improvement of job security, and the maintenance skills and qualifications. Employers 
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and their associations also assumed some social responsibility for technological 
change. Additionally, government strategies to improve IR in view of technoloaical 
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change primarily focused upon adjusting the legal framework (Fuerstenben;, 1993: 
191). It is at present facing major challenges due to both internal and external 
structural changes. 
As regards the Swedish IR system, it was popular for its 'employment principle' or 
'Swedish model' (Dell'Aringa and Lodovici, 1994: 400; Martin, 1995: 263). Being a 
large employer, the state ensures a structure of union-management relations and a 
pattern of economic and social policy. It evolved in the context of almost continuous 
control of the government by the Social Democratic Party (SAP), from 1932 until 
now, while the blue-collar unions affiliated to the largest confederation (LO) 
supported this extraordinary political dominance. The state has a responsibility for 
maintaining full employment by managing demand, providing collective services by 
channelling resources to them, and assuring economic security and equity by 
redistributing income through taxes and transfers (Martin, 1995: 264). At the same 
time, it largely excluded the state from the domain of production for the market, over 
which private capital retained control, and from regulation of the labour market. It is 
the agreement between the two principal peak organisations of unions and employers, 
the LO and the SAF that defined the Swedish model. According to Dell' Aringa and 
Lodovici (1994: 394-397), Austria, Norway, Sweden, and recently Finland, represent 
the more truly neo-corporatist countries. The two advantages of this corporatist model 
are that firstly the higher level of likelihood that the negative social effects of their 
own behaviour are internalised by the large interest coalitions. Thus, trade unions and 
employers are sensitive to macro-economic constraints stemming from wage 
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Increases; secondly, centralised bargaining, which allows for simultaneous 
negotiation, thereby reducing the risk of upward wage spirals. It is because the main 
employees and employers of these countries collaborate with the government in 
defining income and labour policies, that there is generally a consensus on the 
objectives of maintaining the lowest possible level of unemployment and pursuing 
solidaristic policies. 
In Spain, since 1975, there has been a new pattern of IR being built up. The most 
representative Spanish unions have achieved institutional recognition, social progress 
and political power in spite of low union density rates. It seems that the unions, in 
view of the tlexibilisation of labour legislation and the economic decline in Spain, 
today possess a strong voice at the political level. Moreover, the government acts as a 
policy maker, and plays an important role in the ongoing processes of 
institutionalisation and institution building. Meanwhile, in Italy, the role of the state 
has been conditioned by the fact that the government has been weak but the parties 
strong. The public sector is extensive, and the public administration has been 
inefficient, and not up to its task and increasingly has come to serve party political 
interests. IR in post-war Italy have evolved in a voluntaristic fashion, with market and 
political forces dictating outcomes. There is no regulatory framework which 
drastically limits or sets formal legal requirements for collective bargaining, 
consultation, or strike action. On the whole, Italian labour law focuses on individual 
workers' rights, rather than defining the rights and duties of collective interest 
associations and their mutual relationship. The Italian courts rarely intervene in the 
case of strikes, but the cabinet nearly always takes up the role of mediator and brokers 
deals between union and employers. Finally, the role of the state in Italian IR is also 
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shaped through the state sector, by which we mean not just the public sector per se, 
but also the nationalised industries and public holdings (Ruysseveldt: 1996). 
According to Dell' Aringa and Lodovici (1994: 396), the US labour market is 
characterised by competitive markets, low employment protection, weak interest 
groups, and fragmented wage negotiation, occurring mainly at the finn level. Bamber 
and Lansbury (1993) note the three roles that the US government plays as firstly 
directing the regulation of tenns and conditions of employment; secondly, the 
regulation of the manner in which organised labour and management relate to each 
other; and finally as an employer. Historically, the government regulates the tenns and 
conditions of employment; in areas that relate to discrimination, worker safety, 
unemployment compensation, minimum wages and maximum hours, and retirement. 
In 1964, the US government prohibited discrimination in employment on the grounds 
of race, colour, sex, religion, national origin or age. Since 1992, there has been an act 
to prohibit discrimination against disabled workers. The law has been made markedly 
influential in shaping the IR, and particularly in regulating the tactics of bargaining. 
One of the most glaring conclusions that could be drawn from the experience of an 
industrialised country above is the case of Britain, where the unions had a sort of 
independent relationship from the state and employer. Britain sets a distinct example 
in the development of IR and the role of the state that could later be compared to 
Malaysia; its colony for more than a decade. It is also an interesting point that, despite 
its independent relationship, the state still plays a significant role in Britain and in 
almost all the developed nations discussed. However, the new pattern, such as 
experienced by Spain, where unions possess a strong \'oice, or in Italy, where. the 
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government was considered weak, differs with Malaysia's expenence. Here, the 
similarity might be the fact that the state generally remains the most significant player. 
with a difference in the form and the extent of its roles in IR. 
3.6.The Role of the State in IR in Developing Countries 
In stark contrast, the experience of developing countries differs from those of the 
developed ones. Therefore, to quote Hyman (1979), it is often difficult to attempt to 
translate the perspectives of Westemised IR to the developing countries. Apart from 
other differences, one disparity is, as argued by Siddique (1989), the dualistic 
economic feature where a pre-capitalist economic system predominates alongside a 
small industrial sector, together with a segmented labour market where a sharp 
dualism exists both between modem and traditional manufacturing sectors and 
between modem and large firms. However, one of the most distinctive features of 
developing countries is the centrality of the role of the state, whereby, as argued by 
Bean (1994: 218) in IR matters the government has increasingly sought (varying 
degrees of control) over trade union movement and its activities. This is to protect the 
interests of foreign capital, which is regarded of utmost importance. 
3.6.1. Experience of More Developed Asian Countries 
Two more developed Asian countries, Korea and Japan, have been chosen for 
discussion here. Since these are the two countries that Malaysia tried to emulate 
through its 'Look East Policy', implemented in 1983 by the Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad, they therefore deserved a separate analysis. These two countries have also 
moved on from the 'developing countries' label. 
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Japan has experienced dynamic developments and transformations, as noted by 
Sugeno (1994: 94), from confrontational to cooperative labour-management relations, 
the decline of labour disputes and strikes, the establishment of industrial autonomy 
and partnership, and changes in both external and internal labour markets. The state, 
influences IR through a wide range of policies, including economic, fiscal, industrial, 
and social policies, as well as those that specifically focus on labour. The distinctive 
feature of post-war IR in Japan is its dynamism, characterised by drastic social 
changes and industrial transformations. The state has a leading role in its socio-
economic development, guiding it in effect. Nevertheless, Kazuo insisted that the 
state's role is indirect. It has been characterised by inducing the parties' voluntary 
action through administrative guidance or 'endeavour obligation', or the technique of 
achieving de facto consensus through government-sponsored consultation machinery. 
Though the state have been involved in a wide range of issues in labour relations, the 
dual or multi-tier structure of industries and the labour market has basically been left 
intact (Sugeno, 1994: 110). There is a significant resemblance to corporatism in the 
mechanisms of Japanese IR, which some experts term 'loose neo-corporatism'. 
In the Republic of Korea, the government claimed to be the primary architect of 
nation building and the mover of economic development. Korean IR reflects a system 
in which the philosophy of the power elite and their strategy has determined the basic 
nature of the country's IR structure. There are four stages of the development of this 
country's IR namely: market-driven repression (1963-1971); authoritarian corporative 
repression (1972-mid-1987); immature pluralism (mid-1987 to mid-1989); and 
transition towards maturity (mid-1989). Its future success largely depends on whether 
unions, management and the government can successfully develop a social contract in 
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a joint effort to restructure the whole economy, and at the same time modernising the 
IR (Se-II Park, 1994). 
3.6.2. The Experience of Some ASEAN Countries 
There are both similarities and variation in IR practices m some of the ASEAN 
countries, as discussed below. Sharma (1996: 107) concludes that there are three 
different patterns of IR in ASEAN states. Indonesia and the Philippines represent a 
political pattern, Singapore an accommodative pattern, whereas Thailand and 
Malaysia show a conflictual one. He argues that the different patterns closely 
correspond to different stages of industrialisation. The political pattern is at a less 
industrialised stage, a repressive-confrontative pattern (conflictual) at a semi-
industrialised stage, and an accommodative pattern at a newly-industrialised stage. 
Fallows (1995: 445) argues that among the three major institutional forces of workers, 
employers, and government, the third force always plays a central role in the ASEAN 
IR system. It is because the so-called Asian model of industrialisation is based upon 
the interaction between government guidance and market competition where 
companies are said to competing vigorously to meet the goal set by the governments. 
The dominant approach to IR in ASEAN is collective bargaining complemented by 
compulsory arbitration. However, there is the comprehensive legal framework, which 
supports this practice. According to ASEAN laws, a trade union must be registered in 
order to have legal status (Sharma, 1996: 98). Sharma claimed that the government 
intervenes whenever employers resist the recognition of trade unions as the sole 
bargaining agent of workers. This claim will be probed using the Malaysian case. 
However, in general there are variations in the expectations of governments as to the 
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role of the trade unions, in so far as the ASEAN governments have demonstrated their 
commitments to a certain extent to protect trade unions as social institutions. 
Sharma also argues that in recent years, there is a tendency to attempt to transform the 
mode of IR from traditional confrontational to consensual, usually by an extensivc 
practice of tripartism, the adoption of a voluntary codes conduct for industrial 
harmony, and an emphasis on indigenous values and national development needs. 
Though the main concern over the years has been to maintain a stable and harmonious 
IR system, the search for a viable mechanism remains. It is notable that in this regard, 
ASEAN countries have attempted to emulate the Japanese experience by adopting 
measures such as joint labour-management consultation and quality circles (Sharma, 
1996), another area examined in this study. 
There are differences in the pattern of the relationship between the government and 
the labour movement in these countries. In Indonesia, Sharma claimed that labour and 
government collaborate almost as an organ of the government. In fact, the government 
has become more repressive whenever threats to its ability to control have appeared. 
The case of Marsinah and the role of the local police in 1993 showed the existence of 
repression (Sharma, 1996: 99; Interview: Muchtar Pakpahan, 18 June 2001). In 
Thailand, while the Free Labour Congress and the Internal Security Operations 
Command (ISOC) have a close contact with the government, the rest maintain their 
distance. In the Philippines, this situation is intensified. In Malaysia, the Malaysian 
Trade Union Congress (MTUC) has a conflictual relationship with the government 
whereby the government has seen fit to promote in-house unionism in the private 
sector to promotc Japanese-style labour-management relations. In Singapore, there is 
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full cooperation between the labour movement and the government, evidenced by the 
fact that a number of leaders of the National Trade Union Congress (NIUC) have 
become Members of Parliament, ministers, and even the President of the country. 
The structure of the trade union movements are also fragmented, such as those in 
Thailand and Philippines, while others are more unified. In Malaysia, and this is 
discussed in detail further in this study, the movement has become fragmented due to 
the conflict between trade unions. Singapore, however, is said to enjoy a truly unified 
trade union movement. According to Sharma, Indonesia has also enjoyed a unified 
labour movement in the aftermath of the Pancasila labour philosophy, but has become 
more fragmented in recent years. However, Gall (1998a: 369) notes the emergence of 
the Indonesian independent labour movement in a period of 'increased confidence and 
combativeness' . 
Ihe five ASEAN members also have differences with respect to the degree of 
legitimation of industrial action on the part of the industrial workers. In Indonesia 
strikes are legal, but not tolerated, while in Thailand they were once banned them, and 
similarly, Philippines banned them in 1981. Malaysia allows strikes, but those 
motivated by sympathy or politics are illegal. In Singapore they are legal, but the 
referral of an industrial dispute to the Arbitration Court can always bring out their 
early demise. In the midst of these, it is also important to analyse the role of 
employers associations in ASEAN, and especially in Malaysia and Singapore. 
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3.7. Comparative Analysis between the Developed and the Developing Nations 
Though it is difficult to compare, there are stark differences that have helped us 
understand the situation faced by these two classes. For example, the differences in 
the number of population engaged in wage-earning employment, as well as the 
difference in the focus of economic sector (agriculture or industry) are among some of 
the prominent factors. Most of the developing world's IR are of a dualistic economic 
structure, where a pre-capitalist economic system predominates alongside a small 
industrial sector. However, the most distinctive feature of the developing world is 
again the centrality of the state's role. Among both the more and the lesser developed 
nations, the government has increasingly sought a varying degree of control over the 
trade union movement and its activities. Such governments playa more active and 
interventionist role compared to the state's role in the European developed nations and 
the USA. 
The reasons for this, among others, are the beliefs that IR have a direct bearing upon 
the development process. Some unions in Asian countries can be considered simply as 
'administrative anns of the state' (Bean, 1994: 219). It thus becomes acceptable to 
assume that a certain duality of trade unions exist in the developing worlds, that is, on 
the one hand, defending and promoting the interests of their own members, yet at the 
same time being required to contribute to the national development effort. 
3.8. Conclusion 
The debate over the state's role in IR has recently centred on a general agreement that 
it acts in the economic sphere. In a democratic society, the state is expected to satisfy 
its people by providing reasonable standard of living (Niland, 1994: 38). When we 
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discuss the role of the state in IR in the modem world, what we actually mean is the 
standpoint of the approach and involvement of the government. As the most 
significant element in determining the legal environment within which IR operate, its 
role as an actor actually can be seen in several aspects. It acts as a third party regulator 
in promoting a legal framework, which establishes general ground rules for union-
management interaction, particularly in the procedures for collective bargaining. 
Second, it acts as a means of supporting and underpinning collective bargaining, 
whereby governments make statutory provisions relating to minimum conditions of 
employment. The third, and well-established function in many countries, is the 
provision of state services for conciliation, mediation and arbitration. In Britain and 
the USA there is a wide range of public peace-making machinery, whereas in France 
and Germany, the institutional provision of government assistance in dispute 
resolution has been minimal. A fourth aspect of the role of the state has become 
increasingly important and this is as a direct and primary participant. As a major 
employer within the public sector, the greater the importance of government as an 
employer the more influential it is likely to be on a particular country's IR system. 
Industrial countries differ, however, in the extent to which they rely on government 
legislation to determine the procedures of collective bargaining, to fix the substantive 
terms of employment and to settle disputes. In the developed nations, the state has 
initiated policies towards the deregulation of parts of the existing IR system, opening 
more to market forces, as shown in Britain, Belgium, Spain and to a certain extent 
Germany and Italy. In the developing world, the opposite has happened, and this study 
on Malaysian IR intends to examine the various factors behind this different approach. 
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Chapter Four explores the background of significant issues and themes in Malaysian 
IR, which gives a basic understanding to this study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE BACKGROUND TO THE MALAYSIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIO~S 
SYSTEM 
4.1.Introduction 
Chapters Two and Three explored the role of the state in the economy and in IR, 
respectively. There was shown to be strong link between the two, which revol\'es 
around the role of the state in the former heavily influencing the role of the state in the 
latter. 
This chapter outlines issues and central themes that are of importance to Malaysia for 
the whole period under study. It provides us with a background understanding as to 
what motivates and influences the state's role in the Malaysian economy and relate 
this to its effect on IR policies. This chapter also highlights the emergence of a plural 
society in Malaysia and the related racial issues, which, as argued in this study, at 
times complicate the Malaysian scenario and influence the way the state functions. 
The plural society indicates that each major ethnic group in Malaysia, the Malays, 
Chinese and Indians, has distinct cultural values that may be contributory to the way 
IR relationship is practised in the country. 
Malaysia today is a relatively small Southeast Asian country, with a total land area of 
about 330,000 square kilometres. Since the formation of 'Malaysia' in 1963, the 
region has included Sabah and Sarawak on the Borneo island. Malaysia consists of 
thirteen states with two federal territories, Kuala Lumpur and Labuan. By 2000, there 
was a population of 21.2 million people, comprising a mixture of Malays. Chinese and 
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Indians as its major ethnic groups. It has a young population, with 42% of the 
country's population falling within the 15 to 39 age groUp.21 The country's total 
labour force was estimated at 8.6 million in 1997, with services sector being the 
biggest employer by providing 48% of total employment. The other major sectors are 
manufacturing (28%), agriculture (15%) and construction (9.1 %).22 Malaysia has long 
been a leading producer and exporter of commodities such as natural rubber, palm oil, 
cocoa, timber, pepper and tin, and is a net exporter of petroleum and natural gas. 
Today, Malaysia is recognised as one of the world's leading exporters of electronic 
semi-conductors, air-conditioners and audio-visual equipment. Moreover, it exports 
products derived from the country's natural resources, such as rubber products (like 
soap, margarine, oleo-chemicals) and timber products (plywood, mouldings, 
furniture). Over the last 8 years, Malaysia's GDP growth rate has been an impressiye 
8% per annum. 23 
4.2. An Historical Overview of Malaysia 
To understand contemporary Malaysia, it is crucial to look into its socio-cultural, 
political as well as economic background. The analysis below focuses in brief on 
themes and issues that surround Malaysia, from pre-colonial times to the period when 
Malaya was under British and Japan, two colonial rulers that left the greatest impact 
on the country. Even though there were other influences beforehand, like the Dutch 
[\\~\~\' document]. l'RL 21 Refer to Malaysia Your Profit Centre In Asia- The People .• 
http://202.185.160.3/profitipeople 1.html 
22 Refer also to Malaysia Your Profit Centre In Asia- The People [\\\\w document]. URL 
http://202.185.160.3/profitipeople 1.html 
21 Refer Malaysia Your Profit Centre In Asia- The Economy [\\·\\W document]. llRL 
http' 202.1 R5.160.3/profiteconomi.htrnl 
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and Portuguese,24 the British were the longest colonial power to rule \lalaya, and 
most important of all to this study, it represented the beginning of the plural society, 
dual economy and an employment system based on wage labour. The traditional 
Malay administrative system was then replaced by a Western-type bureaucratic 
system, which provided the basic foundation for the development of a capitalist 
economy (Khoo, 1972: 226). 
4.2.1. The Colonial Rule: Structural Changes 
The British, apart from introducing a westernised bureaucratic system that became 
permanent, brought about the plural society, the concept of wage labour, dual 
economy and a 'divide and rule' policy that leave such an impact on future multi-
racial Malaysia. 
4.2.1.1.The Pre-Colonial Malay and the Birth of a Plural Society 
The significance of understanding the pre-colonial Malay society in the context of 
this study is to understand the origins of the continued 'political supremacy' of the 
Malays. Thus, the brief discussion below describes the pre-colonial Malay socio-
political and economic practices that contributed to their lagging behind, as opposed 
to seizing a new economic opportunity to better themselves under the British capitalist 
system, as did the immigrant Chinese. These knowledge help us understand how even 
present day the Malays still struggle to better themselves and their communities 
24 To see how step by step the British overtook Malayan states under their administration and control 
from the Dutch. or thl' Dutch influence over the Portuguese. read for example Li (1982) who ga\'e an 
economic analysis on the subject. For a more recent reading, see Abraham (1997) \vho analysed the 
roots of race relations in t\1alaysia, which originated from the 'divide and rule' policy of the British. 
113 
economically, and some still believe it can only be achieved through political 
supremacy in a coalition government. 
Primary sources that described their early socio-political system, however, are limited 
to accounts of colonial officials with their bias on vested interests.25 The Malays of 
the nineteenth century gained much of their laws and custom from the Malacca 
Muslim sultanate, at its peak during the 14th and 15th centuries (Jomo, 1988: 4). This 
patrilineal system inherited by the Malays (apart from the matrilineal one in Negeri 
Sembilan26) became the basis for all colonial powers, especially the British, to 
acknowledge the 'special rights' of the Malays as the indigenous people. The issue 
became more apparent after the British immigration policy brought in floods of 
immigrants, particularly the Chinese and Indians from theie respective countries. 
The British in the mid-nineteenth century found the Malays as peasant farmers with a 
subsistence economy in scattered villages, especially along the banks of the main 
rivers (Roff, 1967: 1). They were initially involved in tin-mining and, prior to the 
nineteenth century, it was claimed that although mining was a Malay industry, it was 
rather a part-time occupation due to their commitment to agriculture (Abraham, 1997: 
79). The political system also complicated matters as the Malay chiefs, who were in 
general more powerful than the sultans, had control over land and there was rarely, if 
25 Both Lim (1976) and David Wong (1975) illustrated debates between colonial officers over the pre-
colonial Malay land-tenure system, each arguing from their perspectives, but of course bringing such an 
impact to the Malay states. 
26 See Durrishah (1990) which explains the matrilineal system of ~egeri Sembilan Malays for a long 
time practiced the adat pc/patill. She also discusses how the Malays were sometimes confused ovcr the 
difference between culture (adat) and Islam. 
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any, upward movement between the ordinary and the ruling class.27 The British 
interests in Malaya were also limited to securing raw materials for industry, as well as 
developing markets for exports, and Malaya fitted well into serving this need. ~8 
Chamhuri and Surtahman (1985) noted that pre-colonial Malay produced only on a 
subsistent basis and the British administration introduced the mass production of tin 
and rubber which led to the arrival of thousands of Chinese and Indians to the country. 
This partly explained how the Malays were left behind in both commercial agriculture 
and other modem industries.29 
Li (1982: 109) argues that after the British control was established, the composition of 
the population drastically changed; a change that was so rapid that at the end of his 
analysis of 1938, the aliens clearly outnumbered the Malays. In fact, in the 1931 
census, the first official realisation of the situation hit the Malays hardest. The census 
shows that the Malays in the Federated Malay States (FMS), that is the more 
developed states among all the Peninsular states, were outnumbered by Chinese and 
Indians between 34.7% and 63.7%. The Malays were only the majority in the 
Unfederated Malay States (UMS) of lohor, Kedah, Pedis, Kelantan and Trengganu, 
which apart from lohor, were the less developed areas of the peninsular (Comber, 
1983: 17). The Chinese migration only fell in 1932 after the Great Depression 
(Comber, 1983: 18) when the government imposed the Aliens Ordinance, which 
stipulated a quota of 1,000 per month on male Chinese. 
27 Gullick (1958) best described the situation faced by ordinary Malays in the socio-political system at 
the brink of British forward movement in 1874. 
2S See Jomo (1988) and Chamhuri and Surtahman (1985), each giving a comprehensiw account of the 
economy of pre- and colonial periods. . 
29 Jomo (1988). Gullick (1958) and Khoo (1991 and 1972) all offer analyses on the SOCIO-\!JlJy 
political system and economic practices bdore the arrival of British administration. 
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There was a negative perception that worsened the Malays' plight in their involvement 
in the commercial economic sector in pre-Independent Malaya. Though the British 
colonialists regarded them as 'the owners of the Malay country', since their existence 
in Malaya thousands of years before the coming of the migrants, they were at times 
outnumbered by the migrants (see Table 4.1). Li (1982) remarked that the Malays 
'were not active participants in modem enterprises' and 'were satisfied with being left 
alone'. It was to the alien immigrants that 'the economic development of Malaya is 
chiefly to be credited to' (Li, 1982: 109). However, there were the deliberate policies 
of the British that brought in large numbers of immigrants to Malaya, and it was their 
pre-conceived judgement of the Malays that altered the history of Malaya. The British 
also had a certain fixation that the Indians as labourers were 'more easily manageable, 
obedient, dependent, and accustomed to British rule' (J omo, 1994: 2). That also might 
have ascertained their place mostly as workers on rubber plantations and railways, the 
less commercial side of the modem economic undertaking in Malaya. 
Table 4.1: Population Census, 1931, by race 
Nationalities Population Percentage 
Europeans 17,768 0.4 
Eurasians 16,043 0.4 
Malays 1,644,173 37.5 
Other Malaysians 317,848 7.2 
Chinese 1,709.392 39.0 
Indians 624,009 14.2 
Others 56,113 l.3 
Total 4,385,346 100.0 
Source: Vheland, 1932. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that from a very early stage in colonial Malaya there was 
already a demarcation line between ethnic groups, which later affected the labour 
mo\'cment. The demarcation in economic activities further encouraged this situation. 
The British, who generally opposed any disruption such as labour movement to their 
116 
economic agendas, naturally let this happen as the more disunited and disorganised 
the movement was, the better it was for them. 
Natural differences coupled with British 'divide and rule' policies heightened the 
friction between the Malays and Chinese. The economic plight of the former had 
already become a debate among the minority of educated Malays as early as the tum 
of the century when, in 1906, ai-Imam (The Leader), a Malay periodical, was first 
published in Singapore. Though initially just concerned with religious issues, by the 
1920s it had begun to support a Malay nationalism movement with the emergence of a 
Malay intelligentsia. This saw the Kaum Tua- Kaum Muda debate,30 which was 
concerned with Malay issues, such as economic backwardness as compared to 
immigrants (Roff, 1967; Abraham, 1997: 187). By the 1920s and 1930s, an English-
educated Malay elite also joined ranks in promoting Malay rights and their economic 
plight, but more in favour of the British protection policy towards the Malays. There 
were also the Malay-educated nationalist, joining ranks with some Cairo-educated 
Malays who were anti-colonial, anti-Chinese and anti-aristocracy (Abraham, 1997: 
188). 
The matter was made worse by the fact that no efforts were made by the British to 
integrate the plural society. Politically, the early twentieth century saw the Chinese 
very much influenced by mainland China politics,3l while its education system, which 
was not monitored by the British until 1920, was founded and financed by the Chinese 
:\0 Kaum Tlla and Kawn Mllda reflected debates between the more aggressive group of \lalay 
intelligentsias Kml1l1 Muda (the Young Ones) as compared to the more conservative ones, I\(/Wll Tua-
(the Old Ones). Roff ( 1967) offers detailed analysis of the situation . 
. 11 For more details, see Blythe (1969) who analysed, apart from the Chinese secret societies, the history 
and important periods in early and after \V orld \\' ar II Malaya. 
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community themselves (Comber, 1982: 21). Therefore, the education system also 
permitted and encouraged significant nationalism towards mainland China. 
Over time, the Malays were treated differently following the British policy of 
'protectionism' over their 'special right'. Milne and Mauzy (1986: 20) called the 
policy 'destructively paternalistic'. It made the Malays the 'favoured indigenous race', 
by protecting them from 'economic competition, ugly commercialism, and the 
deleterious effects that modem urban life was considered to pose for their culture' 
(Milne and Mauzy, 1986: 20). The Malay peasants were encouraged to maintain their 
old, outdated way of life in rural areas, and had if lucky, a basic education that did not 
prepare them for the modem, fast-changing world that was enveloping Malaya. All the 
while, the Malay aristocracy approved this policy since it helped preserve the feudal 
royal establishment and maintain Malay deference to rank (Milne and Mauzy, 1986: 
21). Out of 'moral obligation' the British employed more Malays into the government 
service, though for many years only in lower rank posts, but this left a Malay majority 
in the public sector today (discussed further in especially Chapter 10). There was the 
English-medium elitist Malay College of Kuala Kangsar (MCKK), established to 
produce English-educated Malays to the appointment of Malay Administrative 
Service (MAS), a junior branch of Malayan Civil Service (MCS-dominated by 
'natural born British subjects of European descent' (Comber, 1983: 21). However 
only the sons of Malay 'aristocrats' attended the best schools like MCKK or had 
further education as far as England. 
This 'divide and rule' policy made the non-Malays believed the British policy was in 
accordance with pro-Malay policy of 'Malaya for Malays'. From early twentieth 
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century therefore, there were already a general animosity between the \lalays and the 
Chinese, apart from their already existing natural differences of language, culture and 
beliefs. There was a period of political upheaval in the affairs of immigrant 
populations between 1929-1934, that made the Chinese more wary of British 
intentions towards them and the pro-Malay policies. This started with the Immigration 
Restriction Ordinance of 1928, intended to 'prevent unemployment or economic 
distress or to promote the public interests', and later in 1933, the Aliens Ordinance 
intended to regulate the immigration of aliens 'not quantitatively, but also 
qualitatively, and to control their residence in the Colony' (Abraham, 1997: 200). 
If all these factors were not enough to contribute to the ill-feeling between the two 
ethnic groups, their economic practices, discussed below, drove them further apart as 
labour demarcation emerged, where races were to be more glaringly identified with 
certain economic activities. 
4.2.1.2.The Emergence of Wage Labour and Dual Economy 
The tin and rubber industries prompted the British to bring In great numbers of 
Chinese and Indians to work in mining and rubber plantations respectively.32 A 
number of contradictory reasons have been suggested to explain the lack of 
indigenous Malay workers and why the British and the other earlier mining employers 
appeared to prefer immigrant labour.33 Most of the rice-peasant Malays were 
economically self-sufficient in their communal village setting and were said to be 
32 For a comprehensive study on the early tin industry read Wong (1965), for both analyses on tin and 
mbber read 1.1 (1982). 
33 Li (1982: 135) argues that as 'nature's gentlemen', the \lalays were not interested in becoming \\'age 
earners either in the plantations or 1111 mines. 
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reluctant to work under the strenuous working conditions and strict disciplinary 
regulations of wage employment. It was also in the interest of the mining and 
plantation owners to rely on a cheap and plentiful supply of immigrant workers who 
laboured solely for money, whereas the Malays were regarded as an unstable source of 
labour supply, since they could always return to their kampungs34 whenever wage 
work became unpalatable. Thus, there was clearly a lack of understanding by the 
colonial government over the nature and importance of agriculture and padi-planting35 
to Malays, and that created the vast difference in their attitude towards Malays and 
their later employment policy. As Wilkinson observed: 
'Agriculture is the soul of Malay life. He is essentially a planter; his festivals 
are seasonal; his joys and sorrows depend on the crops; and his whole life is 
regulated by the great rice-planting industry' (Wilkinson, 1957: 66). 
In fact, it was also part of the British policy to encourage the Malays to continue with 
their rice production activities, as more of this staple food was required to feed the 
growing immigrant workers (Durrishah, 1995). The Malays in the early twentieth 
century actually showed an interest in applying for land for rubber cultivation, which 
showed their interest in commercial crop, even though the area applied a lot smaller 
than applied by the Malay rulers and the Chinese planters. This interest alarmed the 
British.36 The encouragement towards the planting of rice then became almost a 
forceful policy, with the British unfailingly compelling the Malay chiefs to get their 
anak buah37 to work in the paddy fields (Durrishah, 1995). When the land was under 
total control of the British under the Resident System, the Malays were again side-
34 'Kamplil/g' means village. 
35 'Padi' means paddy or rice. 
1<> Durrishah (1995) explains in detail the introduction of the British Torrens land system into Malaya in 
early twentieth century that replaced the Malay traditional land system. 
n 'AI/ok hllah 'literally means niece or nephew, but in the Malay traditional system it meant the people 
under the authority of Malay chiefs-usually related and ll\'t~ in his 'area'. 
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tracked. Since they were not involved in rubber plantations, except as smallholders of 
generally less than 10 acres of land, their position was again at a disadvantage. As Lim 
(1976: 147) noted, the Malay political elite who sat in the State Council had no 
authority over any decisions made by British administrators. If a choice had to be 
made between a Malay cultivator or aliens, especially European planters to acquire 
land, it would be made against the Malays (Lim, 1976: 161). It did not help that the 
Malay elite did not understand the nature of colonial land law. Out of the nature of 
their social system and lack of any modem knowledge, the ordinary Malays were 
ignorant. It was also true that the Malays who lived in kampungs were not too keen to 
leave behind their traditional life and join the wage labours in plantations, as this 
might take them away from their close-knit family. In effect, this led to the 'dual 
economy' where the peasants preserved their non-commercial traditional economic 
practices, further separating them from the modem sectors. Only the Malay elite was 
taken care of by the British sufficiently to quieten them. All of this suggests that it 
became economically and politically cheaper and less problematic for the colonial 
administration and the investors to rely on immigrant labour, instead of encouraging 
the available Malay communities. 
Up until 1914, the immigrant labourers were forced to pay their employers for their 
passage and advances and this situation favoured the employers. By 1911, the 
indenture system of the Indian labourers was fonnally tenninated by the British, and 
in 1914, the Chinese indenture system officially ended too. The Indian labourers were 
later brought using the 'kangany' system, where the 'kangany' (workers on estates 
themselves) received commissions from employers to return to India to recruit more 
labourers to be brought into Malaya. Only after 1910, when rubber became an 
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industry, did the Indians begin to immigrate in substantial numbers. The majority of 
the Chinese labourers recruited in the early period worked in the tin mines. During the 
first two decades of the 20th century, the Chinese working in the tin mines were 
estimated to number about 200,000 in the FMS alone. In 1913, the Chinese provided 
216,231 of a total of 225,405 tin mine workers. Just as the bulk of the labour force in 
the rubber plantations was made up of Indians, the overwhelming majority of the mine 
workers were Chinese. These attitude of the British shows that at this stage, Indians 
and Chinese were merely considered as 'workers' who were thought to stay 
temporarily in Malaya. 
However, in 1922 there was an act to enable the Indian government to impose some of 
its terms on the Malayan governments in connection with the treatment of Indian 
labour in Malaya. A standard wage, compulsory education for Indian labourers' 
children, the strict regulation of kangany recruiting, and the abolition of penal 
sanctions for breaches of labour contracts were among the new terms. The conditions 
under which emigration to Malaya for service as an unskilled labourer was to be 
permitted were clearly defined. The overwhelming majority of the recruited Indian 
labourers worked on the rubber plantations. In 1908, the Tamils provided 43,515 
rubber estate labourers out of the total of57,070 in the FMS. In 1918, Indian labourers 
constituted 139,480 of a total of 201,964 estate labourers in the FMS. During the 
Depression of 1930-1933, when the price of rubber dropped, a large number of Indian 
labourers were repatriated. By May 1934, when the position of rubber industry had 
improved, the Indian government assisted in the emigration of non-recruited workers, 
marking the by-passing of the sen'ices of kangany. On the payment of wages, before 
the intervention of the Indian government towards Indian labourers in Malaya, it was 
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considered a matter to be negotiated purely between individual employers and 
employees. From 1923 onwards, the Indian Immigration Committee had the power to 
prescribe standard wages for Indian workers, based upon a standard budget that took 
into account the cost of foodstuffs, clothing, festival preparations, household 
equipment, return passage to India, savings, and maintenance of dependents. Indian 
nationalists insisted that these standard wages be applied throughout Malaya, but there 
was no general rule. The wages for Malay labourers were lower than the wages 
enjoyed by the Indians. Moreover, the higher wages enjoyed by labourers in Singapore 
or the differences enjoyed among ethnic groups had already started at this early stage 
and originated from the different views held by the British or investors towards them 
(Li, 1982). 
It is interesting to note the involvement of nationalists or representatives of the Indian 
labourers from India itself, such as in 1936, when a representative arrived in Malaya 
to investigate the conditions of the Indian labourers there when he suggested the re-
establishment of the standard wages of 1928. The workers had complained that while 
they had shared the hardship of the depression with their employers with a cut in their 
salary, they were being denied the right to share the benefits of renewed prosperity. In 
early 1938, the old standard wage of $.50 a day for men was temporarily restored but 
reduced again on May 1, 1938 to $.45. This marked the influence of the British 
government in controlling the conditions of work and the welfare of the Indians 
compared, for example, to the Chinese labourers who were more independent, often 
more costly, and in fact prone to organise and strike at the instigation of political 
agitators (Li, 1982). 
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As for the Chinese labourers, though there was a lack of concern from the Chinese 
government towards their citizens working in Malaya, their wages were higher, even 
on the same plantation. There were several reasons why the employers paid the 
Chinese more than their Indians or Malays counterparts. They were mostly engaged in 
piecework rather than on a daily basis, and were willing to work longer hours, 
therefore earning more by producing more. Almost all skilled-workers were Chinese, 
and thus paid more. They were also regarded as more efficient, hardier, and stronger 
than the Indians. If there was a suggestion for them to be paid equally, then the Indians 
would lose other advantages enjoyed by them. Many employers thus preferred Indian 
workers rather than the Chinese labours, for the reasons stated above (Li, 1982: 144). 
The Indians they argued, in the meantime received better treatment in other aspects 
which were denied to the Chinese. 
In this early period, ordinances concerning the welfare of labourers were rudimentary. 
The first systematic welfare code for the FMS came into existence in 1912, and for the 
Straits Settlements, in 1920. In 1923, as a result of negotiations between the Malayan 
governments and the government of India, both these codes were revised. The 
conditions of Indians labourers were closely inspected by the Indian government 
through its representatives in Malaya. While the Labour department was occupied 
with Indian labour affairs, the Chinese labourers were left to fend for themselves, 
though officials of the Chinese Protectorate (later the Secretariat) acted as assistant 
labour controllers responsible for their welfare. The labour code stipulated that no 
labourers should be bound to work for more than six days a week, or for more than six 
consecutive hours or nine non-consecutive hours a day of actual labour. Any labourer 
working more than those hours was to receive overtime. Children were not eligible for 
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contractual employment, and could not be employed in any fonn of labour except in 
accordance with rules which subjected such employment to medical supervision. 
Nevertheless these regulations were rarely enforced, except partly in the plantation 
sector (Li, 1982: 146). In 1929, the Workmen's Compensation Law was passed by the 
Federal Council of the FMS, while an identical one was passed by the legislature of 
the Straits Settlements. According to this law, workers who earned more than $200.00 
a month and who received injuries resulting in death or disablement for a period 
exceeding seven days or who contracted occupational diseases were entitled to receive 
various prescribed payments from their employers. Other social legislation, such as 
the provision of old-age pensions, retirement plans and the like, did not exist in 
Malaya. Then there were measures directed towards the advancement of the welfare of 
the labour class, which came from the above law, with some pressure from the British 
government itself. Li (1982: 147) stressed that there was in fact no labour movement 
in Malaya in the period from 1895 to 1938. He perceived it as a time of unorganised 
riots, when the cost of living rose and earnings could not sustain even a starvation-
level existence (Discussed in Chapter 6). This was easy for the employers to put 
down, especially when what the employers did was regarded as a favour rather than an 
obligation. As such there were no tenns of equality where negotiations might apply. 
Table 4.2: Rubber Plantation Area (in acre) According to Ownership by 
Nationalities, 1920 
Races Area Percentage 
Eur~ean 510349 70.8 
Chinese 153476 21.3 
Indians 4950 6.0 
Others 13513 1.9 
Total 720288 100.0 
Source: Kamaruddin, 1992: 18. 
Table 4.2. illustrates the Europeans, Chinese and Indians ownership of rubber 
plantations in Malaya in 1920. It shows that no Malays held a rubber plantation, of 
more than 100 acres each. 
Again Table 4.3. and Table 4.4. show the same tendency of the extent of ownership 
of European, Chinese and Indians as compared to others in Malaya in 1938. The 
significance of this fact is the realisation that the Malays lacked ownership and wealth 
during this time, encouraging them to fight more enthusiastically for their 'special 
rights', which were later granted in the constitution. 
Table 4.3: The Distribution of Rubber Estates Among Different Nationalities in 
FMS 
SS 
UMS 
Total 
MALAYA 
nationality of 
ownership 
European 
Chinese 
Indian 
Others I 
Malaya, 1938( acres) 
European Chinese I Indian I Others I Total 
( essentially 
British) 
853,841 
132,165 
544,414 
1,530,420 
Number 
5,000acres 
and over 
47 
1 
5 
118,076 47,104 13,405 1,032,426 
61,011 12,036 1,646 206,858 
143,554 28,665 76,062 792,685 
322,641 87,795 91,113 2,031,969 
Source: Li, 1982: 86. 
Table 4.4: Nationality of Ownership, Estates, 1938 
(by size of estates) 
of estates 
Total 
1000-4999 500-999 100-499 
acres acres acres 
467 237 245 996 
47 94 911 1,053 
5 21 343 369 
13 1 10 I 63 I 91 
Source: Li, 1982: 86. 
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Table 4.5. illustrates the increase in immigrant labours, especially Chinese and 
Indians, and to a lesser extent, Javanese. The significance of this table is that it shows 
a much greater total in the number of Chinese and Indians as compared to 'others' in 
this category. This fact contributed to the birth of the permanent plural society in 
Malaya, which became more apparent after WWII when the three major communities 
- the Malays, Chinese and Indians - fought for their respective rights. 
Table 4.5: Numbers of Estate Labours According to Races In FMS, 1907-1920 
Years Indians Chinese Javanese Others Total 
1907 43824 4348 6029 2872 58073 
1908 43515 6595 4999 1961 57070 
1909 55732 12402 6170 2778 77524 
1910 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 128446 
1911 109633 31460 12795 12127 166015 
1912 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 188050 
1913 142476 25081 12197 8496 188050 
1914 120144 24000 10115 7120 161379 
1915 126347 27446 8356 8592 170741 
1916 138295 42831 7485 7496 196123 
1917 148834 55240 7746 8902 220758 
1918 139480 46372 8249 7821 201964 
1919 160658 61089 7861 7492 237134 
1920 160966 40866 8918 5808 216588 
Source: Kamaruddm, 1992. 26. 
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4.2.1.3. The Ethnic Bargain 
According to Shamsul Amri (1994: 8), the decade immediately after Wv\'ll (August 
1945-July 1955) was a critical period in Malaysia's modern history. The British had to 
deal with at least four major challenges - racial strife, labour unrest (Discussed further 
in Chapter Six), communist insurgency and widespread opposition to the new system 
it had introduced: the Malayan Union. This led to a situation of near anarchy as a 
result of war-torn conditions and other negative consequences that developed in turn. 
On the other hand, the ,colonial state tried to rebuild the economy and society through 
various means. This period also saw the setting up of the present-day administrative 
structures, political arrangements and public policy institutions in Malaysia. 
During two weeks of political vacuum before the arrival of the British Military 
Administration (BMA), the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA - largely 
Chinese), the precursor of Malayan Communist Party (MCP) overtook Malaya. 
Widespread ethnic 'score-settling' ensued, targeting those they thought were pro-
Japanese and needless to say, attacking the almost entirely Malay police force, who 
worked for the Japanese (Milne and Mauzy, 1986: 21-22). Thus, the British produced 
the 'Malayan Union' idea which would unite the FMS, UMS, Penang and Malacca as 
a single crown colony (Singapore was not included because of its large Chinese 
population and also its strategic value), For the first time, the Malay nationalists 
united to oppose the program, even though some Malay rulers were threatened to sign 
the treaty which would strip them of their sovereignty and eliminate the 'special 
position of the Malays' (Milne and Mauzy, 1986: 22). This period also saw the birth 
of the UMNO in May 1946, led by an aristocratic lohor family, Onn Jaafar. This was 
followed by mass Malay demonstrations, boycotts, and protests that shocked the 
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British. Faced with all these, the British announced in July 1946 that the ',\lalayan 
Union' would be replaced by a federal scheme, with details to be worked out by 
UMNO, the rulers and the British. There was no provision for the representation of 
the non-Malays. This further enhances the claim made in this study that the British 
perceived the Malays as the indigenous people of Malaya, and the immigrants as 
'guest-workers' . 
The Federation of Malaya 1948 was established in February, re-instituting the rulers' 
functions, restoring Malay 'special rights' and most important of all, strict citizenship 
provisions were made as opposed to the 'jus-soli ,38 concept under the Malayan Union 
that was greatly opposed by the Malays. The UMNO became the dominant Malay 
political force from then on, for the Malays, and as proven later, in the government as 
well. As for the Chinese and Indians, their slow reaction was said to be caused by the 
greater attentions paid towards events in their respective home countries. If the 
Malayan Union became a reality, the non-Malays had the most to gain. However, the 
positive outcome was that after the implementation of the 1948 Federation, Chinese 
and Indian nationalism became more Malaya-centred (Milne and Mauzy, 1986: 24). 
This was apparent after the birth of the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) and the 
Malayan Chinese Association in (MCA) in 1946 and 1949, respectively. 
About the same time, there was labour unrest due to dissatisfaction over labour issues 
and labour laws (discussed in Chapter 6), and the MCP, also influenced by resolutions 
made at a meeting of young Communists at Calcutta in February 1948, resorted to 
1H 'Jus soli' means the right of citizenship by virtue of birth in a country. 
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guerrilla warfare (Milne and Mauzy, 1986: 24). The British declared a nationwide 
state of emergency that lasted until 1960. During the Emergency, the British made an 
extra effort to suppress communism by introducing the Briggs Plan, thereby relocating 
more than 500,000 Chinese to 'New Villages' where they could not be threatened by 
or tempted into assisting the MCP. In a way, this relocation caused further bitterness 
towards the government. However, the process towards independence was under way, 
and the British let be it be known that Malaya would not be run by one single ethnic 
group. This led to attempts at ethnic co-operation, such as the Communities Liaison 
Committee (CLC), comprised of top leaders of ethnic communities. An attempt by 
UMNO President, Dato' Onn to open UMNO membership to all ethnic groups was 
flatly rejected by UMNO members, and this made him resign, and form the 
Independence of Malaya Party, a multi-ethnic party much encouraged by the British. 
Tunku Abdul Rahman (nephew of the Sultan of Kedah, a member of royalty) who 
took over the UMNO presidency, warned that the Independence of Malaya Party 
would undermine Malay interests. However, most Malays did not join the party, 
therefore diminishing its multi-ethnic credibility. 
What this discussion has shown so far is how the Malayan communities developed 
their political preferences along ethnic lines, just as they did in aspects of their 
economic life. The belief is that by choosing racial-based parties such as the UMNO, 
Me A and MIC, their interests would be protected by their leaders. The British, 
however, then changed their mind and supported the UMNO and Me A alliance after 
victories in the municipal elections in Kuala Lumpur in February 1952. In 1954, the 
MIC joined the alliance, now completing the representati\'c for three major ethnic 
groups in Malaya. The UMNO \'icwed itself as the major party of the coalition based 
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on the Malays as the largest ethnic group, as the indigenous race, and also the biggest 
electorate - about 87% at the time (Milne and Mauzy: 1986: 27). In the 1955 
Legislative Council's first general election, The Alliance quietened their critics and 
sceptics and won 51 of the 52 seats. 
With this impressive win, the British now acknowledged that the way forward for 
Malaya was through co-operation between ethnic groups, represented by their 
respective parties. The next hurdle was to create a constitution that would be accepted 
by all communities. This is where 'the bargain' amongst the ethnic groups came in; 
'an agreement' among community leaders on how best to solve future racial issues in 
Malaya. The essence of the bargain was the 'acceptance by the non-Malay leaders that 
the Malays, as indigenous race, were entitled to political dominance, while in return 
the Malay leaders recognised that socio-economic pursuits of the non-Malays should 
not be infringed upon' (Milne and Mauzy, 1986: 28). The constitution also 
incorporated the principle of jus soli, an issue that was strongly opposed by Malays in 
the 1946 Malayan Union concept. Moreover, Islam became the state religion (with 
freedom of religion guaranteed), the powers of Malay rulers were maintained, Malay 
land reservations continued and a clause introduced so that Malay 'special rights' 
were protected under Article 153 in the 1957 independent Malaya constitution. This 
was to include rights such as reservations or quotas for Malays in the federal public 
service and am1ed forces, business permits or licences, and educational scholarships. 
There were segments of each community that rejected the terms, but the majority 
appeared to accept the bargain and therefore the progress towards independence 
proceeded. As seen later. this 'bargain' or 'ethnic agreement' was forever 'fought for' 
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by the Malays and 'challenged' by the non-Malays. As also discussed these issues 
affected other national policies in Malaysia, including IR. 
4.3. The Main Issues after Independence 
The main and inter-related issues as discussed below, centred on the on-going conflict 
between the Malay and Chinese communities that brought about a turning point in the 
new independent nation. This discussion is followed by an account of the efforts made 
towards national unity, the establishment of the NEP that extended for twenty years 
and a long era under the present Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad. All these factors 
have had their own impact on IR policies and practices, as discussed further from 
Chapter Seven onwards. 
4.3.1. Sino-Malay Relations and the 13th May 1969 
Twelve years after Independence, on the 13th May 1969, the worst racial riot in 
Malaysian history broke.39 Two questions that are raised here are - what caused it and 
what impact did it have on IR? 
With regard to the first, Comber (1983: 73) noted the Tunku's claim that it was 
instigated by the communists coupled with Chinese secret societies. The Minister of 
Home Affairs blamed the opposition parties, and 'anti-national and subversive 
elements'. However, the National Operations Council (NOC) which took over the 
running of the country after the riot, offered other hypotheses. There were differences 
in the interpretation of the constitution by Malays and non-Malays, and resentment by 
19 See Comber (1983) \\'ho analyses the period before and after the 131h :\ lay racial riot. 
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Chinese over the provisions relating to the establishment of Malay as the official 
language, and the Yang Dipertuan Agong's (Agong, or the King) responsibility to 
safeguard the special position of the Malays, clauses found in Articles 152 and 153 in 
the Malaysian Constitution. However, the weeks of campaigning leading up to the 
1969 general elections were what prompted the riot. Both the Alliance and opposition 
parties, especially the Partai Islam seMalaysia (PAS), an Islamic party dominated by 
Malays, and Democratic Action Party (DAP)40, contributed to the heightened 
animosity between the two communities. The Alliance emphasised maintaining 
'Malay special rights', with the Tunku saying: 
'The Malays have gained for themselves political power. The Chinese and 
Indians have won for themselves economic power. The blending of the two 
with complete goodwill and understanding has brought about peace and 
harmony, coupled with prosperity to the country' (cited in Comber, 1983: 64). 
The PAS countered this with a promise of an Islamic state, in order to amend the 
constitution to give it a more Malay rather than Malaysian slant. The DAP attacked 
the MCA for 'surrendering Chinese rights to UMNO' and claimed to fight for 
'Malaysian Malaysia' - a concept first popularised by People Action Party (PAP) 
under Lee Kuan Yew"~ I The outcome of the election was devastating for the Alliance 
since it lost 25.84% of the seats that it formerly held. Worst of all, it lost Penang to 
Gerakan, with the PAS having a firmer grip on Kelantan. The Gerakan and DAP - two 
Chinese dominated parties - had considerable success in Selangor. On the 11 th and 
lih May, these two parties held 'victory procession' parades in Kuala Lumpur -
which saw provocative acts and insults directed at Malays. On the evening of 13th 
May, a group of UMNO supporters assembled outside the house of the Selangor 
~II DAP was and still is a Chinese dominated party though claiming to be non-conununal. It was the 
Malaysian version of PAP after Singapore was sacked from Malaysia in 1965. 
41 Singapore joined Malaysia with Sabah and Sarawak in 1963. However. the PAP stand on several 
issues, most importantly on racial issues, drove the Tunku to dismiss it from the Federation in 1965. 
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Mentri Besar (Chief Minister of Selangor) and during the ensuing action \lalays and 
Chinese indulged in killing, arson, looting and burning. E\'en with police and army 
reinforcements the riot went on until 15th May, with the Agong proclaiming a state of 
Emergency to secure public order. 
Relating to the second question, how the government dealt with the aftermath of the 
riot became a watershed period in Malaysian history. Apart from declaring a state of 
Emergency, the NOC composed of politicians, civil servants and members of the 
police and military was set up, slowly taking power from the retiring Prime Minister, 
and finding ways to solve the problem behind the 13th May. A national ideology called 
Rukun Negara was established (discussed below), and new restrictions on free speech 
were imposed. Milne and Mauzy (1999: 23) note that this even included words used 
by Members of Parliament, that were likely to promote feelings of ill will between 
races. The definition of sedition was enlarged under the amended Sedition Ordinance, 
so that it was an offence 'to question any matter, right, status, position, privilege, 
sovereignty or prerogative established or protected by the provisions of Part III of the 
Federal Constitution' (cited in Means, 1991: 14). These are rights of citizenship; 
Malay special rights; the status and powers of the Malay rulers; the status of Islam; 
and the status of Malay as the national language. The most important long-term 
outcome was, of course, the introduction and implementation of the national 
economic plan, the NEP (discussed below). 
4.3.2. Rukull Negara as National Ideology 
Means (1991) argued that prior to 1969, Malaysian leaders responded to shi fts in 
public opinion from the detached perspecti\'e of the 'bene\'olent' patron. Public 
opinions was important, but the country's elite believed in the understandings and 
agreements that could be reached among major communities. But after the 1969 riot, 
the reshaping of public opinion and political culture became a major objective of 
government policy. The campaign involved the national ideology the Rukull Negara, 
introduced in 1970 to gain public acceptance for the basic political agreements 
worked out by the first generation of the Alliance. 'Rukun' as contended by Milne and 
Mauzy (1986) and Means (1976) has two meanings: the first is 'fundamental doctrine 
and essential part of a religion', but in the context of interracial relations it also means 
'quiet and peaceful', 'like the ideal relationship of friendship' or 'united in purpose 
while mutually helping each other', while 'Negara' means nation. In short Rukun 
Negara promoted five principles: Belief in God; Loyalty to King and Country; 
Upholding the Constitution; Rule of Law; Good Behaviour; and Morality. Unlike the 
NEP, the Rukun Negara went unopposed. However, whether or not the Rukull Negara 
lasted as a philosophy to lead the nation is another matter and involves research 
beyong the scope of this study. Suffice to say, in the aftermath of the 13th May, the 
national ideology was supported by leaders in both the government and in the 
opposition. This shows the wariness after the riot and the mutual desire to move 
ahead. 
4.3.3. NEP as an 'Instrument' to National Unity 
It is interesting to note what Shamsul Amri (1994) argued about the implications of 
13 th May on the future of Malaysia. For Malaysia's self reliance he suggested 'national 
unity' as a major objective that should always be the priority of the nation and its 
people in order to achieve their vision. In describing the stability that has been enjoyed 
by Malaysia since the riot in 1969, Shamsul Amri outlines three crucial elements 
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which were historically responsible for the creation of what he called' a state of stable 
tension' in Malaysia, which in tum provided the condition for the country to evolve 
into its present state. These are the 'military' factor, the 'ethnic bargain' factor and 
thirdly, the 'development planning' factor, which refers to the NEP. 
Before the restoration of Parliament the government issued a White Paper entitled 
'Towards National Harmony', outlining the conditions for the end of the emergency. 
By the time the parliamentary government was restored in February 1971, the NEP 
was almost ready to be implemented. NEP, as argued by Means (1991 :23) became 
more important than the Rukun Negara, because 'it became the foundation of and the 
yardstick for all economic and social policy as projected at least until 1990'. 
The basic objectives and goals of the NEP were set out in the Second Malaysia Plan 
(MP2). The first aim was: 
'to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, by raIsmg income levels and 
increasing employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race. 
The second was to accelerate the process of restructuring the Malaysian 
society to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually 
eliminate the identification of race with economic function' (MP2, 1971). 
Apart from the modernisation of rural lives, this policy also planned a rapid and 
balanced growth of urban activities and the creation of a Malay commercial and 
industrial community in all categories and at all levels of operation. Ultimately, it was 
hoped the Malays and indigenous people would become 'full partners' in all aspects 
of the economic life of the nation. However, the government promised that no 
particular group would experience any loss or feel any sense of deprivation. The 
launching of the NEP was accompanied by impressive statistics of how far behind the 
Malays wcrc as compared to non-Malays in various sectors of the economy. The NEP 
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goal in 1990 was that the Malay ownership of and participation in all industrial and 
commercial activities should achieve 30 per cent. As we will see, it is the second 
prong of the NEP, the intention to re-structure the society that again created the 
controversial aspect of the NEP in years to come. 
4.4. Mahathir's Era: Industrialisation as the Catalyst to a Developed Economy 
Mahathir made his first impressive mark in Malaysian politics immediately after the 
13 th May riot when he wrote a scathing letter to the Tunku, accusing him of being pro-
Chinese, and demanding his resignation as Prime Minister. As a result, he was 
expelled from UMNO (Comber, 1983). In his political wilderness he wrote 'The 
Malay Dilemma' which was soon banned in Malaysia but published in Singapore. In 
it, Mahathir made known his frustrations over the Malays backwardness in the 
economy and suggested changes in the Malay value system (Mahathir, 1970). In 1999, 
Mahathir still outlined the importance of a 'united nation of Malaysians', praising 
'just and equitable policies' that Malaysia had adopted in politics, education, poverty 
eradication and economic development. Mahathir admitted that these policies 'have 
their onerous costs as well as their profound benefits, and have helped Malaysia to 
achieve significant progress in building a united nation since the racial riots of May 
1969' (Mahathir, 1999: 14). 
In the last three decades, the transformation of the Malaysian economy has been 
spearheaded by the industrial sector as a result of a more diversified production 
structure. Anuwar (1994: 217) argued that policies on industrial investments since 
Malaysia gained Independence are broadly divided into four periods. The first is the 
years immediately after Independence (when the Pioneer Industries Ordinance of 1958 
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was introduced) up to 1969 during which import-substitution industries were 
encouraged. The second is the period after 1968 (when the Investment Incenti\'es Act 
was introduced) up to 1980 during which export-related incentives were introduced. 
This period also saw the introduction of the Industrial Coordinaton Act of 1975 as an 
instrument to achieve New Economic Policy objectives. The third is the period after 
1980, which coincides with the implementation of the Fourth Malaysia Plan (MP4). 
and it was also during this period that emphasis was given to second-round import-
substitution industries (lSI), including the heavy industries. The last one is the post 
1985-86 recession period, which saw the introduction of the Industrial Master Plan 
(IMP) and liberalisation measures to attract more investments into the manufacturing 
sector. 
During the 1960s, the development planning thrust was chiefly aimed at agricultural 
diversification and modernisation with more emphasis being given to productivity 
improvements in commercial crops, large-scale land development schemes, and 
infrastructure building for agricultural projects. By the end of that decade, the country 
witnessed its first phase of structural transformation, primarily achieved through 
agricultural diversification and an expansion of the industrial base. The next decade 
saw the introduction of the NEP, which coincided with the launching of the MP2 
(1971-75) and the First Outline Perspective Plan (OPPl; 1971-1990). The latter 
become the cornerstone of the government's development thrust for the next two 
decades, during which both agricultural and industrial growth strategies were 
perceived within the context of the overall NEP objectives, giving emphasis towards a 
more balanced growth strategy with more attention given to poverty eradication and 
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the restructuring of society to rectify ethnic economIC imbalances (Anuwar, 199-+: 
707). 
By the beginning of the 1980s, the economy had undergone rapid growth, and more 
importantly, a structural transformation during which growth in real GDP accelerated 
from an average of 5.25 per cent per annum during the 1960s to an average of 8.3 per 
cent during the 1970s. During the 1980s, the economic transformation become more 
apparent because economic growth related to efforts at industrial expansion. The 
launching of the MP4 (1981-1985) called for greater efforts towards export-oriented 
industrialisation (EOI), as well as the promotion of heavy industries. The economy 
expanded by 7.8.per cent in 1984, but slowed down with a negative growth of -1.0 per 
cent in 1985. During this period, Malaysia witnessed the negative impact of being an 
open-economy that is too dependent on the economic well-being of its main trading 
partners. 
What Sharma (1996) argued in his analysis could be used to explain Malaysian state's 
role in its economy. Eager to 'catch up' with the industrialised world, Third World 
nations that have just achieved independence embraced what he claims to be 
'economic nationalism' and planned industrialisation. The above discussion 
confinned this view. The World Bank Report (1993) too, in trying to explain the 
economic success of Southeast Asia, acknowledged the 'deliberate state intervention' 
via protection and price distortions. This report admits the neo-classical explanation, 
which highlights several factors such as low inflation, a stable legal and political 
framework, open economic systems, and undistorted prices. However, IR and the 
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human resource policies of governments have been the critical factors in the success 
story of these economies, as will be discussed from Chapter 7 onwards. 
4.4.1. The Industrial Master Plan, 1986-1995 
The formulation of the IMP mirrors the government's efforts to shift its industrial 
planning approach from a largely market-oriented approach to a distinctly planned or 
target-oriented one within a free enterprise economy. Thus, the manufacturing sector 
was called upon by the government to play an increasingly important role in this 
sphere. 
The principal objectives of IMP were first to accelerate the growth of the 
manufacturing sector to ensure a continued rapid expansion of the economy and to 
provide a basis for meeting the social objectives consistent with the NEP. Next, it 
hoped to promote opportunities for the maximum and efficient utilisation of the 
nation's abundantly endowed natural resources. Thirdly, it aspired to build up the 
foundation for leap-frogging towards an advanced industrial country in the 
information age, by increasing its indigenous technological capability and 
competitiveness (Anuwar, 1994: 715). It is accepted and expected in Malaysia, and 
perhaps among most developing countries that the state must playa leading role in all 
the areas connected with technological development. The argument in these 
developing worlds is that the technology base is still 'embryonic' and lacks the 
capabilities required for industrial development (Anuwar, 1992: 98). The failure of the 
market mechanisms to activate any concerted effort towards positive change makes it 
all the more important for the state to intervene. 
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The initiative of the Malaysian government started in earnest with the launching of the 
Fifth Malaysian Plan (MP5; 1986-1990) and the IMP (1986-1995), both in 1986. 
Before that period, the efforts were ad hoc in nature, though there existed, for 
example, in the colonial period the Forest Research Institute (1879), followed by 
Institute of Medical Research in 1901, and the Rubber Research Institute (RR!) in 
1925. During the post-independence period there were research efforts towards 
increasing farm activities, developing new technologies in farming, and intensifying 
research in food processing. Thus the Malaysian Agricultural Research and 
Development Institute (MARDI) was established in 1969 and Palm Oil Research 
Institute of Malaysia (PORIM) was established in 1979. The agricultural emphasis 
was on searching for new clones and high-yielding seed varieties of rice, rubber and 
palm oil. As the government began to acknowledge the importance of science and 
technology (S&T), the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment 
(MOSTE) was established in 1976, complemented by the role of the National Council 
for Scientific Research and Development (NCSRD) from 1975 onwards. In the same 
year, the merging of the Standards Institute of Malaysia and the National Institute of 
Scientific and Industrial Research to become the Standards and Industrial Research 
Institute of Malaysia (SIRIM) marked another significant development in terms of 
industrial Research and Development (R&D) in the country. Placed under MOSTE, 
SIRIM undertook and promoted the task of industrial research and assisted industries 
in efficiency and development. The Coordinating Council for Industrial Technology 
Transfer was then formed under the MOSTE in 1977 to coordinate the activities of 
various agencies dealing with technology transfer so as to accelerate the 
industrialisation process in Malaysia. 
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4.4.2. Other Supporting National Policies 
Mahathir will be remembered as the PM who initiated a number of policies that he 
believed would support the NEP objectives (discussed in Chapter Seven onwards). 
The first was to leave a direct impact on IR, the Look East Policy (LEP), when 
Malaysians were urged to look towards and emulate Japan and South Korea for their 
'diligence, discipline, loyalty, the promotion of group rather than individual interest, 
high quality and good management systems in business' (Milne and Mauzy, 1999: 
55). In line with this was the Malaysia Incorporated concept, encouraging business 
owners and workers in the public and the private sectors to work together, and 
enabling Malaysian firms to create companies a la the Japanese sogo soshas (the large 
trading companies). One controversial suggestion that will be discussed in this study 
was the encouragement towards 'in-house' unions - another idea that stemmed from 
the LEP. 
In 1983 came the announcement of the Privatisation Policy, where Mahathir believed 
the 'profit-seeking' private sector could 'deliver the goods' that were lacking in the 
government sector (Milne and Mauzy, 1999: 56). This was an ideal vehicle for 
achieving the NEP aims, Bumiputeras could be employed in business, particularly as 
entrepreneurs, thus adding to the assets held by them. Even though this policy faced 
criticisms and had flaws, as discussed further in this study, Mahathir adhered to it 
until the 1990s. 
4.5. The National Development Plan - a Continuation or a Breakaway'? 
In 1990, the NDP was introduced to replace the NEP. The NDP re-stated some of the 
NEP's aims, such as promoting balanced development and optimising growth, as well 
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as eliminating social and economic inequalities (MP6, 1991). However, there was an 
emphasis on shifts to rapid industrialisation (Kok, 1994: 98). Poverty eradication was 
now directed at hard core poverty and restructuring the society with the aim of 
actively promoting a 'viable and resilient' Bumiputera into the commercial and 
industrial community. There was also a focus on the human resource development 
(HRD) as a fundamental requirement for achieving the objectives of growth and 
distribution. In 1992, Mahathir produced his 'Vision 2020' idea - for Malaysia to 
attain the status of a highly-developed nation in its own mould, that is developed not 
just economically, but also politically and socially. Until 1997, Malaysia had enjoyed 
a period of continued economic prosperity, and it was helped by a more 
accommodating policy to non-Bumiputeras that assisted in moderating ethnic tension. 
It is along the lines of this main picture of Malaysia that we are going to analyse the 
development of a sub-system; less talked about and seemingly less important, the 
relations of the state with the employers and employees in Malaysia. The early 
contention here is that the issues revealed and discussed above directly and indirectly 
influenced the role of the state in IR. It is just a matter of how and to what extent. 
However, again the main interest is to analyse why the state was able to determine its 
roles in the way it did and what factors enabled this role to be performed. This 
analysis therefore includes analyses on the trade union movement, the law, the 
administration and process that Malaysia experienced from its earliest period until the 
end of the NDP in 2000. 
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4.6. Conclusion 
The discussion above highlights the main issues and themes in Malaysian history until 
the end of the NDP. It contends that much of what happened in the past influenced the 
development of future Malaysia. 
The first glaring factor that frequently looms large in Malaysian history is the racial 
issue involving, in particular the relationship between the Malays and the Chinese. 
The implication is that the evnets following the British colonial era, the Japanese 
Occupation, and then in 1948 the Federation of Malaya Agreement as well as the 
outcome of 13th May 1969, brought heavy consequences to current Malaysia. The 
beliefs in the special rights of the sultans and their Malay subjects, embedded in the 
1948 constitution, and later in the 1957 independent Malaya constitution (which has 
lasted to date), became the legal basis for the insertion of BUl1liputera rights in the 
NEP, and later again in the NDP. 
The 13th of May 1969 taught the Malaysian leaders that 'open conflict' should not be 
allowed in a fragile multi-racial country, such as Malaysia, that still faced many 
unsolved problems. The NEP was the direct result of this relationship of insecurity 
within and between each ethnic group, until it was spelled out in the form of a twenty 
year national development policy. The Malays, unhappy with their economic 
backwardness, won the struggle for their 'rightful position' to be recognised, this time 
in a more structured and systematic policy. This national policy then enabled the state 
to develop others that have the ultimate considerations for the Malays, or as later 
temled politically, the Blimipliteras. The NDP is then a continuation, even though, as 
wi 11 be discussed, it managed to break away from some of the old issues, and advance 
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Malaysia and Malaysians towards a better future, at least economically. However, the 
most important fact emerging from the Malaysian past is that the political leaders of 
the coalition government believed that to achieve national unity in Malaysia, a subtle 
'consensus' approach is the best. This fact will be illustrated again in the relationship 
between unions and the government, as discussed further in Chapter 6. 
Meanwhile, the following chapter discusses the research methods. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
5.1. Introduction 
As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the main objective of the current study 
is to examine the contending factors that shaped the role of the state in Malaysian IR. 
As argued in the review of the literature, there is a close relationship between the role 
of the state in the economy and the role of the state in IR. In Chapter Three, the 
discussion highlights the state as the most prominent player in the IR in developing 
countries, while Chapter Four has given an overview of the scenarios in Malaysia 
from the colonial period until the 1990s. All the issues and themes that influenced the 
state or became the turning points in Malaysian history have been laid out with the 
intention of providing a background understanding on the process experienced by 
Malaysia in its IR system. The contention is that what influenced the state in those 
turning points of its history also influenced the state's roles in its IR policies. 
However, this does not eliminate other new factors from being analysed. 
This chapter therefore describes the research design that has been used to achieve the 
objectives of the study. It discusses why and how certain methods are used to generate 
data to examine the research questions. It also explains how these methods are carried 
out, how the data are analysed, the assumptions made and the limitations that are 
faced. 
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5.2. The Research Design 
A researcher must be justified in adopting either a qualitative or a quantitative method 
or both in their study. For the same reason, the discussion below explains why a 
qualitative method has been chosen. Locke, Spirduso, and Silverman (1993) argue 
that every graduate student must give an honest answer as to why he/she has chosen a 
qualitative approach in his/her study, and that answer must show compatibility with 
answering the research questions, and the requirements for carrying out a qualitative 
study. It is in that capacity that I wish to clarify certain points in this chapter. 
First, why have qualitative methods been chosen as the means to answer the research 
questions, with a view to formulate a thesis of this study? This research is about the 
role of the state in IR in Malaysia. It analyses the development of IR practices in the 
country, by scrutinising the roles played by its key players - the state, the employers 
and the trade unions, as representatives of the employees. In this context, the 
arguments are given from the state's point of view: what the state has done, how, and 
most importantly, why it has done it. It focuses more on the development at policy 
level, as enacted by the present government, and comparison are drawn with previous 
ones. A qualitative approach is also the best means to achieve a broader view, one that 
captures not just the present but also the past of the IR system in Malaysia. What this 
research needs in order to answer its research questions are what Patton (1990: 39-41) 
calls 'themes of qualitative inquiry'. He lists ten such themes, out of which six best fit 
this research interest. 
On naturalistic inquiry. Patton stresses that this is research about real-world 
situations, as they unfold naturally. The researcher must therefore be non-
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manipulative, unobtrusive, and non-controlling. He or she must be open to \\'hate\"er 
emerges from the study, and must not put constraints on the outcomes. Such criteria 
apply to this research, which looks at the development of the role of the Malaysian 
state in IR. Even though there are many theories related to this, few assumptions can 
be made unless a thorough analysis has been done on the topic. Moreover, the 
researcher must look at the phenomena of interest from a holistic perspectil'e, that is, 
by trying to understand the whole focus of study as a complex system. As Patton 
(1990: 40) argued, a holistic perspective will allow 'a focus on camp lex 
interdependencies not meaningfully reduced to a few discrete variables and linear, 
cause-effect relationships'. This has been carried at in Chapters Two to Four, where a 
comprehensive picture has been given first on the nature of the role of the state, then 
its role in IR, and lastly on themes and issues surrounding Malaysian history. The 
reason for this approach is to clarify beforehand the important background themes and 
issues that have influenced the state especially in its national policies since, as argued 
in this study, that has impacted on its IR policies too. 
An inductive analysis will immerse the researcher 'in the details and the specifics of 
the data to discover important categories, dimensions, and interrelationships; begin by 
exploring genuinely open questions rather than testing theoretically derived 
(deductive) hypotheses' (Patton, 1990: 40). This research needs to do just that, before 
either conforming to or rejecting any theory. Categorisation, dimensions and 
interrelationships within the roles of the state have to be explored, first usmg a 
triangulation of sources and methods, before conclusions could be derived. 
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Qualitative data compnse 'detailed, thick description; inquiry in depth; direct 
quotations capturing people's personal perspectives and experiences' (Patton, 1990: 
40). This research derives its data from first; the written documents and existing 
statistics (primary or secondary); and second, interviews with key informants. Both 
are specifically chosen to complement and be compared to each other. Key informants 
have been carefully selected for their knowledge and experience, and the information 
they give is cross-checked with existing sources. This research believes in d.vnumic 
systems (Patton, 1990: 40) which 'give attention to process, which also assumes that 
change is a constant and ongoing process, and this is either on an individual or at a 
bigger scale, an entire culture'. This research also relies on what Patton called (1990: 
40) personal contact and insight where the researcher has direct contact with and can 
access people, situations and phenomena under study. As Patton argues, the 
researcher's personal experiences and insights are an important part of the inquiry and 
critical to the understanding of the phenomenon. Patton also suggests that the 
researcher assume each case to be special and unique, in what he termed as unique 
case orientation. 
What can be perceived as more interesting is what Patton (1990: 40) calls emphatic 
neutrality; that is, while admitting that complete objectivity is impossible, and pure 
SUbjectivity undermines credibility, the researcher should try to understand the world 
in all its complexity: 'not proving something, not advocating, not advancing personal 
agendas, but understanding'. He or she may include personal experiences and 
emphatic insight, but must be non-judgemental toward whatever content may emerge. 
In this context, the researcher admits her familiarity and the extent of knowledge on 
Malaysia and its system of administration but stays objective to the methods and 
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findings of this study. In addition, the researcher agrees with Patton, who argues that 
there must be design flexibility, where the openness of the researcher to adapt inquiry 
as understanding deepens and/or situations change. Avoiding getting locked into rigid 
designs that eliminates responsiveness therefore becomes essential. In this case, the 
interview questions, even though they are from prepared sets, vary from person to 
person regardless of whether they may represent the same institutions. At times too, 
the questions asked were expanded and became open-ended explorations, based on the 
knowledge of the interviewee, and the extent to which the person was willing to talk. 
Nevertheless, the most important factor of all as far as this study is concerned, is that 
one must have context sensitivity. This is where findings in qualitative research are 
placed in a social, historical and temporal context. Such context sensitivity should 
make a researcher dubious of the 'possibility or meaningfulness of generalisations 
across time and space' (Patton, 1990: 40). 
Based on the above argument, the qualitative method is the most appropriate approach 
for this study, because of its suitability to be used to answer the research questions. 
5.3. The Research Relationship 
For the purpose of this study, a relationship has been established with the research 
participants. In this context, the relationship is not only about 'gaining entry' to the 
setting or 'establishing rapport' with the participants but more about establishing the 
kind of cooperation that is needed in this study in order to answer the research 
questions. 
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Basically this thesis analyses the development of the role of the state in \lalaysian IR. 
There are at least five main parties involved in this research. First there is the 
government, and in particular, the Human Resource Ministry (MoHR) with all the 
departments under its jurisdiction, including those that take particular care of the 
private sector IR. Second is the Public Services Department (PSD), which manages 
the public sector IR only. Then there are two main bodies of trade unions, which are 
actually divided into two: MTUC for the private sector unions and; the CUEPACS for 
the public sector and the employer associations which are mainly federated under the 
MEF. These institutions have given a positive response to using their facilities, getting 
access to information needed for the research, and about their officials giving 
interviews. The researcher made prior contact with and interviewed some of them 
about a year before embarking on this research. Thus, key informants include the 
Director Of Industrial Relations Department of Malaysia (from the MoHR), the 
Secretary General of CUEP ACS, and the Industrial Relations Officer and the 
Research Officer of MTUe. These people are significant since they are directly 
involved with the IR process. Moreover, all have agreed to offer their knowledge on 
the situation and nature of the practices and the development of IR system in the 
country. Since these are the key people who are actually involved in the IR process, 
their opinions are essential to this research. 
There are also other parties who influence the Malaysian IR system. In particular, 
there are some regional trade unions, and international bodies such as the International 
Labour Organisation (lLO). From these institutions, all the relevant published 
materials are analysed and compared with the available data from Malaysia. Other 
than that, views and data from local non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
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politicians and academicians are also included in this research as they are the parties 
that are either directly or indirectly involved. Their input is tested against the rest of 
the data gathered from the obvious main sources, the government and the trade 
unIons. 
The existing/available data are gathered from the National Archive where appropriate, 
and from various Malaysian libraries. Libraries that were used for this study include 
the Malaysian National Library, the MoHR Library, the PSD Library, the INTAN 
Library, the University of Malaya libraries, and those of the MTUC, MEF and 
CUEPACS. 
5.4. Sampling 
The discussion below describes and justifies the decisions made regarding sources of 
data, as well as the sites, persons, places and times for the fieldwork. The sampling in 
qualitative research includes even thinking in a 'sampling-frame terms' (Miles and 
Huberman, 1984: 41). For example, while interviewing an informant, one needs to 
consider why this informant is important, and who, from there, should be interviewed 
next, in order to avoid bias. 
In the quantitative research design, two types of sampling are generally considered: 
probabili(v sampling and convenience sampling. In probability sampling, each 
member of a society has a known, non-zero probability of being chosen, which allows 
for a generalisation of statistics from the sample to the population of interest. Light et. 
al (1990: 56) argue that this produces the best, high-quality research, with the rest 
considered as convenience sampling, which is strongly discouraged in a quantitati\'e 
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research. In this qualitative research, however, the third category, called purposeful 
sampling (Patton, 1990: 169) or criterion-based selection (LeCompte and Preissle, 
1993: 69) is adopted. According to Maxwell (1996: 70): 
'This is a strategy in which particular settings, persons, or events are selected 
deliberately in order to provide important information that can't be gotten as 
well from other choices' . 
Weiss (1994: 17) argues that a great deal of qualitative research do not use sample at 
all, but uses panels, people who are considered unique and able to be informative 
since they are experts in an area or were privileged to witness events. Selecting times, 
settings, and individuals that can provide us with the information we need in order to 
answer our research questions is the most important consideration in qualitative 
sampling decisions (Maxwell, 1996: 70). Maxwell (1996: 72) lists four goals for 
purposeful sampling, namely, first; achieving representativeness or typicality of the 
settings, individuals, or activities selected. Second; to adequately capture the 
heterogeneity in the population, and to ensure the conclusions represent the entire 
range of variation, in this context the parties involved in the study. Third; to select the 
sample to deliberately examine cases that are critical for the theories with which we 
began the study finally. The fourth goal is to establish particular comparisons to 
highlight the reasons for differences between settings or individuals. Based on the 
arguments above, let us look at the sampling process of this study. 
The first issue discussed here concerns the available/existing data, either primary or 
secondary sources. The materials cover the period from the early labour movement, 
which marked the start of IR system in Malaysia, as discussed in Chapter Six. 
However, for this period, the materials used are mostly derived from secondary 
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sources. The data/source depend much on the available work already published by the 
previous researchers, which fortunately, were considerable. The researcher use 
primary materials, interviews, and newspapers to support data and arguments, 
especially starting from 1957, as it marked the return to the indigenous people of their 
political power, with the co-operation of the other two main ethnic groups. It was also 
still possible to find people (veteran trade unionists) who were involved in the IR 
process and able to offer insights into the system in the past. 
Prior meetings had been made a year before the start of this research, and once this 
study started, contact was made in writing with the government institutions in charge 
of the IR system in Malaysia. Prior appointments were also made with trade union 
bodies, particularly CUEPACS, MTUC and MEF. Agreements were reached and 
permissions given to use the resource bases (libraries and computer facilities) of the 
respective departments. Moreover, written requests were made and granted to conduct 
interviews with the officials from the government departments and the trade union 
leaders and employers' federation. 
Previous explorations into the insights of, firstly; the academics, and in particular the 
ones who have carried research on trade unionism or the government's role in the 
politics, economics or social aspects of Malaysia. This knowledge was derived chiefly 
from their research into the government's role on the political, economic and social 
aspect of Malaysia. Second, sources from the NGOs were also given due 
consideration since there is a growing interest shown by them in Malaysia in affairs 
that concern the people. Recently, there have also been a growing number of NGOs in 
Malaysia, whether as independent or dependent members of an international body. 
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Third, views of the Malaysian politicians, who either still are, or have been directly or 
indirectly involved in the IR system in Malaysia were taken into consideration. 
As far as the research is concerned, the views of all the parties chosen are based on 
their significance in the IR system in Malaysia. In other words, even though they may 
be a component party of the ruling government, or a member of the opposition, if they 
do not playa prominent role in the making of policies, or in the development of the IR 
system, they were purposely left out from the discussion. Representativeness in this 
sense is based on the role played rather than numerically. 
5.5. Data Collection 
The discussions below describes the methods used in this research, such as what data 
were collected, how they were collected and how much of these data are needed. For 
the purpose of this research, several ways of collecting the data are discussed. 
5.5.1. Primary and Secondary Data 
Interviews, questionnaires, observation and experiments are all important sources of 
data in social research, but they do not comprise all the information gathering. 
Existing sources, whether in writing, figures or electronic form, are also important 
bases for research (Sapsford and Jupp, 1996: 138). There are three factors that mark 
the importance of existing sources. First, even though this type of source is often 
played down, social researchers have, in fact, built extensively on the existence of 
such sources as government reports, official and unofficial records, private papers, 
and statistical collections. Just like the rest of the information gathering, these sources 
have advantages and limitations, and could be used either well or badly. Second, 
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existing sources could be exploited at various stages of the research process, as in the 
literature review, and again in the later development of the research. The third point, is 
that these sources are not neutral 'asocial data' which are 'necessarily self-evident' 
(Sapsford and Jupp, 1996: 138). 
This research relies greatly on existing sources, including the pnmary and the 
secondary sources about the IR system in Malaysia. Sapsford and J upp (1996: 141) 
best explain what is meant by primary and secondary data: 
'Historians and others conventionally regard as primary sources those that 
were written (or otherwise came into being) by the people directly involved 
and at a time contemporary or near contemporary with the period being 
investigated. Primary sources, in other words, form the basic and original 
material for providing the researcher's raw evidence. Secondary sources, by 
contrast, are those that discuss the period studied but are brought into being at 
some time after it, or otherwise somewhat removed from the actual events. 
Secondary sources copy, interpret or judge material to be found in primary 
sources' . 
In this research, the primary data are the unpublished data or the original copies of 
important materials. They are to be found in the respective offices, or if older, in the 
National Archive of Malaysia, and take the form of statistics, memos, minutes, annual 
reports, gazettes, files, government records or documents, or trade unions or political 
parties' documents. The secondary data, however, are the published materials, in the 
form of books, journals and articles on the Internet or in printed form, such as 
newspapers. These have been gathered from libraries, the National Archive, the 
government or trade union offices and libraries, or the Internet. Where the Internet is 
used, the researcher has ensured that the data source has a reliable base. Newspapers 
are considered an important source for this research as news, policies or government's 
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decisions can easily be gathered from them, rather than from the respective 
government offices. 
Much of the important data, including primary, unpublished raw data, were from the 
MoHR, and the PSD. Mostly, the data from the MoHR are from the Industrial 
Relations Department (IRD), the Labour Department (LD), and the Trade Union 
Affairs Department (TUAD) of the same ministry. These include yearly official 
statistics consisting of, for example, details of memberships of trade unions, the 
number of strikes, infonnation on collective bargaining processes and files (where 
possible) consisting of minutes that usually explained the policies made. The 
gathering of these unpublished data was only made possible by establishing a good 
rapport with the respective government and unions' offices. 
5.5.2. Interviews 
The interview method, which is used in most qualitative research, is considered as 
highly important in this research. Interviews have been made with key informants 
from all the relevant sources including officials from the government sector, 
especially from the MoHR, who take charge of the administration of the private sector 
IR. There are, in fact, seven departments in the MoHR, which are responsible for 
administering and overseeing the IR system in the country. These are the LD, 
Peninsular Malaysia, the LD, Sabah, the LD, Sarawak, the IRD, the TUAD, the 
Department of Occupational Safety and Health, and the Manpower Department. Of 
these, the three most important are the IRD, the TUAD and the LD, Peninsular, which 
is the headquarters for Malaysia. Apart from that, there are several other 
departments/organisations that either report to the MoHR or are independent, but still 
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deal with labour matters in Malaysia. These are the Social Security Organisation 
(SOCSO); Employees Provident Fund (EPF); Human Resource Development Fund 
(HRDF); and the Industrial Court. Even though no interviews were conducted with the 
officers in charge of the rest of the departments, (apart from the three most important 
departments mentioned), primary and secondary data were gathered and used if 
matters implicated them in the analysis. Since the focus of this research is the role of 
the state in IR system in Malaysia, it is only logical that each of the above departments 
and the role of the related institutions are scrutinised. Their functions in the 1990s, as 
stated in their objectives, are analysed based on the facts gathered through library 
works/existing sources, and have been counter-checked in interviews with 
representatives of the unions and the officials. 
It is interesting to note that the MoHR officials interviewed were quite co-operative, 
despite their positions as government servants tied to the General Order. Only one 
official 'warned' the researcher to not being 'too critical' of government policies in 
this study. In general, however, the officers at MoHR, particularly from the three 
departments, were helpful in giving their insights. One could not help but wonder if it 
could be due to their interactions with unions and employees in the private sector, and 
also the MEF. These represent individuals and bodies of the private sector who are 
known for being less bureaucratic. This is not to say the MoHR officials have been 
'too willing' to impart 'inside infonnation', as they needed extra time and more visits 
before the conversations became less official and more relaxed. That explained the 
three fieldtrips made during the completion of this study. 
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The second group of government officials interviewed was from the PSD, which takes 
charge of the public sector IR. There is a difference in the attitude shown here towards 
the interview. The officers were more conservative in their approach to answering the 
questions, with one insisting that the researcher write down exactly what was said. 
The difference, as compared to officers in MoHR, could be due to the nature of their 
job whereby they are dealing with matters that concern government policies affect 
government servants, and thus from time to time relate to government public 
employees' unions. As a result, they tried harder to clarify their views, and it was hard 
not to notice their reserve in saying things 'off the record'. This is not to deny that 
they were co-operative to the best of their abilities, within the constraints of the job 
description. 
The next group interviewed were officials from the two main trade union bodies that 
represent employees from the private and the public sector: the MTUC and 
CUEPACS. The individuals chosen for interview were the ones involved at the 
policy-making level. This was purposely done to give a comparative weight to the 
status of officers interviewed from among the government sector. Almost all the 
MTUC leaders and officials were found to be more frank and open in their accounts 
on the roles of the state and the role of the unions in Malaysia. However, there are 
exceptions, such as the MTUC President himself. As discussed in Chapter Nine, his 
appointment by the government as a senator in the House of Senate in the Malaysian 
Parliament, was questioned by even his colleagues. There were concerns that he might 
be influenced by the government and therefore shied away from being blunt on 
government policies on IR. He was evidently more in line with the President of 
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CUEPACS, who had also just recently gained his Datue2 from one of the state's 
government. Both were seen to be more restrained in their interviews. Leaders from 
CUEP ACS were generally more restrained in their analysis or comments and this 
related very much to the argument in this study that the public sector employees as 
represented by CUEP ACS has a 'political' relationship with the government, therefore 
more restrained in their approaches as compared to trade unionists in the private 
sector (as discussed further in Chapters Ten to Twelve). However, overall, the trade 
unionists offered invaluable insight to the nature of Malaysian IR in both sectors. 
In addition, there were mixed responses from those who have 'retired'. Retired 
unionists were more 'straight to the point', and this especially applied to those from 
the MTUC or those who have served both in MTUC and CUEP ACS. Even though 
retired, all unionists interviewed were very much interested in what went on in the IR 
issues, and some are actively involved at union matters at international level. Needless 
to say, they offered valuable insights that have been lacking in all the previous 
research conducted on Malaysian IR thus far. 
Only two officials from the MEF were available, even though, admittedly, more 
would have been more appropriate. Those who represented the MEF, however were 
ones that apparently could offer the most information, and since they were not 
constrained by government rules and regulations, they were more 'open' in their 
views. There were also two interviews conducted with representatives from the 
employer's side, and their participation was valuable. The same, and more could be 
~2 'Oatuk' is an honorary title, given away by the government. usually through the Sultans who head the 
states in MalaYSIa. 
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said of interviews made with a very prominent Singaporean trade unionist and cabinet 
minister, an NTUC Deputy Secretary General, and a regional trade union 
representative from the ICFTU-APRO. There was also one interview conducted with 
a very prominent trade union leader (the SBSI) from Indonesia. The lists of names, 
their position, place and dates of those interviewed are found in Appendix I. 
5.6. Data Analysis 
In data analysis, a matrix was first used to show the logical connections between 
research questions and research methods: that is sampling, data collection, and data 
analysis decisions. This matrix is based on the one used by LeCompte and Preissle 
(1993). However, due to the complexities of the arguments and the incomplete nature 
of the available data, this method was used more as a guideline. The data gathered 
were generally sorted, based on the themes and issues identified, and used 
accordingly. 
Maxwell (1996: 77) argues that the best way to deal with qualitative data is to start 
analysing as soon as the first data collection process ends. He suggested that: 
' .. the experienced qualitative researcher begins data analysis immediately after 
finishing the first interview or observation and continues to analyse the data as 
long as he or she is working on the research, stopping briefly to write reports 
and papers' (Maxwell, 1996: 77). 
Therefore, the first step that the researcher made was to analyse the fieldnotes, 
interview transcripts and documents collected, by reading and making notes on them. 
Based on that, there are three choices of analytic options (Maxwell, 1996: 78). The 
data can be written in memos, categorised (by coding or thematic analysis) or 
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contextualised. Miles and Hubennan (1994: 72-75) suggested writing memos as we 
perfonn data analysis, so that it captures our analytic thinking about the data. 
Categorising strategies that are used in this research are through coding, and sorting 
the data into broader tenns and issues. Coding in the qualitative research is different 
from coding in the quantitative research. In qualitative research, the goal of coding is 
to 'fracture' the data and rearrange it into categories that facilitate the comparison of 
data within and between these categories (Strauss, 1987: 29; Maxwell, 1996: 78). Or 
by using another fonn of categorising analysis, the data is sorted into broader themes 
and issues. Glaser and Strauss (1967) argue that the key feature of most qualitative 
coding is that it is grounded in the data. While some coding categories may be drawn 
from existing theory, others are developed inductively by the researcher during the 
analysis, or taken from the conceptual structure of the people studied. In order not to 
lose the original context from which they developed, codes and memos are linked, 
either physically or by cross-referencing, to the data that gave rise to the categories. 
The third method, contextualising strategies, is an attempt to understand the data in 
context, using various methods to identify the relationships among the different 
elements of the text (Atkinson, 1992; Mishler, 1986). What these strategies have in 
common is that they do not focus primarily on relationships of similarity that can be 
used to sort data into categories independently of context. Instead they look for 
relationships that connect statements and events into a coherent whole (Maxwell, 
1996: 79). But in this research context, the second contextual strategy is used which 
involves identifying connections between categories and themes. This is a broader 
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type of contextualising step, with results that can construct the theory for the research, 
and this, in fact, is the primary goal for qualitative research (Dey: 1993). 
5.7 .Assu mptions ILimitations 
Two aspects of assumptions or limitations of this research have to be admitted. The 
researcher made the assumption that the data collection is workable with no serious 
obstacles. This assumption is based, first, on the research relationship established 
between the researcher and the research participants. It is also due to the prior 
arrangements made before the actual fieldwork, the understanding that the researcher 
will not face the problem with getting the available data, or doing the interviews with 
the respective research participants. As far as this study is concerned, the research 
participants for interview sessions are representative to the area of study and are able 
to offer answers to the research questions. The validity of the findings through 
interviews is going to be cross-checked with the available data which are gathered 
from all the parties involved in the industrial relations system in Malaysia, not only 
from the government. 
Another the constraint was the period for data collection, which took longer than 
anticipated. What happened was that during the fieldwork, the researcher faced 
unexpected problems that disrupted the arranged meetings or work, and also while on 
the fieldwork, it is discovered that further interviews or library work were needed. 
This meant the researcher had to spend more time on data collection, and in the case 
of interviews, the following interviews sometimes were performed in the next year. 
This incurred unexpected costs, though the outcome was satisfying. The follow-ups 
did help to provide insights and establish better relationships with the sources, thus 
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providing more valuable input that were impossible without such a close and relaxed 
working relationship. 
However, one particular problem relates to the sampling being based on key 
informants. Maxwell (1996: 73) calls it key-informant bias and argues that since the 
researcher has relied on a small number of informants for a major part of their data, 
even if these informants are purposely selected and the data themselves seem valid, 
there is no guarantee that these informants' views are representative of the group as a 
whole. Heider (1972) and Sankoff (1971) suggest the researcher do a systematic 
sampling. To achieve that, the researcher has tried to be as systematic as possible in 
selecting the key informants, and making sure they represent the policy-making 
process of the organisations chosen in this study. Moreover, the researcher needs to 
use triangulation, that is, using more than one method in collecting data. For example, 
to counter-check the information given by key informants in an interview, other 
sources are also used. A government officer may only give positive information 
regarding the government's role in Malaysian IR, but the researcher then always 
counter-check the same information based on primary and secondary data. Interviews 
with other officials from the trade unions, the MEF or views from politicians (from 
the government and opposition parties), or the NGOs also provide a more balanced 
view. By doing that, it is hoped that the validity threat is minimised. In the context of 
this research, that is exactly what the researcher has done. 
5.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has explained in considerable detail, first the research design of the 
study. the research relationship that has been established, the sampling, the data 
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collection process and the data analysis. In doing so, the researcher has explained 
what has been done prior to the research, what is to be done next, as well as why and 
how and admits the assumptions made and the limitations that she has had to face 
during the fieldwork. Nevertheless, efforts have also been made to ensure that these 
obstacles are reduced using all the means available in qualitative research. 
In justifying why qualitative methods have been used, the researcher has pointed out 
that the reasons are purely academic in the sense that these methods answer the 
research questions best. The rest is a step-by-step account of how the procedure of the 
research has been undertaken. All three main parties of IR actors in Malaysia were 
analysed, through using the existing sources, interviews and in part, observation. 
Mostly, the use of secondary sources applies to for the early period of analysis of IR in 
Malaysia. Primary sources for this early analysis are only counter-checked where 
conflicts in infonnation occurred. Regarding contemporary Malaysian IR, primary 
sources are the major contributor, and secondary sources are relied upon only when 
there are no primary sources available. To complete this, interviews are arranged with 
the various institutions involved in the system. Notes/memos, interview transcripts, 
and existing sources are coded, based on the categories/themes of the research. After 
taking all the precautions of the validity threat, it is hoped that this research will 
contribute some new findings to the body of knowledge regarding IR. 
From Chapter Six onwards the analysis focuses on themes and issues of Malaysian IR. 
It starts with the impact of the colonial government on the labour movement in pre-
independent Malaya. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE BIRTH OF THE LABOUR MOVEMENT AND TRADE CNIO~ISM 
6.1.1ntroduction 
Chapter Four gave an overview of the significant issues and themes that form the 
background of this study on the role of the state in Malaysian IR, and also shed light 
onto important events, issues and policies that surround and affect Malaysian plural 
society during the whole period being examined. Moreover, it highlighted the 
significant social, economic and political experiences of Malaysia, challenging 
Sharma's view (1985) of 'stages of industrialisation' 43, and Kuruvilla's (1996) 
'economic development' theory. It was suggested that all aspects of Malaysian 
history, as well as current factors have helped shaped the development of Malaysian 
IR. 
This chapter analyses the birth of Malaysian IR, which started with the inception of 
wage labour and commercial agriculture in Malaya until its independence in 1957. In 
exploring the colonial state's roles and how it shaped Malayan IR, in both the private 
and public sector, it is suggested that the British colonial state dominated both the 
political and the economic sectors and consequently the IR system. -+-+ This chapter 
also notes the significant stages of ethnic relations that developed during the colonial 
rule and influenced the nature of Malaysian IR in later years. The contention here is 
4.1 Sharma (1985: 17) suggested that the different stages of development in countries reflect their 
positions internationally, and less industrialised countries could be classed as least industrialised, semi-
industrialised and newly industrialised. These groups, he argued, han' their own pattern of IR (refer 
Chapter Three). 
44 There were the Portuguese (since 1511) and the Dutch in Malacca (1641) before the British. In 
between British colonialism there was the Japanese Occupation in :\lalaya during World War Two. The 
history of British inter\"ention in parts of Malaya and then the whole of the Peninsular can be found III 
\;tnous \\orks, such as Li (1982); Emerson (1937); Furni\"all (1948); Chin (1946); Purcell (1946); 
Swettenham (194~); Sadka (1968) and \\'instedt (1958). among others. 
166 
that this early stage contributed to the development and shape of Malaysian IR in the 
post 1957 era. This especially refers to the birth of moderate unions and unionism, the 
separate treatment for the public sector and the significance of ethnic issues as 
contributing factors shaping IR policies. 
This chapter starts with an analysis of the Malayan labour movement before WWII, 
which marked the beginning of IR in Malaya, especially amongst immigrant Chinese 
and Indian labourers. Next, the short Japanese Occupation is explored, analysing 
worsening race relations especially between Chinese and Malays due to the different 
treatment they received and the Malays' reluctance to support communism. The 
period after WWII is then discussed as this was the turning point in the development 
of the Malayan labour movement, which saw the British return to Malaya, imposing 
laws and making efforts to 'liquidate' the militant labour movement, thus emphasising 
the state's intervention in IR. This period also covers the taming of the labour 
movement, especially of the MTUC in the private sector. An analysis is then made of 
the public sector unionism. 
6.2. The Malayan Labour Movement before the World War Two 
While Li (1982: 147) argued that there was no labour movement in the early days of 
industrial economy in Malaya, that is from 1895 to 1938, evidence has shown 
otherwise. The origins of trade unions had already started among the small Malay 
working class as early as 1894 (Morgan, 1977; Purcell, 1948; and Roberts, 1964 as 
cited in Jomo and Todd, 1994: 55). However, the Malayan labour movement at this 
stage was dominated first by the Chinese, and later by the Indians. The Chinese, who 
brought their traditions from China, encouraged Chinese labourers to be members of 
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secret societies, guilds or Mutual Help Societies as this tradition had had been 
established in Singapore and main towns in Malaya over a century before that 
(Blythe, 1969; Gamba, 1962a). The secret societies and guilds were composed of both 
employers and employees and therefore could not be termed as trade unions. 
However, they managed, controlled and settled labour issues between them, marking 
the emergence of a labour movement in Malaya, and therefore the birth of Malayan 
IR as well as awareness of the plight of workers in the country. 
The Chinese labour movement from 1920 onwards should be viewed against the 
background of Chinese politics and nationalism, which saw the emergence of leftists, 
communism and militant movements among Chinese workers (Gamba, 1962a: 4; 
Kamaruddin, 1992). The Chinese labour organisations from the 1920s to 1940s were 
then influenced by broader Chinese, anti-Japanese, anti-colonial or other 
'international' pan-Chinese concerns (lomo and Todd, 1994: 57). The Profintern (the 
communist trade union international) influenced the amalgamation of several trade 
unions all over Malaya in 1926, forming the Nanyang General Labour Union 
(Stenson, 1970:9). By 1930, Chinese secret societies which were originally viewed as 
harnlless were 'entirely lawless and were providing the Malayan Communist Party 
(Mep) with the bulk of its strike pickets and strong-arm forces' (Gamba, 1962a: 3). 
By this stage, the MCP, which was formed in the late 1920s, had also been actively 
involved in all labour activities (Stenson, 1970). 
As intimated in Chapter Four, the labour unrest was caused by dissatisfaction over a 
fair share in the lavish returns of the rich country. Table 6.1 shows the contribution by 
the richer FMS to the British government. The balance of trade of the FMS for fourty 
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years (1895-1938) was always 'favourable' (Li, 1982: 41). The chief exports were 
dominated by tin (1895-1914), then replaced by rubber in the later years (Li, 1982: 
41). However, wages for each ethnic group were different, with the Chinese paid 
higher than the Indians or Malays (Gamba, 1962a; Li, 1982: 142). 
Table 6.1. FMS revenue, 1895-1938 
Year Revenue ($) 
1895 8,481,007 
1900 15,609,807 
1905 23,964,593 
1910 26,553,018 
1915 40,774,984 
1920 72,277,146 
1925 86,564,279 
1930 65,560,870 
1935 62,364,264 
1938 63,053,114 
Source: Li, 1982: 14. 
During the Great Depression (1929-32), the Malayan economy suffered from the 
depreciation of rubber and tin prices with workers facing wage reductions, dismissals, 
and repatriation (lomo and Todd, 1994). The post-depression period convinced 
labour that they could not depend on paternalism alone to solve their problems and so 
they started using strikes as a means to achieve their purposes. The most affected 
were the Chinese and Indians, who dominated the tin and rubber industries (Comber, 
1983: 19). Between 1933 and 1936, when rubber and tin prices soared again, the cost 
of living also went up but not the wages. The workers demanded a pay rise, in some 
instances up to a 30 percent increase, as reported in 1939 (LDAR, 1939: 3). Other 
demands included the call for the employers not to violate conditions and terms 
agreed in the work agreement letter and to better the conditions of the workplace and 
living quarters (Kamaruddin, 1992: 49). In September 1936, skilled and unskilled 
Chinese workers launched a series of strikes. A multi-ethnic strike was later organised 
by Traction Company workers, but the majority was still Chinese (Kamaruddin, 1992: 
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48). When the Singapore Municipal workers went on strike at the end of 1936, it 
involved 13,000 Chinese and Indian workers, and in fact marked the first strike by 
government employees. In January and February 1937, strikes were reported at coal 
mines in Batu Arang and Hong Fatt tin mines in Sungei Besi, both districts in 
Selangor (Gamba, 1962a: 7; Kamaruddin, 1992: 48). At the same time, strikes by 
skilled labourers and mechanics occurred in several places in Malaya. In March 1937, 
further strikes by Chinese estate workers in Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Melaka, Johor 
and Pahang involving 10,000 employees took place (Kamaruddin, 1992: 49). Most of 
these industrial disputes were instigated by the MCP (Gamba, 1962a; Kamaruddin, 
1992; Jomo and Todd, 1994; Stenson, 1970). 
As for the Indian workers, labour organisation came a little later than the Chinese, and 
when it did, they were further segregated from each other .. ~5 It was only after some 
knowledge was acquired on political and trade union struggles in India, and some 
contact was made with Chinese workers, followed by the rise of more educated 
generation of workers that there was a greater union consciousness among them. This 
led to some industrial action both in the private and the public sectors led by several 
Indian organisations, including the Central Indian Association of Malaya (ClAM), 
formed in 1936 and the Klang District Indian Union (KDIU). In early 1941, there 
were strikes by the KDIU, demanding a rise in wages and a general improvement in 
work conditions. They also protested against the poor treatment of the workers and 
their families by management and the lack of social amenities on the estates. The 
strikes spread to many other estates in Selangor and Negeri Sembilan, prompting the 
British to send in troop reinforcements, arrest the Indian leaders under Emergency 
45 Arasaratnam (1970) and Stenson (1980) both analyse the Indian workers and their labour movement. 
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Regulations, and dissolve the KDIU (Jomo and Todd, 1994) and, on 16th \1ay 19.+1 
declare a state of emergency in Selangor to crush them. These incidences should not 
go unnoticed, as after this period, the vibrant nature of the Malayan labour movement 
would end, and the new independent government followed the precedence set by the 
colonial government on how to suppress growing unrest. 
The Indian movement flourished when the Chinese one became inactive in 19.+0 due 
to the change in MCP policy. What this suggests is that the growth of independent 
organisations among estate workers in the pre-war period occurred when they were 
not suppressed by the British. Their focus was naturally economic at first, but later 
became political when their basic right to organise was denied by employers/planters. 
Supported by Indians nationalists, they fought for wage increases and wage parity 
with Chinese labours and against brutal treatment by estate staffs (Stenson, 1970: 28). 
By 1938, the authority stopped altogether the migration of Indians to Malaya. 
Employers started to cut down the estate workers' pay by 20 percent, while 30 percent 
of them were made redundant. Again, from 1937 to August 1938, rubber and tin 
prices fell and as such the demand for labour also dropped. But this time the 
employers were not keen to send the labourers back home. Instead, through co-
operation between the government and United Planting Association of Malaya 
(UP AM), it was suggested that there should be a pay cut and a shortened working 
hours. Thus, employers reduced their pay by 10 cents per day for Indian workers and 
20 to 25 cents for Chinese workers, while labourers in the mining sector were given a 
pay-cut of 40 per cent. There were no spontaneous protests to these actions apart from 
one strike by mining workers in Sungei Besi and some attempts by Indian estate 
workers in several places in Perak. What this discussion suggests is that, even though 
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it was far from a perfect system, there was a vibrant relationship between the three 
parties at this stage, where each party did contribute to the outcome of their 
negotiations. 
Compared to the Chinese and Indians, the Malays lagged behind in their labour 
movement because of their late involvement in the commercial activities. They only 
became involved in small numbers in union activities seen in the Batu Arang 
collieries in Selangor and the Singapore Traction Company. Apart from the smaller 
numbers of Malay labourers engaged as wage workers, there were suspicions over the 
nature of labour movement that was dominated by Chinese and then the Indians 
(Kamaruddin, 1992: 28). Their late entrance into union activities contributed further 
to the dominance of the Chinese and Indians workers in the earlier part of the trade 
union movement in Malaya. However, it is important to note that there was gradual 
increase in Malay self-consciousness and self-assertiveness over events that 
surrounded them. Between 1934-1941, there emerged three 'contending' new elite 
groups among the Malays: Arabic educated religious reformists; the largely Malay-
educated radical intelligentsia; and English-educated administrators recruited mainly 
from the traditional Malay ruling class. They attempted to create a 'large-scale, pan-
Malayan organisation capable of equipping the Malay people, as a people, to run their 
own affairs in the modem world' (Roff, 1967: 211). This awareness, though at first 
economic in nature, later turned political as they urged the British and the Malay 
establishments (the Malay ruling class) to give due attention to the welfare of Malays 
in general, especially their economic backwardness as compared to the immigrants. 
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The British were concerned about labour unrest in its colonies 46 and as such, events 
in the 1930s led the authorities to consider regulating the unions in the hope of 
making them more accessible to the state. Thus, in late 1939 the Trade Unions Bill 
and the Industrial Courts Bill were introduced in the FMS for the first time and 
enacted in 1940, while the Trade Disputes Ordinance (TUO) was passed in late 1941. 
Both the ordinances were restrictive on the right to unionise and to pursue industrial 
action, reflecting British legislation and conservative opinion at the time (lomo and 
Todd, 1994: 64). The TUO required registration of all trade unions, granted extensive 
powers to the registrar, who now could refuse registration of unions' likely to be used 
for unlawful purposes' (lomo and Todd, 1994). However even though not a single 
union was registered, since the Japanese invaded Malaya by December 1941, the 
introduction of the laws marked the start of a phase in Malayan IR. Before the 
implementation of the TUO, the authority dealt with the movement in a number of 
ways. Workers involved in strikes faced either dismissal and/or imprisonment under 
the Labour Code, and/or deportation under the Banishment Ordinance (lomo and 
Todd, 1994: 58). The government also retaliated by blocking the migration of Chinese 
and Indians from their respective countries. Moreover, Chinese and Indians labourers 
who were made redundant were also sent home. The new laws clearly solved the 
problems without having to tackle militant unionism in the old ways. 
The above account shows that up until WWII, the Chinese and the Indians formed the 
bulk of the industrial work force with the Malays considered as unimportant 
contributors. It was evident that the immigrants, in comparison to the Malays, were 
more involved in the commercial economic life (Comber, 1983: 19), thus their more 
4(, Gamba (1962a: 100) noted that the British were particularly anxious about strikes in copper mines in 
Northern Rhodesia. 
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active participation in the early movement. The Chinese were more aggressive in the 
early labour movement, not just because they were influenced by Chinese politics and 
nationalism, but also because they inherited the culture of defending their interests, 
such as shown by the presence of secret societies and guilds, which the Indians and 
Malays lacked. This is an important fact that influenced the development of trade 
unionism in Malaysia in later years, since the vibrant labour movement stopped after 
WWII by the government who were intimidated by even their presence. In fact, 
slowly Indians replaced the Chinese, and when the Malays were a part of the modem 
economic life, especially during the NEP, they were the more active unions' 
members. To some farsighted Malays, even during this early period, the Chinese were 
already challenging their political supremacy, even with a 'pro-Malay' British policy 
(Roff, 1967; Comber, 1983: 24). In addition, the political activities of the Chinese 
which were connected to events in China further increased Malay doubts over their 
sincerity or protestations of loyalty to Malaya. Racial divisions, especially between 
Malays and Chinese, worsened in later years, complicating the social, economic and 
political scenes in Malaya. Furthermore, the laws became a foundation that even 
independent Malaya later adopted, demonstrating the British influence not just in the 
Malaysian political system but also in its IR. As discussed below, the Japanese 
occupation of Malaya emphasised and worsened the already divided working 
communities. 
6.3. The Japanese Occupation and Ethnic Relations 
Japanese military rule in Malaya, which lasted for less than four years, from 1942 to 
1945, was said to have made little impact on the labour movement (Kamaruddin, 
1992). However, the long tenn devastating impact caused by the differential treatment 
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meted out to the three ethnic groups that increased the animosity among especially the 
Chinese and Malays, needs special attention. 
Politically, the Japanese rule highlighted the fact that the British and their allies 
ungraciously fell to an Asian power. Apart from severe economic hardship created 
within communities, they showed some tolerance to the Malays and Indians but 
treated the Chinese harshly. Initially, Malay and Indian nationalism was encouraged. 
Also, there was a Japanese-sponsored Malay army, the Pembela Tanah Ayer (PET A) 
or The Nations Defender, an anti-British Malay organisation believed to have been 
the offshoot of the first radical Malay political organisation, the Kesatuan Melayu 
Muda (KMM) or the Young Malay Union (Roff, 1967: 173). The KMM, suppressed 
during British administration, was allowed to operate under the Japanese, with its 
jailed leader released by the Japanese and appointed within PET A (Roff, 1967:255; 
Comber, 1983:26). The Japanese supported and encouraged the Indian Independent 
League (IlL) and the Indian National Army (INA) whose primary struggle was for the 
independence of India from the British (Jomo and Todd, 1994: 69). Moreover, the 
Indians took the IlL and INA as a salvation to their problems and misery, which 
uplifted their morale, sense of dignity and national pride. They identified and 
participated in this movement, and the contact with well-organised Chinese workers 
boosted their confidence for union organisation after WWIl. On the other hand, the 
Chinese that had supported anti-Japanese campaign even before their invasion of 
Malaya, organised themselves under the MCP-Ied Malayan People's Anti Japanese 
AmlY (MP AJA), which spearheaded most of active resistance to the Japanese (Jomo 
and Todd, 1994: 68). The MCP became a very significant force, whereby the British 
were compelled to accept its offer of co-operation in defeating the Japanese. and 
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granted legitimacy to its status and its associated organisations, such as the GLC 
(Ramasamy, 1994: 58). However, the important point is that the MCP failed to 
impress the majority Malays, except the radicals, but made some contact with Indian 
workers (Jomo and Todd, 1994: 69). 
Generally the hardship caused by military rule directly affected Malayan people. It 
brought chaos to the economy, shortages of food and a scarcity of jobs, which led to 
unemployment. Men feared being forced into labour and being assigned to various 
places in and out of the country, such as to the Siam Death Railway (Ramasamy, 
1994: 59). There were tens of thousands of workers, especially Indians, transported to 
Thailand and Bunna to work on the railway project. However the long-tenn effect 
seemed to be the Japanese discriminating racial policy, softer towards the Malays 
while brutal towards the Chinese, thereby worsening the already sour relationship 
between these two ethnic groups. The Chinese were being singled out due to their 
mutual animosity among them since the Sino-Japanese War in China, and also 
because of their associations with MPAJA, which marked a military challenge to the 
Japanese. When the Japanese surrendered, there was for almost a month of political 
vacuum in Malaya before the BMA took over and in which the MCP-Ied MPAJA 
instigated a bloody racial riot (Comber, 1983). 
6.4. The Taming of the Labour Movement 
The period after the WWII was a turning point for the Malayan labour movement in 
more ways than one. The discussion below highlights the impact of Japanese 
occupation, which led to enforced suppression on a vibrant but militant labour 
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movement with the support of the employers from 1945-1948, thus creating a new 
moderate labour movement in Malaya. 
As already discussed, British rule encouraged communal divisions, an issue exploited 
during the Japanese occupation, leading to the Sino-Malay riots immediately after the 
war ended (Comber, 1983: 28). From April 1946 to March 1947, a number of militant 
trade unions led by MCP-linked GLUs emerged, especially in Singapore with the 
Singapore GLU incorporating 65 unions (Jomo and Todd, 1994). The GLUs then 
formed the Pan-Malayan General Labour Union (PMGLU) in 1946 and became the 
front organisation of the MCP, which organised the workers' movements. The 
PMGLU was later reconstituted as the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions 
(PMFTU). These organisations gained significant organisational as well as political 
experience, especially resulting from the role played by its earlier front organisations 
such as MPAJA and MPAJU during the Japanese occupation. By late 1945, there was 
already a dramatic rise in the district-based GLUs in various parts of the country. 
Moreover, there were strikes and demonstrations demanding improvements in wages, 
conditions of work, social amenities in urban industries, transport services, ports, 
rubber plantations and mines. The GLU-Ied workers were successful in their requests, 
especially when demands in rubber and tin rose and employers were desperate to 
increase production. Thus, the GLU became prominent in the immediate post war 
period, working towards the short and long-term solidarity and awareness of workers, 
both in the economic and the political spheres. 
Though the GLU went beyond economic and communal boundaries by bringing 
together multi-racial workers, it did not necessarily solve the communal issues that 
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arose, when the minority of wage-earner Malays were not too enthusiastic to join 
forces with their Chinese and Indian counterparts. This reluctance on the part of the 
Malays was not hard to understand. They were the minority in the wage earners' 
group, and they saw how the MPAJA (mainly Chinese and influenced by communists 
- never a strong influence in Malay communities) overtook Malaya in the bloody 
aftermath following the Japanese surrender. The employers viewed this as a positive 
sign, whereby they could become the ready supply of non-unionised labour which 
would make up for the labour shortage. Moreover, they could be used as a balance to 
the threats from the organised Chinese and Indians workers. However, since the 
Chinese and Indians were the bulk of the industrial workforce, their activities as a 
general, multi-racial and political union ultimately worried and threatened both the 
colonial government and the employers. The British noticed the changed attitude of 
workers due to their exposure to the Japanese occupation. The BMA now realised that 
though they no more in need of the help of MCP, the party had gained prominence 
amongst Malayan people, and had become very organised as well as posing a political 
threat to the British colonial comeback. The GLUs now gained support from Chinese 
labourers, who were impressed by its ability to improve workers' wages and 
conditions after the war. The GLUs effectively enabled them to move within their 
geographical area rather than occupation or industry. In 1946, the GLUs went a step 
further by managing to bring all Indian labour unions except one (Negeri Sembilan 
Labour Union) under their influence. This further strengthened their position, and in 
the same year, when Jawaharlal Nehru of India came to visit Malaya, he attended one 
of GLU branch meetings (Jomo and Todd, 1994: 74). The British then realised the 
need to change policy. The BMA, which had been instituted as an interim measure, 
not having a long-ternl labour policy, dealt with workers on an ad-hoc basis. Always 
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in line with Colonial Office directives, the BMA adopted a more liberal approach and 
recognised the establishment of trade unions. However, not all BMA officials agreed 
since they were more allied to British employers, and some refused to recognise the 
political, economic and labour changes created after Japanese occupation (Gamba, 
1962a). The employers were also pressuring the administration to take some action to 
check these trends. So the employers and the government embarked on a series of 
measures to curb the labour movement, in particular by arresting the union leaders 
and activists. However, a few actions by the BMA made them unpopular with the 
workforce, such as inflated prices of essential supplies and supplies of food, coupled 
with corruption and mismanagement (Ramasamy, 1994: 60-61). When the 1939 wage 
level for government employees was retained, and only a limited increase was given 
to labourers in the private sector, the workforce were disillusioned. The Japanese 
currency was not recognised and Japanese collaborators were persecuted in an 
arbitrary manner (Ramasamy, 1994:61). Following this, war prisoners who amounted 
to 30,000 in Singapore were used to carry out the work of the strikers (Gamba, 
1962a), a factor that did not endear the BMA to Malayans as it was accused of staving 
off wage increases (Ramasamy, 1994: 61). The conflict with the MCP mounted when 
military measures were introduced to break up left-wing strikes and demonstrations in 
late 1945. More arrests were made of those suspected of collaborating with the MCP 
and the MPAJA was disbanded, infuriating the left (Stenson, 1970: 76). The turning 
point in the relationship between the Mep and the British came in February 1946, 
when the BMA responded with military force to a celebration arranged to inaugurate 
PMGLU, an event not permitted by the British. 17 people were killed in Malaya, 2 in 
Singapore and many were injured and arrested (Morgan, 1977: 167). The Mep took a 
drastic stand, abandoned its 'moderate policy' and adopted a policy of labour 
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organisation and agitation. In addition, the PMGLU was forced to the forefront, 
laying organisational groundwork with working class with grievances and aspirations. 
In 1946, the British tried implementing the Malayan Union, which was then opposed 
by the left as it represented a continuation of old colonial policy and no attempt 
towards self government (Ramasamy, 1994: 61). The Malays, now represented by 
conservative Malays, mounted a strong challenge, forcing the British to replace it with 
the Federation of Malaya 1948 thereby restoring the Malays' special rights (refer to 
Chapter Four). This is the period that also saw the rise of the UMNO as the main 
political party for the Malays, marking another era of moderate and alternative 
organisations encouraged by the British. 
The British government welcomed the development of democracy through the trade 
union movement modelled after the British type. It was also considered that the trade 
unionism know-how and the 'proper' trade unionism should be encouraged, thus the 
new Labour government in Britain dispatched Trade Union Advisers (TUA) to the 
colonies for this purpose. A model Trade Union Ordinance (TUO) was also issued to 
be implemented throughout the empire. This was actually part of a broader colonial 
strategy to ensure that the development of trade unions in the colonies did not 
challenge British hegemony. The major pre-war legislation, the Trade Unions 
Ordinance 1940, with certain amendments based on the recommendation from 
London, was finally implemented on 1st July 1946, and a post ofTUA was created to 
take charge of a Trade Union Adviser Department.47 In addition, two more separate 
departments concerned with labour matters were established: the Department of 
Labour and the Registrar of Trade Unions. From then onwards, the role of the TUA 
H See Gamha (1 %2a: 100) on the arri"al of John Alfred Brazier (the TUA) in Singapore in December 
1945. 
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was to ensure there was growth and development of 'sound', 'responsible' or 
'independent' (independent from the communist and the GLUs) trade unions, and in 
fact, he was asked to 'liquidate the GLU' on his arrival in Malaya. He managed to 
organise white-collar unions and some dominantly Indian unions with little bargaining 
power. This effort provided the government with an alternative labour group to the 
militant PMGLU, an impact that brought the end of militant unionism in Malaya. 
Here we see the importance of the implementation of the 1940 TUO after the War, 
turning a new leaf in the country's trade unionism. It made possible the whole idea of 
bringing the unions under state control, and curbed the growth and development of the 
PMGLU-Ied militant unionism. In fact, the year 1947 marked a shift in initiative in 
the handling of labour situation, from the PMFTU to the employers and the 
government (Jomo and Todd, 1994: 78). The PMFTU, while having some internal 
struggle, was seeking a legitimate stand in the government's eye (Stenson, 1970: 
205). However, in early 1948 the PMFTU realised that they had to confront the 
government in order to be taken seriously or else they would risk losing the labourers' 
support. This delayed action gave the government an advantage, when they had 
sufficient time to weaken the PMFTUs power by using the TUO (Jomo and Todd, 
1994), thus strike actions in 1947 did not receive support as in 1945 and 1946. Both 
government and employers joined forces with the former using all resources to the 
extent of bringing in police to intimidate workers, acting as employer, legislator, 
administrator and also enforcer (Jomo and Todd, 1994: 82). To sever the ties of 
PMFTU from its affiliates, the government encouraged the registration of all its 
member unions. For this reason, GLUs all over Malaya and Singapore reorganised 
themselves into PMFTU and SFTU in the hope that they may not be required to 
181 
register. It should be noted that the Registrar of Trade Unions (R TU) had great 
discretionary powers to grant or reject application to registration, and in this case, the 
RTU refused an application by the PMFTU while granting those made by the SFTU 
and other affiliates. This led the PMFTU to resort to what led to the first Emergency 
rule in Malaya, in June 1948. There was a sudden increase of industrial action in the 
second quarter of 1948, beginning in April of that year in Singapore and spreading to 
mainland Malaya in May and June (Jomo and Todd, 1994; Gamba, 1962a; 
Kamaruddin, 1992). 
Here, economic as well as political considerations prompted the colonial government 
to take an aggressive stance. Three amendments to the TUa were made through the 
Federal Legislative Council (FLC) on 31 st May 1948. The first allowed only persons 
with at least three years' employment in an industry to hold official trade union posts 
in that industry, an amendment aimed at professional trade unionists. The second 
prevented anyone who had been criminally convicted from holding a post in a trade 
union, while the final amendment was to prohibit federations of trade unions other 
than those based on similar trade, occupation or industry. All three amendments had a 
direct effect on the trade union movement, while the last amendment effectively made 
the PMFTU and the federation of trade unions illegal (Gamba, 1962a; Jomo and 
Todd, 1994: 84; Leong, nd). The Mep and the PMFTU were therefore banned, and 
those alleged to be involved with the violence were arrested and deported. A state of 
Emergency was declared in central Perak and central Johor on 16th June, and later on 
1 i h July, before being extended to the rest of the country. Such Emergency 
Regulations gave the govemment the legal means to restore order, thus rules deemed 
necessary could be implemented. The police now had the right to disperse any 
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meeting or assembly of five or more workers. Moreover, strikes were considered 
illegal if employers were not given two weeks' written notice signed by seven people 
representing the group concerned. With the employers resorting to various forms of 
intimidation of the work force and reprisals against the unions, workers were in 
disarray, fear and confusion (Jomo and Todd, 1994). 
The state of Emergency thus marked the end of militant UnIOnIsm in Malaya, a 
repression that could not be fought off by the left-wing unions because of its 
extensiveness. Police raided premises, arrested some 600 people, either deported or 
repatriated large numbers of people, especially to China. The scale of repression could 
be seen by the sharp fall in the total of workdays lost due to strikes, as well as the 
numbers of unions and their membership after the Emergency was declared. 
Workdays lost in 1949 were 5,390 compared to 370,464 in 1948 while the number of 
strikes in 1949 was only 29 compared to 181 in 1948 and finally workers involved in 
strikes in 1949 numbered 2,292 compared with 34,037 in 1948 (LDAR, Federation of 
Malaya, 1948-1957). 
The Emergency rule did not affect the 'responsible' and 'independent' unions, which 
the government had been encouraging since 1946. These new unions continued to 
grow in number, though some faced heavy constraints from the government who 
suspected them of collaborating with the previous PMFTU militant style unionism. 
The early development of these new unions comprised the white-collar and Indian 
workers; the railway workers, government unions and clerical employees (Gamba, 
1962a). Efforts were made as well to win over the plantation workers from the 
PMFTU's influence. The government not only encouraged and supported these new 
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unions, but also tried to incorporate them in the government system by appointing 
them to some important state bodies. As such, they had to playa supportive role in 
furthering the government's scheme. Such examples included English-speaking 
labour leaders of non-PMFTU unions, like V.M.N.Menon (Estate Staff Union) and 
M.P.Rajagopal (Pan-Malayan Railway Worker's Union or PMRWU) , who were 
appointed to the Malayan Union Advisory Council (MUAC). Some like P.P. 
Narayanan (Negeri Sembilan Indian Labour Union), Osman Siru (Penang Postal 
Uniformed Staffs Union), Kong Soo Chin (Selangor Clerical and Administrative 
Staff Union), and again M.P.Rajagopal were appointed to the Labour Advisory Board 
(LAB) in as early as 1947. There were also those who were appointed to more 
glamorous positions such as to the Federal Legislative Council (FLC) (Morais, 1975). 
The government used the TUA of Malaya to build up and encourage new unions, 
concentrating on rubber plantation workers as well as the public sector employees. 
The former sector was a crucially important one in the economy, and putting it under 
sound and responsible unions benefited the state as a whole. Needless to say, the new 
unions were small, fragmented and weak to bargain with their employers. The few 
relatively large ones, like the plantation and railway unions, had their leadership 
weakened by the Emergency circumstances and state patronage. Their subservience to 
the state became more evident when they needed the TUA's support to carry out their 
trade union work, submitting themselves further to the government's influence (lomo 
and Todd, 1994). The government's move demonstrated its support towards the 
recognition of 'clean, responsible and independent' unions, that is, independent from 
the influence of the militant PMFTU. In return of their sudden rise to prominence. and 
with certain prestige and glamour, it was only natural that these labour leaders became 
more grateful to the government and felt obliged to support it. The other t\\'O 
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significant facts emerged here: one, the increasing role of the public sector unions as 
representing the new moderate unions; second, the multiracial outlook of union 
leaders. Both traits can be found in the development of future unionism in \1alaysia. 
At this stage, the unions were without a proper union structure, but the new unions 
received limited support from workers, a factor that worried the government. 
Moreover, there was a constant threat that the influence of the communist movement 
as well as the more militant PMFTU might return. It was with this in mind that the 
government started thinking that there needed to be another, more organised, more 
structured and recognised union, one that would be accepted by workers, but at the 
same time become 'the eyes and ears' of the state. This led to the formation of the 
Malayan Trade Union Council (MTUC) in 1948. 
6.5. The MTUC and 'New Unionism' 
Particularly from 1950 onwards, various efforts were made by the colonial 
government to win support from the masses in order to counter left-wing unionism. 
To ensure support from all three ethnic groups, the government initiated a number of 
social reform policies especially geared to attract Malay and Chinese endorsement of 
the government's agenda. Among the Malay masses, the focus was on the Malay elite 
and middle class in one comer and the peasants in another. The Malay upper class 
was adopted into the governing body, while rural reforms were passed for the Malay 
peasants, who actually dominated the peasant group in Malaya. Among the Chinese 
communities, the Briggs Plan was designed to isolate the insurgents from the rural 
Chinese. Trade union leaders at this stage were dominated by Indians (Leong, n.d.), a 
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significant feature that, as discussed below, permanently replaced the left-wing 
unionists amongst the Chinese labourers. 
'New unionism', as an alternative to a communist or militant union movement was , 
encouraged and sponsored by the colonial government (Azizan, 1989: 56) in the 
belief that it was assisting the development of 'sound' and 'responsible' unions. The 
role of this new union would be to help provide workers with a channel to express 
their grievances, and for the government to establish links with and monitor labour. 
Initially, the government took early steps by promoting a number of 'moderate' 
labour leaders to places of prominence, such as the MUAC, the FLC, and the LAB. 
However, the government had to accept the fact that the existing unions were 
unorganised and national labour leadership was absent. The worry concerning 
communist influence encouraged them to bridge the relationship with the new type of 
unions, but they also saw that the formation of a national labour centre was inevitable 
(Azizan, 1989: 59). 
The colonial government sent abroad labour leaders as observers to the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) inaugural conference in London in late 
1949, which was seen as an important step to socialise trade unionists with new roles 
in the MTUC. In the eyes of the British, a 'responsible' labour centre would be a 
buffer to counter the influence of the left-inclined World Federation of Trade Unions 
(WFTU) (Gamba, 1962a: 399-402). The labour leaders were, in fact, sent to London 
at the time when the MTUC had not yet been inaugurated. One of the representatives, 
P.P. Narayanan, a government-nominated member of the FLC, was soon to head the 
MTUC (Morais, 1975). In this regard, Azizan (1989: 62) rejects Zaidi's idea (1975: 
15-19) that trade unionists during this time were prime movers. To Azizan, they \\'ere 
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merely 'labour leaders that played a subsidiary, or rather, a collaborative role to that 
of the government' (Azizan, 1989: 62). The unions and the union leaders themselves 
were in fact dependent upon the government as it was not possible for union leaders 
to establish a national union centre without the help of the colonial government. 
Despite some colonial officials and employers being reserved and sceptical towards 
the idea of a Pan-Malayan based trade union movement, the colonial administration 
adopted it as a strategy to counter communism. 
From the start, the colonial government made sure that the MTUC lived up to their 
expectations. At the first conference to discuss the formation of the MTUC, held on 
the 2th and 28th February 1949, speeches were given by pro-British leaders, each 
representing the three ethnic communities, Onn laafar, Tan Cheng Lock, and R. 
Ramani. In a way, trade unionism was now being treated the way the British had 
treated Malayan politics after the War, that is, it needed to be represented by the three 
main ethnic groups. More than 150 delegates, representing 165 registered unions, set 
up a Working Committee which was to ascertain further steps in establishing closer 
inter-union liaison, the machinery, and the organisation that would allow regular 
consultation and discussion between the trade union movement and labour 
representatives from various government bodies and committees. 
It was only a year later, on the 25 th and 26th March 1950, that the inaugural conference 
took place in Kuala Lumpur attended by 174 delegates representing III unions out of 
165 unions registered (Raza, 1969: 357). Again, speeches were made by the same 
three community leaders. M.P. Rajagopal ofPMRWU, the appointed member ofFLC, 
chaired the conference and was asked to adopt the report and recommendations of the 
1949 Working Committee. A resolution to form the MTUC was made followed by an 
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election of members of the Central Committee (Azizan, 1989: 64). Despite the 
government's repeated statements that the growth of 'responsible and sound' trade 
unionism was encouraged, the Chinese remained aloof and sceptical (Raza, 1969). 
The nine members from the Central Committee were elected by delegates in the 
conference (each union had a maximum of two delegates), while the representatives 
for the five groups were elected by the delegates belonging to the respective groups. 
However, what is interesting to note is that from the beginning, the TUA, Mr Brazier, 
played a leading role on behalf of the government and involved himself and ten others 
from the department in all stages of the conference. Brazier got the full support of his 
top superiors, particularly from the High Commissioner General himself (Gamba, 
1962a: 397-98). To most 'moderate' labour leaders, Brazier seemed the sincere party, 
helping them building a 'bona-fide' trade union movement. He had trade union 
background but still experienced some difficulties convincing certain colonial 
officials of the virtues of 'responsible' trade unionism in post-war Malaya. The labour 
leaders at this stage also owed Brazier and the government all the benefits and 
advantages of their 'state sinecures' (Azizan, 1989: 68). Their image and influence in 
society were suddenly raised, and they were given a sense of confidence and 
importance. When some of them were elected in the MTUC conference, their 
position, if somewhat questioned by other unionists who were not picked by the 
government, was legitimised. 
A few important facts have already emerged regarding MTUC in this early stage. The 
structure of the MTUC was that it was an advisory and co-ordinating body for the 
unions as well as a link between unions and the labour representatives on the 
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government bodies. The supreme authority lay in its Annual Delegates Conference 
(ADC) with each delegate (two delegates for 500 members or less, and one delegate 
for every additional 500 members) entitled to a vote. MTUC, registered in 1951, was 
not as a trade union, but a society under the Societies Act, 1949. As such, the MTUC 
could actually be barred from engaging in a trade dispute or entering into negotiation 
with employers. As discussed further in Chapter Nine, the government has not used 
this against the MTUC, and it has to a considerable extent until today acted as the 
national labour centre for its affiliating unions. The MTUC was not permitted to 
affiliate or take an active part in political movement and had no executive authority 
over its affiliates. Most delegates attending the inaugural conference seemed well 
aware of the limits of MTUC effectiveness at this stage. They agreed it would not 
permit racial, occupational, or industrial domination, and that it would not be a 'super-
union', or a federation of trade unions, or an organisation with power to actively 
participate in individual trade union disputes, or in any way exercise executive 
authority over affiliated unions (Josey, 1958: 49). This limitation of the MTUC 
highlights the fact that the colonial government was against another powerful national 
labour centre that might resemble the PMFTU. The arguments that the significance of 
MTUC was waning in the eyes of its affiliating unions still persisted, but at least to 
some, the MTUC was a central body that provided a platform from which to take up 
various labour issues. For example, questions such as labour policy, trade union 
education, organisation of workers in new industries, union amalgamation and 
mergers, international labour relations, could only be dealt with by the MTUC at 
national level. Following this, the year 1956 served as a tentative dividing line 
between government-nurtured unionism and independent unions and saw the 
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weakening of communist insurgency as well as successful London talks regarding an 
independent Malaya. 
6.6. The Environment leading to Independence 
The period 1950-57 saw Malayan IR trapped between the support for independence 
and independent unionism. Prompted by the Malayan people, though the political 
parties were actually supported and encouraged by the British, there was a move 
towards granting independence to Malaya in the early 1950s. The first general 
election in 1955 was succeeded by the formation of a new constitution, and the 
appointments of local ministers. The Alliance Party, which represented the three main 
ethnic groups, UMNO, MCA and MIC, became prominent with the support of the 
British and then won the 1955 general election with a landslide victory, which 
hastened the move towards full independence. This victory fulfilled the colonial 
government's dream to separate militant or 'left-wing' trade unionism from politics, 
which with an agreed constitution, was achieved on 31 August 1957. 
The Labour Party of Malaya, which succeeded in bringing in more educated Chinese 
to join in their movement, lost very badly to the British-backed Alliance Party. 
However, it was encouraged by the development of the labour movement in 
Singapore, and the landslide win by Peoples Action Party (P AP)48 as well as by the 
government's relaxed attitude towards the setting up of political funds by trade 
unions. The Malayan Labour Party blamed its failure to win seats in the election on 
the lack of commitment by members and Indian leaders in MTUC. P.P. Narayanan, 
4X To understand more about how the PAP of Singapore won the Singapore General Election 1955, see 
Leong. 'Perkembollgon Kesatlloll Seker/a dan Dasar I\olonial di Malaya. 1 c)..f5-195 7', which outlines 
the labour movement in Singapore, which had a big impact on the resurgence of Chinese workers' 
participation in Malayan trade unionism and their desire to become invoh'ed in constitutional politics, 
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the MTUC President in 1955, said that trade unions and politics should be separated, 
or else it would bring negative influence to workers (Leong, n.d.: 34). This view 
reflected the attitude of labour leaders (mostly Indians) at the brink of independence. 
There was also unhealthy competition between the Chinese and Indians leaders in 
MTUC as the main trade union centre in Malaya. This could be seen between Ooi 
Thiam Siew from Malayan Mining Union, who aspired to be the secretary general of 
the MTUC during the Delegates' Conference in April 1955, but was defeated by the 
Indian dominated National Teachers' Union's leader, K.V. Thaver. Ooi took his loss 
badly and criticised MTUC for being a racial union monopolised by Indians and 
meant for Indian welfare, especially those working in the plantations sector. 
The Chinese labour leaders tried to increase the status of Chinese workers as union 
members to be on a par with Indian workers, and especially when the National Union 
of Plantation Workers Union (NUPW) , formed in 1954, saw a consolidation of 
plantation workers' unions. At this stage, there was a tendency for labour leaders to be 
directly involved in politics, an influence of the success of Singapore's Labour Party 
and later the PAP. However, their failure in election, and dependency on the 
government and foreign institutions, such as the ICFTU, again weakened the 
independent union movement in Malaya. 
6.7. Public Sector Unionism 
No thorough study on the origins of Malaysian public sector IR in the past has been 
made. Gamba (1962: 22) reported 'powerful clerical, professional and administrative 
officers' associations' established before 1940, but did not elaborate. Even on these he 
said the members were 'expatriates and a few Asians in the higher divisions or in the 
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Malay section of the Service'. A study by Jomo and Todd (1994) also failed to 
explore the early period of pre and post-war public sector unionism. 
However, Gamba (1962a) gave an interesting account of how, even in the early 
period, public servants were treated differently from private sector employees, and 
also from their European counterparts by the colonial government or, right after the 
war, the BMA. The discrimination became obvious when the cost of living rose and 
the rates of salaries was low, making life difficult for Asian civil servants and the 
clerical staff in private firms. The Malayan public, especially its civil servants, were 
already wary of the BMA's empty promises for example, when they returned after the 
Japanese occupation, they promised food supplies: 
Rice by the hundreds of tons, flour and other consumer goods were said to be 
on the way. Rice was to be distributed free and in abundance (Gamba, 1962a: 
79). 
Nevertheless, this was not to be. The locals blamed the British for the Japanese 
invasion of Malaya and were also disgusted with their failure to protect Malaya, and 
for failing to be responsible for the post war consequences. This was made worse 
when the British promised European internee officials (those captured and jailed by 
the Japanese during the war) much bigger sums of compensation, while local staff 
received only three months' pay on the 1941 scale (Gamba, 1962a: 76). However, 
when the European leaders of the Malayan tin-mining industry warned the 
administration and criticised it over its poor handling of the matter, making references 
to 'Malay Rulers and the people' as the victims, the administration settled their claims 
in full. This discrimination is obvious; the leaders who made the allegations were 
Europeans, had they been locals they would have been categorised as subversives. 
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At the same time, there was already strike fever among industrial labour (estate staffs 
and labourers, the mercantile and business employees) but the civil servants had not 
adopted disruptive practices. In fact, when approached by strikers in early 1946, the 
civil servants at administrative levels refused to join. During the Malayan Union 
administration, the salaries were determined by The Wages and Cost of Living 
Committee appointed by the Governor of Malayan Union. This situation is best 
described by Gamba (1962: 79): 
The Japanese face-slapping had ceased but the pre-war servility of junior to 
senior, of Asian to European, even to a lesser degree, was re-introduced 
together with the difficulties raised against the promotions to higher 
appointments. 
Here, it is interesting to note that since the labourers were not confined to a tradition 
of service as faced by those in the government service, they obtained through strikes, 
benefits which were denied to the government's clerk. What the civil servants wanted 
from the BMA and later the civil administration was three and a half years' back-pay 
for the period of Japanese occupation, as enjoyed by the European government 
servants. However, the Financial Secretary in Singapore announced only ex-gratia 
payments for non-interned government servants. In fact, the government wished to 
compensate according to the twenty, forty, and sixty per cent deductions made by the 
Japanese. On 4th March 1947, the Junior Civil Service Association (JCSA) rejected 
this, and on March 24t\ 1947, all Asian government employees in Singapore attended 
a 'Back-Pay Protest', marking 'the first time in the history of Malaya and Singapore 
that Asian government employees had dared protest against their employer' (Gamba, 
1962a: 86). A partial revision of salaries and wages for Asian civil servants did not 
take place until 1948, when 'piecemeal' increases were granted, until the general 
revision in 1953 (Gamba, 1962a: 92). In fact, 1951 saw the Report of the Joint 
193 
Committee on Cost of Living Allowances, appointed by the Federal and Colony 
Legislative Councils under the Chairmanship of Dr F.e. Benham (Gamba, 1962a: 99). 
Information regarding Benham Report could not be found in Gamba's or other 
scholars' work. Fortunately, some primary materials were gathered at the CUEPACS 
Headquarters that shed some light. The Federal Secretariat Circular No 28, dated 16th 
October 1950, though intended to raise other issues, provides us with some 
information on the Benham Committee Report.49 The Circular stressed the Colonial 
government's commitment towards collective bargaining in the public sector. In it, it 
says: 
The government has therefore decided in accordance with its declared view 
that rates of remuneration are properly a matter for collective bargaining 
between employer and employee that an opportunity should be afforded to any 
service to give formal notification of its desire to negotiate its own salary 
scales in preference to accepting whatever decisions may be arrived at by the 
Legislative Council. .. (Circular no 28, 1950). 
In the circular, five mam conditions for any negotiations between employer and 
employee in the public sectors were made. The first said that while negotiation is 
taking place, the officers will remain on their existing salary scales. Second, the 
negotiations will only be conducted with representative bodies, such as unions or 
associations. Third, the government must also be satisfied the unions or associations 
are sufficiently representative of the staff comprising the service on whose behalf they 
purports to act. However, the outcome of negotiation would be deemed to be made 
for all, even though they are not members of the unions or associations. Fourth, there 
will be no negotiation on the date of implementation of any agreement reached. Fifth, 
if a number of services elect to negotiate, it will not be possible to set up the necessary 
4'1 S~e Appendix III on F.S. Circular 0:0 28 of 1950. 
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machinery for all such services at the same time. The present Emergency might also 
delay the government. Based on the five conditions, any union or association 
representing a particular service needs to first notify the Chief Secretary by filling in 
and forwarding the attached form. Unions were given until 15th November 1950 to 
ballot their members before submitting applications for negotiations. The offer, 
however did not extend to 'staff on the Malayan Establishment who are not employed 
solely by the Federation Government whose terms or service are a matter of wider 
concern nor does it apply to the Malay Regiment or the Police' (Circular No 28, 
1950). 
It was obvious that after a year, the democratic effort of the British government had 
caught up with them. In the Federal Secretariat Circular No 6 of 1951, the Acting 
Financial Secretary of the Federal Secretariat observed a large number of applications 
for negotiation on salary scales received from different services. 50 He remarked how 
much work would be involved as compared to the small staff, and that it would result 
in the delay of the negotiation process if revision were to be based on the conclusion 
of each negotiation. Thus, the government decided: 
" .that new salary scales in accordance with the recommendations of the 
Special Committee on Salaries, as accepted by resolution of Legislative 
Council 23rd November 1950 shall be introduced ..... The introduction of the 
Benham scales will be without prejudice to any further amendments that may 
result in consequence of any agreements reached by negotiation (Circular No 
6,1951). 
It is when the colonial government felt burdened by the applications for negotiations 
that in 1953, after a few years of attempts, the Whitley system, the same that had been 
introduced in the United Kingdom in 1919, was incorporated in the Federation of 
50 See Appendix IVan Federal Secretariat Circular No 6 of 1951. 
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Malaya (Interview: Jamaluddin Md Isa: 30/1/2001). Whitley Councils comprised two 
councils; the National Joint Council (For Division I-N) and National Joint Council 
for IMG ( Industrial and Manual Group), while at departmental level there was the 
Departmental Joint Council (DJC) (Jomo and Todd, 1994). The impact of the 
National Whitley Councils was quite obvious: the government was trying to find ways 
to settle disputes through discussion and agreement. 
The essence of establishing the Whitley Councils for the civil service was to 'find 
means for the improvement in relationships between employers and work-people so 
that labour disputes could be avoided by discussion and agreement, and to provide for 
a systematic review in the industrial field with a view to improving conditions in 
industry generally'(Jomo and Todd, 1994: 92). Ideally, the Whitley Council would 
compose of an equal number of representatives from the employers' and employees' 
sides operating at national, departmental and local levels. If negotiations broke down, 
there was the Arbitration Tribunal, consisting of a panel of independent persons. 
These chosen people were from the nominees of both the Official and Staff sides of 
the National Whitley Council, with an acceptable chair appointed by the King. 
On the part of the workers, this made them consider forming unions that would unite 
all of them under a national union, hence the origin of the CUEP ACs (Interview, 
J amaluddin Md Isa: 30/1 / 2001). 
6.8. An Analysis on the Early IR Issues in Colonial Malaya 
The discussion below centres on issues that concern the early labour movement. 
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In the 1940s, trade unions attracted mainly Chinese and Indians for reasons discussed 
above. The colonial employment policy saw the Indians mainly recruited into the 
government and British owned private sectors, and particularly the plantation sector. 
The Chinese, apart from the traditional undertakings, worked in generally smaller 
Chinese firms. In the 1950s, the higher proportion of English-educated Indians, less 
militant and more docile, dominated the moderate and British-sponsored 'new 
unions'. Leong (nd) noted that leadership of the new trade unions until 1955 was 
dominated by Indians. Chinese union leaders only emerged in 1955 when the Labour 
Party produced political leaders who used the unions for personal advantage. 
The period also saw the dramatic growth of unions from 1948 to 1957 as illustrated in 
Table 6.2. The growth in union membership from 1950 to 1956 was particularly 
remarkable, increasing from 54,579 to 232,174. Meanwhile, the greatest increase in 
union membership, both in the public as well as in the private sectors, happened 
during the same years; 1951 and 1955-56. Factors that might have contributed to 
these increases include the success of wage negotiations, as in the plantation sector, 
and the introduction of a wage negotiating machinery in the public sector (Jomo and 
Todd, 1994: 89). The government also reduced the minimum age for union 
membership to 16 years, which could also serve as a contributing factor to the 
increase in union membership. The period of self government, though limited, for a 
few years before independence encouraged the increasing numbers of unionism both 
in the public as well as in the private sector. This was also the period when employers 
were still opposing unionisation. 
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The government, still wary of the situation caused by communist influence in the 
country, encouraged trade unions that were considered responsible; ones that could 
maintain the needs of labour without challenging the political and economic systems. 
The employers, on the other hand, were still opposing unionisation, especially of 
bigger, independent, national unions, but supported in-house or company unions in 
the hope of pre-empting the emergence of stronger or more independent unions (lomo 
and Todd, 1994: 89). The case of the management of Lever Brothers and Fung Keong 
Rubber Manufactory, which both refused to recognise the National Union of Factory 
and General Workers, should be noted. This refusal brought about the protracted 
strikes in 1954 and 1955 respectively. After the strikes were broken, the management 
of Lever Brothers expedited the formation of a company union, and in fact advanced 
$500 to assist in the printing costs (lomo and Todd, 1994: 89). There is no evidence 
however to support views that the incidence of strikes might have encouraged people 
to join the unions. 
Table 6.2: Number of Unions and Membership in The Public and Private 
Sectors, 1948-1957 
Public Sector Private Sector Total Total 
Year Unions Members Unions Members Unions Members 
1948 52 25,692 104 43,442 156 69,l34 
1949 70 20,142 93 21,163 163 41,305 
1950 84 25,451 84 29,128 168 54,579 
1951 100 38,685 91 68,486 191 107,171 
1952 123 43,579 91 84,370 214 127,949 
1953 138 41,450 93 68,107 231 109,557 
1954 136 42,256 96 71,214 232 1l3,470 
1955 137 52,061 98 93,688 235 145,749 
1956 l35 67,301 100 164,873 235 232,174 
1957 151 n.a. n.a. n.a. 250 222,073 
Sources: Federation of Malaya, Annual Report of The Trade Unions Registry, 1948-1957 
Table 6.3 illustrates that though there was a bigger number of unions in the public 
sector compared to the private sector from 1950 to 1956, the membership numbers in 
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the private sector unions were more encouraging. As a specific example, in 1956 there 
were 135 trade unions registered in the public sector with 67,301 members, while in 
the private sector there were only 100 unions registered but with a membership of 
164,873. Table 6.3. showed that the level of strike activity in 1956 was far greater 
compared with the previous seven years. This is in tandem with the increase of union 
membership in 1956 (refer again to Table 6.2). In fact, the changes in union 
membership between 1951 and 1956 were largely due to unionisation level in rubber 
plantations. This sector was the most significant player in the fluctuating union 
membership. For example, between March 1952 and March 1953, the membership of 
the Plantation Workers Union, Malaya (PWUM) grew from 36,000 to 485,962 
(Gamba, 1962a). In 1953, the drop in rubber prices might have contributed to the 
decrease in union memberships, but in 1954 and 1955, the numbers rose again. 
Table 6.3: Number of Strikes, Workers Involved, and Workdays Lost, 1948-1957 
Year Number of Strikes Workers Involved Workdays Lost 
1948 181 34,037 370,464 
1949 29 2,292 5,390 
1950 48 4,925 37,067 
1951 58 7,454 41,365 
1952 98 12,801 44,489 
1953 47 7,524 38,957 
1954 78 10,011 50,831 
1955 72 15,386 79,931 
1956 213 48,677 562,125 
1957 113 14,067 218,962 
Sources: Federation Of Malaya, Annual Report Of the Labour Department, 1948-1957. 
Table 6.4. illustrated that there was a large number of unions registered and de-
registered in the same year. For example although it seems like there was no change 
in the number of unions between 1955 and 1956, the fact was there were 26 new 
unions rellistered in 1956, with almost the same numbers de-registered for various 
2 
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reasons. At this stage, the cause can be attributed to hostile employers, competition 
among unions for members, less-educated members and inadequate finances. It is 
important to note these traits as they could be found again in later years in relation to 
the efforts made by unions to stabilise themselves and also the government's role in 
either encouraging or discouraging them. The life spans of unions at this stage were in 
fact decided on by the trade unionists. 
The other issue is the consistent British anti-communist stance, a trait found later in 
independent Malaysia. Since the crushing of the influence of communists on Malayan 
trade unions by the government, the movement became more and more dependent on 
it. Thus, when they became affiliated with the ICFTU, the liaison was not free from 
government's dictation. The ICFTU, once established in Southeast Asia, was 
expected to 'keep in touch with government and other British agencies (Gamba, 
1962a: 402). When for example, these unions appealed to the state to assist them in 
matters of administration, legal problems, difficult employers, and membership 
recruitment, they became dependent on the state, and particularly to the TUA. This 
was the case when the TUA, Brazier, actually planned with detailed preparation the 
first conference that gave birth to the formation of the MTUC. In fact, he went down 
to ensure the first presidency of the labour centre was filled by someone 'acceptable 
to the colonial government, to the employers and to the bulk of labour' (Gamba, 
1962a: 406). In other words, the leaders of the MTUC were government nominees. 
The paternalistic role of Malayan TUA's Department ensured details of each union's 
organisation and encouraged a consultative relationship between itself and the union, 
a relationship that tied unions to dependence on and subservience to government. 
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The issue on whether the unions should be involved in politics was also discussed as 
the colonial government intended them to be 'non-political', but as was found out, it 
was the government itself who could not separate the unions from politics. For 
example, it supported leaders and unions who displayed strong anti-communist 
convictions, and harassed left-wingers. When a left-wing WFTU wanted to establish 
links in Malaya, the government encouraged 'a binding and an exclusive relationship' 
between the Malayan union movement and ICFTU. 
Table 6.4: Number or Unions Registered and De-registered, 1948-1957* 
Year Newly Voluntarily Cancelled * * / Failure to comply 
Registered Dissolved Ceased to exist with statutory 
Requirements*** 
1948 42 44 49 18 
1949 38 11 15 5 
1950 19 1 11 1 
1951 33 5 5 2 
1952 37 5 4 1 
1953 29 7 4 1 
1954 18 5 13 1 
1955 29 19 6 1 
1956 26 8 13 6 
1957 37 13 4 2 
Source: Federation Of Malaya, Annual Report of the Trade Unions Registry, 1948-1957. 
*these figures include both employers' and labour unions. 
**many of these unions were cancelled because they no longer existed, but had not completed 
the administrative requirements to dissolve themselves. 
***includes failure to file annual returns and unlawful constitution of the trade union's 
executive. 
In 1951, when the MTUC's leader raised the issue whether it should support the 
fomlation of the Labour Party of Malaya or the Independence of Malaya Party, 
members supported the former, claiming that the Labour Party would represent 
working class interests. On the other hand, there were views that the formation of the 
Labour Party would further diyide the mo\'ement towards independence from the 
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British. As no decision was reached in a meeting on the 10th July 1951 and again in 
the MTUC second ADC in August, individual unions were left to choose their own 
political preferences. At this stage, the colonial government was still fearing that the 
labour movement would be drawn to the left-wing groups which had been driven 
underground (lomo and Todd, 1994: 101). By mid-1954, under new leaders, the 
MTUC adopted a more radical policy, demanding self-government, asked for a 
revision to the Emergency Regulations, and requested a planned economy as well as 
reforms to improve the position of waged labour and peasants. So far, there had been 
no express commitments by the unions to the party, or vice versa, and the MTUC time 
and again stressed its independence from any political party. 
There was also an objection from the unionists to the establishment of political funds, 
proposed in 1953, in the fear that such a fund would divide the labour movement 
communally. In the 1950s the unionists continually debated on whether trade unions 
should get involved in politics or not (Raza, 1969). For example, the NUPW decided 
that it would not take the opportunity to gain political influence, despite their 
numerical strength. Though the proposal was carried by 63 votes to 27, no union set 
up such a fund, though it was granted in the 1955 Trade Unions Amendment Bill. 
There were two reasons why that happened, one was due to the lack of agreement 
surrounding the question of union involvement in politics, while the other due to the 
poor financial situations faced by most unions. This scenario enabled the government 
to abolish the right in 1971, after several unionists who had won the May 1969 
elections on opposition tickets were elected to Parliament (lomo and Todd, 1994: 
101 ). 
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Prior to independence, the MTUC joined the debate on the proposed federal 
constitution for independent Malaya, marking the labour movement's contribution. In 
a memorandum to the Reid Constitutional Commission, the MTUC rejected the 
proposed special position of Malays and recommended the abolition of Sultanates in 
independent Malaya. This stand met with a negative reaction by several affiliated 
unions. Immediately prior to Independence, the MTUC felt it had to reaffirm its 
stance of political neutrality to the Alliance Party, who were still suspicious of the 
union movement. During this period, the administrative arm of the government, 
especially the RTU (who was also the TUA), had started to exert extensive power 
over the unions, since at anytime it could de-register those suspected at being a threat: 
another issue that is debated in the current Malaysian IR. During the 1950s, the RTU 
was more influential in shaping the union movement in Malaya compared to during 
the influence of GLU or PMFTU. The use of police should also be noted, as they 
were always employed and available to enforce government policy, through arresting, 
detaining, or controlling the demonstrators during pickets. Equally important was the 
service of the Special Branch (police intelligence), the ISA and Emergency Rule, each 
used either to gain information or to repress dissent: another issue that will appear 
again in future Malaysian IR. The state at this stage, slowly but surely set the 
precedent for the independent Malaysia. 
6.9. Conclusion 
There are several key points to be remembered from the discussions above. Kerr, et.al 
(1960) argue that there is a central logic to industrialisation that can be seen in every 
society, 'although different societies take separate paths on the way to 
industrialisation'. Variations only occur in approaches adopted by the elite of the 
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states who organised the industrialisation process. The central problem of IR around 
the world was not 'capital versus labour' but 'the structuring of the labour force, how 
it gets recruited, developed, and maintained (Kerr et al., 1960: 280). Another scholar, 
Simitis, a believer in the convergence theory, agreed with this view and suggested the 
'juridification' of the state as the inevitable consequence of industrialisation in all 
democratic societies. To him, juridification is not a peculiar feature of certain cultures 
or national characters. Rather, it is an activity whereby the state steers labour relations 
in certain prescribed directions (Bellace, 1994: 25). If we are to believe that, in the 
case of early labour and the trade union movement in Malaya, the colonial power had 
managed to do just that. In the early stage of pre-industrialisation, the state was hostile 
and reactive to workers and the emerging labour movement. The reasons for this 
varied, as in the case of Malaya, where the colonial government was desperately 
trying to protect its investment and welfare. However, the reason is not purely 
economic, as there were also political considerations. These factors were interrelated 
and did not stand on their own. The colonial government had to take measures 
politically (through legislation, rules, and administration) to protect, ostensibly in the 
Malayan case, the indigenous interests, while pursuing their economic goals. 
Bellace (1994) rightly pointed this out when he remarked that in many countries, the 
state itself was newly formed, followed by the independence movement. During the 
move towards independence, political parties aligned with nascent unions. Once 
independent was attained, the same new leaders faced the problems of creating an 
independent economy, 'a process that necessarily coincided with industrialisation' 
(Bellace, 1994: 22). It is at this point too that a strong, independent union was not 
welcome, conversely, it would be considered a threat and a liability to the state's 
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economic plan. As a consequence, the state became hostile, as proved in Malava 
during this same period. Though it looked as though a change, in that the trade unions 
were recognised after the war, this is in form rather than substance. 
The other point in Malaya is how, due to their bigger role in commercial economy, 
the Chinese and Indians immigrants naturally played a more significant role in the 
labour movement prior to WWII. The twist came afterwards when new unionism was 
encouraged by the British who, for economic and political reasons, saw the Indians as 
trade union leaders. The Japanese Occupation worsened ethnic relations, and 
economic demarcation persisted until after independence. The Malays demonstrated 
an encouraging role only after they were more involved in modem employment, 
particularly because of the British protective policy towards them, as seen first with 
the 1948 Federation of Malaya, and later in 1957 independent Constitution, discussed 
in Chapter Seven. Regarding legislation, amendments made to the TUO after the war 
legitimated the state's control over labour matters and trade unionism. This fact is 
highly important as the same ordinance has been used until the present time, with the 
same amendments applying to counter the labour movement. The Japanese sparked 
new animosity among ethnic groups. However, they also contributed to the Malayan 
people's renewed interests in their position in the country after WWII. The most 
important issues that stayed until after independence are the Malay sultans' status and 
privileges; the status of the Malay language; and the Islamic religion; and the status of 
the Malays as the Bumiputeras or 'sons of the soil'. This awareness grew amidst the 
increasing number of educated Malays and their greater involvement in public 
services, as discussed further in Chapter Seven. In short, the British set the precedent 
as to how the state should act as a legislator, administrator and employer in situations 
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when there is a possible future rise of the labour movement. In Chapter Se\'en, the 
discussion centres on the paradoxical nature of Malaysian IR in its efforts to break 
away, but at the same time, for various reasons, preserve British influence. 
206 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIO~S 11\ INDEPEI\DENT 
MALAYSIA, 1957-70 
7.1.1ntroduction 
Chapter Six has examined how the colonial state dominated Malayan IR for political 
and economic reasons, leaving behind labour legislation and the bureaucratic and 
socio-political system that was not free of its influence. This chapter looks into the 
next phase in Malaysian history that covers the first period of independence until a 
year after the 13th May racial riot that become a watershed in Malaysian history. 
This chapter focuses on how the state performed its roles in Malaysian IR, in both the 
public and private sectors, and factors that influenced these roles. It highlights the 
efforts of the new nation towards self-government before it took a dramatic tum by 
introducing the NEP in 1971. In the IR context, despite promises of a free and 
democratic trade union movement, this period saw the government resort to various 
IR legislation to repress left-wing challenge or labour militancy, a stand inherited 
from the colonial era. Challenged by old and new issues, the government felt it 
necessary to safeguard the socio-political stability of the country to enable them to 
pursue economi~ development especially through foreign investment. Moreover, this 
twelve-year period saw three emergency rules: the one that already existed and lasted 
until 1960 fuelled by Mep threat; the second, in 1964, triggered by Indonesian 
Confrontation (or K01~rrolltasi); and the last one a direct outcome of a more internal 
connict, the racial riot of 13 th May 1969. These emergency rules also affected the IR 
system in general, as the moderate unions were trapped between striving for workers' 
issues and responding positively to government pressure or face extinction. 
7.2. The Alliance Policy on the Economy and IR 
The discussion below focuses on the role of the Alliance government, first in the 
economy and later in the major legislation that influenced or determined the direction 
of IR in this period. 
The new independent government promised a policy of a strong, free and democratic 
trade union movement and, in fact, initially this movement was involved in the 
process towards an independent Malaya. The MTUC sent in proposals to the Reid 
Constitutional Commission - the commission responsible for drafting the independent 
constitution, where their requests regarding labour, labour legislation, fundamental 
rights, the independence of Public Services Commission from political or communal 
bias, and an independent judiciary were 'adequately met' (MTUCAR, 1956/57). 
Three MTUC leaders were already elected by secret ballot in July 1955 to sit on the 
FLC. As early as 1957, visits from trade union personalities from Britain itself 
persuaded the government to form 'national unions' and to 'set up Industrial 
Relations' machinery (ARRTU, 1957). Another legislation, the Employment 
Ordinance, 1955, was also enforced in 1957, much to the satisfaction of the MTUC 
(MTUCAR, 1956/57).51 At the end of 1956, the Minister of Labour heaped praises on 
the MTUC for their support towards 'resisting the spread of communist influence in 
trade unions' (MTUCAR, 1956/57). Clearly, what the government meant by a 'free 
and independent trade union movement' was one free from becoming 'the tools of 
'I Fmployment Ordinance 1955 that provides regulations more for individual workers is only discussed 
when issues that concerned IR and related to it arise. 
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any group of entrenched individuals or p artym en , and free from interference by 
'outside agencies wherever these may be from' (MTUCAR, 1956/57). Obviously, the 
government did not count interference from itself as a factor that might hinder trade 
unions from becoming free and independent. 
Generally, the government seemed to show a genuine aspiration towards change in 
this early optimistic period. The minister stressed his ministry'S current commitment 
to build up a 'proper industrial relations machinery' and to give assistance to the 
establishment of 'self government' in industry. The tripartite Federal Labour 
Advisory Board ceased in December 1956, and in 1957 was replaced by the enlarged 
tripartite body called the National Joint Labour Advisory Council (NJLAC). It would 
be a 'purely voluntary and advisory body', where representatives should be able to 
'advise Minister for Labour on all questions affecting labour and the promotion of 
industrial peace, and to advise ... on matters in which employers and workers have a 
common interest' (MTUCAR, 1956/57). In fact, the government made sure that there 
were equal numbers of union and employer representatives on the council (ARRTU, 
1959). The government was also aware of 'a desire on both sides of industry to 
provide for and operate an effective system of voluntarily agreed joint machinery for 
negotiations and consultation' (Minister of Labour's speech as cited in Josey, 1958: 
2). At this stage, the government believed this machinery was 'a stronger guarantee of 
industrial peace and of smooth functioning of employer-employee relations than any 
legislators or courts or enforcement officers ... ' (Minister of Labour, as cited in Josey, 
1958:2). 
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However, the first PM of independent Malaya, the Tunku, said there would be no 
change in the government's overall attitude towards the trade union movement and 
that it would encourage the growth of 'healthy trade unionism' besides continuing to 
provide bargaining power to union members for the ultimate purpose of safeguarding 
their interest and wellbeing (Josey, 1958:1). This implies its intention to continue the 
British labour policy that it inherited before the granting of independence, which was 
further compounded when the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare also talked of 
the same commitment, that the government encouraged 'responsible and genuine 
trade movement'. Stability in IR was emphasised and, counted as necessary for the 
industrial peace and prosperity of any country. In its Election Manifesto as early as 
1955 the Alliance, besides promising to promote 'healthy and strong Trade Unions in 
order that workers can protect and promote their vital interests', also promised to 're-
deploy labour in the event of an economic recession' (MTUCAR, 1956/57). 
In another speech, the PM highlighted that it was the duty of everyone 'who owes 
allegiance to this country to work towards the stability of the government'. Even 
though it was not made explicit, he was most certainly referring to the new citizens of 
Malaya, the non-Malays, an outcome of the 'political bargain' in the independent 
constitution. As early as 1957, the Tunku was also talking about the need to bring in 
investors to Malaya, since the British were not offering any financial assistance to its 
national development planning: 
We have to earn sufficient income to pay for our various services, social and 
economic development of this country, but if trouble is created by the workers, 
nobody would think of investing money in these industries ....... Unions can do 
a lot to bring about good understanding between employers and employees, 
and it is with this understanding that the well being of the workers and 
e\'crybody concerned will be assured (Josey, 1958: 3). 
210 
The Tunku stated that unions must be free from politics or political influence (Josey, 
1958: 3). However, in the same speech, his call for unions to support the government 
contradicted his earlier view. Appeals to government officers who \\'ere trade 
unionists not to participate in discussions of political topics had already been made by 
the Federal Establishment Office (FEO) as early as 1954. An FEO Circular No 1 of 
1957 reads: 
It is desired to clarify the position of Government servants in Group B who are 
active in the trade union movement and who are nominated as delegates of 
their union to a trade union congress or to a party political organisation. Such 
officers are not prohibited from being delegates at conferences where political 
matters are to be discussed, but will be bound by the provisions of FEO 
Circular No 4 of 1954 not to participate on political topics. 52 
Officially at first, the government did encourage the trade union movement with 
'particular emphasis on a national rather than on a state basis unions' (ARRTU, 
1957). By the end of 1957, there were 250 employees' unions and ten employers' 
unions, with eight of the employees' unions being federations of trade unions. One 
hundred and fifty one of the 250 employees' unions or 60 percent comprised the 
government servants. By the end of 1957 too, 68 of the 260 unions were of a national 
basis, 50 were unions of government servants, and 18 were from the private sector. 
Seventy-one unions with a total membership of 159,235 were affiliated to the MTUC, 
a drop from III trade unions and 185,195 members in 1956 (ARRTU, 1957). There 
were 19 unions removed from the register for various reasons. Although there was no 
major change in legislation, there was the Trade Unions (Appeal) Rules 1957 that 
prescribed the procedure for appeal into the Supreme Court to those aggrieved with 
the decision of the Minister of Labour in upholding the decision of the Registrar. This 
~! FEO Circular No 1 of 1957 
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was for cases where an application for registration or withdrawal or cancellation of 
registration was refused to a trade union (ARRTU, 1957). 
Up to a certain extent, the government's proclamation of supporting a 'strong, free 
and democratic trade union' was, in the few years after independence, believable. 
With the communist influence still a threat, though there were hesitations and 
protestations, the MTUC still gave it a benefit of the doubt, by endorsing most of 
government's policies towards a better economic development. However, this was not 
lasting, as without financial help from its fonner colonial master, the government felt 
that to achieve economic objectives it needed to ensure socio-political stability, and 
this was shown by its decision to amend the TUa 1948 in 1959 and later, other laws 
and regulations (see 7.2.2). 
7.2.1. The Five-Year Development Plans and Industrialisation Process 
The main contention of this study is that the economy has always been the prominent 
reason for the state's influence in IR issues. The discussion here aims to highlight the 
fact that the government was committed to use the economy as the main mechanism 
towards a more developed Malaysia through its five-year development plans and 
industrialisation. 
By 1956, a year before independence, the First Malaya Plan (FMP), that is the first 
five-year development plan, actually started. This was in tandem with self-
government by the Alliance Party after winning the 1955 general election. As already 
discussed in Chapter Six, the state tried to replace militant unionism with right-wing 
unionism, endorsed by the new government. The period 1957-1970 coyers three 
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national development plans, starting with the FMP (1956-1960), the Second Malaya 
Plan (2MP) (1961-1965) and the third, the First Malaysia Plan (MP 1) (1966-1970). 53 
lomo (1999: 85) called the Tunku's era the 'Alliance Laissez-fairism' period where 
there were' generally laissez faire policies with 'mild' lSI, agricultural diversification, 
rural development and 'mild', but increasing ethnic affirmative action policies'. 
Kuruvilla (1995) called the period 1957-70 'market-led'. The economic policy 
focused on the state's involvement in the development of the infrastructure and rural 
sector, with the industrialisation process left to the private sector. This led the state to 
create a favourable climate to attract foreign investment in important lSI. This was 
further confirmed with the enactment of the Pioneer Industries Ordinance 1958 
(Anuar, 1992) and the creation of Malaysian Industrial Finance Corporation 
(Kuru villa, 1995). 
In fact, the FMP explicitly gave priority to rubber plantations (the estates), mining 
industries, building ports, modernising agriculture and provide basic needs for 
industrial development (Kamaruddin, 1992: 61). The objective was to encourage 
investments in the public and the private sectors to create jobs for the growing labour 
force. In other words, the economic system and the structure remained the same. The 
FMP was not financed by the British, even though the new government asked for help 
(Kamaruddin, 1992: 62). This further explained the need for the new government to 
curb left-wing unionism as it would hinder foreign investments, a factor that had 
become increasingly important. The British, however were more keen to help enlarge 
defence and their own incomplete projects (Kamaruddin, 1992). As discussed in 
53 IIfalaysia KilO (1991). pp n3-731. 
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Chapter Six, before granting independence the British spent years on ensuring the 
leftist forces which threatened their economic interests were curbed. At this stage, too 
the multi-ethnic elite that they supported with the Alliance gained prominence in 
Malaysian politics, each representing the three main ethnic groups, and committed to 
protect their own ethnic interests. 
The state interference in the economy at this stage was minimal. The government, 
which was still new, depended on just two primary commodities and therefore foreign 
investment was considered crucial. British interests were defended and the pre-
dominantly Chinese local businesses were able to strengthen their position in the 
economy (lomo, 1999: 90). The strategy to promote the interests of Malay business 
community was 'feeble', whereby more attention was given to rural development to 
win the majority rural Malays (lomo, 1999: 91). However, this in a way already 
showed the intention of the independent government to give special attention to the 
Malays. The MTUC at this stage was also supportive towards the government's 
efforts in FMP. Almost the same scenario applied to when the 2MP and MP1 were 
implemented (Kamaruddin, 1992: 63). 
At this point, the relationship between the three actors was that of inter-dependency, 
and this need for each other, coupled with the enthusiasm of a new independent 
country, shaped the early relationship between the government and unions. In the 
context of IR, as discussed below, up until 1964 the voluntary system where the 
state's minimal role in the actual running of IR ended, as a change in legislation \vas 
triggered by old and new issues. 
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7.2.2. Trade Union Ordinance, 1959 and Other Laws and Legislation 
The discussion below highlights the TUO 1959 and other laws and legislation 
introduced in 1964/65, the reasons behind their implementation and its impact on IR. 
In 1959, just two years after achieving independence, the government consolidated 
the existing laws and regulations for trade unions. The TUO 1959 retained the 
amendments made in 1948 to the 1940 TUE (ARRTU, 1959:2). The three important 
rules that stayed were (1) outlawing federations of a general character and confining 
them to unions catering for workers in similar trades, occupations or industries; (2) 
reducing the influence of outsiders by requiring trade unions officials other than the 
secretary to have three years' experience in the industry of their union; and (3) 
introducing certain changes among which the new definition of a trade union was 
significant. 'Trade union' is now defined as 'any association or combination of 
workmen ... within any particular trade, occupations or industries', thus limiting its 
scope. This actually was the government's policy of preventing the formation of 
larger unions and checking into leadership among workers, clearly a worry that was 
inherited from the communist-influenced era. In the long run, these limitations also 
afforded the RTU (that replaces the TUA), and the Minister of Labour wide 
discretionary powers to ascertain or determine the nature of trade unionism in 
Malaysia, in line with the government's aspirations. In fact, the practice of secret 
ballots, as used by unions before taking strike action, was never before specified. 
However, the RTU was then given the honour to prepare a model, that two thirds of 
union members must agree to a strike action, and this model then became the 
reference of the unions. 
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The government admitted that the restriction 'to workmen or employers in anyone 
particular trade, occupation or industry or in similar trades, occupations or industries' 
was to ensure 'the refusal of registration of 'omnibus' unions which in the past 
wrought much harm to industrial peace' (ARRTU, 1959). Also, officers and 
employees of trade unions were required to be Federal Citizens to present aliens from 
interfering in the running of trade unions in Malaya. Newly established unions were 
prohibited from collecting funds and property unless registered. The Registrar was 
now empowered to summon and examine on oath anyone he thought able to give out 
information on any unions (ARRTU, 1959). With this new Ordinance, all existing 
trade unions were to seek re-registration, where out of 249 unions, 26 failed to apply 
for registration in due time (ARRTU, 1959). 
The MTUC attacked the TUO 1959 as 'severely restrictive' as regards the 
organisation of workers into unions due to the prescribed definition of a 'trade union'. 
While in the old TUE 1948, federations of trade unions were restricted to those whose 
members were employed in similar trades, occupations or industries, single unions 
were able to enrol persons from different industries. Although the MTUC called for 
suitable amendments, the government turned their proposal down (MTUCGCR, 
1966/67). On the other hand, there was support from unions towards the TUO 1959, 
when some felt it was 'to ensure the protection of workers' interests' (David, 1984). 
The RTU reported that there was a 'smooth passage' through the Legislative Council 
over TUO 1959 as evidence that the workers did not object to it (ARRTU, 1958). 
In 1965, the law was amended again when the government supplemented TUO, 1959 
with the Trade Unions Act 1965 (ARRTU, 1959; MTUCAR, 1966/67). The RTU was 
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given wider powers to de-register or refuse to register a union. This \\as the case 
when a union representing the same trade, occupation, or industry already existed, on 
the grounds that 'it is not in the interest of the workmen in that particular trade, 
occupation or industry that there be another trade union in respect thereof. This 
amendment also gave the government the right to structure unions. 
Again in 1965, the government introduced two sets of Regulations, the Essential 
(Arbitration in Essential Services) Regulations, 1965 and the Essential (Prohibition of 
Strikes and Proscribed Industrial Actions) Regulations, 1965. Both were introduced 
under the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1964. While the first set of legislation 
restricted the right of private sector employees in 'essential services' to take strike 
action, the second set prohibited government servants from taking part in strikes and 
prescribe industrial action during Emergency (Jomo and Todd, 1994). Even though 
these Regulations were subsequently withdrawn, in their place the Essential (Trade 
Disputes in the Essential Services) Regulations 1965 was promulgated. These 
regulations retained the restrictions and ended for good the IR system that was based 
primarily on the British voluntary system, whereby parties were given maximum 
encouragement to settle their problems through methods and procedures previously 
agreed between themselves 'with a minimum of outside intervention' (ARML, 1965). 
What prompted the move towards introducing the system of compulsory arbitration 
was the government's growing worry about the 'increasing expansion of the trade 
union movement and the intensification of its activities' (ARML, 1965) (This is 
further discussed under 7.4.). The government was also worried about trade unions in 
the public sector, where it was thought that in early 1965, a mass action was being 
planned 'which could have seriously affected the stability and economy of the country 
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and jeopardised the nation's efforts to face the "confrontation'" (AR.vIL, 1965) 
(Discussed under 7.4). With these revised regulations, the Minister of Labour was 
given special powers to intervene and, if necessary, to refer disputes to the Industrial 
Arbitration Tribunal. When the minister felt fit to intervene, 'no strike or lock-out or 
any proscribed industrial action' should take place (ARML, 1965). 
At the end of 1967 there were 277 registered unions but with just 3 federations and 
with a total membership of 359,534. There were 40 unions with fewer than 50 
members, some even under 10, reflecting the ineffectiveness and helplessness of 
unions (MTUC GCR 1966/67). However, the MTUC accepted these restrictions on 
'general unions' on the understanding that they were 'purely temporary measures 
subject to revision as soon as more stable conditions prevail' (MTUC ADC 
19966/67). This referred to the government's plight with the communists and the 
second Emergency rule caused by Konfrontasi. In 1964, the MTUC and the Malayan 
Council of Employers' Organisations signed a Code of Conduct, both agreeing to do 
'their utmost to maintain industrial peace, at least during the period of national 
emergency brought about by the Indonesian Confrontation' (AR, Ministry of Labour 
1965). Even with this co-operative attitude of MTUC, the government in their reports 
condemned the trend showed by militant trade unions in early 1960s, where they 
'stick uncompromisingly to their so-called rights and prerogatives and rely 
excessively on the use of their own position and strength to achieve their aims and 
objectives, to the disregard of the serious effect of their action on the economy of the 
country or the paramount interests of the public at large' (ARML, 1965). (The 
activities of these 'militant unions are discussed in 7.4.). 
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So with TUO 1959 and the other regulations, there was no avenue for trade unions to 
be the 'strong, free and democratic unions' that the government initially promised. As 
discussed under subsections below, the government put forward the two reasons of 
economic and political stability to retain and in fact intensify restrictions through 
legislation on labour movement, thus turning it (the government) into the most 
dominant determinant factor in Malaysian IR. 
7.2.3. The Industrial Relations Act, 1967 
The Konfrontasi ended in August 1966, after the Bangkok Peace Pact was signed in 
Jakarta (Raza, 1969). Trade union leaders expected the compulsory arbitration law of 
the Essential Regulations Act 1965 to be a temporary measure and to be repealed with 
the end of this Confrontation. However, the government indicated that the law was to 
be made permanent. In June 1967, a comprehensive Industrial Act was passed. IRA 
1967 consolidated all previous laws concerning industrial disputes. This Act also 
imposed further restrictions on the right to take effective industrial action. The 
definition of 'strikes' now included even refusal to work overtime as it defined a 
strike as: 
any act or omission by a body of workmen employed in any industry acting in 
combination or under a common understanding which is intended to or does 
result in any limitation or restriction or cessation of or dilatoriness in the 
performance or execution of the whole or any part of the duties connected 
with their employment (MTUC GCR, 1966/67). 
IRA 1967 also gave the Minister of Labour wider power 'to intervene in any trade 
dispute in the private sector and refer it to the Court on his own motion if he deems it 
to be in the public interest to do so' (ARRTU1967). The Minister was also 
empowered to add, vary or alter the schedule of public utility services which to 
MTUC should be left as a matter for the legislature rather than government (MTUC 
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GCR 1966/67). The IRA 1967 also excluded public employees from the chief 
provisions of the law, namely, those concerning recognition, organisation, 
conciliation and arbitration, as well as the right to strike (MTUC GeR, 1966/67). The 
Agong's consent that was required for the referral of public service disputes to the 
Industrial Arbitration Tribunal was now extended to employees in statutory 
authorities. Strikes or lock-outs were prohibited (a) during the pendency of 
proceedings of a Board of Inquiry or (b) after a trade disputes has been referred to the 
Industrial Court or (c) in respect of any matter covered by a collective agreement 
taken cognizance of by the Court or covered by an award of the Court or (d) on a 
claim for union recognition (ARRTU 1967). Strikes were now also broadened to 
include the 'go slow' (ARRTU 1967). 
When the draft was introduced at the tripartite NJLAC, the MTUC commented on all 
restrictions of the fundamental rights of workers and the discrimination between the 
private and public sectors. New industries like 'Banking' and 'Petroleum' were put 
under 'public utility services'. The MTUC condemned IRA 1967 for giving 'the 
minister extensive and unlimited powers to interfere with, regulate and control a trade 
dispute, even when the national interests may not really be involved or threatened' 
(MTUC GCR 1966/67). However, all comments, memorandum, and even writing to 
ICFTU and 'other world agencies' did not bring any changes to the provisions in the 
Act. This showed how even at this stage the NJLAC as a tripartite body failed to 
function effectively for trade unions. In 1967 the then General Secretary of MTUC, 
SJH Zaidi wrote: 
The officials of the trade unions ha\'c long felt the tenuous but carefully 
planned moves of the go\'crnment of the day to reduce Workers' 
Organisations to a state of complete impotency. The IRA 1967 has just about 
finished the process which commenced with the introduction of the TUO 
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1959. The Ordinance broke most of the unions into tiny little units and the Act 
has deprived even these small, ineffective and \\'idely scattered unions 
whatever virility or strength they might have still possessed (MTUC GCR 
1966/67). 
From the government's point of view, it had reason to believe there was resistance 
within the trade union movement itself towards changes proposed by MTUC to 
strengthen the movement. The MTUC, in its 1966 Conference, proposed that the 
unions be organised into ten groupings according to their industries in order to 
consolidate them. However, the majority of union leaders were reluctant to surrender 
their positions of power, and bona fide members were also doubtful of the re-
organisation of the unions. In addition, there were complaints from the smaller unions 
about 'abuses' of outside influences that might encourage 'uncontrolled political 
influence' in local trade unions (ARRTU 1967). The government was wary of such 
trends among trade unions during these years 'especially where they affect the public 
and national interest' (ARRTU 1967). It felt that the voluntary system could no more 
resolve problems governing employee-employer relations, therefore straining 
relationships and, in a number of cases, leading to serious strikes and lock-outs. 
Extreme left-wing elements taking the IR into 'their crusade of street fights and 
sabotage had to be swiftly and firmly countered in order to avoid a retreat to the 
chaotic early days of First Emergency' (ARRTU 1967). Therefore, the government 
took action to cancel the registration of some trade unions that it thought were being 
manipulated by 'subversive elements'. 
There were however several protective measures for unions as initiated after the U.S. 
Wagner Act of 1935 and Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, where a number of unfair 
practices that might originate from employers were prohibited. Employers, for 
example, could not interfere with or coerce employees in their right to organise and 
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they could not discriminate, dismiss, or intimidate workers because of their union 
activities. Neither could they support management-dominated unions. The IRA 1 967 is 
defined as: 
An Act to provide for the regulation of the relations between employers and 
workmen and their trade unions and the prevention and settlement of any 
differences or disputes arising from their relationship and generally to deal 
with trade disputes and matters arising therefrom. 
In a way, the implementation of the EA 1955, the TUA 1959 and the IRA 1967 co-
ordinated the IR system in Malaysia and completed the government's overall policy 
towards trade unionism and IR. While the IRA 1967 takes care of matters discussed 
above, the EA 1955 states important definitions regarding employment relations such 
as 'service', 'days', 'employers', 'employees' and 'wages'. The TUA 1959 
meanwhile endorses the rights of employers and employees to be organised within the 
context of the law. As discussed in 7.4. below, these rules and regulations, which are 
still major IR laws today became the cornerstone of Malaysian IR, setting the nature 
of IR that controls the relationship between individual employers and employees or 
between their unions. The IR system could only be operated within the context of 
these laws, even though, as seen in later chapters, there are attempts at change by the 
trade unions and the government, if not the employers. The employers did not have 
any desire to as these laws ensured their favourable position. 
7.3.The Political Scene, 1957-70 
The discussion below looks into how the political factor influenced the state's roles, 
and also how even trade unions were influenced by patriotism and 'national interests'. 
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7.3.1. The Tunku's Leadership and Challenge 
The Tunku's style of leadership played a part in determining the role of the state in 
that period. He was respected among the coalition partners, having successfully 
negotiated the terms of Independence in 1957. He was also the one to promote the 
'elite accommodation system' that was based on 'the goodwill and the understanding' 
of ethnic sensitivities in Malaya (Means, 1991: 5). However, the Tunku was also the 
first PM to inherit British legacy, one of them the plural society, as shown by the 
racial composition of the Federation of Malaya as seen in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: 
Racial Composition of Federation of Malaya 1921-57 
Population in OOOs by 
census year 
Race 
1921 1931 1947 
Malays* 1569 1864 2428 
Chinese 856 1285 1885 
Indian** 439 571 531 
Others 43 68 65 
Total 2907 3788 4909 
*inc\uding aborigines (orang ash) 
**inc\uding Pakistanis 
1957 
3125 
2334 
707 
112 
6278 
Percentages by 
census year 
1921 1931 1947 1957 
54.0 49.2 49.5 49.8 
29.4 33.9 38.4 37.2 
15.1 15.1 10.8 11.2 
1.5 1.8 1.3 1.8 
100 100 100 100 
Source: Wu, 1995, xxvi. 
The Malays were still the bigger majority with 49.8% of the population, but the 
Chinese had shot up to 37.2%. This was a significant switch from the 1921 figure, 
whereby the Malays were 54% and the Chinese were a lower 29.4% and shows that 
the majority of the Malays had gone down. The Indians, nevertheless, stayed the 
smaller majority with 1.8% in 1957, though this percentage increased as compared to 
1.5% in 1921. 
Judging by the occupations of ethnic groups that had developed by 1957, it is easy to 
conclude that the three major ethnic groups had been further divided into distinct 
occupations thus widening the gap between them. Table 7.2 illustrates this situation 
clearly. While there were more Malays in agricultural activities and the public sector, 
the Chinese were dominant in mining, commerce and market gardening. The Indians 
remained in commercial agriculture (mainly in the rubber plantations), railways and 
public works (Wu, 1995: xxvii). As discussed in Chapter Four, there were fragile 
situations apart from natural barriers between the three societies, as well as 
generalisations and stereotypes about races by the British. As labourers the Malays 
were perceived as 'docile, rural and unsuited for commercial enterprises' while the 
Indians were seen as 'quarrelsome at times' and 'well suited for plantation and public 
works as they could endure the heat and labouring'. The Chinese on the other hand 
were thought to be 'difficult to control or discipline' but were 'hard-working and 
enterprising' (Wu, 1995: xxvii). 
The paid-up membership of all registered trade unions on 31 st December 1957 was 
222,865, with 222,073 from employees' unions. The breakdown by gender and race is 
seen in Table 7.3, which also shows that the Indians still formed the majority of union 
members, with the Chinese and Malays contributing almost equal numbers. Males 
contributed 76 per cent of the total employees' union membership. Finally, the 
majority of Indian labour who were unionised were from the rubber plantations. 
Table 7.2: Occupation by Ethnic Group in 1957 
(in thousands) 
Industry Malays Chinese 
Agriculture, fishing, forestry 749 310 
Rice 381 9 
Market gardening 23 54 
Rubber 260 200 
Mining, manufacturing 36 136 
Commerce 32 127 
Other industries and services 180 174 
Government 17 5 
Police, home guard 43 4 
Armed Forces 15 2 
Source: Wu, 1995: xxvii. 
Indians 
174 
0.5 
I 
150 
16 
32 
80 
8 
2 
3 
Table 7.3: Members of Employees' Unions (Sex and Race) 
Males Females Total Percentage 
Indians 89,595 39,080 128,675 58.0 
Chinese 38,703 7,794 46,497 21.0 
Malays 40,545 5,306 45,851 20.5 
Others 828 222 1050 .5 
Total 169,671 52,402 222,073 100.0 
Source: ARRTU, 1957. 
The Tunku also inherited the Emergency Rule 1948, and in later years saw Malaysia 
marked by several new incidents. In the 1959 general election, the Alliance won 
another victory but not as impressive as in the 1955 election, since there emerged 
increasing challenges from opposition parties (Vasil, 1972). The conflict between the 
Alliance and the PAP of Singapore in 1964-65, the Indonesian KonJrontasi policy, the 
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Language Act controversy of 1967, the Labour-Party-led hartal in 1967 and the 
electoral campaigns of the 1969 general election all contributed to the increasing 
ethnic confrontation that culminated in the 13th May race riots. After this date, the 
Tunku was attacked by the 'ultra- Malays', with none other than Mahathir Mohamad 
writing an accusing letter, accusing the PM of being pro-Chinese, and calling for his 
resignation (Khoo, 1995: 21). Even though Mahathir, who at the time had just lost his 
Kota Star seat in the election to a PAS candidate, and a few others were later expelled 
from UMNO and the letter was banned, his call for a 'pro-Malays' government 
represented the feelings of the Malay majority. The resentment centred on their 
community's economic backwardness and the desire to use political dominance to 
win their fonnerly lost causes. The Tunku' s resignation and the NEP were two most 
direct outcomes of these events. 
7.3.2. The Formation of Malaysia and the Second Emergency 
The discussion below shows how patriotism won over the relationship between 
MTUC and the government in response to outside challenge. In 1963, the 'Federation 
of Malaysia' was fonned with Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak as members 
(Comber, 1983). There was substantial reservation about bringing in Singapore into 
Malaysia since about 75 percent of the island's popUlation was Chinese, but with the 
inclusion of British Borneo with their majority of 'indigenous' people who were 
thought of as Malays, the Chinese were hoped to be outnumbered (Comber, 1983). 
Sabah and Sarawak, the two new members of Malaysia, all the while remained 
separate in their labour movement from each other and also from the mainland 
Peninsular Malaysia. It should be pointed that the TUA restricted membership of a 
union to workers in the Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak. FurthemlOre, Sabah 
and Sarawak were considered rural states, with relatively few waged employees, and 
in fact were geographically and historically isolated from the Peninsular (Jomo and 
Todd, 1994: 106). 
The MTUC at first saw the opportunity to fonn a national trade union centre for 
Malaysia with Singapore National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) and had already 
arranged talks (MTUCAR, 1964-65: 55). This was not to materialise, as Singapore 
was expelled from Malaysia in 1965. Lee Kuan Yew's call for 'Malaysian Malaysia' 
where it challenged the Malays' special rights was too much for UMNO and the 
Malays. For the two years Singapore was in fact treated differently with concession to 
retain control of its education, labour and other matters (Comber, 1983). The last 
straw was when there was an open conflict and race riots in Singapore between the 
Chinese and Malays in 1964, which saw many people dead and injured. It coincided 
with the Indonesian Konfrontasi, a policy launched by Sukarno the Indonesian 
President, who opposed 'Malaysia', calling it a 'British ploy' to control territories and 
suppress anti-colonial forces (Azizan, 1989; Milne and Mauzy, 1986). In fact, there 
was evidence that the idea to include Sabah and Sarawak by the Tunku was originated 
by the British who said to Kuala Lumpur 'you can't have Borneo without Singapore' 
(Comber, 1983). The Konfrontasi included troop clashes on Indonesia's border with 
Sabah and Sarawak, and on the Peninsular Malaysia west-coast, besides restrictions 
on Malaysia's trade and higher military expenditures (Milne and Mauzy, 1986). All 
these coincided with increasing labour unrest, giving the government another reason 
to declare a second state of Emergency in September 1964 (Anantaraman, 1997: 6). 
That voluntary system, flawed as it was, came to an abrupt end during the 
f\OI~rrolltasi. Though the KOI~rrolltasi did not have any direct implication on the IR 
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system per se, when the Emergency Rule was implemented, the trade unions reacted 
to it accordingly. The MTUC advised its affiliating unions to avoid from conducting 
industrial actions but to settle disputes through negotiation. This shows the MTUC 
patriotic attitude towards Malaysia when the nation was attacked by outside forces 
and again, it demonstrated how the government had succeeded turning 'national 
interest' into an issue that the MTUC accepted as deserving the support of workers as 
responsible citizens. 
Table 7.4:Number of Unions Registered and De-registered, 1957-1969 
Unions De-registered 
Year New Union Voluntarily Ceased Failure to comply with 
Registered Dissolved to exist statutory requirements 
1957 37 13 4 2 
1958 35 5 17 9 
1959 20 18 5 12 
1960 48 17 13 6 
1961 38 14 2 6 
1962 38 14 2 1 
1963 26 28 2 10 
1964 24 12 - 5 
1965 23 6 4 4 
1966 10 9 4 4 
1967 3 18 1 4 
1968 9 13 6 5 
1969 7 6 3 3 
Source: Malaysia. Annual Report of Trade Unions Registry,1957-1969. 
The Konfrontasi dragged on from 1963 to 1966, giving the government a strong 
reason to use the Emergency rule to its advantage in curtailing the labour movement. 
It was on the pretext of the Emergency conditions still prevailing that the 1959 TUO 
(discussed above) was amended, empowering the R TU to de-register or refuse a 
union. Ifwe look back at Table 7.4, we can see that the number of de-registrations, for 
various reasons, exceeded new registrations in 1959, 1963, and during 1966-1969. By 
228 
comparison, the number of strikes, workers involved and man-days lost decreased in 
1964, the year the Konfrontasi was officially declared, as compared to the percentages 
in the previous year. 
The year before Malaysia was officially declared, in 1963, saw the increasing labour 
unrest in the country, while the MTUC as the main labour centre failed to prevent the 
trade unions from engaging in industrial action. There was increasing labour unrest 
which actually started from 1962 up until 1964 (discussed under 7.4). This again 
contributed to another reason for the Alliance to declare a state of emergency. A Code 
of Conduct for Industrial Peace was signed by the governrnent, employers and unions 
in November 1964, but did not result in the weakening of the industrial unrest, since 
only the moderate unions (MTUC) signed the pact. Again, this became a good pretext 
for the governrnent to make the transition from a voluntary system to a compulsory 
one. 
The MTUC called the implementation of the regulations in 1965 'The Blackest Day 
for the Trade Union Movement' (MTUC 45 Years). It felt it had been 'stabbed in the 
back' by the governrnent it helped elect and given loyal support to during the 
Confrontation. But the Minister of Labour stated: 
It is inevitable that when we are faced with a deteriorating situation not only in 
the governrnent sector but also in the private sector, Governrnent must act, and 
in doing so, it is equally inevitable that certain courses of action hitherto 
available would have to be curtailed ... (MTUC 45 Years). 
The fact was that the governrnent did not only confine this prohibition to its 
employees. It promulgated regulations relating to Arbitration in the Essential Services 
in the private sector so that the degree of industrial action that could be taken by the 
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unions in the various industries was also curtailed. The MTUC took it as a betrayal of 
'trust and goodwill' and thereby issued a statement on 14th Nlay saying: 
The government's decree brought about in a most undemocratic manner the 
parallel for which can only be found in countries with Police and Dictatorial 
regimes, has brought disgrace to the very concept and ideals which Malaysia 
has so far stood for. MTUC is profoundly shocked that the central 
government, inspite of its continuous declarations both nationally and 
internationally to defend the democratic way of life of Malaysians citizens 
should have taken such a drastic step. 
MTUC said the government had taken the last constitutional weapon of unions in 
mainland Malaysia. Accusing the government of becoming anti-labour, the MTUC 
told the government that they were calling for an extra-ordinary delegates conference 
to consider, among other things, withdrawing workers' representatives from the 
NJLAC and various boards and organisations where they were representing workers' 
interests, and to campaign for international support and solidarity. The NJLAC 
meeting which was scheduled for 18th May 1965 was cancelled because of MTUC's 
absence. On the 23rd May the MTUC Secretariat issued a paper entitled 'What ails the 
workers in the States of Malaya'. However, all these protestations did not bring the 
desired effect. 
Meanwhile, the government boasted the effectiveness of the new compulsory system. 
There was roughly a 310 percent decrease in the number of man-days lost due to 
strikes during the period of the Emergency, 1964-67. Realising how the compulsory 
arbitration system benefited the industrial policy, the government then replaced the 
Emergency Regulations and the Industrial Court Ordinance 1948 with the IRA 1967 
(this Act is discussed above). With this implementation, the government perpetuated 
the compulsory IR system with the present day Industrial Court, which was 
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established under this Act, making it playa pivotal role in ensuring industrial peace in 
Malaysia. 
7.3.3. The Third Emergency and its Impact on IR 
As has been discussed, the race riot on 13 th May 1969 had dramatic ramifications for 
Malaysian history as a whole. As for IR, the impact was enormous. The riot triggered 
the declaration of the third Emergency Rule in Malaysia, just twelve years after 
independence. It questioned Malay backwardness in the economy and Malay rights, 
as the Bumiputeras again became centre-stage, thereby demanding the government's 
fast and effective attention, as it appeared. This triggered the Alliance's drafting of the 
NEP, prior to which it saw the implementation of various amendments to labour laws 
to supplement the coming dramatic change. 
Two new IR legislations were passed in 1969, apart from the Emergency Regulations 
already enforced. These were the Essential (Modification of Trade Unions 
(Exemption of Public Officers) Order 1967) Regulations,1969 and the Essential 
(Trade Unions) Regulations 1969 (ARRTU 1969). Such legislation further restricted 
the role of unions and their ability to unite. Under the Essential (Modification of the 
Trade Unions (Exemption of Public Officers) Order, 1967) Regulations 1969, unions 
of public officers cannot affiliate with any organisation whose membership is not 
confined exclusively to public officers (ARRTU1969). The Essential (Trade Unions) 
Regulations, 1969, amended the Trade Unions, 1959, with six features. It removed the 
provision for the issue of temporary certificates of registration; it gave the Registrar 
powers to take action against any branch of a union as and when necessary; trade 
unions officers must be employed in the industry with which the union is connected; 
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there was a safeguard against 'wild-cat' strikes; a prevention against persons 
employed by a statutory authority from joining or being members of any trade unions 
unless the membership of that trade union is confined exclusively to persons 
employed by that particular statutory authority; and lastly, there was the abolition of 
political fund (ARRTU 1969). This is apart from the already enforced TUa 1959 and 
TUA1965, as discussed in 7.2.2. 
The 1969 regulations left MTUC stunned as seen in a period of inactivity that is 
discussed in Chapter Eight. The government promised again that these 'new laws 
were enacted specifically for the duration of the Emergency' (ARRTU 1970). These 
new restrictions meant the unions were no longer allowed to negotiate certain 
conditions of service, such as redundancy, promotion, transfer and allocation of work 
duties. The trade unions' tendency to be active in politics was curbed with the 
abolition of political funds, and the fact that now officials of political parties were not 
allowed anymore to hold office in trade unions. Public service unions now were 
forbidden to affiliate with any organisations whose membership was not confined 
exclusively to public sector employees, forcing 56 public service unions to withdraw 
from the MTUC. The R TU powers were much more strengthened, in fact, on any 
trade union affairs. 
The government argued that its policy in 1969 and the change of economic policy that 
was about to be implemented (the NEP) was for 'social justice' in general and for 
'national unity' (ARRTUI969). It contended that it 'became incumbent on the 
government to introduce remedial measures in various fonns including restraints and 
modifications to laws including labour laws as embodied in the amendments of 
232 
October 1969' (ARRTU 1969). It claimed to be in the larger interests of workers, and 
frankly stated that it would 'rationalise employee-employer relationship, help about 
manageable labour force, attract new investments, create employment opportunities 
and enable a more rapid tempo of industrialisation and development' (ARRTU1969). 
7.4.The State, The Public and Private Sector IR, 1957-70 
This discussion below looks into some of the turning points in public and private 
sector IR during this period. On 23rd October 1957, the CUEPACS, after some 
negotiation with the government, was formed. Before that, there was the Government 
Services Staff Council (GSSC), which became a forum for co-operation among public 
sector unions. Now, the CUEPACS represented the Staff Side of the Whitley Council 
(refer Chapter Six). That the government did grant the registration of CUEPACS as a 
trade union, though hesitantly, was quite extraordinary. With this formation, 
CUEP ACS were able to represent the public sector unions on the Staff Side of the 
Whitley Council, and negotiated and heard grievances of public sector employees. As 
early as 1957, the public sector raised issues such as equal pay for women and a 
housing scheme for public sector employees. There were also claims made by 
individual unions in the public sector for improved wages and conditions. 
However, the government kept on delaying the settlement of long-standing claims. 
Either encouraged by the private sector unionism militancy or solidarity or leadership, 
some public sector unions were quite aggressive themselves, threatening industrial 
action whenever they felt the government denied them their rights. This was in 
tandem with the claim made by a veteran trade unionist that trade unionism in those 
days, in comparison to the present day, and even in the public sector had much more 
freedom, and a committed leadership. Realising that the Alliance government was 
always pro-capitalist and free enterprise, the union movement was more united. 
This was shown by the 22 December 1962 strike of the Railwaymen's Union of 
Malaya (RUM), which stretched for 22 days (Interview: K.George, 7/2/2001; 
Azizan, 1989; Jomo and Todd, 1994). The strike was meant to force the government to 
abolish the daily wage system and to grant them government servant status so that 
they would become entitled to public service conditions of employment. They 
managed to persuade the government to accept their claims, and they gained their 
monthly rates and, a few years later, their public service status (Interview: K.George, 
7/212001). In fact, the government extended the reforms to other daily rated workers 
in the public sector shortly after that. This success was not achieved without some 
pain and some degree of solidarity among trade unionists, with help from the rest of 
the labour unions. They brought the Malayan Railway services to a halt, gained the 
support of both MTUC and CUEP ACS, with other unions like the Port Swettenham 
Harbour Trade Union and the NUPW also staging sympathy strikes. Other unions 
either conducted sympathy strike ballots or gave moral and material support (RUM 
Biennial Report, 1962/64). What this spectacular strike by the RUM showed is that 
with the proper support from trade unions both in the public and private sector, as 
well as some organisational skills and solidarity, strike could bring about the desired 
result, a factor which in later years was denied to the unions in modem Malaysia. It 
further confirmed what the veteran trade unionist claimed ' a strong leadership, very 
unlike today's leadership in both sectors, who have no conscience whatsoever' 
(Interview: K.George, 71212001). 
There were other strikes and work-to-rules used during 1963-65, (Jomo and Todd, 
1994: 1 16) such as the one and a half work -to-rule by the Laboratory Assistants' 
Union and in May 1964, the Union of Post Office Workers strike, both for long-
standing claims. Following the government's refusal to implement the Arbitration 
Tribunal Award after the union submitted its claim for arbitration, the workers 
resorted to a work-to-rule in January 1965. In June 1964, the members of the 
Federation X-Ray Staff Union commenced a work-to-rule, and in January 1965, the 
National Union of Hospital Assistants threatened the government with strike action. 
One of the other memorable strikes by the public sector unions was the one staged by 
the Malay Forest Employees' Union (MFEU), which stretched for 36 days, over long 
outstanding claims for better wages. Remembering the strike, a veteran trade unionist 
who was the General Secretary of the MFEU recalled that it was the longest strike by 
any public sector union (Interview: Jamaluddin Mohd Isa, 30/112001). He 
remembered meeting the PM and was asked by the Tunku to wait for the Sufftan 
Commission. Out of solidarity among them, they went on strike, and this was despite 
the Tunku' s doubt over their seriousness since this was and still is a hundred per cent 
Malay members' union. Five thousand people, including a thousand members and 
their families, went on a full strike, and the matter was made worse they were 
supplied food by the Chinese and Malay contractors who logged as they wished in the 
forests. The government was furious, as the forest industry was being ruined and there 
were not many foresters left to man this situation. At long last the government 
succumbed to the union's demand and they were granted a 10 to 15 per cent increase 
(Interview: Jamaluddin Mohd Isa, 30/1/2001). 
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At this stage the National Whitley Council still offered the public sector collective 
bargaining as a means to settle wages and negotiations. However, as early as 1958, 
there was already an intervention when the government imposed a wage freeze on 
public sector employees, giving recession as the reason. Later, after agreeing to 
consider the wage claim, for not the first and the last time the government warned that 
it would not negotiate unless it was in the 'national interest' (CUEPACS AR 
1959/60). The word ' national interest' from then on would be found in later 
decisions or policies made by the government until the 1990s (Refer discussions in 
Chapter Eight, Nine and Ten respectively). 
The plight of collective bargaining in the government sector was therefore short-lived. 
With the appointment of the first Commission, the Suffian Royal Commission, wage 
negotiations were gradually lost by public sector unions. It is important to note that 
these were also the years when the government curbed trade unionism in general, with 
the 1965 regulations already discussed above. 
The Commission, which actually began its work in 1965, completed a report in July 
1967 (National Joint Council, Staff Side: 1975). Then the government chose to 
implement some of the commission's recommendations, saying that it did not have 
enough money to implement it as a whole. CUEP ACS was adamant that at least the 
government implemented the increase for the lower division (Division IV); the 
Industrial and Manual Group (IMG). Somehow, the CUEPACS was able to meet the 
PM and obtained a promise from the government to implement the Suffian 
Commission for the lower group (Interview: Jamaluddin, 3011/2001). However the 
implementation was suspended because of the 13th May 1969 race riot. As in the 
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private sector, a fragile situation triggered by the race riot again became a scapegoat. 
In fact, May 13th 1969 has been used as a ground for a dramatic change of policy. 
From 1963, CUEPACS and its affiliating unions tried without success to form a 
national union, the National Union of Employees in the Public and Civil Services 
(NUEPACS). CUEPACS officials thought that re-organising CUEPACS into 
NUEPACS would 'consolidate and stabilise the bargaining position of the entire Civil 
Servants by organising them in a single national union' (CUEPACS AR 1965/66, 39). 
CUEP ACS at that early period realised its inability to be an effective organisation 
with its present structure. With that in mind, a draft constitution was circulated to all 
its affiliates by 29th May 1967. Copies were forwarded to the Registrar of Trade 
Unions on 15 th May 1967. He did not give any reply for months, forcing CUEP ACS 
to ask for intervention from the MTUC, Public Services International (PSI) and 
ICFTU. A resolution was made at a CUEP ACS Special Congress Convention on 18th 
June 1967 and a copy was sent to the Minister of Labour on 21 st June 1967. The 
Minister, instead of giving a reply, invited CUEPACS leaders to a meeting and told 
them informally that the government had decided to invoke section 27(2) of the Trade 
Unions Ordinance 1959 and regulate how 'public officers ' (employees of 
government) should be organised in trade unions. He was true to his word when, by 
28th September 1967, a Gazette Notification was issued regulating that public officers 
may' form or be members of only such trade unions which confined their membership 
to employees within a particular occupation, Government Department or industry'. 
The Registrar then followed with a letter, drawing attention to the Gazette 
Notification and ruled that NUEPACS could not be registered. The CUEPACS vowed 
to fight back against the ruling, but to no avail. This failure sa\\' eUEP ACS and other 
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trade unions in the public sector remained divided and therefore not as strong as it had 
hoped. 
On the part of the government, it was just what they wanted. A united trade union of 
the public sector under one united national union would probably make the 
negotiation process a lot easier but would surely mean a bigger and stronger union. 
Even as divided unions, public sector ones could still pose a threat, and as a national 
union the threat could be fatal to the government. With the implementation of the IRA 
1967, the future of public sector unions as compared to the private sector unions was 
further marginalised. It could never be argued again that after the implementation of 
IRA 1967, the objectives of public sector unions were more streamlined according to 
the government wishes, with very limited, if any, union rights. 
As a comparison, it has been shown that the MTUC was more active in this twelve-
year period. Even though the government repressed labour militarism, during the 
1960s there emerged several new trade unions which were more militant, for example 
the Pineapple Industry Workers' Union, the Shoe Industry Workers' Union, the 
National Union of Employees in the Printing Industries, and the United Malayan 
Estate Workers' Union (UMEWU) (ARRTU 1958). They were ready to face the 
government and employers with a direct confrontation rather than using the moderate 
and responsible approach already embraced by the MTUC. In 1967, the militant 
UMEWU, the Overseas Commonwealth Force Employees' Union and the Victoria 
Estate Labour Union were all de-registered, ostensibly to limit the formation of 
splinter unions (Jomo and Todd, 1994: 112). Again, the barrier to mass development 
was the fact that there were already unions favoured and preferred by the government. 
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and in particular the non-militant ones like those affiliated under MTUC and co-
operative with the government. In other cases, the RTU just registered a splinter 
union, as seen with the National Union of Employees in the Printing Industry in 1967, 
which clealry definitely undennined it. The MTUC, needless to say, distanced 
themselves from all these militant unions (MTUC GCR, 1966/67). 
Table 7.5: Strikes, workers involved and man-days lost, 1957-70 
Year Strikes Workers Involved Man-days lost 
1957 113 14067 218562 
1958 69 9467 59211 
1959 39 6946 38523 
1960 37 4596 41947 
1961 58 9045 59730 
1962 95 232912 449856 
1963 72 17232 305168 
1964 85 226427 508439 
1965 46 14684 152666 
1966 60 16673 109915 
1967 45 9452 157894 
1968 103 31062 280417 
1969 49 8750 76779 
1970 17 1216 1867 
Source: Adapted from ARML, 1957-1970. 
The government learnt that by employing legislation, strikes - the index to industrial 
unrest for this period were effectively curtailed. As illustrated by Table 7.5., in 1957 
there were 113 strikes with 14,677 workers involved and 218,562 man-days lost. 
From 1959 to 1961 the numbers were considerably lower, and this was the time when 
the TUa 1948 was amended in 1959. In 1965, again the numbers were lowered to 46 
strikes, with 14,684 workers involved and 152,666 man-days lost as compared to 
before the 1965 regulations were amended and implemented. A much higher number 
of strikes (85), workers involved (226,427) and man-days lost (508,439) occurred in 
1964. Again, 1968 showed an increase to 103 strikes, with 31062 workers involved 
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and 280,417 man-days lost, while in 1969 with the amendments and implementation 
of new laws the numbers went down considerably. The strikes numbered only 49, 
workers involved 8,750 and man-days lost 76,779. All these statistics served as proof 
to the government that with restrictive laws, the IR system would forever be in their 
control, thereby ensuring a stable economic environment. 
By 1970 the government reported the forming of 'a number of new unions' as 
evidence that the laws 'were not entirely restrictive' (ARRTUI970). It claimed that 
amongst trade unionists, the concept of trade unions as bargaining institutions was 
fast becoming 'out of date' (ARRTUI970). It agreed totally with the new tendency of 
unions towards 'interest in the education, social and cultural activities'. However, this 
could not beat the fact that in 1970, out of 251 unions, there were only 2 unions with 
more than 10,000 members as compared to 78 with fewer than 100 members. Thus, 
there was only one federation of trade unions left (ARRTU 1970). 
7.5.Conclusion 
The argument in this chapter shows the government representing the 'state' gradually 
winning its argument that for the sake of 'national interests', the Malaysian labour 
movement needed to support the government's policies, even though they did not 
agree with any of them. As early as 1955, with the start of the five-year development 
planning and industrialisation process, the government started this campaign. One 
after another, regulations was promulgated until the unions had no other choice but to 
confOlm in order to survive. The political scene, as discussed, did not help the trade 
unions struggle, and more and more they were dragged to support the government or 
branded traitors to the nation and faced extinction. As the unions were replaced by 
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moderate ones, this transition was inevitable. By 1970, the fate of private and public 
sector IR was sealed. 
This period is one of the most dramatic eras since it encapsulated the three Emergency 
Rules and established all the important acts regarding IR that apply to this day 
(EA1955, TUA 1959 and then IRA 1967). At most times, the government was driven 
by the need to ensure economic stability, though now and again, the words 'national 
interest' appeared. It was true that communists were a threat to socio-political and 
economic stability and the initial reason behind the promulgation of the laws and 
regulations. Laws, like the emergency regulations, were not necessarily meant to 
restrict labour movement, but showed that the labour movement had become a target, 
especially with its tendency to become involved in communism or left-wing militant 
labour movement and politics. However, after the emergency rule was lifted, 
signifying the end of the communist threat, the regulations and restriction in TUA 
1959 were not. In fact, the government promulgated other regulations, depending on 
new issues that arose. This saw the implementation of Essential Regulations 1965, 
which were not lifted after the Indonesian Confrontation and, in fact validated in 
IRA 1967. When the labour movement showed signs of threatening the status quo, 
amendments were made, in most cases without the consent of or in consultations with 
MTUC and CUEP ACS - two national labour centres representing private and public 
sector employees - or even the NJLAC, the tripartite body. National development 
planning became the final objective set by the government and law was the means to 
ensure its success. 
2.t\ 
This twelve-year period also saw the state becoming more dominant, determined and 
in control of IR issues. Executive powers started to overshadow the union mO\Oement 
at all levels of their decisions, except in early 1962, with the rise of strikes, in the 
public as well as private sectors. Employers at this stage were almost always on the 
winning side, since the government, in its eagerness to achie\Oe economic 
development for the nation, ensured that employers' laws and regulations befitted 
them. The factors that influenced the state's roles were almost always economic, 
though ostensibly, often it was made out to be socio-political. In the fragile period 
during the communist agitation, the Konfrontasi, and after 13th May 1969, social and 
political stability were made out to be the priorities to be achieved at all cost, even if it 
meant repressing the labour movement. At this stage, much evidence on the part of 
the labour movement showed that they had contributed towards it by always 
endorsing government larger national objectives. But then, with the restrictive laws 
and regulations already prescribed to them, they did not really have a choice. With the 
13th May race riot, the government seemed to have found greater evidence that 
militant movements should, for the sake of national interest and national unity, be 
forever suppressed. The end of this period not only saw the end of Tunku's 
leadership, but also the end of another era, a period known to be more 'democratic' 
and 'sympathetic' towards the Chinese, which was one of the reasons why he was 
vilified by the ultra- Malays and forced to resign after the 13 th May 1969. The end of 
his leadership also highlighted the increased need to emphasise Malay issues and 
interests, as discussed further in Chapter Eight. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE ERA OF THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY: 
MALAYSIA'S OWN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTE:\I 
8.1.1ntroduction 
Chapter Seven has shown how for economIC and socio-political reasons, the 
government changed the voluntary IR system to a compulsory one that marked the 
empowerment of the state. The 1957-70 era firmly established through legislation and 
administration, the framework in which IR were to be played in the future. 
This chapter examines factors that influenced the state's roles in IR in the era of the 
NEP (1971-1990). It shows how a fixation on achieving the objectives ofNEP turned 
other policies including IR into complementary policies. This chapter shows how yet 
again legislation and administration ensured the enhanced role of the state. It 
highlights how the same reasons (real and imagined) were used to ensure the state's 
dominance over IR, and especially the labour movement. This chapter also explores 
the possibility of the political leadership factor as one of the important reasons that led 
to the state's dominance. To test these views, analyses on important IR issues for the 
twenty years in question are made. To help with the analysis there is an exploration of 
the roles played by MTUC, CUEPACS and MEF, apart from the federal government 
itself as the employer for the public sector. 
8.2. The Development of the Role of the State under NEP 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the world system theory as proposed by Wallerstein 
(1980) and Hoog\'clt (1997) suggests there is a dynamic upward or dowl1\\ard 
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mobility of the role of the state in the economy. Malaysia experienced this global 
phenomenon following independence, with the federal government attempting moves 
to bring Malaysia out of its 'periphery' nation state by adopting the 'seizing the 
chance' strategy through its five-year plans. 
The NEP was a continual but more explicit major plan that outlined a long-tenn target 
to achieve socio-economic goals. The state, represented by the federal government 
and its machinery, took drastic and calculated steps to distance Malaysia from the 
'dependency' phenomena, and changed its industrialisation policy from lSI to EO!. 
The FDI became the means to bring Malaysia to another economic level. Meanwhile, 
the NEP was a direct result of a racial riot. A mixture of the two saw Malaysia as a 
corporatist state, authoritarian, as well as flirting with economic liberalisation. In the 
1970s, the government encouraged active participation from workers in the economy, 
while at the same time adopting restrictive legislation, and turning to privatisation and 
a higher industrialisation. In IR, the state remained dominant, putting achievement of 
NEP objectives as the highest priority. This approach nonetheless caused an 
imbalance of power between the state, capital and labour. Through legislation, 
administration, and its direct participation in policies in both the private as well as the 
public sector, the state adopted strategies that enabled the country to achieve 'national 
objectives' which it hoped would solve domestic problems that were more 
economically, politically and ethnically intertwined. 
8.3. The NEP and the 'Malay Agenda' 
The NEP worked within the framework of the First Outline Perspective Plan (OPP 1), 
the long- teml goal of Malaysia, which in this case ran concurrently with the NEP, 
from 1971-1990. Prior to this there was the First Malaya Plan (FMP) (1956-1960), the 
2MP (1961-1965) and then First Malaysia Plan (MPl) (1966-1970). Under the NEP 
there were four five-year plans, namely the Second Malaysia Plan (MP2), the Third 
Malaysia Plan (MP3), the Fourth Malaysia Plan (MP4) and Fifth Malaysia Plan 
(MP5). The NEP was introduced and incorporated concurrently with the 
implementation of the MP2 (1971-1975). Under the administration of the second and 
third PM, the NEP was very much the central and dominant policy. However, during 
Mahathir's era, the government adopted many other 'complementary policies' such as 
Look East Policy with preference to in-house unions, Industrialisation, Privatisation 
and Malaysia Incorporated. All these policies have impacted on IR. However, first it 
is necessary to understand the essence ofNEP, which the researcher wishes to term as 
period of a calculated 'Malay Agenda'. 
After the riot, the Deputy PM, Tun Razak took several steps to re-establish stability in 
the country. The parliamentary government was restored in February 1971 and a new 
policy was already laid. A government White Paper entitled Towards National Unity 
explains the government's intention to address the problems that were believed to be 
the cause of the 13th May 1969. Once introduced, the NEP became more important 
than the national ideology, the Rukunegara. It offered a comprehensive programme to 
achieve specific and quantifiable goals. Two pronged objectives, one; to eradicate 
poverty irrespective of race, and second; to restructure society so as to eliminate the 
identification of race with economic function were laid out. 5-l 
S4 Alala\'.I'ia.'Second Mala\,sia Plan, 1971-1975 (1971) outlines both the MP2 and the NEP. MTUC. 
CUEPACS and the Lab~ur Minister's annual reports also gaye extensiyc coyerage on the policy 
However, in the annual reports the Malay issues were not pronounced. 
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However, the most significant issue in the context of this study is that the 0:EP also 
became a period of planned 'Malay agenda'. The second prong of NEP clearly 
referred to the betterment of Malays, with the argument that they are indigenous 
people who deserved special right, and therefore special attention. The 13th May gave 
a valid reason for the government to change course and legitimised the Malays 
position within the new national policy. By stating that the NEP was to achieve 
'national unity' it gave the nation a new direction to move in and implied that 
'national unity' was not there before the 13th May, and would not be attainable if the 
Malays were not happy with their economic position as compared to other ethnic 
groups, especially the Chinese. It was a history-based argument that the Malays as the 
Bumiputeras (sons of the soil) deserved help to achieve their rightful place in the 
economy. The 13th May was said to be proof that as a result of a place denied to the 
Malays, a fact overlooked by the Tunku, the event turned out to be racial. This is 
despite other claims that stressed politics and psychological factors as also 
contributing to the conflict (Means, 1991:23). Nonetheless, starting with Tun Razak's 
administration, the government enhanced their efforts towards the betterment of the 
Malays' economic position. 
The NEP facilitated greater Bumiputera participation in commercial enterprises with 
various measures taken to create the Bumiputera Industrial and Commercial 
Community (BCIC). This includes revitalising existing trust agencies like the Majlis 
Amallah Rakyat (MARA), the Perbadallan Nasional (PERNAS) and all the state 
agencies including the State Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs). 
Moreover, there were programmes to mobilise Bumiplltera savings through schemes 
such as the Amanah Saham Nasiollal (ASN) and the Permodalall Nasiollal Berhad 
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(PNB). Rural incomes and living standards, among issues raised as the causes of the 
13th May riot, were also given due attention with the plan to modernise the 
agricultural sector. These were agencies like Federal Land Development Authority 
(FELDA), Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (FELCRA), and 
the Regional Authorities (Lin, 1994: 575). 
Much has been written on its success, just as there are a few who regarded NEP as a 
failure. 55 In the context of IR, the NEP was designed to increase the ethnic 
distribution of the workforce in proportion to the ethnic distribution of the population, 
and to increase the Bumiputera share of corporate ownership from 2.4 percent in 1970 
to 30 percent in 1990 (Kuruvilla and Arudsothy, 1995:161; Means, 1991:24). This 
strategy was to be achieved through re-distribution via growth in output and 
employment. In implementing the NEP, government leaders stressed the deprivation 
of the Malays in comparison with the non-Malays as being the underlying cause of the 
13 th May crisis (Means, 1991:23). To redress that, for the Bumiputera an allocation of 
30 per cent employment quota became a pre-requisite to qualify firms for import 
protection and tax holidays. Under the NEP too, government contracts were reserved 
for Malay-owned firms, while all firms had to keep aside 30 percent shares for 
Malays. 
The 1970s saw the expanding role of the government in the Malaysian economy as it 
increased state intervention, public sector expenditure and based economic growth on 
" Mehmet (1987) was quite critical of the government intervention in the economy under the ;-..JEP and 
claimed that the policy failed to benefit the majority of Malays, instead was mismanaged and only 
enriched a minority of Malays whom he called the 'Malaysian elite'. Gomez and Jomo (1999) also 
c\plored Malaysia's political economy and focused on the relationship between politics. patronage and 
profits under the NEP, and relate how rent and rent-seeking influences the accumulation and 
concentration of wcalth in Malaysia. All three authors do not believe in the government proclamation 
that the policy helped the Malays. 
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EO! (Gomez and lomo, 1999: 24). Such government intervention arose from the 
realisation that while the 'invisible hand' of market forces had enabled Malaysia to 
enjoy rapid economic growth,56 it could not be relied upon to achieve social and 
equity objectives, both of which were considered extremely important in the context 
of a delicately balanced multi-racial Malaysian society (Lin, 1994: 564). Moves were 
made to ensure the Malays' privileged access into education, better paid jobs, 
professional bodies, top management positions and investments in 'more profitable' 
commercial and industrial enterprises in order to create a viable BCIC (Lin, 
1994:560). In theory, 'ethnic monopolies in functional economic compartments would 
be ended and replaced by ethnically balanced and proportionately allocated 
advantages' (Means, 1991 :24). In other words, behind the government's move to 
intervene more in the economy was an agenda to correct an economic imbalance 
between MalayslBlimipliteras with the non-Malays/non-Bumiputeras and the hope of 
achieving 'national unity'. In that process the government persuaded and sometimes 
coerced the labour class, into accepting and adapting to changes that they brought in 
and enforced in the name of 'national interest'. 
In 1975, Parliament passed the Industrial Co-ordination Act (lCA), which extended 
the NEP racial employment quota system to the private sector. The Act ensured that 
industry and commerce would employ 30 percent Malays and promote them in an 
appropriate sequence to supervisory and management positions. The Chinese, fearing 
that these new requirements made Chinese business operations, and especially the 
family-based small business enterprises difficult, sought amendments to the Act. 
56 Lin (1994) explores on the Malaysian economy from 1957 to 1991 and saw that despite some 
setbacks, Malaysian economy achieved impressive growth, with the structure of the economy changed 
to manufacture and services. 
Though the government was being pressured by the Associated Chinese Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry of Malaysia (ACCIM), it remained unwavering, though some 
minor concessions and promises were made (Means, 1991: 59). 
How the government gained the support of the non-Malays is seen through a very 
fragile period in regards to the relationship between the Malays and Chinese. UMNO, 
the dominant party in the Alliance had managed to convince the non-Malays that the 
empowerment of Malays would not detrimentally affect their interests (Kuruvilla and 
Arudsothy, 1995: 161-162). The argument was that economic growth under the NEP 
would 'increase the size of the pie'. According to Gomez and lomo (1999: 24), the 
attention given by the government on eradicating poverty ensured minimal political 
opposition. In fact, the NEP seemed to respond to problems of inter-ethnic economic 
imbalances and therefore it was received favourably. It was the emphasis on wealth-
restructuring, and the actual implementation of the NEP that later became grounds for 
criticisms. 
On the verge of the NEP the country was still dependent upon two pnmary 
commodities, namely tin and rubber (See Table 8.1), where there were still income 
inequalities and poverty, the two biggest problems faced by the government after a 
decade of Independence. In 1970, 58% of the rural population who mostly comprised 
Malays, were poor, as compared to 21.3% of the urban population. Moreover, 68.3% 
of those who were in the agricultural sector were poor. Most of the Malays' economic 
activities were in the traditional sectors, working as rubber tappers, once a year rice-
planting, rearing livestock and other non-productive activities (Chamhuri and 
Surtahman, 1994: 243). 
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Table 8.1: Peninsular Malaysia: Major Exports, 19S1-1969(percentages) 
Item 1951-1955 1956-1960 1961-1965 1966-1969 
Rubber 64 63 50 44 
Tin 21 17 25 25 
Iron ore 1 4 6 4 
Timber 1 2 2 5 
Palm oil 2 2 3 4 
Other 11 12 14 18 
Source: Lim. 1973. Economic Growth and Development in West Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur. 
Oxford University Press. 
The western states were more advanced than the northern and the eastern states. Thus, 
the poverty percentage was still very high, as much as 76.1 %, 68.9% and 64.5%, in 
the eastern and northern states of Kelantan, Terengganu and KedahlPerlis 
respectively, as compared to Selangor which had a much lower 29.2%. Income 
inequalities also showed more amongst the western states as compared to the northern 
and eastern states of Malaysia. Reasons for this were unbalanced developmental 
projects established by the government itself or by the private sector. In 1971, only 
0.3% of industrial projects were granted in Trengganu, as compared to 32.9% 
invested in Selangor (Chamhuri and Surtahman, 1994: 244). The other factor was that 
the western states were given priority by the colonial British, where they were 
grouped as FMS and Straits Settlements (see Chapters Four and Six). 
More importantly, most of the rural area population were Bumiputeras who were 
involved in traditional agriculture, and this explained their economic backwardness. 
In 1970, 65% of the Malays were poor compared to 26% of the Chinese and 39% of 
the Indians (Chamhuri and Surtahman, 1994:246). The Malays' average income from 
1957 to 1958 was RM I..J...J. as compared to RM272 and RM217 for the Chinese and 
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Indians, respectively. It was with this background that the government felt the need to 
act. The strategy was based on the assumption that the overall economic growth 
would remain sufficiently high for all sectors to be able to benefit from it. At the same 
time, the government would redistribute the wealth of the country according to the 
national program. Fortunately for the government, the economy was buoyant from 
1970 to 1974, making it possible to manage political demands and ethnic rivalries. 
The economy did change in 1975 due to a world-wide recession, but it quickly made a 
recovery in 1976, allowing the government to make a few adjustments (Means, 1991: 
46). 
Within the scope of the NEP, with the labour-intensive EOI and the related growth of 
services, an increased number of Bumiputeras did become engaged in wage labour 
themselves, opening up opportunities for them to be involved in trade. The fact that 
after the NEP there was an increased involvement of Malays in trade unionism, and 
other aspects of the modem economic sphere in Malaysia for that matter, in itself 
supported some views that the NEP was a success in helping them. They became 
more involved in the modem economy because there was a policy enabling and 
encouraging them to do so. 
Statistically, between 1969 and 1973, 98% of all persons recruited into the public 
service were Malays. Prior to the NEP, the quota for the elite Malayan Civil Service 
was 4: 1, but that did not apply to the professional and technical services. After the 
NEP the quota system continued in the new and unified Malaysian Administrative and 
Diplomatic Service, in fact exceeding the formal quota of 4: 1. The Malays were now 
given more chances to hold important policy-making superscale posts in the civil 
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services and the military. From the educational aspect, the ~alays were given higher 
quotas to enter universities or higher learning local and abroad, plus goyemment 
stipends. The conversion of the Malay language as the sole medium of instruction 
helped more Malays to advance their higher education. As an example, between 1970 
and 1979, the number of Malay students at the University of Malaya rose from 49.700 
to 66.4%, respectively. After 1970 too, the quotas for admission were extended to 
specific fields and courses of study in which Malay representation had been low 
(Means, 1991 :26). After five years, much helped by a real GDP growth rate of 7.1, 
which exceeded the target of 6.8% per annum, the NEP already showed some 
achievement on the overall incidence of poverty. 
After 20 years, the unemployment rate, which was 7.5% in 1970, went down to 5.1 %, 
and this is below expectations of 3.6%. The average monthly income per household in 
Peninsular Malaysia rose to RM1163 in 1990 from RM264 in 1970. The 
Bumiputeras' average income also rose to RM931 in 1990 from RM 172. However, by 
comparison this was still below the average income of the other ethnic groups, the 
Chinese and the Indians. The incidence of poverty in the Peninsular dropped from 
49.3% in 1970 to 15% in 1990 (Means, 1991 :46), a rate that exceeded the 
expectations of 16.7%. The incidence of poverty in rural areas also decreased to 
19.3% in 1990 compared to 58.7% in 1970. The expected rate was 23%. Among the 
less developed areas of the eastern and northern states where the majority population 
was Malays, there was an increase in the people's average monthly income. In 
Kelantan, for example, there was a rise from RM269 in 1976 to RM726 in 1990. 
Another poor state, Trengganu, increased from RM339 to RM905. The poverty rate 
also decreased. The incidence in Kelantan dropped from 67.1 % in 1976 to 29.9% in 
1990. Kedah, a northern state in the Peninsular, dropped from 61 % to 30% during the 
same period. The GDP per capita rate improved, rising from RM993 in 1970 to 
RM4392 in 1990 (Chamhuri and Surtahman, 1994: 253). 
The discussion shows that the NEP did bring the desired result, if not totally. The 
main intention of bringing more Malays into the mainstream economy succeeded and, 
politically, it gave the government a reason to continue and stick to the view that 
ethnic parity in the economy is one important way to achieve national unity. For 
twenty years there were no recorded racial clash, even though NEP received some 
criticisms. Overall, the Chinese and Indians also prospered economically, another 
reason that made the NEP bearable to them. It shows to the government that the 
policies that it implemented, including IR, brought the result that it had hoped, and 
saw no reason to jeorpadise this. In fact, the NEP gave a reason to uphold all the 
legislative framework and policies. 
8.3.1. IR policy under NEP 
With the introduction ofNEP, the role of trade unions was re-phrased clearly: 
The role of trade unions would have to be related as closely as possible to 
these national objectives (ARRTU, 1971: 22). 
Trade unions were urged to change, discard the 'bread and butter issues' or 'workers' 
versus management' role only. They were asked to enlarge their role to a workers' 
education programme and social and cultural projects. 
What is important in the national context of economic development is 
identification of the trade unions with the national aims and objectives and a 
declaration on their part that they are partners in national development 
(ARRTU, 1971:22). 
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With that expectation from the government there were three sets of Regulations, 
namely the Essential (Trade Unions) Regulations 1969, the Essential (Trade Unions) 
Regulations 1970 and the Essential (Trade Unions) Regulations 1971, making certain 
amendments to the Trade Unions Ordinance1959 (ARRTU, 1971: 23). In 1971. there 
was the enactment of Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 1971 with several features 
concerning the removal of a temporary certificate of registration, power to the R TU to 
take action against branch of unions that indulged in illegal activities, rules against 
wild-cat strikes, disqualifying officers/employees of political parties and removal of 
provision to political funds (ARRTU, 1971: 24). Amendments made to the IRA1967 
in 1969 also guaranteed that several new rules followed to 'ensure economic and 
social advancement, national unity and solidarity' (ARRTU, 1969: 28).The essence of 
these provisions was to facilitate the smooth running of the NEP without unions 
creating problems, and also to keep unions apolitical. In 1971, the MTUC had 73 
unions affiliated to it with a membership of 175,261, that is more than 65% of the 
total organised workers. CUEPACS, registered as the Federation of trade unions, had 
60 affiliating unions but only 50,762 members, a little less than 19% (ARRTU, 
\971:30). The Whitley Council was still suspended because of the 13th May 1969 and 
only ad hoc meetings to maintain liaisons between government employees' side (Staff 
Side) and the government (Officer Side) were held. 
Ministers of Labour, Manickavasagam in 1971 and Richard Ho later, outlined the 
government's policy very clearly. They stressed that the government wanted mutual 
respect, harmonious relations and fruitful co-operation between employers and 
workers to ensure the economic success of the NEP. The government was still wary 
of communist-led trade unionism before the NEP era and adopted an attitude whereby 
it acknowledged trade unions as 'important institutions in modem society' but would 
not tolerate if they were abused. Malaysia was regarded as a young country with the 
majority of workers not fully understanding the principles of trade unionism and 
easily manipulated. Therefore, trade unions 'cannot be given unlimited power'. While 
they regarded the power of the RTU with contempt, the government regarded him as 
'an impartial authority' who provides a guarantee to workers that their rights and 
privileges as members of trade unions are safeguarded (Manickavasagam, 1971). In 
simple words, the government showed its willingness to tolerate trade unionism but 
on their tenns. 
At this stage, the minister still agreed that the free collective bargaining and voluntary 
joint agreements arrived at freely between employers and workers were a 'more 
successful method' of ensuring industrial peace and stability in IR than compulsory 
measures enforced by legislation. But he reminded them of the need for the parties 
concerned to see themselves as part of the community, who would be affected by any 
industrial dispute (Manickavasagam, 1971). 
This view reflected the government's dislike of open conflict. Looking back, this is 
very much related to way the political co-operation among the parties in the coalition 
government was practised. It used discreet discussion, rather than open discussion 
over policies, and especially what was considered a 'sensitive issue' (for example the 
Malays special position, was, and still is, regarded as 'sensitive issue') must not be 
discussed in the open. Discussing 'sensitive issues' was an offence even until today. 
People who were thought to incite hatred or disunity among racial groups could be 
subjected to detention under ISA, \\'here they could face at least two years of 
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detention without being charged in open court, for inciting instability to the national 
security. Therefore, 'sensitive issues' were discussed among political leaders, then 
released to the public after decisions were arrived at. In a way, this resembles a top-
down management system and is in fact, in line with the 'elite accommodation 
system' that had started during Tunku's era and has been practised until today. 
Generally, it has shown to be working for Malaysia.57 Because the community is 
multi-racial, and the 13th May 1969 has shown that it could tum into a bloody riot that 
would upset economic, social and political stability, the government believed it was 
best to deal with 'sensitive issues' amongst the leaders first. After all these were 
elected leaders through democratic means. The opinion was that they should be given 
the authority to discuss 'sensitive issues' and make decisions for the people. 
This way of resolving disputes among the multi-racial communities m Malaysia 
actually influenced other aspects of life in Malaysia too. It clearly explained how open 
industrial disputes like strikes or pickets were consistently despised by the 
government to whom there was no need to have open conflict, when people can sit 
together and discuss differences or disputes. This view is shared by bureaucrats and 
trade unionists alike (Interviews: Ismail Rahim, 25 January 1999; Izhar Harun; Wahab 
SalIeh; Zainal Rampak, 2811112000; Abdul Rahman Manan, 91111999). When 
interviewed, alI prominent government officers from TUAD, IRD or the LD, viewed 
strikes and pickets as not the best ways, which should only be regarded as the last 
resort, after all else has failed and, in fact, were looked upon as unnecessary. During 
57 The practice was only broken a few times: for example, during Mahathir's campaigns in the 
constitutional crisis in the 1980s, then much later after the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim the Deputy PM in 
1998 that led to the 'refornlation movement'. From then on, open conflicts were harder to curb, since 
with the help of the Internet the government was put on the defensive. and a lot more of the ISA 
(detention without trial in open courts) was used. 
the implementation of NEP, the experience of 13th May was still new and fresh in 
people's minds and the majority of Malaysians were still wary towards open conflicts. 
Interviews with veteran and prominent trade unionists who were active in that era also 
revealed how the 13th May persuaded unions leaders to become more accommodative 
and co-operative towards government's policies, especially when it was stressed time 
and again that the ultimate goal is 'national unity' (Interviews: Jamaluddin Mohd Isa, 
30/1/2001; Mohd Jamil Ismail, 6/1/1999, K. George, 71212001; Zainal Rampak, 
7/1/1999). 
On the part of the government the campaign was consistent. In 1978, Richard Ho 
highlighted how workers should not expect 'good wages' alone (Richard Ho, 1978). 
On September 1 ih, while opening the 6th Annual General Meeting of the Penang and 
Prai Textile and Garment Workers' Union, Richard Ho stated: 
'In the process of our nation's development, it is of utmost importance that 
every single group of our people, especially workers, jealously guard 
industrial peace and stability, so that the New Economic Policy will not suffer 
obstruction .... Any undue belligerent attitude or irresponsible act, will not 
only endanger the interests of workers as a whole, but also disrupt the orderly 
system of our society, frustrating efforts to achieve our National objectives. 
Government will continue to encourage the growth of democratic, healthy 
Trade Unionism, for the protection of our workers' interests and for the 
maintenance of our harmonious industrial climate'. 
The speech revealed the government's total commitment towards the NEP, just six 
years in operation. It also shows how much the government regarded the significance 
of support from workers towards the achievement of NEP as well as the attitude that 
demand total loyalty from workers. In other words, the workers would be held 
responsible if 'any irresponsible act' caused a disruption in achieving the NEP's 
objectives. While at a Conference of Officers of the Registry of Trade Unions on 26th 
October 1978, Ho reminded government officers of their tasks: 
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It bears repeating that the government takes a very serious view of the public 
being held ransom in the course of disputes between employers and workers. 
It is your bounded duty to take swift action against the offending party, 
irrespective of its status or position, in accordance with our laws .... This you 
should do, as much as to protect the public interest, as to maintain the dignity 
of the law, to deter all who might from time to time forget the larger interests 
of the public they serve, in the pursuit of narrower self-interest. ... You have 
the onerous continuing task to remind both employers and workers that they 
should come to terms to enhance our positive labour environment, so that 
investors actual and potential, will continue to accept labour here as a 
responsible complement to our industrial development. The fact that the 
destiny of our Nation as a whole and that of employers and workers are 
intertwined, must be made clear and beyond any doubt (Richard Ho, 1978). 
This speech to the civil servants, such as the RTUs' officers, again demanded total 
obedience in carrying out the government's policies, even though, from another 
perspective, it defeated the purpose that they should first serve the interests of the 
public. This call also reflects the general understanding of Malaysians and the 
government that the latter was regarded as the state, and therefore deserving of total 
loyalty. This relationship between Malaysian public service officers and the 
government is another important factor that ensured government's success in the 
implementation of their policies for the whole period under study. The public 
servants, on the other hand, considered the government as an employer that needed to 
be obeyed. Interviews with prominent government officers in the MoHR and the PSD, 
each catering for the private and the public sector IR, revealed that each took 
responsibility for administering government policies very seriously. 58 Apart from 
IRA 1967 and TUA 1959, there was the General Order (GO) for the public sector that 
outlines the 'dos and don'ts'. The government officers regarded themselves as 
working for a democratic government elected by the people. Therefore, they did not 
differentiate between duties as civil servants or political demands made by the leaders 
58 Interviews: Zainal Rahim, 28/11/2000; Bagh Singh, 11/212000; Ismail Rahim, 17/112001 ;Zainor 
Rashid, 5'3/1999; Azlan, 27/211999; Mohd Zubir, 16d/200l; Izhar Harun,l6/l/200l; Mohsin :--'1ohd 
Khir, 4/211999. 
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in the government. They believed that if they supported the government, the ultimate 
goal, that is peace and prosperity for the people at large, would be achieved. So in a 
way, obeying the government was a manner of showing they cared for the public 
interests. If they went against the government's wishes by going on strike, they were 
acting against the public, and therefore could be termed selfish and uncaring. The 
government on no uncertain terms called these acts irresponsible and a betrayal and 
since then has taken great pride in reporting years of declining strike acti\"ity as the 
proof of industrial harmony. 
The process that developed the Malaysians' general attitude towards disputes and 
open conflict was a consistent one, and mostly inspired by the government. Workers 
were urged to conduct their affairs in an orderly fashion, in compliance with the 
constitution and laws of the country and within the confines of the 1975 Code and 
Conduct for Industrial Harmony. The government's effort in bringing in foreign 
investors was to be regarded as creating employment opportunities for the people. 
Admittedly, it needed support from Malaysians, without which the whole 
development programme would have come to naught. It was not easy for a young 
country to succeed, as at the same time it also had to face competition from other 
developing countries. Without strikes or open conflicts, the government was more 
focused to providing facilities such as free trade zones (FTZs), suitable factory sites 
and an efficient immigration service. Therefore, it could not afford to accommodate 
independent and free trade unions. 
Among the Malays, the reluctance towards strikes or open conflict is related to 
culture. The Malays' traditional and pre-colonial society, as discussed in Chapter 
Four, reflected a class-based society; the rakyat (the ordinary people - the ruled) and 
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the pemerintah (the rulers). Generally, to the ordinary rakyat, the rulers should be 
obeyed, not opposed (this does not mean there were no incidents to prove otherwise). 
The consequences were proven when the Malays got involved more in commercial 
economy, dominated the public service and the trade unions movement, and the open 
conflict subsequently declined and almost ceased in relevance. It also explained the 
preference of the Alliance Party, and later the Barisan Nasional (with the dominant 
player, UMNO- a Malay party), to consultations and discussions, rather than open 
confrontation. Of course this was much helped by the legal framework. Ho says: 
'Differences there will always be in a democratic country like ours; but a legal 
framework exists within our industrial relations system to settle such 
differences without resorting to industrial action (Ho, 1978). 
Again, employers and employees were reminded to develop along 'responsible and 
constructive lines'. At the MTUC 24th Biennial Delegates Conference in 1978, Ho 
warned the MTUC about several matters. While acknowledging that the number of 
registered trade unions and their members were increasing, Ho says; 
'Mere size however, uncoordinated by organisational discipline, untempered 
with moderation and unguided by dedicated and thinking men and women, 
will only translate at some point of time, as loss of direction and the 
generation of forces which are more likely to be destructive than constructive'. 
Specifically, he wanted the MTUC to control its affiliates from resorting to industrial 
action that' caused hardship to the innocent public' (Ho, 1978). 
In 1980, spurred on by the MAS-AEU dispute (discussed in 8.5.5.), the government's 
stand was put into action. Despite opposition from the MTUC and the ILO, the 
government again amended both the TUA1959 and the lRA1967. The impact was 
instantaneous. Now the public officers and any person employed by a statutory 
authority holding any post in the managerial or professional group or who was 
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engaged in confidential or security capacity could not join or be a member of any 
trade union (MTUCAR, 1981182:98). The definition of 'strike' was widened, to 
include the word 'reduction'. The Registrar, if satisfied that a strike or a lock-out 
would contravene the TUA or any other law, could direct the trade union or employer 
not to commence the proposed strike or lock-out. 
In the amendments to the IRA1967 in 1980, there was a prohibition of strikes in 
essential services, to include private sector industries, such as banking. The Minister 
of Labour now has the power to suspend any trade union for a period of not exceeding 
six months if, in his opinion, the union is being used for: 
'purposes prejudicial to or incompatible with interests of Malaysia security or 
public order. During suspension, the certificates of registration of the union 
shall cease to have effect, it shall be prohibited from carrying out its nOlIDal 
activities and its fund shall be frozen' (MTUCARI981182:98). 
There will be no appeal and non-compliance will be punished. The Registrar now at 
its discretion can disqualify a member of a trade union or federation executive from 
holding office, and he can also enter trade union premises if he has ground to believe 
that an offence under TUO has been committed. Section 2A of IRA 1967 states that 
the AgOllg (the King) shall appoint a Director General of Industrial Relations (DGIR), 
'who shall have the general direction, control, and supervision of all matters relating 
to fR' (MTUCAR, 1981182; IRAI967). The MTUC already condemned this as 'a 
political appointment rather than a career civil service one' (MTUCAR, 1981182). 
The amendment also stated that an employer may convey directly to his workmen in 
such manner as he may deem appropriate any information pertaining to any collective 
bargaining or trade disputes concerning them. Also, there was a restriction on \vorkers 
not directly involved in the trade dispute and elected union officers from participating 
directly in picketing. Section 52 of IRA 1967 denied workmen in the statutory 
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authority the provisions of the Act relating to the protection of the rights of \vorkmen 
and employers and their trade unions (Part II); recognition and scope of representation 
(Part III); collective bargaining (IV); conciliation (V) and representation on dismissal 
(VI). On top of that, the government sent a draft of these amendments to the MTUC 
on 29 th January 1980, for discussion at the tripartite body NJLAC on 4th February. 
The government then rejected all 183 counterproposals from the MTUC. What this 
implied was a top-down management and unilateral decisions with the government 
having the final decisions. It totally defeated the purpose of the tripartite body, the 
NJLAC. 
Mahathir, then the deputy PM, had already made his stand very clear. He was 
adamant that the amendments were necessary so that leaders and outside forces could 
not 'masquerade' as workers' 'protectors' (Mahathir, 1980). Later on, this argument 
was consistent with the official line taken by the government, that Malaysia should be 
aware of outside forces, or sometimes tenned as 'neo-colonialists'. However, a more 
subtly note was issued by Richard Ho (1980) over the amendments: 
The philosophy behind the amendments is; 
-to safeguard the national security and public order for the well-being of 
everyone; 
-to ensure the growth of healthy trade unions; 
to safeguard the workers' interests. 
Again, the question of national security, public order and workers' interests came to 
the fore. It stressed the government's general view that the majority's needs would 
always come as a priority in the government's decision. To the government, the 
majority meant ordinary people at large, and not the workers. Using that argument, 
the public was again reminded of the tribulations of the communist era, the racial riot 
and the emergency ruk that followed. It was not difficult to understand how then the 
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umons, such as MTUC, although opposing the amendments, did not resort to the 
extreme ways used by the 'left'. 
The government insisted the system was tripartite and in 1972, the government 
encouraged a tripartite relationship, warning employers not to exploit labour and 
declared May 1st as Workers' Day (ARRTU,1972: 24). The government amended the 
TUO to allow unions to venture into business, an opportunity that came with the NEP. 
In his speech to ILO's 59th Conference in Geneva, the MTUC Secretary General 
spoke of a 'very satisfactory' relationship with the government and he was optimistic 
of economic ventures ofNUPW, NUTP, among others, under the MTUC. In fact, the 
government helped labour established Bank Buruh (The Workers' Bank), which was 
to cater for workers' needs in business (MTUCAR, 1973174: 240-241). In the 
1984/85 report the government said the trade unions were sought in preparing the 
Mid-Term Review of the MP4, and invited to contribute views and ideas to the 
fonnulation of the MP5 (MLAR, 1984/85: 180). Even though it showed the 
government's effort to incorporate the unions into mainstream economic activities, 
from the MTUC point of view, however, it was a total failure (MTUCAR, 1983/84: 
1). Despite the calls for good work ethics, higher industrial productivity and the 
recognition of the common interests of the three important parties; the employees, 
employers and the government, the MTUC claimed there was apathy on the 
govemment's side and belligerency from the employers towards the workers' 
organisations. In 1990, the MTUC reported the failure and losses of labour movement 
in its venture into the economic sphere, including the Bank Bllruh (MTUC AR, 
198911990: 33). MTUC now strongly advocated that the labour movement must 
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refrain from economic ventures, except co-operative societies, and pay more attention 
to the workers' cause (MTUCAR, 1989/1990). 
The discussion shows how the government has systematically managed to put across 
their argument of the need for industrial peace to achieve national unity in Malaysia. 
Its contention was that Malaysia was a young country which depended on foreign 
investment and it needed to take all possible factors into consideration to create an 
economic success, even if called 'suppressive'. This consistency on the part of the 
government, coupled with a supportive administration, were strong enough factors to 
see them succeed in 'winning over' people, especially the trade unionists. 
8.3.2. Foreign Direct Investment at All Costs 
According to Kuruvilla and Arudsothy (1995: 164) FDI grew dramatically when 
Malaysia changed strategy from lSI to EOI policies. That change in policy was caused 
by the shortage of revenues brought about by the government's heavy involvement in 
the NEP, Industrial Coordination Act (leA) and heavy industries policy (HIP). The 
growth in dependency on FDI saw the government's consistent repressive policy in 
IR. 
Between 1975 and 1985, FDI in Malaysia was large compared to other countries (look 
at Table 8.2). So, while relatively dominant foreign investors were in Malaysia 
during the colonial period, they were even more welcomed after independence. This 
was especially true as Malaysia embarked on lSI when FDI was very much needed, 
thus causing the lSI sector to be dominated by foreign investment. Jesudason (1989: 
11.+) argued that capital-intensi\"l~ lSI did not do much to overcome the income 
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disparities of the Malays against the Chinese. The ~EP became a hope for a change in 
direction after the racial riot of 1969, especially the ownership pattern was hoped to 
be restructured and to meet the 30% target for Malay ownership. In the Second 
Malaysia Plan (MP2), the government stated its intention quite clearly: 
... at least 30% of the total commercial and industrial activities in all categories 
and scales of operation should have participation by Malays and indigenous 
people in terms of ownership and management. The objective is to create over 
a period of time, a viable and thriving Malay industrial and commercial 
community which will operate on a par and in effective partnership with non-
Malays in the modern sector (MP2, Malaysia, 1971: 158). 
Table 8.2: The Stock of FDI as a percentage of GDP in 1975 and 1985 and External Debt 
as a P t fGDP' 1985 ercen age 0 ID 
Percentage of GDP 
FDI External Debt 
1975 1985 1985 
Malaysia 25 29 60 
All less Developed Countries of Which; 6 9 45 
-Africa 15 13 63 
-Asia(including Malaysia) 5 6 30 
-Latin America(and Caribbean) 9 14 62 
Source: Edwards. 1994. 'The Role of Foreign Direct Investment'. 678. 
By the 1970s too, the government felt the need to inject a new dynamism in the 
industrial sector, thus encouraging FDI Tax concessions in the 1950s, followed by 
Investment Incentives Act 1968 and the Free Trade Zone Act of 1971 (Edwards, 
1994: 689). The Act promoted a rapid development of Export Processing Zones 
(EPZs), which were almost entirely dominated by FDI. The ICA 1975 gave the 
Minister of Trade and Industry enormous discretionary power over the manufacturing 
sector whereby investments were subject to the obtaining of licences and putting aside 
30% equity for the Malays. The Chinese business sector opposed it, forcing the 
government to amend the ICA by exempting small compames (with less than 
RM250,000 in shareholder funds) from the Act (Jesudason, 1989: 141). 
By 1976, the state had a share of at least 40% in each of the three largest domestic 
banks in Malaysia. By 1981, the Malays, through state enterprises, controlled 60% of 
the corporate shares in the mining and the plantations sector (Jesudason, 1989: 91). 
By the 1980s, the public sector's trust agencies had completed the domination of 
primary (plantations and mining) sectors. This was about the same time when the 
government thought of changing its industrial strategy as well as adopting the Look 
East Policy (LEP) (both discussed below). However, during the recession in the mid 
1980s, the net inflow of foreign investment dropped from RM3. 0 billion 1981-83, to 
an average of RM 1.5 billion over the four years between 1984-87 (Edwards, 1994: 
691). It picked up again in 1988 to a total of RM1.9 billion, and from 1989 to 1990 
the annual average FDI rose to over RM6.0 billion. 
There were two obvious factors that encouraged the revival of the FDI. One was the 
real devaluation of the exchange rate of more than 30% in the second half of 1980s as 
the Bank Negara (the National Bank) ceased to support the ringgit and repaid much of 
the external debt (Edwards, 1994: 691). The second factor was the relaxation of 
restrictions on foreign equity holdings, whereby the highly export-oriented companies 
could be wholly foreign-owned. In December 1985, the ICA was amended to exempt 
companies with shareholders' funds of up to RM2.5 million. The licensing conditions 
were also relaxed, and in 1986, the PM announced further concessions to foreign 
investors. Companies could now be wholly foreign-owned if they exported more than 
half of their production or even if they sold their production in the domestic market, 
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provided they met certain employment conditions (Jesudason, 1989: 188). In short, 
the Malaysian government regarded FDI as very important in the Malaysian economy. 
Ifbetween 1981 and 1985 FDI made up 24% of the total investments approved by the 
Malaysian Industrial Authority (MIDA), between 1986 and 1989 it accounted for 
more than half (Edwards, 1994: 692). MIDA has worked as a one-stop investment 
centre to cut red-tape, to promote, coordinate and monitor FDI (Chia, 1993: 68; Zainal 
Abidin, 1990: 61). 
The discussion here emphasised the government's commitment towards encouraging 
FDI to invest in Malaysia, and also to stay, and therefore, as further discussed in this 
chapter, explained its resistance towards any obstructions to its efforts, least of all 
from trade unions. In tenns of IR, the shift in IR policies consequent to the adoption 
of EOI showed the state's interest in catering for the needs of FDI. The commitment 
to keep Malaysia as a low-cost, labour-intensive country where manufacturing was 
primarily for exports, made the government enact policies to give Malaysia a 
competitive edge. The state increased its involvement in the IR arena, moving to a 
greater state control and enacted a policy of discouraging unions in important sectors, 
especially the electronics sector (discussed under 8.5.4). 
8.4. Social and Political Factors 
This study contends that Malaysia's social and political factors were also important 
issues that have influenced the direction of IR, but have not been fully probed by 
previous researchers. Socio-political factors refer to both political leadership and the 
political scene which were intertwined with social issues in influencing the 
development of Malaysian JR. No matter how different the personalities of the 
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Malaysian leaders, they were united over national policies, especially during the 
implementation of the NEP. The Malaysian PM has always been the UMNO 
President (even though not stated in the Malaysian constitution) and the UMNO 
represents Malays. Therefore, even though these political leaders were representing 
Malaysians as a whole, individually they were the Malays' representatives, and the 
NEP, with pro-Malay policy, was also a political issue. Over time, the PM's authority 
has grown, especially during Mahathir's era, thus the PM has long replaced the 
position of Malay rulers, who have now become only symbols of unity. The UMNO 
President is chosen through a UMNO general election and he thereby became the 
President of the coalition Barisan Nasional. When the Barisan Nasional wins in the 
Malaysian general election, the President becomes the PM. Malaysians vote in 
general elections, at least every five years, and this democratic system has been in 
practice since 1955. 
8.4.1. TUD Razak aDd Hussein ODD'S Era 
While the Tunku was known as the Father of Independence, and was substantially 
responsible for the formation of the larger Malaysian Federation, whereby he 
introduced and cultivated the 'elite accommodation system', the younger generation 
of Malay elites were not too keen on his 'too accommodative' and 'compromising' 
policies towards non-Malay political demands. After the 13th May, while calling for 
his retirement, the government was urged to take a 'non-negotiable' stand and adopt a 
'one-party, one-race' system (Means, 1991: 9; Firdaus, 1994). Even though this call 
was unheeded, the impact could be seen later, when the government's policy became 
more 'pro-Malay' during the NEP. Hence, the argument that both social and political 
factors influenced the state's role, first in the economy, then in IR. 
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Tun Abdul Razak's era (1970-76) marked a 'second generation' of Malaysian 
political elite. There was no immediate break in leadership and no succession crisis, 
but it was a rapid transition of power from elites who had fought for independence 
and the formation of Malaysia with new elites who were more interested in new 
agendas of public policy and styles of leadership (Means, 1991: 19). Looking back at 
the racial riot, the attempts made by Tun Razak to break away from the Tunku's style 
of leadership, which was based on an 'elite accommodation system' was 
understandable, if not totally acceptable. He was also under pressure from several 
'ultra-Malays' or Malaysian 'Young Turks', one of them being the present PM 
Mahathir Mohamad (Means, 1991: 19). Tun Razak's era saw the launch of the NEP, 
and the extension of the Alliance Party to become a bigger Barisan Nasional in 1974 
(Milne and Mauzy, 1999). Before becoming PM, as a Minister of Education, Razak 
produced a report for creating a national system of education with a common syllabus, 
in 1956. As the Minister of National and Rural Development 1959-69, he adopted 
some techniques used to fight the communists by setting up operation rooms which 
recorded agricultural projects, determining which were proceeding as planned or 
lagging behind. He re-shaped the FLDA , later known as FELDA (the Federal Land 
Development Authority), which helped people, especially Malays, to become new 
settlers on land and trained and equipped them. In short, Tun Razak had the Malays' 
priorities in mind. 
Like Tun Razak, Hussein Onn's era was also short (1976-1981). However, it was 
during his period in office that the amendments of the labour laws happened in 1980. 
Even though he was regarded as not leaving a strong impact on Malaysian politics 
(Means, 1991) he held strongly to the national objectives set by the NEP. Hussein 
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Onn's period was one of continuity III finding ways to reverse the \Ialays' 
backwardness in the economy, an agenda that was continued and looked set to be 
pondered on at an increased speed under the controversial present PM, Mahathir 
Mohamad. 
8.4.2. Mahathir's View on the Malays and Labour 
Mahathir, the longest serving PM of Malaysia, has been described as authoritarian, 
but cannot actually be categorised in simple words as he has been full of paradoxes. 59 
In his controversial book 'The Malay Dilemma', written after the 13 th May and 
banned, Mahathir showed his controversial tendencies and accepted that some of his 
ideas and thoughts might create 'despondency' or 'severe resentment' (Mahathir, 
1970: 3). On trade unionism, he wrote in 1970 (Mahathir, 1970:108): 
Trade unionism has come to stay in Malaya. It is generally regarded as good 
for the workers. It prevents exploitation of labour and enables workers to have 
a fair share of the prosperity which is the product of their labour. 
Unfortunately some workers, glorifying in their new-found strength, see in 
trade unions not only the opportunity to use collective bargaining for better 
wages but for making other demands. No disciplinary action can be taken 
without costly industrial action. Under such conditions diligence is not 
encouraged and the desire for self-improvement is inhibited. 
In 'Malay Dilemma', Mahathir was specifically referring to schemes to 'force Malay 
labour into the competitive field of skilled and semi-skilled work'. He goes on: 
Absolute security and good working conditions are not the aims of this 
scheme. Trade unions are therefore superfluous. To ensure that workers may 
get a fair deal, and nepotism and other forms of favouritism are avoided, an 
impartial body should be set up to look after the welfare of workers. 
59 Rder to Khoo (1995). who claimed that Mahathir is full of paradoxes. For example, as anxious as he 
\\3S to secure the survival of thc Malays. Mahathir seemed prepared to see the end of 'Malayness·. :\s 
a rebel in 1969. he asked for loyalty in 1988. He belic"es in history but is terrified by it. Other books 
by Zainuddin ( 1994). Rajendran ( 1993) and I I 'ng (1998) was full of praise for the man. 
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Mahathir was dedicated to pursue the NEP but with a difference in approach. The 
administration 'would be improved to achieve the policy goals with greater haste and 
less waste' (Means, 1991: 85). Since Mahathir himself was a critic of the government, 
the general view was that he would pursue more liberal policies towards its critics and 
towards a more open political process on sensitive issues. However, in March 1981, 
the Parliament passed the Societies Act (Amendment) Bill 1981, giving the Registrar 
of Societies the power to de-register any group challenging 1) the government, 2) 
Islam or other religions, 3) the National Language, 4) the special position of the 
Bumiputeras, or 5) the legitimate interests of the country's other interests. 
Mahathir wanted to break away from the image of the previous three Prime Ministers. 
After nine months in office, he called for a national election, and adopted a slogan of 
'Clean, Efficient, and Trustworthy' for the Barisan Nasional (Means, 1991: 88). After 
obtaining the new mandate, Mahathir was free to set new policies if he wanted to. He 
instead insisted on the continuation of the earlier policies, particularly the NEP. 
However, it was clear that after a year, Mahathir was set on policy adjustments. While 
fully supporting the NEP, Mahathir criticised its implementation and strategies. He 
brought in changes in style in the forms of the many policies that mirrored his insights 
on a number of national issues. As a start, as tensions mounted over certain issues that 
relate to both the Malaysian and British governments, Malaysia pursued a 'Buy 
British Last' policy (Means, 1991: 92). Such issues between Mahathir and Britain 
actually started when Mahathir rejected an invitation to attend the Commonwealth 
Heads of Govemments Meeting in Australia, accusing the Commonwealth of being 
ineffective, and complaining about Australian public comments over Malaysian racial 
issues (Means, 1991: 92). This happened at the same time as a dispute over landing 
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rights in London of the Malaysian Airlines System (MAS). The British government 
was seen as retaliating when it ended preferential trade benefits for Malaysia and 
increased students' fees for all Malaysians studying in that country. The Malaysian 
Government reacted by announcing the 'Buy British Last' policy. By the end of 1981, 
British goods were boycotted, requiring British firms to find ways to solve the issues. 
They pledged RM15 million to help Malaysian students studying in the country, but 
the boycott was only officially lifted in 1983. This was after talks between Mahathir 
and British Foreign Secretary where some concessions were given in the form of 
RM161 million by the British Government to help Malaysian students, and the 
transfer of Carcosa, the residence of British High Commissioner during colonial 
times, back to the Malaysian government (Means, 1991: 92). In short Mahathir 
endeared himself towards Malaysians at this stage by being a firm leader; somebody 
who 'delivered'. 
Regarding amendments to labour laws, in 1980, Mahathir, the then Deputy PM 
(Mahathir, 1980) said the government did not take away workers' rights but instead: 
... only enshrined them in a manner in which they cannot be even inadvertently 
exploited by their own leaders or international trade unionists masquerading as 
their protectors .... We have thus strengthened 'worker democracy' in all 
possible places. 
As Deputy PM, Mahathir has shown his firm stand over labour matters, especially his 
resentment over interference from international labour bodies, such as the ITWF at 
the MAS-AEU dispute (refer discussion at 8.4.2. and 8.5.5. below). After he became a 
PM in 1981, his policies became more dominant, and each policy was issued as 
'national policy', as discussed below. 
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8.4.3. The Social and Political Scene 
In 1974, the Barisan Nasional opened up to more political parties, in addition to the 
original three; the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), the People's Progressive Party 
(PPP) and the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan). Politics in Malaysia had never 
been homogenous or static. It was always about compromising between elite leaders 
in the coalition government, with most parties representing certain ethnic groups, 
even though it declared itself a non-racial party. It was also about firm counter-attacks 
on the opposition. However, opposition has played a part in Malaysian politics, 
different from for example it nearest neighbour, Singapore6o which makes it a more 
interesting study. The contention is that while the political scenario affects many 
aspects of governance and policies, it certainly affects IR. 
Mahathir's era was known to be a period of assertion of executive power (Milne and 
Mauzy, 1999). The period 1981-1990 saw Mahathir tackle and win three 'contests for 
power'; crises with the Agong and Malay rulers in 1983; his opponents in UMNO in 
1987; and the judiciary in 1987-88. Even though it did not have a direct implication 
for lR, it shows Mahathir's dominant and aggressive role in Malaysian politics and his 
fiml stand in countering dissent. In the first crisis, Mahathir succeeded in amending 
part of the Constitution - and changes to emergency powers now gave the PM alone 
the right to declare emergency. Mahathir used the line that change was needed to 
make sure 'the rights of people were not violated' (Milne and Mauzy, 1999:33). This 
action was in line with his letter to the Tunku in 1969, and his writing in Malay 
Dilemma in 1971. In 1986, the deputy PM, Musa Hitam resigned out of a political 
bO II ngle (\ 996:92-95) in explaining the Singapore's government total control of its conununity listed a 
muzzled media, a compliant judiciary, a fiercely loyal group of civil servants and 'a mute political 
opposition' . 
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disagreement with Mahathir. In 1987, Musa teamed up with Razaleigh Hamzah to 
challenge Mahathir in what was called Team 'A' versus 'Team 'B' in the UMNO 
general assembly. Mahathir won the Presidency with a small 43 majority votes out of 
1,500 UMNO representatives. Midway through the crisis, UMNO was de-registered 
on the grounds that some of its branches who voted in the UMNO General Assembly 
were not properly registered, making their votes invalid. The Team 'B' later formed 
Semangat 46, a party opposed to the new UMNO (New) under Mahathir. However, 
by 1990, Mahathir managed to win a clear victory in the general election. 
In 1987, Mahathir was involved in another crisis with the judiciary, where he 
criticised its meddling in politics. This was following several cases lost by the 
government in the courts (Milne and Mauzy, 1999: 47). Since Mahathir believed that 
his position was mandated through elections, the courts' decisions were regarded as 
'unwarranted infringements of executive power that thwarted the will of the majority' 
(Milne and Mauzy, 1999: 47). It was during this crisis that amendments were made to 
the Constitution, where powers of judiciary now would be conferred by Parliament 
through statutes, and no longer embedded in the Constitution. The High Courts were 
stripped of their power of judicial review, previously granted in the Constitution. The 
Attomey General now assumed responsibility for judicial assignments and transfers, 
and has had control over what case to hear and what courts to use (Milne and Mauzy, 
1999: 47). 
These three crises demonstrate Mahathir's shrewdness in Malaysian politics, a trait 
that again emerged when dealing with other policies. It meant the end of separation 
of power and the growing executive authority, a point that at the same time explained 
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the growing weakness of trade unionism in Malaysia and the direction of IR under his 
administration. The discussion on some significant issues below is evidence of this. 
8.5. The State and Some Significant Issues 
The discussion below shows how the state became more dominant in Malaysian IR, 
especially during Mahathir's tenure as PM. Under Mahathir, Malaysia continued the 
NEP until the end, but supported it with the LEP, the Industrialisation Policy, 
Privatisation, Malaysia Incorporated, and later in 1992, the Wawasan 2020 or Vision 
2020 (discussed in Chapters Nine and Ten). 
8.5.1. Look East Policy: Encouraging In-bouse Unions 
The LEP, introduced in 1981, could be viewed either as Mahathir's political agenda 
or part policy of NEP. In our context, the LEP should be able to explain an agenda 
that has become one of the nation's major policies, and in the context of IR, 
encouraged the formation of in-house unions. 
Mahathir wanted Malaysians to look to the East instead of the West; towards Japanese 
and South Korean work ethics, diligence and discipline in work, as well as loyalty to 
the nation and to the place of employment. It should also be seen as an effort to put 
priority of group over individual interests, with an emphasis on productivity and high 
quality, upgrading efficiency, narrowing differentials and gaps between executives 
and workers, and on management systems which concentrate on long term 
achievement (Mahathir, 1983: 276). Mahathir's interest in the South Korean 
development strategies and the Japanese and South Korean work ethics were apparent 
~\'cn before he became PM (Means, 1991: 92-93). He expressed admiration for the 
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Korean success in industrialisation and inspired by the close co-operation of large 
Japanese corporations with the government using the sago sash as concept. Mahathir's 
need to redress Malaysian economic approaches might be related to his dreams for the 
Malays of Malaysia. In The Malay Dilemma, he criticised Malay backwardness and 
argued that it was the Malays' code of ethics and value systems that brought them 
down, making them unable to compete with the non-Malays. The need to change the 
value system and ethical code 'therefore determines the success or failure of 
corrective measures' (Mahathir, 1970: 172). He says: 
If the value system is wrong, corrective measures will not be productive or 
will be only slightly productive. When the value system motivates, very little 
corrective measures are needed. This analysis of the value system of the 
Malays clearly shows that it hinders the progress and competitive abilities of 
the Malays in a multiracial society (Mahathir, 1970: 172-173). 
It was then Mahathir's hope that the Japanese and Koreans would be role models for 
the Malays, while at the same time be the source of business skills and technological 
transfers. However, the policy was not as simple as it was made to sound. Various 
components of Malaysian economic and trade policies were justified to make room 
for the Look East slogan, as discussed below. 
Some viewed the LEP with cymcism, that it was merely an attempt to find an 
alternative to the West (Rajendran, 1993: 91; Kua, 1983: 276), or another 
manifestation of anti-British and anti-Western bias (Means, 1991: 92). Others found 
the idea of portraying Japan as the perfect model nation, where there were selfless 
workers and selfless bosses, almost unacceptable, more so because of the belief that 
the phenomenal growth of Japanese economy cannot be attributed to the Japanese 
work ethic alone (Kua, 1983: 279). There were other factors, such as the help the 
Japanesc recei\'cd from the USA and The World Bank after Japan's defeat in WWII, 
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that helped contributed to the Japanese success. Furthennore, there were flaws to the 
'Japanese Miracle'. Some analysts pointed out the Japanese paternalistic system and 
'quality control circles' applied only to a few big companies, not to the average sized 
or small companies (Kua, 1983: 281). To some initially, the policy was viewed as 
changing Malaysia's foreign orientation in a variety of economic matters (lomo, 
1994: 150). 
Mahathir insisted the policy was not an anti-Western move, even though it was 
announced after a dispute between Malaysia and Britain over several issues. Apart 
from the 'Buy British Last' policy, there was the take over of British finns in 
Malaysia and the raised fees of Malaysian students studying in Britain 
(Saravamuttu,1983: 283; Milne and Mauzy, 1999: 55; Means, 1991: 92). Saravamuttu 
(1983: 283) explained the two levels of implementation of the LEP. One was that of 
an external economic policy whereby Japanese-cum-Korean governmental and private 
sector aid, technical assistance and training were being sought and contracted for in 
Malaysia. As an extension of this policy, students were sent in increasing number to 
both these countries for vocational and tertiary education. Second, there was the level 
of domestic policy wherein the Malaysian government itself sought to inculcate a 
supposed Japanese work ethic through various propaganda devices and through 
concrete promotion and implementation of the policy in the private and the public 
sectors. 
According to Milne and Mauzy (1999: 55), Mahathir proposed two features which 
Malaysia needed to adopt in the LEP. First, was the concept of Malaysia 
Incorporated; encouraging business owners and employees in the public and pri\'ate 
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sector to work together. The second was to create companies based on the Japanese 
sago sashas (the large trading companies)61. However, there was in fact a third feature 
which the government of Malaysia did not press hard for acceptance. This was the 
idea of 'in-house unions' or 'enterprise unions' or 'company unions' as described by 
some scholars, which was a prevalent phenomenon in Japan. Officially, it was not 
forcibly to be implemented and that was understandable. 
From the government's point of view, and this was confinned by the Director General 
of Trade Unions Affairs (DGTUA), it is entirely up to the workers themselves to get 
themselves organised (Interview: Izhar Harun, 16/1/2001). Therefore, the preference 
of in-house unions did not mean the government was encouraging the fonnation of 
unions. If it were made compulsory it would be giving out a confusing signal to 
workers, and employers and the government never encouraged trade unionism to that 
extent. In the light of achieving economic objectives, such as the NEP, in-house 
unions or the existence of unions at all, could be detrimental to investors, especially 
the FDI. In fact, 'in-house unions' was not a new concept in Malaysia but had been 
there long before LEP. Moreover, employees of statutory authorities62, have long 
practised in-house unions, as seen in a clause in the TUA, section 27(3)(a) which 
says: 
no person employed by a statutory authority shall join or be a member of, or 
be accepted as a member by any trade union unless the membership of that 
trade union is confined exclusively to persons employed by that particular 
statutory authority. 
61 To understand more about sogo soshas, read Chee and Gomez (1994 )in Jomo, K.S.( eds). 1994. 
Japan and Malaysian Development: /n the Shadow of the Rising Sun. London and New York. 
Routledge. 
(," "Sta~tory authority" means any authority or body established, appointed or constituted by any 
written law. and includes any local authority. See Trade Unions Act, Part I (2). 
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The difference of the restriction on statutory authority with what was implemented 
under the Look East Policy was that, under the provision in the TUA, the restriction to 
'in-house unions' was compulsory (Wu, 1995: 15), and under the LEP it was not. This 
again differentiates the government attitude as employer, since statutory authority is 
considered part of the public service. 
With the implementation of the LEP, the heavy investment of Japanese companies 
and their business practices would impede the self-sustaining development of 
countries like Malaysia. On the whole, Japanese finns were unlikely to provide the 
impetus for creating the kind of IR to sustain the work ethics attitudes that the policy 
sought to promote (Kua, 1983: 305). Others perceived cultural problems, such as long 
office hours, in transferring some Japanese practices to Malaysia (Milne and Mauzy, 
1999: 55). Mahathir asked that efforts be made to increase work productivity through 
propaganda campaigns, company welfarism, in-house unions, harder work and greater 
loyalty to the company and management. Jomo argued that the Japanese achieved 
success in those areas because they had evolved along complex, culturally and 
historically rooted systems of material incentives (including guaranteed lifelong 
employment and seniority wage systems, which are not implemented in Malaysia). He 
wamed that since Malaysia's LEP seemed cost free, with no extra expense to the 
company, it was only normal for it to bring no extra benefits to workers, in terms of 
work ethics, quality control circles and in-house unions. 
The encouragement of in-house unions was in opposition to the creation of stronger, 
larger national unions, which clearly meant independence from employers. So the 
creation of in-house unions was the answer to the go\,emment's wariness, especially 
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in the light of their dependence on FDI. As it was, national unions in Malaysia did not 
cover workers from the Eastern states of Sabah and Sarawak. Even though, by 
comparison, an in-house union could consist of members of different occupations, it 
also meant smaller, ineffective and weak unions that were unable to challenge 
employers in particular, and the government in general. 
The government argued that in-house unions would protect the interests of labour 
whereby it would develop more harmonious employer-employee relations. However, 
Chandra (1983: 317) for example, stressed the flaws in the Japanese industrial 
practices that had negative implications for the workers. First, the practice of life-time 
employment in Japanese firms was confined to only 25% of the labour force, and they 
were in the larger firms. Second, even in large firms there was a lot of dismissal of 
workers who did not please management, for example female employees who got 
married and had children. Third, women workers were discriminated against and paid 
less. Fourth, in the small firms that employed the majority of Japanese workers, there 
were unsatisfactory elements in terms of wages and working conditions. The 
difference in the wages of large firms to those of the small ones was at least 100%. 
Other benefits such as company housing, and pensions were minimal. The last flaw 
was in health and safety measures, which were not given much attention. 
Even though there were some commendable features of some Japanese big 
companies, such as consultations, it was made possible because the capital-labour 
relations in Japan grew out of its 'autonomous industrialisation programme', which is 
very different from Malaysia's 'dependent type industrialisation' (Chandra, 1983: 
318). In-house unions would only undermine an already weak labour movement. 
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First, workers from the same industry would not have the power that comes from 
collective strength since they would only be organised on the basis of individual fim1s 
or factories. Second, it was conceivable that employers would exploit the situation to 
stagnate or even depress wages. Third, since union leaders in in-house unions would 
have to negotiate wages on their own with their respective management, they were 
more dependent upon the goodwill of their bosses. Thus, that left a union leader 
under the power of their bosses, and this influenced their effectiveness as union 
leaders, dependent on them for resources (office, time off etc) and even legitimacy. 
The government insisted that the encouragement of in-house unions would produce 
leaders who would be much more aware of their companies' needs, thus facilitating 
improved productivity programmes. In actual fact, in-house unions would also be less 
able to compare the company's wages and other benefits with other employers (Jomo 
and Todd, 1994: 214). In simple words, in-house unions would put the management in 
a better and higher position than workers. Mahathir defended this by saying: 
Some of our companies ... have just been set up and are coming up, but if 
forced to pay the same benefits as the more successful ones, will definitely 
succeed. Hence .... it would be meaningful for these firms, especially the new 
ones, to have in-house unions which have proved to be a big success in 
Japan ... (NST, 6/3/1983). 
Mahathir believed that in-house unions were the underlying key factor behind the 
"Japanese miracle'. However, this belief is unfounded as research has revealed that its 
practicality even in Japan was 'a myth rather than reality' (Levine and Ohtsu, 1991: 
102). In fact, in Japan, the Japanese model consisted of the combination of three 
features; 'lifetime employment'; 'length-of-service wage and promotion'; and the 
'enterprise union' (in-house). The Malaysian private sector has never practiced 
'seniority system' or 'lifetime employment', which allow employees to be permanent 
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employees, never in fear of layoff or dismissal. This shows that Mahathir's idea was 
selective and veneered towards benefiting further the management side. 
When criticised, Mahathir stressed the 'national interest' factor, and therefore 
justified the in-house union concept, which he claimed had been used successfully by 
the Japanese. In fact to him, so successful was the in-house union concept that the 
Japanese have 'easily beaten the West who practices the old system of trade 
unionism'. In short, in-house unions were an answer to a need for ' a successful 
system suited for Malaysia in its development efforts' (Wad and Jomo, 1994 :216). In 
a way, it was a significant move when Mahathir encouraged at least in-house unions 
as compared to his earlier stand on trade unionism, when he perceived them as 
'superfluous' (Mahathir, 1971: 108). However, this policy was never made 
compulsory, in line with the government's stand that it is up to the workers to 
orgamse themselves (Interview: Izhar Harun, 16/1/2001). This shift of opinion 
(encouraging in-house unions) did not even come out of his free will as when it was 
announced, the government was under pressure by the AFL-CIO (see 8.5.4.). The 
organisation urged the US government to withdraw the GSP if Malaysia kept on 
resisting the unions in the electronics sector, an economic consequence that Mahathir 
as a leader could not afford. Nonetheless, it shows that unions in Malaysia could 
benefit from affiliation to larger international bodies. The other factor was that 
Malaysia prided itself on being a democratic nation since its independence, which 
explained the comprehensive IR system available, even if restrictive. As the economy 
varied and grew, Malaysia ventured out of agriculture, and thus a good relationship 
with other countries, even Western countries that had become targets of Mahathir's 
grudges, was in fact important, prominent and needed. Furthennore, the pennission 
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for in-house unions did not mean independent unions, and therefore they were never a 
threat to the government. 
The management benefited from the implementation of in-house unions over national 
or larger unions (see 8.5.4.). The Malaysian Employers Federation (MEF) foresaw as 
early as 1982, a year after LEP, that in-house union leaders would be amenable during 
collective bargaining sessions (Aminuddin, 1996: 83). The argument was that the 
bargaining process would be quicker, smoother and less contentious. The people 
involved would be those who had a truer feeling for the well-being and expectations 
of both the company and its employees. Of course it also meant the union was 
working on its own as a smaller body against its own employer, instead of being 
represented by stronger national unions. However, one cannot generalise this as there 
were cases when some companies found that the process of collective bargaining was 
in fact more difficult when dealing with inexperienced and poor negotiating skills of 
in-house union leaders (Aminuddin, 1996: 83). In a way, that was the negative impact 
of in-house unions for employers. However, in general, in-house unions helped keep 
unions small and responsive to the particular conditions of their industries, as well as 
become a system that kept labour movement fragmented and therefore did not 
threaten the government. 
Even without in-house unions, trade unionism in Malaysia was already weakened by 
several factors. Although the MTUC attacked the idea in the later period of its 
implementation, at the beginning it still held some hope that Japanisation would bring 
life-long employment and a seniority wage system, which were both absent in the 
private sector employment in Malaysia. However, there were already criticisms that 
Japanese workers in Japan did not enjoy security of tenure, housing facilities, and 
other welfare benefits, besides the fact that women workers were discriminated 
against. The implementation of in-house unions further eroded confidence since even 
at unionisation level, there was still some government on workers in the electronics 
industry. 
Some examples revealed the government's preference towards in-house unions over 
national ones. In October 1983, a claim for recognition of the National Union for 
Petroleum And Chemical Workers (NUPCW) was rejected by the RTU on the 
grounds that there was already an in-house union in place (Wad and Jomo, 1994: 
219). This decision was not challenged because of the wide discretionary power of the 
RTU as inscribed in the TUA 1959. Another case arose when workers of Tanaka Sdn 
Bhd, a subsidiary of the Dragon and Phoenix garment factory in Penang failed in their 
bid to get their union re-registered. The Penang Textile Workers' Union (PTWU), 
who organised the Tanaka workers, tried to enlist the help of MTUC and two 
international bodies but still failed. Plans to later amalgamate five regional textile 
unions in Peninsular Malaysia into a single union were abandoned, though a national 
federation was at last formed in the late 1980s (Wad and Jomo, 1994:220). There 
were, however, hesitations on the part of the government to totally suppress national 
unions that had already existed. This suggests a less confrontational strategy by the 
government. It could be due to external forces, like condemnation from ILO or other 
international bodies, that might led to embarrassment and put Malaysia under 
economic constraints. Thus, there were cases when national unions succeeded in 
resisting attempts to displace them. A determined struggle by the Electrical Industry 
Workers' Unions (EIWU) to organise the largely female workforce saw the RTU 
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rejecting an application by workers of ITT Transelectronics, a factory in the Penang 
FTZ, to register an in-house union (Wad and lomo, 1994: 220). 
So, as seen in Table 8.3, there was the undeniable increase of in-house unions since 
their implementation. However, the figures also show that it is the public sector which 
now included the statutory authority that contributed the bigger number of in-house 
UnIons. 
Table 8.3: In-house unions in Malaysia, 1984-88 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Total 177 189 199 210 224 
Percentage of total unions 49.3 51.2 52.5 51.3 54.5 
Percentage of private sector unions 28.2 32.5 36.1 36.7 38.2 
Percentage of statutory authority unions 94.8 95.1 95.l 95.1 96.6 
Percentage of government service unions 45.8 47.2 47.6 47.2 46.7 
Source: Arudsothy and Littler, 1993. 
In weighing up the government insistence on in-house unions, it should be recalled 
that this policy was part of the programme of the NEP, which saw the move from an 
lSI to an EOI strategy. That move, (discussed in 8.5.2) made the government more 
dependent on foreign investments and thus emphasised the need for 'industrial peace' 
or fewer industrial disputes. In-house unions which are only attached to their 
companies were hoped to be answer to a more direct management-employee 
relationship. 
8.5.2.Industrialisation and IR 
The linkages between industrialisation strategies and IR policy have been a subject of 
interest of several scholars, either earlier, in general (such as Kerr et ai., 1960) or 
more current on Southeast Asia (Kuruvilla & Venkaratnam 1996; Kuruvilla 1995; 
Kuruvilla & Arudsothy; Gall, 1998; and Sharma, 1996). Kuruvilla in particular 
rej ected the logic put forward by Kerr et. al (1964), that industrialism would lead to a 
convergence of the IR system. However, industrialisation is still regarded as a central 
variable, besides political regimes and market forces, in explaining IR policies and the 
transformation in IR systems. In general, the industrialisation strategy is central 
importance in the development agenda of economies that pursued economic growth 
such as Malaysia. The changes and adjustments of industrialisation process m 
Malaysia could be divided into three major phases as illustrated in Figure 8.1. 
Figure 8.1 :Industrial Development and Major Policy Initiatives, 1958-90 
I PHASE 1 r--- PIONEER 
INDUSTRIES 
ORDINANCE 
1958 
I PHASE 11 t- INVESTMENT INCENTIVES 
ACT 1968 
l PHASE 111 r LAUNCHING 
OF FOURTH 
IMPORT -SUBSTITUTION I-r------
I DOMESTIC MARKET ORIENTATION 
EXPORT -ORIENTATION 
FREE TRADE ZONES 
NEW ECONOMIC POLICY 
INDUSTRIAL COORDINATION 
ACT1975 
EXPORT-LED 
GROWTH 
MALA YSIA PLAN HEAVY INDUSTRIES 
PROGRAMME 
INDUSTRIAL MASTER 
PLAN (1986-95) 
PROMOTION OF 
INVESTMENTS ACT 
1986 
1981-85 
ACTION PLAN FOR 
INDUSTRIAL TECH-
NOLOGY 
DEVELOPMENT 
Source: Anuwar AI1.1992. Malaysia's Industrialisation: The Quest/or Technology. 
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Figure 8.1 illustrates the phases taken by Malaysia to change the direction of 
economic development and Malaysia, which later affected the direction of IR as well. 
63 Phase I refers to the years immediately after Independence (when the Pioneer 
Ordinance of 1958 was introduced) up to 1968, during which the emphasis was on lSI 
that were mainly established to cater for the domestic market. The dominant feature of 
the lSI policy was the emphasis given towards industrial development in the private 
sector, and especially in encouraging foreign investments (Anuwar, 1991: 7). Phase II 
refers to the period after 1968, when the Investment Incentives Act was introduced, 
up to 1980, when the EOI process was emphasised. There was the introduction of 
export-related incentives and the establishment of FTZs in a number of locations. The 
introduction of the ICA in 1975, became another instrument to achieve the NEP 
objectives with regard to Bumiputera equity participation and employment in the 
manufacturing sector. This phase saw the production of consumer durable, 
intermediate input, and capital goods (Anuwar, 1991: 9). These products were 
produced in large quantities, thereby usmg more capital-intensive methods of 
production and needing an adequate supply of highly skilled manpower. There was a 
shift from labour-intensive manufacturing to more-capital and technology-intensive 
products, which included machinery, motor-vehicles, petrochemicals, and other 
resource-based industries. 
6.1 The economic policy in 1957-70 focused on the state's involvement in the development of an 
infrastlUcture and the rural sector while industrialisation was left to the private sector. This phase of 
market-led lSI brought about mixed results. By 1969, Malaysia's economy had grown by more than 
5% per year, while the manufacturing growth rate was high at 10.2% annually, and private Investment 
increased by 7.3% annually. On the other hand, the participation of ethnic Malays was limited and 
ownership remained static at 1.5% to 2%, while the share among Chinese and Indians grew relatively. 
The result of this difference in output was claimed to be one of the reasons behind the 13 th May riot 
which saw the implementation of the NEP and state-led lSI (Kuruvilla, 1995). 
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Meanwhile, Phase III, which was the period after 1980 coincided with the 
implementation of the MP4 (1981-5), the fonnulation of the Industrial Master Plan 
(IMP) in 1986, and the introduction of the Promotion of Investments Act of 1986. 
This Act was seen as an important policy instrument to attract more FDI into the 
manufacturing sector. It was during Phase III that there was a change of leadership 
whereby Mahathir took over as the PM in 1981. Moreover, it was a period where 
more action-oriented and varied policies were embraced highlighting Mahathir's 
aggressive leadership style. In the context of the labour laws, 1980 had already shown 
amendments to TUA1959 and IRA1967 that empowered the state. 
As already discussed (see 8.3.), the NEP aimed to acquire the Bumiputera share of 
corporate ownership from 2.4% to 30% by 1990. The outcome in 1975 showed that 
although there was an increased economic participation by Malays, it was still below 
the Malay nationalists' expectations. While their total share of manufacturing 
employment rose to 32%, and their managerial positions to 17%, their ownership 
share was only 8% (Kuruvilla, 1995: 43). Neither was there a positive development of 
entrepreneurship among Malays and the industry was still dominated by Chinese. This 
failure put the state under pressure whereby it intensified its investment in lSI by 
enacting the ICA 1976. Now, the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MIT I) had the 
complete power to direct and control the development of industry, including the 
issuing of licences to industries based on NEP objectives. The government pursued 
further by creating the Bumiputera Investment Fund with shares for the Malays to 
invest, apart from making sure that the Malays shared ownership in all joint ventures 
and foreign policies (Kuruvilla, 1995: 43). The impact of state intervention at this 
level was quite serious. With the government revenues pouring into NEP and ICA 
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policies, private and foreign investment balked, in the fear of nationalisation by the 
state. Increased borrowing from international banks burdened Malaysia with foreign 
debt, which as a percentage ofGDP, rose from 8.45% in 1975 to 11 percent by 1976-
77. 
This forced the government to change course and launch a massive campaign to 
encourage private and foreign investment during the 1977-80 period. The policies 
adopted encouraged investment incentives, infra-structural facilities and other 
benefits. This was the period when electronics and textile industries were specifically 
targeted, and the period when labour laws that might have discouraged foreign 
investment were relaxed or unenforced by the state to create a conducive environment 
for investors (Kuruvilla, 1995: 44). Key industries and the export sector were 
protected against union activities, again for economic reasons. This time of transition 
from lSI to EOI marked the beginnings of massive foreign investment in the 
electronics sector by both the US and the Japanese. It also coincided with the 
implementation of LEP, as discussed above. In sum, this confirmed the contention in 
this chapter that NEP was ensured success by the implementation all the other 
complementary policies. 
In 1980, Mahathir Mohamad, while still a deputy PM and an Industries Minister, 
launched a major heavy industries policy with the objective of accelerating industrial 
growth as well as increasing the Malay ownership under the NEP. The state's role 
now was directly involved in establishing large-scale, capital intensive lSI to provide 
industrial goods and consumer durables for the domestic market. It was also to 
support a range of private sector and consumer goods industries. In 1982 and 1985 
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there were two recessions that saw the draining of revenues caused by the heavy 
industries programmes. Malaysian external debt rose to unprecedented levels with 
foreign borrowing and poor performance from heavy industries investments. Losses 
in the venture exceeded US$2.24 billion, and 37% of the public debt was the result of 
government-backed foreign loans. Because of this the government took some firm 
measures to counter the problems. Thus, promoting privatisation or many state-owned 
public sector industries cut public spending. At the same time, the government 
prioritised over economic objectives by replacing Malay managers in the declining 
state-owned heavy industries either with Japanese or private sector managers who 
were thought to be more professional. In a way it was an admission by the 
government that there was a limit in the pursuit of a 'Malay Agenda' in this period. If 
the economy was at stake, even the ethnic-based pro-Malay policy had to be stopped. 
Where IR are concerned, some scholars classified the period from the 1950s until 
1977 as 'restricted' or 'controlled pluralism'. Workers required some degree of fair 
and humane treatment but economic development goals ruled supreme over unfettered 
trade union rights. The three major labour laws; the EA1955, the TUa 1959 and the 
IRA 1967 made sure that there was proper system in which IR should be run. The 
EA 1955 legislated in detail fair conditions of work; there were restrictions on union 
registration process; and collective bargaining was restricted even though it became 
the primary form of resolving industrial problems. The MTUC, the central union 
body, was registered as a society not a trade union, to ensure the state had control of 
the growth and character of unions. This period saw the state continually protecting 
the FDI by making sure terms and conditions negotiated by unions were not more 
favourable than the provisions in the EA 1955. Even though strikes were allowed, 
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there were many restrictions on the process, making it difficult in order to discourage 
unions from doing so. Under the IRA1967, once the minister of labour had referred 
any disputes to an arbitration process, strikes were no longer permitted. 
It was from the above background that Malaysia made its way from an agricultural-
based economic to an industry based one, and especially in the manufacturing sector. 
It was a move from labour-intensive to capital intensive production that was full of 
barriers, and which saw the responsibility for change being taken over by the state. It 
also took charge of labour legislation, and restricted the freedom of unions to organise 
and to bargain. This was to ensure that their move towards an industrialised country 
became a reality. A compliant labour force is a necessity for this drastic change, thus 
the state resort to a number of measures to ensure its economic objectives (under 
NEP) were met. Despite this, Kuruvilla claimed IR policy at this stage to be 
'controlled pluralism', referring to the minimal state intervention in the administrative 
matters (Kuruvilla, 1995: 48). However, even though it looked like the government 
intervened minimally by letting the IR system run on its own, the already repressive 
labour laws had been enforced. Thus, this study disputes Kuruvilla's view. Despite 
the government's insistence that the restrictions were in the 'national interest', the 
imbalance of power based on the laws and too many prerogatives for employers put 
workers at a loss. Therefore, the contention of this study is that during lSI, and more 
so during EOr, the Malaysian state did not practise pluralism, but more a repressive 
policy. This was especially true since as Malaysia adopted EOI, FDI became more 
prominent. Encouraging FDI meant keeping costs low so as to keep Malaysia's 
competitive edge and to sustain a cheap, and 'disciplined' labour force. If anything, 
the researcher prefers to categorise Malaysia under 'authoritarian corporatism', 
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especially during the NEP era. To quote Park (1994: 80), the term refers to the state's 
corporatist function, supported by a political monism that does not tolerate interest 
group democracy. It is a situation whereby the government assumes full authority to 
represent the collective interests of the parties, and usually suppresses independent 
representation of organised interests, particularly those of labour. 'The state seeks to 
create a system that will integrate the defeated working class, discipline it, and 
provide it with a sense of participation, despite its mostly symbolic value' (Park, 
1994: 80). It is best to explain the Malaysian case during NEP, since almost all the 
necessary tools and machinery of democratic practices were present, but curbed. 
The preference towards the economy over labour was very apparent, even to the 
extent of amending the laws. There were exemptions made specifically to fit the 
demands of foreign electronics companies (discussed under 8.5.4). For example, the 
EA1955 forbade the employment of women between the hours of 10 P.M. and 5A.M. 
but this restriction was lifted in 1969 (Rasiah, 1995: 77) to suit women who formed 
78.6 percent of the workforce in the electronics industry.64 
64 Today, Part VIII on the 'employment of women' (EA1955) reads: 
34( 1) Except in accordance with regulations made under this Act or any exemption granted 
under the proviso to this sub-section no employer shall require any female employee to work 
in any industrial or agricultural undertaking between the hours of ten o'clock in the evening 
and five o'clock in the morning nor commence work for the day without having had the 
period of eleven consecutive hours free from such work: Provided that the Director General 
may, on application made to him in any particular case, exempt in writing any female 
employee or class of female employees from any restriction in this sub-section, subject to any 
conditions he may impose. 
(2)Any person-(a)who is affected by any decision made or condition imposed under the 
proviso to sub-section (1); and (b) who is dissatisfied with such decision or condition, may 
within thirty days of such decision or condition being communicated to him appeal in writing 
therefrom to the Minister. 
(3) In deciding any appeal made to him under subsection (2), the Minister may make such 
decision or order thereon. including the alteration or removal of any condition imposed of any 
condition. as appears just and such decision or order shall be final. 
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An example of foreign company exemption from labour laws was in 1981, when 
INTEL Corporation was allowed to work its employees continuously for sixteen 
hours, against the EA1955. In 1988, an amendment was made to the EA1955 giving 
the DGIR power to allow employers to work their employees more than the hours 
permitted by the Act. We can see that here it is clearly a case of giving a priority to a 
certain category of work, and giving the workers' rights least consideration.65 
In the case stated above, it was clear that in special circumstances, in this respect, the 
dependence on foreign industries that still prevailed, the government was ready to be 
flexible, therefore preferring employers over employees. It also shows that the 
government took a pragmatic approach towards the implementation of its IR policies 
to suit the situation at anyone time, a clear emphasis on economic development. 
Again, it shows the wide discretionary power given to the DGIR in deciding matters 
that are actually better left clear of any grey areas. This disputed the claim made by 
the DGIR that he had 'no power' over IR matters in Malaysia (Interview: Ismail 
Rahim, 25/1/1999). 
Apart from the EOI as the prime reason for increased government intervention, the 
fact that the government was so deeply involved in heavy industries itself contributed 
to the move. As it was so immersed in the NEP in general, the government had a 
65 Sub-section 60A (lA) on 'hours of work' of the EA1955 clearly gives very wide powers to the 
DGIR: 
'The Director General may, on the written application of an employer, grant permission to the 
cmployer to enter into a contract of service with any or more of his employees, or with any 
class, category or description of his employees, requiring the employee or employees, or the 
class, category or description of employees, as the case may be, to work in excess of the limit 
of hours prescribed under sub-sections ( 1) (a), (b) and (c) but subject to sub-section (l) (d) and 
to such conditions, if any, as the Director General may deem proper to impose, if he is 
satisfied that there are special circumstances pertaining to the business or undertaking of the 
employer whICh renders it necessary or expedient to grant such permission:. 
Provided that the DIrector General may at any time re\'oke the approval given under this 
subsection if he has rcason to belIe\e that it is expedient to do so. 
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bigger role as a direct employer. To promote economic efficiency, the gO\'ernment 
took to increasing regulations for unions. After the Malaysian Airlines (MAS) strike, 
the government amended the IRA 1967, giving the Minister Of Labour greater powers 
than he had already enjoyed. Now he could declare any industry or service 'essential', 
and when that was the case, no unions were allowed. From that point on, 'Essential 
services' included banking, electricity, fire, port and airport as well as postal and 
prison services. Also the Minister could suspend a trade union for six months if he 
thought that the union was' acting against national interest'. 
On the administration side, the government ensured the smooth runnmg of 
industrialisation process. The Minister of Labour, for example, was involved in trade 
union recognition claims (see Table 8.4). From 1980 to 1986, his rate of rejection of 
claims for recognition increased as was the proportion of rejections to total rejections 
in manufacturing that had increased dramatically. Moreover, from 1980 to 1986, the 
minister rejected the greatest number of recognition claims in the labour-intensive, 
low-cost manufacturing areas of textiles and light electrical (Kuruvilla, 1995: 52). 
When a minister referred cases of trade disputes to the Industrial Court, that was the 
end of collective bargaining in the private sector. According to Kuruvilla (1995: 52), 
the government was 'far more willing to refer disputes on his own initiatives for 
binding arbitration to the Industrial Court'. 
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Table 8.4: Union Recognition Claims in l\lalaysia, 1980-86 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
all industries 
Total claims 125 149 119 112 169 224 224 
voluntary recognition 54 74 59 38 51 3 7 
recognition accorded by minister 5 16 8 6 8 2 6 
recognition rejected by minister 29 23 15 39 80 131 
(percent) (19.4) (19.3) (13.3) (23.0) (35.7) (58.4) 
man ufacturing 
Total claims 78 55 66 105 136 172 
Voluntary recognition 44 26 25 30 26 20 
recognition accorded by minister 4 5 5 5 1 2 
recognition rejected by minister 12 13 7 26 62 98 
(percent) (15.3) (23.6) (10.6) (16.7) (45.5) (56.7) 
rejections in manufacturing 
as percentage of total rejections 41.3 56.5 46.6 66.6 77.5 74.8 
Source: Kuruvilla, 1995: 52. 
However, an interview with the Deputy Executive Director of the MEF, whose views 
represents mostly private sector employers unions in Malaysia, revealed that even the 
MEF did not like to be referred to the Industrial Court, claiming that even at the IRD 
level, the result would be 'leaning towards employees' (Interview: Shamsuddin 
Bardan, 11 December 1998 and 14 December 1998). Asked what he thought of the 
way the government managed the conflicts among parties involved in IR in Malaysia, 
he claimed that the 'arms twisting' methods used by the IRD would put fear into 
parties involved, thus' 85% of cases were settled for this reason'. MEF felt that the 
government department was not objective enough to settle disputes and that included 
the Industrial Court, again citing that 85% of cases settled in the court were in favour 
of employees. While acknowledging that industrialisation generated employment, the 
above discussion shows that the government used legislation and administration 
through the MoHR and its many departments to ensure its success. 
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8.5.3. Privatisation in 'Malaysia Incorporated' 
In the early 1980s, Mahathir proposed the 'Malaysia Incorporated' (\;lalaysia Inc) 
concept at the same time that he encouraged privatisation. 'YIalaysia Inc' means: 
Malaysia should be viewed as a company where the government and the 
private sector are both owners and workers together in this company. In a 
company, all owners/workers are expected to cooperate to ensure the 
company's success. Only through the success of the company. will the 
owners' and workers' well being be safeguarded and improved ... (Mahathir, 
1983: 305). 
In short, 'Malaysia Inc' called for the co-operation between business and government. 
The implementation was primarily through trade promotion schemes and efforts made 
to stabilise the price of commodity (Means, 1991:98). Just like the FDI and 
Industrialisation policies, privatisation and the concept of 'Malaysia Inc' should be 
analysed in the context of NEP. In Malaysia, privatisation started in the early and 
mid-1980s, where there has been a 'significant redirection of economic policies in the 
Asian-Pacific region towards exposing the public sector to competition' (Ng and Toh, 
1992: 42). Just like Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand, and the newly industrialised 
countries (NICs) at the time, namely South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, more 
attention were given towards privatisation as well as deregulation and liberation. 
The greater role of the private sector in the economy was emphasised in the MP5 
(1986-1990) and there were guidelines on privatisation in 1985.66 As discussed in 
Chapter Two, the dominant role of the state in the economy brought ideas like 
'privatisation', which was an important step to be taken by the state in their choice to 
de\'clop, and develop fast. Ng and Wagner (1989:211) argues that there was a 
conviction among development economists, development agencies and governments 
of industrial as well as developing countries in the fifties, sixties and even se\'enties 
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that only governments can undertake the necessary steps to promote and guide the 
development process. Not only that, it was thought that natural resources also belong 
to the state who would distribute them among citizens rather than individuals (Ng and 
Wagner, 1989: 211). In the Malaysian case, ethnic consideration again mattered. The 
growth of public enterprises to purchase or to create corporate assets on behalf of the 
Malays and other bumiputeras groups was encouraged. As already explained under 
the NEP above, that meant providing more employment opportunities in favour of the 
Malays, who were in a less advantageous economic position. In Malaysia, however, 
privatisation might mean just 'corporatisation'. Like 'commercialisation', 
corporatisation did become an issue in Malaysia, smce it confused the public and 
unionists. 'Corporatisation' refers to legislation that changes the legal status of a 
public enterprise to that of a limited liability company whose shares, however, are still 
fully owned by the government (Ng and Toh, 1992: 46). In other words, there was a 
great deal of confusion in the early days among Malaysians, since privatisation did 
not actually mean the government letting go of any public enterprise. As one veteran 
trade unionist claimed, even government officials were not really clear on the 
difference between 'privatisation' and 'corporatisation' (Interview: Mohd Jamil 
Ismail, 2911211998). To him, and this was proven right in the 1990s (discussed in 
Chapter Ten), it was just a process whereby government agencies were transformed in 
the style of private enterprises but kept government's interests intact. However, there 
was genuine privatisation, like the Klang Container Terminal in Port Klang (The Star, 
30/811989). 
,,', See I\lalaysia. 1985. 'Guidelines on privatisation·. Economic Planning Unit. Prime Minister's 
Department. 
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~evertheless, in the 1980s, Malaysia's record in privatisation was reported as 'very 
impressive', by one international consultant and as 'among the world leaders in the 
realm of privatisation' (NST, 13/1 0/1989). It was indeed a calculated plan by the 
government as privatisation was encouraged more when the Malaysian economy was 
suffering from the effects of world depression, and especially when the prices of 
Malaysia's export commodities such as rubber, tin, palm oil and timber fell (Means, 
1991: 97). However, it was at the same time as when the government saw that its 
investments in Bumiputera corporations and trust agencies had risen (Rajendran, 
1993:110; Means, 1991:97). By 1983, government investments which were mostly 
designed to promote Bumiputera participation in the economy had been channelled 
through 57 institutions, 115 statutory boards, and corporations that controlled or had 
joint-venture shares in 500 subsidiary companies (Means, 1991: 97). Nevertheless, in 
1982, the government's budget deficit had risen to RM 1 0 billion, with a trade balance 
deficit of RM2.5billion, as compared to RM5 billion surplus just two years before. 
That was one of the reasons that called for the government's drastic move into 
privatisation. 
The techniques used by the Malaysian government were divestiture and non-
divestiture, with the latter including traditional contracting-out, leasing, management 
buy-out and deregulation as well as an early retirement scheme for civil servants 
(refer to Chapter Ten). The government took charge of stimulating the private sector 
construction industry, and promoted the exports of Malaysian commodities through 
Japanese style trading houses, called sogososha. In the 1980s, there were at least six 
Malaysian-style sogososhas, that is, incorporated international trading companies.67 
(,0 For a detailed discussion on the impact of this policy. see Chee Peng Lim, 'Malaysia Sogo Soshas-
:\0 Gll So Far'. in lomo K. S.(eds). 1983. The Sun Also Sets. Petaling laya. Insan. 
As examples of divestiture programmes, which in most cases were only partial, the 
government floated the equity of major state-owned enterprises such as MAS; the 
Malaysian International Shipping Corporation (MISe); cement companies, Syarikat 
Telekom Malaysia Berhad (national telecommunication company); the distributor of 
the national car, EON and its manufacturing company Proton; besides Tenaga 
Nasional Berhad (TNB), the country's electricity generating enterprise (Ng and Toh, 
1992: 50). Under the ICA, in line with the NEP, the state allocated at least 30% of the 
floated shares in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) to the Bumiputeras. 
What that meant was that a reserve was made for Bumiputera individuals and 
institutions approved by the state to hold shares in trust for the indigenous popUlation. 
A study by Gouri (1991) revealed that one of the major challenges for privatisation in 
the Asian-Pacific economies was a politically acceptable balance between efficiency 
and equity (Gouri, 1991: 89). Labour tends to stress equity, while emerging 
beneficiaries (consumers and would-be owners) tend to stress the efficiency aspect of 
privatisation. For labour, privatisation brought fears that related to loss of jobs (since 
privatisation also meant cost-effectiveness). It could also have meant loss of benefits 
already won, scope for re-hiring, loss of a hard-won union power and scope for 
unionisation. It was in this context that Malaysian unions representing workers in 
state enterprises earmarked for privatisation voiced their objections. The Malaysian 
government handled these issues using two key elements. The first was by giving 
public assurances that there would be job security and protection of current benefits. 
There was also the promise of opportunities to own shares in the newly privatised 
companies. 
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CLEPACS naturally made privatisation its top agenda in its 1983 conyention (8T, 
617/1983). As substantial numbers of its members would be affected, CUEPACS at 
this stage opposed privatisation (8T, 26/811983). It was worried about 'job insecurity, 
unfavourable wages and conditions of service'. It also opposed any form of 
privatisation 'of public services which have been traditionally the responsibility of 
government' (8T, 26/811983). This, they argued, would be at the expense of the lower 
income group, who could not afford the increase in prices as the private sector made 
profits their main objectives. Therefore, CUEACS wanted the government to study its 
effect first, especially when workers were denied of the benefits of pensions as now 
enjoyed by government servants (The Malay Mail, 5/8/1983). MTUC, on the other 
hand, took a more conciliatory stance. When Ahmad Nor, the CUEP ACS President 
voiced the union's concern, MTUC President PP Narayanan said it welcomed 
privatisation, as long as 'Malaysians were made to understand the relevance of it and 
the ways in which it could improve the overall welfare of the people (BT, 12/411983). 
CUEPACS urged the government to be responsible for the 'privatised' governments' 
workers, then with the privatisation of the Telecommunications Department 
(Telekom). The PM, Mahathir Mohamad, ensured that employees would be taken 
care, with each given one or two years to choose either the government or the private 
scheme (NST, 20112/1983). He insisted it was for mutual benefit of the employees, 
the private sector and the government, as 'the interests of the three parties are the 
interest of the nation' (NST, 20112/1983). The argument was that privatisation 
brought efficiency, and companies were motivated by profits, widening market that 
led to mass production, making prices cheaper. The National Union of the Telecoms 
Employees (NUT E) raised concerns over EPF, housing loans (only 4 % interest under 
govcmment scheme), and the pension scheme (NST, 111511984). Telekom, together 
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with MAS and Petronas (the national oil-company), were among the first few that 
went into privatisation. By 1989, the move was into full gear with 22 govemment-
owned concerns already privati sed (ASWJ, 9/8/1989). The intention was that two 
years later there would be 246 government-owned enterprises privatised under the 
Privatisation Master Plan. There were already 81 companies established by the 
government to assists the Bumiputeras, divested to Permodalan Nasional Berhad, the 
national equity corporation charged with amassing corporate holdings on behalf of the 
designated citizens, or sold directly to Bumiputera individuals and concerns (ASWJ, 
9/8/1989). In 1989, several earlier privatisation deals had already sparked widespread 
criticism, triggered by 'secret negotiations', the paucity of government disclosure and 
the granting of lucrative contracts to individuals and companies 'with close links to 
officials in the Mahathir's administration' and to UMNO (AWSJ, 9/8/1989). In other 
words, privatisation turned out to be another extension of the 'Malay Agenda' as 
contended earlier in this chapter. As for workers, as a result of consistent assurances 
by the government over right of unions activities, promises of better schemes and job 
security, the opposition was slowly drowned (NST, 18/1/1989; BT, 20/11/1989; NST 
15/9/1989, The Star, 2/9/1989). The government on top of that ensured that it was 
'still in control of privatised companies' (BT 20/11110989) which seemed a firm 
enough assurance. 
8.5.4. Electronic Industry and the Case of HATWU 
Since promoting EOr in the late 1960s and 1970s, and especially in the period 1987-
92, Malaysia showed economic growth with an annual GDP exceeding 8 percent 
(IMF, 1994/95). However, the electronics industry, a significant contributor, was 
made a 'pioneer industry' and therefore, from the first arrival of foreign MNCs, the 
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government denied trade unions' efforts to organise workers (IMF, 1994/95). The 
Pioneer Industry Ordinance (PIO) 1958, and later amendments to labour laws in 1967 
and 1969 legalized the shift for female workers and further reduced workers' rights. 
This was part of the lucrative deal for MNCs in the opening of FTZs in 1972. 
American MNCs were the first to set up electronics factories in Malaysia. There was 
anti-union stand in US electronics, computers and component finns in companies 
such as Motorola, Seagate, Texas Instrument, Harris and Hewlett Packard in the US 
itself. The same stand was made by Malaysian companies, and the government, so 
much dependent on FDI, supported this move. The setback was that other Japanese 
and Gennan electronics companies too, even though their parent nations recognised 
and pennitted unions, rallied and sheltered behind the US-imposed non-union policy. 
Therefore, while electrical, textile and gannent industries, for example, allowed 
unionisation in 1971 and 1978 respectively, the electronics workers in Malaysia were 
dcnied this right (IMF, 1994/95). This is one classic example of the abuse power by 
private sector employers, which encouraged by the government's own lenient policy 
towards them out of its dependence to FDI or MNCs. The discussion below emphasis 
this argument further. 
The EIWU and other IMF-affiliated unions tried to unionise the electronics workers 
from the early 1970s (Interview: Arunasalam, 2211112000). In 1973, the RTU warned 
the EIWU not to unionise them, claiming that they were categorically different from 
'clectrical' finns. This decision was made despite the government bunching both 
industries together in most of its data classifications (e.g. exports, employment and 
output). From 1976 onwards, the International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF) 
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championed the issue, together with the ILO, who began putting pressure on the 
:v1alaysian government. They failed to make any effective impact. 
So it was surprising when the government announced in September 1988 that it would 
allow 85,000 electronics workers to form/or join unions, an unexpected but a much-
awaited decision. It was, in fact, believed that efforts by AFL-CIO to get the US 
government to withdraw its GSP status from Malaysia that did the trick (IMF, 
1994/95). The threat looked real to the government since the GSP was removed from 
the Asian NICs in February 1988. This shows that an outside/external factor has 
forced the government to backtrack in its decision. The reason this time was purely 
economIc. 
When the Labour Minister asked the MTUC to help set up the unions, the labour 
centre was more than happy to oblige, but a happiness that was short-lived. The 
American transnationals, especially the Malaysian American Electronics Industry 
(MAEI) members, opposed the government's move (lMF, 1994/95). The US 
government rejected AFL-CIO efforts, which was thought to be due to the American 
transnational companies' lobbying power in the then Bush government (IMF, 
1994/95). Suddenly the government backtracked, and announced that it would permit 
the organisation only to in-house unions. Even this proved difficult, as seen by one 
particular case of Radio-Company of America (RCA) Sdn Bhd in 1988. 
This was the first US electronics firm to experience a worker-led attempt to start in-
house unions. As the union was being formed, the company changed its name to 
Harris Solid-State (HSS) Sdn Blld without telling the employees, prompting the 
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TUAD to tell unionists to change the name accordingly. To the trade union activists 
this was just an effort to kill the union (Interview: Bruno Pereira, 2611,2001). The first 
President of RCA Union, Bruno Pereira, did not receive any notice from the employer 
at all and was only alerted by the DGTUA (before RTU, now DGTUA) to change 
name. After going through the tedious procedure, the company refused to recognise 
this, forcing the TUAD to conduct a 'membership check', and even after it was 
confirmed that the membership represented 57% (it must be 50% + 1 according to 
TUA1959), the company still refused. The Minister used his power under the 
IRA 1967 to give notice of recognition to the company. However, on the last day (the 
14th day) on 23rd January 1990 the company 'offered workers' of both employees 
from HSS and another of its branches, Harris Semiconductor to transfer to Harris 
Advanced Technology (M) Sdn Bhd (HAT). The workers were threatened to be 
dismissed if they refused to sign transfer forms, which were given to all except half of 
exco-members of the (forming) union and six union activists. While the rest of 
workers were transferred to HAT, 24 were put in a bogus operating production line 
without any work but getting their normal wages. This 'cold-storage' treatment went 
on for 6 months (Interview: Bruno Pereira, 26th January 2001; loth General Meeting 
Report, HA TWU). Meanwhile, on the 16th January 1990, the ministry approved the 
HSS Workers Union (HSSWU), and stated that the company had approved the union, 
effective from the 23rd June 1989 (the workers had actually already been transferred 
to HAT in 23rd January 1990). The HSSWU still sent a collective agreement proposal 
to the company (HAT) on 14th May 1990. Thus, starting 22nd June 1990, there were 
four collective bargainings between the two sides. In August, the HAT advertised for 
posts that belonged to the union activists, prompting the union to report to the IRD. A 
\\'cck before the conciliation process started at the IRD, the company sacked all the 21 
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union activists (l worker had already resigned, 2 had been absorbed to HAT). The 
company did not tum up to the IRD and the collective agreement has not been agreed 
upon until today. The MoHR referred the case to the Industrial Court in October 1990 
after the HAT workers picketed in front of the factory for 21 days (Interview: Bruno 
26th January 2001; 10th General Meeting Report, HATWU). 
The case was only settled in 1997 after several court battles at the Industrial Court, 
High Court and Appeal Court. On the 1th August the Appeal Court rejected the 
company's appeal and ordered all 21 workers to be reinstated at HAT and all costs 
paid to them (loth General Meeting Report; Interview: Bruno, 26/1/2001). Their plight 
is not yet over, as in 1997, even after the TUAD approved the application for change 
of name from HSSWU to HATWU, the company applied to the High Court to revoke 
the DGTUA's decision, which it did with costs in 1998, and the union filed an appeal 
to the High Court's decision. The case is still pending. 
However, this case showed the 'helplessness' of the government against an MNC, out 
of a weakness in the system and the tedious legislation process. While a company 
could find it easy to change its name through the Registrar of Companies (another 
department), the union sti 11 have to go through the process of satisfying the TU AD 
and IRD, which takes time, and is always under the pressure of the government 
general policy on the economy. In this particular case, it showed that the government 
policy of discouraging unions, even in-house unions in the electronics company, cost 
the workers unnecessary misery. When asked, the DGTUA admitted that the battle is 
no\\ bet\\ccn the union and the High Court (Interview: Izhar Harun, 1611 1200 1). The 
DGTUA remarked that if the union did not go to the court, the TUAD could de-
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register the present union and they might apply for a new union based on the present 
company. The company has since changed its name twice to Intersil, and then Chip-
Pac. The union is still registered under HATWU and so far not even one collective 
agreement has materialised (Interviews: Bruno Pereira, 26/112001; Izhar Harun, 
16/1/2001; Mohd Zubir, 16/1/2001). 
8.5.5. The MAS-AEU Dispute and its Impact on Labour Laws 
This dispute is very significant to Malaysian IR following the 1960s period, as it 
denotes a new wave of labour repression that led to the 1980 amendment to the TUA 
1959 and the IRA 1967. It showed how serious the government was towards 
suppressing dissent, again to protect economic interests. Also, it stressed the 
government's wariness towards outside influences that contradict its decision or 
policy. In fact, the dispute between the MAS employees who were represented by 
Airline Employees' Unions (AEU) was a landmark case during the NEP period. It 
confinned the earlier argument that there existed an imbalance of power between the 
employer (in this case the government itself) and employees. The dispute also showed 
thc weakness of the MTUC as a labour centre as against the government and the RTU, 
who acted on its behalf. 
The dispute started with the AEU asking for a higher starting pay for a lower income 
group of employees in a new collective agreement which the MAS rejected. The MAS 
management referred the deadlock to the Minister of Labour, who called for 
conciliatory meetings. Before the second round of the session, the RTU, based on 
illforn1ation by the MAS management, directed the AEU to strike off the membership 
of 874 members \vho were said to be involved in 'illegal industrial action' 
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(MTUCAR,1979/80). 213 workers were then suspended for allegedly boycotting 
'overtime' and commencing 'go slow'. A total of 119 workers were dismissed. The 
RTU held the AEU responsible for 'go slow' and 'boycott of o\'ertime' and on the 
2ih January 1979, served a show cause letter on the AEU as to why its registration 
should not be withdrawn or cancelled. The union's fund was frozen and the Minister 
ordered a restriction on the function of the AEU until it explained itself, as ordered by 
the RTU. 23 union activists were then arrested under the ISA1960, including one 
local representative from the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITWF), 
David Uren (MTUCAR, 1979/80). ITWF helped organise retaliatory action, both 
locally and abroad. There was a stranded MAS airplane at Sydney Airport and a 
boycott by transport workers in London, all condemning the ISA arrests. The MTUC 
leader, Narayanan, ironically wrote to Bob Hawke at the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions, and implied that if there were no specific charges, the ISA detainees would be 
released soon (Jomo and Todd, 1994: 143). 
The MTUC in fact only knew of the dispute through the press, and with AEU did not 
pay its fees for two years nor did it seek MTUC's help. It was only later that the 
MTUC volunteered to assist and tried to intervene by requesting an appointment with 
the PM, Hussein Onn, seeking professional legal aid for detained unionists. 
Meanwhile, the MTUC's requests to represent the AEU were not favoured by the 
AEU itself. However, the MTUC President met the Minister, and asked him to 
o\'cI1urn the decisions made by the MAS regarding the workers. The MTUC also 
asked for functions of AEU to be rescinded to make it possible to return to the 
negotiating table to resume collective bargaining. With regards to the use of ISA, the 
government was urged to bring to public trial detained members and officials. The 
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MTUC president also met the PM, who, however, in a Parliament session on 20th 
March 1979, moved a special motion. Expressing deep concern over the dispute, it 
condemned the 'interference by foreign trade unions and international confederations 
of Trade Unions (MTUCAR, 1979/80). It supported the actions taken by government 
in its efforts 'to safeguard and develop MAS as the national airline, including its 
attempts to create a resumption of the collective bargaining negotiation between the 
management and employees of MAS' (MTUCAR, 1979/80). This condemnation was 
baseless as the 'interference' actually occurred after the dispute was already out of 
hand. The MTUC accused the government of 'mishandling and mismanagement' of 
the affair (MTUCAR, 1979/0). The Barisan Nasional government, two thirds in the 
parliament, carried out the motion. In fact, this was the first time the ISA was used to 
arrest trade unionists and workers, despite the government's promises that it would 
not be used against trade unionists (MTUCAR, 1979/80). 68 The point here is why did 
the government not invoke the discretionary power under IRA 1967 and refer the 
dispute to Industrial Court for adjudication? If it had been done, the dispute would not 
have gone out of proportion, and there would have been no need for ISA. The AEU 
submitted a formal reply to the RTU and asked for the union not to be de-registered as 
it was not a 'public utility service', and the MAS workers could refuse to work 
overtime. It argued that the AEU actually had not been on strike. It also gave reasons 
that the extent and period of overtime work demanded by MAS was unreasonable, 
and in fact was requested in an arbitrary and vindictive manner (MTUCAR, 1979/80). 
b8 Intemal Security Act or ISA 1960 gave absolute power and authority to arrest and detain any person 
without trial. Section 8(1) says 'If the minister is satisfied that the detention of any person is necessary 
with the \'1('\\ to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or 
any part therefore or to the maintenance of essential services therein or to the economic life thereof, he 
may make an order (hereinafter referred to as a detention order) directing that person be detained for 
any period not exceeding two years', The Minister has the right to extend the period for another two 
years at anyone time. 
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The RTU rejected the reply, so the union was de-registered and simultaneously the 
government offered a package deal to the 4600 MAS workers, with a revised salary 
scale that the workers had to accept. The workers were released but now there was an 
in-house Malaysian Airline System Employees' union as well as the Foreign Airlines 
Employees' Union. The long-term impact resulted in amendments to labour laws 
1980. 
It is important to note that the conflict happened while the government 
industrialisation programme moved from lSI to EOI and while it was becoming more 
dependent foreign investments. In line with the NEP and with the emphasis on 
improving the economy of the Bumiputera, labour had to remain cheap and docile. 
8.6. The Sate and Public Sector IR 
The period 1971-1990 saw the state's increasingly dominant role in the public sector 
IR. To ensure the smooth running of the NEP, it was necessary for the government to 
implement legislation and unilateral decisions, with policies that ensured the public 
sector became its 'executive arm'. The one-way decision-making was evident in how 
'negotiations' and wage and conditions of service were determined through various 
circulars, as well as the Salaries Commissions and Report, as seen in Table 8.5. 
For many years the commissions did not cover the whole public sector, as the wages 
and conditions of service were based on the groupings made by the government. In 
1967 (implemented only in 1970), there was the Suffian Commission for public 
service. The government chose to implement only some of the Suffian Royal 
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Commission, saying it was facing a financial crisis (Interview: lamaluddin Md Isa, 
30/1/2001 ). 
Date 
1967 
1971 
1971 
1971 
1973 
1977 
Table 8.5.Salaries Commissions and Salaries Committees 
Name 
Suffian Report 
Tun Aziz Report 
Abdul Aziz Report 
Sheikh Abdullah Report 
Ibrahim Ali Report 
Cabinet Committee Report 
To examine the Ibrahim Ali 
Report (CCR) 
Coverage 
Public Service 
J u dges/ judiciary 
Education Services 
Armed Forces 
Public Service 
Public Service 
Source: Report of the Royal Salaries Commission, 1975; Report of the Cabinet 
Committee Appointed By Cabinet to Examine the revised report of the Royal 
Salaries Commission 1975, Vol. I and II, 1977. 
With persistent and firm beliefs, and the backing of the Congress council members, as 
well as the threat of strike, the government then decided to implement new scale for 
Division IV and the IMG group, and later for Division I, II and III when the 
govemment had the 'financial capability' (Interview: lamaluddin Md Isa, 30/1/2001). 
It again demonstrated the absence of proper collective bargaining machinery for 
public sector employees, and how the 'negotiations' with the government had turned 
vcry political. It also depended very much on the leadership factor, in this case among 
CUEPACS leaders as representatives for public sector unions. Veteran public sector 
trade unionists admitted this factor as being very important to succeed in any 
'negotiations' with the government (Interviews: lamaluddin Md Isa, 16/1/2001; 
Ahmad Nor, 6/2/2001; AH Ponniah, 22/1/2001; Mohd lamil Ismail, 6/1/1999). This 
was cspecially so after the 'negotiating right' of the Whitley Council was taken away 
by the govcrnment, first after the 13th May with the suspension of the Council, then 
eroded further with the three NJCs in Circular 2/1973, and then pern1anently with fivc 
~JCs in Circular 5'1979. \Vith the implementation of the Cabinet Committee Report 
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(CCR) in 1979, replacing the Ibrahim Ali Report, all remaining dreams held by public 
sector trade unionists to restore their negotiating rights disappeared. In 1980, the 
government awarded the public sector with generous salary increases, putting the 
CUEPACS in an even more complacent mood. However, due to several economic 
downturns, the government did not entertain demands for salary increases, except 
modest allowance increases, even though the salary revision exercise was due in the 
mid-1980s. Only a few months before the general election in 1990, the public sector 
employees received further salary increases. This was clearly not through 
'negotiations', but confirmed the political relationship between the public sector 
employees and the government. 
It must be said that from the 1970s up until the early 1980s there was an increased 
participation of ethnic Malays in the public sector. In 1970, the formal provisions that 
let CUEP ACS play even a small role in collective bargaining over wages and 
conditions of service was diminished with Circular 4170. The National Operation 
Council that took over the Malayan administration after the 13th May riot put the 
Whitley Council under suspension from 1969 until 1973 (ARRTUI969; Interview: 
lamaluddin Md Isa, 30/1/2001). CUEPACS managed to muster a strong opposition to 
Circular 4170, with strikes, until the government replaced it with Circular 5173 on the 
2nd February 1973. In Circular No 5 of 1973, the Whitley Council was permanently 
replaced by the National Joint Council (NJC)(Circular 5/1973). However, the 
negotiating element was still there. Under the new NJC, three separate negotiating 
machineries were established, for employees in the Civil Service and Education 
Service; employees in the Statutory Bodies and Local Authorities; and one for the 
Police Services (Circular 5/1973). The objective of these N1Cs were to advise the 
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government on pay and condition for Public servlces, including education; to 
negotiate directly with unions and staff associations in all their claims; and to decide 
and if necessary to obtain the government's approval on all matters concerning 
conditions of service in the public sector (Circular511973). The Circular, however, 
outlined that individual unions or staff associations had to negotiate with the Council 
of Pay and Conditions of Service for cases that concerned salaries and other 
conditions that affect only a group of categories. However, these unions or staff 
associations first had to be recognised as representatives of the employees involved. 
The Staff side of the NJC opposed the idea of unions negotiating with the Council of 
Pay and Conditions of Service as it created confusion and impeded the progress of 
any claims made either by single or groups of unions (Rajaguru, 1979). This was 
because the unions were organised on grade as well as departmental basis. As there 
were several departmental unions catering for similar grades there would substantial 
difficulty in getting a favourable negotiated settlement (Rajaguru, 1979). The Staffs 
side wanted the NJC to also become the machinery for negotiation. In order words, 
the NJC was not playing an effective role as the consultative body on all matters 
affecting terms and conditions of service of the public sector IR. Since the NJC 
determined the principle governing methods of fixing wages, it should also negotiate 
on terms and conditions of service which it regulated itself. The other weakness of the 
NJC was that in the event of any dispute being unsettled during negotiations at the 
Council of Pay and Condition of Service, the disputes were to be referred to the 
Industrial Court in accordance with the IRA1967, where the right to arbitrate was 
subject to the discretion of the Minister of Labour, and further under the proviso 23(2) 
subject to the consent of the Agollg or the State Authority as the case may be 
(Rajaguru, 1979). This was contrary to the principles norn1ally followed in finding 
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recourse to a settlement of disputes between employer and employees. The Staff side 
demanded the provisions of the Arbitration Tribunal, as existed under the Whitley 
system. On top of that, the government was making unilateral decisions, without 
discussion or consultation at NJC level, thereby making the NJC machinery 
ineffective. 
The Staff Side of the NJC was satisfied with its involvement in the Ibrahim Ali 
Commission in 1975, but when it demanded its implementation in 1977, CUEPACS 
was in for a disappointment. The government said it did not have the financial 
capability to cater for the Ibrahim Ali wage increases. In August 1975, there was the 
'Revised Report of the Royal Salaries Commission 1975' chaired by Ibrahim Ali 
(Revised Report 1975). In 1976, the government appointed a Cabinet Committee 
under the Chairmanship of Mahathir Mohamad (the Deputy PM) 'to examine the 
revised report of the Royal Salaries Commission 1975'. With the implementation of 
CCR, CUEP ACS was made to look helpless in negotiating wages and conditions on 
behalf of its affiliating unions. CUEPACS did try to threaten the government with a 
strike, but it did not take the opportunity to do so, in spite of the support given by its 
affiliates. Both Houses of Parliament then rejected the Ibrahim Ali Commission 
Report and set out revised wage scales and conditions for public sector employees 
through the CCR. The CCR was not discussed with unions, and here CUEP ACS let 
the individual unions made their stand on the Report. This is where CUEPACS again 
showed its weakness as the main congress for public sector unions. The CUEP ACS 
President called it a 'democratic system' (NST, 311111977), but the fact was it had 
provided an avenue for the government to repeat the action in the future. The 
reluctance of CUEPACS to resort to industrial action, an open conflict, as discussed 
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above, is not hard to understand. Government servants see themselves as first 
'serving' the government of the day, who in tum pay them wages. On the part of the 
government, the campaign was that as public sector employees they were working for 
the people, to achieve a grand design of the NEP - which explicitly spelt out its 
intention to help the Malays, with the ultimate objective of national unity. The 
majority of the public sector was and still is Malay, and the dominant party in the 
government is UMNO (for the Malays). For the Malays to go against the 
government's wishes was like going against their own people, and this was and still 
is, until recently, something to be scorned. 
As for the Public Services Tribunal (PST), which was specially established in 1977 to 
cater for anomaly cases (PST Bulletin, 1977-1999), it had a limited and temporary 
role. It was to solve cases regarding benefits and conditions of service that revolve 
around the Suffian and the Harun Report. The MTUC called for the PST to be 
amended so as to enable it to arbitrate trade disputes in the public sector, instead of 
only anomaly cases (MTUC BDCAR 1988/90). A prominent CUEP ACS trade union 
veteran condemned the PST as 'inadequate' since it would be terminated once all the 
anomaly cases were solved (Interview: Mohd Jamil Ismail, 2911211998). His worry 
was confirmed when in 1999, the PST was dissolved, after the Ministry claimed all 
the anomaly cases 'were already solved' (PST Tribunal Bulletin, 1977-99). The 
bulletin said that more than 600 cases from 1977-1999 were solved, including those 
under the New Remuneration System, the present wage system for the public sector. 
Circular 2/1979 changed the entire structure of the NJC and marked the end of the 
'collective bargaining machinery' for the public sector. It has never been regained 
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(Interviews: K. George, 7/2/2001; lamaluddin ~1d Isa, 30/1/2001; ~lTCC BDCAR 
1988/90: 7). The most significant impact is that this Circular officially terminated the 
right of public sector unions to negotiate or discuss wages. Even though the period 
before that showed CUEP ACS and other individual unions struggling to get their 
demands heard but not necessarily met, at least formally the right was there. Five 
NJCs were now formed; each for the General Public Service (other than the 
employees in the Subordinate and Manual Group); the Education Service; the 
Statutory Bodies; the Local Authorities; and the Industrial and Manual Group (IMG). 
The five councils only 'gave views' on and discussed principles affecting 
remuneration, allowances and facilities for employees in the public sector. No 
discussions on the subject of the existing structure of Salary Scales of the Cabinet 
Committee were allowed. It was also to discuss general terms and conditions of 
service for employees, confined again to giving views 'so as to enable the government 
to decide on the question at issue' (Circular 2/1979). From this period onwards, a 
prominent veteran trade unionist categorically called the process for wage increases in 
the public sector as 'collective begging' (Interview: K. George, 7/2/2001). 
The government did what it thought best to achieve the NEP objectives. In 1981, it 
granted CUEP ACS formal recognition as a national trade union centre for Malaysia, 
much to the disappointment of MTUC. CUEP ACS was also invited to join the 
tripartite body, the NLAC, the EPF Board, the National Manpower Development 
Board, the National Electricity Board, and the Wages Councils (ARRTU, 1983:2). The 
most bitter dispute between CUEP ACS and MTUC was when the government 
delayed and later turned down the candidacy of V. David, MTUC Secretary General 
to the ILO Convention in Geneva. The government's animosity towards MTUC in 
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early 1980s was very much evident, since several MTUC leaders were actively 
involved in the opposition parties. Therefore, the government took retaliating 
measures by according CUEP ACS equal standing with MTUC, and by sending 
representatives to the ILO Convention, even though the ILO itself criticised the move. 
What the MTUC and CUEP ACS leaders did not see at the time was their rivalry 
further weakened the trade union movement in Malaysia, and made the government 
stronger and more dominant. CUEP ACS did not actually succeed in any of its 
fundamental struggles, like negotiating rights, minimum wages or having an effective 
voice in all the tripartite bodies. 
There was, however, a brief period under the leadership of Ahmad Nor when 
eUEP ACS tried to use the aggressive tactic to win over 'negotiations' with the 
government. His small but distinctive victory over T. Ragunathan as CUEPACS 
President in 1983 saw what might be termed a resentment of the dominant Malay 
members in CUEP ACS over the long Indian dominance in the union. The outgoing 
President, T. Narendran, publicly gave support to both T. Ragunathan and Jamaluddin 
Md Isa, citing their 'extensive experience' (The Star 27/7/1983). The fact was the old 
belief was so inculcated in CUEP ACS that an aggressive person like Ahmad Nor was 
not welcomed. Ahmad Nor, on the other hand, expected that he would, being the first 
Malay to head CUEP ACS, and he thought the communication with the government 
would be 'easy' (Interview: Ahmad Nor, 6/2/2001). In June 1985, the government 
announced a small increase of pay in response to the claim submitted by the Staff 
Side of the NJC. The NJC (Staff Side) for statutory bodies rejected the increase, and a 
series of picketing ensued. Encouraged by the stand taken by the statutory bodies, 
other unions which had taken the governments' offer also picketed. The PM agreed to 
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meet the five NJCs before they went on strike. He declared that he had met both the 
President (Ahmad Nor) and Secretary General (Jamaluddin Md Isa), and that both had 
agreed to the pay increase. However, nothing happened, and Ahmad Nor embarked on 
a series of attacks on the government. Publicly, he threatened to withhold the 
predominantly Malay public sector employees' support from the government. The 
government responded that it could not afford salary increases, and used all the 
available media to its advantage. It even accused Ahmad Nor of being 'used by 
foreigners'. When the government made only small increases, and attacked 
eUEP ACS in the UMNO Convention, Ahmad Nor gave a 24-hour notice of 
resignation in April 1986 (Interview: Ahmad Nor, 6/2/2001). His disapproval of 
Mahathir turning the event into something political saw him later venture into 
opposition parties. His departure was not entirely missed as there were some leaders, 
like his own secretary general, Jamaluddin Md Isa, who thought him 'aggressive'. 
The next President, Ragunathan went back to the old ways of non-confrontation and 
therefore put back CVEP ACS to where it was once was; docile and dependent on the 
sympathy of the government. 
To conclude, it seems ironic in this case that the government was more reluctant to 
grant several CUEP ACS demands, as the majority of public sector employees were 
Malays. Despite the NEP itself, with all its complementary policies inclined towards 
favouring Malays, the government's stance on unions were quite non-ethnic based, a 
contention shared by Malaysian trade unionists and scholars.69 Therefore, the state's 
role in the public sector IR was more to ensure that a bigger objective under the NEP 
69 Interyiews conducted with multi-ethnic trade unionists revealed that they did not believe that the 
gowrnment's policy and decisions regarding trade unionism in the country had anything to do WIth 
ellmicity. 
317 
was met, than to fulfil demands from Malay-dominated public sector employees. In a 
way, it showed the government's preference of achieving the long-term goal of 
betterment of Malays in their economic sphere, therefore restricting union rights in 
the public sector. The restrictions made the public sector unions more compliant to the 
government, and therefore enabled the government to go ahead with the NEP more 
easily. 
8.7.An Analysis of the Role of the State and Malaysian IR, 1971-1990 
Generally 1971-1990 was a period of dominance by government over IR. It shows the 
state had managed yet again to influence the direction of IR in line with the nation's 
interests, that is securing economic stability. Again the government used terms like 
'national interests' and 'national unity'. During the NEP period, the underlying Malay 
agenda was one of the reasons for this. By 1981, Mahathir's era had begun, and he 
enhanced national policies with other complementary policies that would never permit 
free and strong unionism. Coupled with the Malaysian culture of anti-left wing 
movements in general, and based on wariness of communism and the fragile racial 
relations, it was easier for the government to implement its policies in IR. However, 
this is not to forget the weaknesses of the trade unions themselves - in particular 
CUEP ACS and MTUC, and the strong position of employers, much ensured by 
government pro-management legislation and policies. 
During the Tunku and Tun Razak's era there were government's efforts to portray 
itself as a neutral arbiter standing abo\'e and mediating between management and 
employees. In the mid 70s, during Hussein's administration, trade unions leaders were 
reminded of their responsibility towards maintaining industrial peace in order to 
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provide a good investment climate for manufacturers from overseas, and urged to 
obey the laws. The trade union movement at this stage was caught between the need 
to fight for the workers' interests and the need to please and adapt to the 
government's expectations. The fragile situation, made worse after the riot 
expenence, and the more repreSSIve laws, all led to further weakening among 
workers. Moreover, the MTUC as the main labour centre was criticised. In fact, 
between 1969 and 1981, the numbers of trade union members fluctuated substantially, 
decreasing by 5 percent in 1970 and increasing by 17 percent in 1974. These changes 
were due to alterations in the political environment itself, where the aftermath of the 
May 1969 racial riot highlighted the repressive side of the government again. The 
NOC in fact made it clear that it only tolerated the docile unions that co-operated with 
the government. 
The restoration of parliamentary rule in 1971 did not lessen many restrictions on trade 
unions which were made during Emergency Rule. In fact, the Parliament amended the 
labour laws to include most of the important regulations, together with new ones. For 
example, although public service unions were allowed to join the MTUC, they were 
not pem1itted to organise strikes over recognition claims, nor to bargain on issues 
designated as 'managerial prerogatives', including dismissal, retrenchment, hiring, 
promotion, transfer, and work allocation. In the 1970s, too, the government succeeded 
in reducing strikes. Such action was now considered insignificant in Malaysian IR, in 
sharp contrast to earlier decades, as can be seen in Table 8.6. The figures show that 
from 1970 to 1974, 1976, and 1977 the number of workdays lost due to strikes 
exceeded 50,000. From 1976 onwards, however, strike activity decreased. 
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Although technically some unions were still legally allowed to organise strikes, the 
state would go all out to fight against them. The restrictive process of strikes in 
Malaysia is stated in the lRA1967, Part IX, under the sub-heading of 'Trade disputes, 
strikes and lock-outs and matters arising therefrom'. For example, section 43 specifies 
restriction on strikes and lock-outs in 'essential services'. No workman in any 
essential services shall go on strike without giving to the employer notice of strike, 
within forty-two days before striking; within twenty-one days of giving such notice; 
or before the expiry of the date of strike specified in any notice aforesaid. Thus, 
union leaders chose not to contemplate confrontation and opted for less effective 
forms of industrial action. This move made them unable to counter any government 
suppression through strike. 
There was also the GSP controversy when the government accused MTUC of anti-
government. The government was put under the pressure of AFL-CIO and IBEW who 
urged the US government to withdraw the GSP status from Malaysia as a threat for 
Malaysia allowing unionism in the electronics industry. Mahathir condemned the 
MTUC and the opposition party, especially trade union leaders like V. David, who 
was in the opposition. V. David, being a DAP man, defended himself and pledged 
support for the retention of the GSP status. However, Mahathir was not impressed and 
the relationship between MTUC and the government during this period was severed. 
The fact that there were a number of MTUC leaders in the opposition parties, and 
actively involved, to the extent that they fought in the election just strained the 
relationship. It gave the impression that the real reason for the bitterness was because 
they were in the opposition, and not in any of the Barisan Nasional coalition parties. 
This view is confinned in Chapters Nine and Ten, when the government has no 
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problems with MTUC and CUEPACS leaders who were clearly supporting the 
governing party. 
Table 8. 6:Number of Strikes, Workers Involved, Workdays Lost, Total rnion 
Membership, and Percentage Involved, 1970-1990 
Year Number of Number of Number of Total Union Percentage of 
Strikes Workers Workdays membership Membership 
Involved Lost involved 
1970 17 1,216 1,867 275,238 1 
1971 45 5,311 20,265 283,594 2 
1972 66 9,701 33,455 296,782 3 
1973 66 14,003 40,866 318,459 4 
1974 85 21,830 103,884 373,572 6 
1975 64 12,124 45,749 477,565 3 
1976 70 20,040 108,562 481,736 4 
1977 40 7,783 73,729 503,267 2 
1978 36 6,792 35,032 523,620 1 
1979 28 5,629 24,868 520,024 1 
1980 28 3,402 19,554 531,740 1 
1981 24 4,832 11,850 548,434 1 
1982 26 3,330 9,621 564,674 1 
1983 24 2,458 7,880 569,229 1 
1984 17 2,437 9,269 547,266 1 
1985 22 8,710 34,773 560,339 2 
1986 23 3,957 14,333 560,531 1 
1987 13 3,178 11,035 560,725 1 
1988 9 2,912 5,784 568,408 1 
1989 17 4,761 22,877 638,004 1 
1990 17 98,510 301,978 667,388 15 
Source: Adopted from ARML, various years; Ministry of Human Resources (1990). 
The end of 1990 saw the government's increased uneasiness over the MTUC and 
slowly promoting CUEPACS as the national labour centre. It further weakened the 
labour movement, and distracted union leaders away from their more important 
causes. At the end of 1990, CUEP ACS' resolutions had not been achieved. If 
anything, the union centres, both MTUC and CUEPACS, managed to survive In 
name, and to secure the old wasy of settling disputes with lots of political manoeuvre. 
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8.8. Conclusion 
The years 1971-1990 confirmed further 'executive dominance' in Malaysia, in both 
the private and the public sector IR. By 1990, the government had used all the labour 
laws, its administrative arm with MoHR and its departments, various national policies 
and its own position as the greatest employer in the country to ensure the IR served 
the purpose of the NEP. With the extensive resources of a large and effective civil 
service, a powerful and well-discipline military, and an extensive party system that 
could mobilise sufficient public support to sustain a parliamentary government, the 
federal government succeeded in maintaining the status quo and keeping the labour 
movement and IR under control. This enormous power conferred to the executive, and 
supported totally by the civil and public service, has given the state decisive and 
prominent position to implement what they think best for the country. Even if the 
NEP was criticised, it has shown some success statistically to deliver its objectives, 
including the Malays' economic interests. 
The keyword most prominently found during these twenty-year period was 'in the 
nation's interest'. The underlying factor was the 'Malay agenda', triggered much by 
the l3 th May 1969. The additional factor was the political one, either the political 
leadership or the political scenario itself. Mahathir proved to be the active aggressive 
leader in promoting various national policies, apart from, and in complementary to the 
NEP. Despite criticisms over the ostentatious nature of these policies by scholars such 
as Jomo and Todd (1994), Gomez and Jomo (1999) and Mehmet (1987), just to name 
a few, the fact was the NEP has achieved, ifnot all then part of its intended objective, 
even if at the expense of IR. That success and the fact that the success was only partly 
achieved made the government again resort to another national development planning: 
the National Development Policy (1991-2000), discussed in Chapters ;-\ine and Ten. 
However, under this policy the government tried to make some changes, especially in 
HRM, and tried not to emphasise the question of the Malay Agenda, resorting instead 
to a more balanced objective. 
Under the NEP, IR policy, administration and legislation have been maintained and 
were developed to meet its objectives. The role and size of the public sector in the 
1970s expanded with the public enterprises, but by the mid-eighties, privatisation was 
intensified to help boost the economy and helped create the BCre. Economy, 
leadership and culture all influenced the role of the state in IR but the Malay question 
was a central issue. The government ensured a weak trade union movement both in 
the private and the public sectors by using the legislation, administration and general 
policies that encouraged all actors towards maintaining industrial peace. At the end of 
1990, the government was still not satisfied with the targets achieved on re-structuring 
employment, equity re-structuring and the creation of BCrC, all of which were related 
to the Malay issue. The next two discussions in Chapters Nine and Ten, each for the 
private and the public sector respectively, explore the NDP period, which were treated 
differently by the government, and as such, need a separate analysis. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
LOOKING AHEAD? THE PRIVATE SECTOR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
UNDER THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
9.1.lntroduction 
The foregoing discussion has shown that for twenty years the government developed 
its IR policy, administration and legislation to achieve the objectives of the NEP. The 
NEP encapsulated Malaysian development plans where the emphasis was gIven 
towards strong economic growth, stable politics and equitable wealth sharing by 
various ethnic communities. With that, strong leadership and Malaysian political 
culture also influenced the role of the state in the Malaysian IR with the Malay 
question a central issue. Although many of the NEP's goals were achieved, the 
Malay/Bumiputeras or ethnic issue was considered not fully solved, therefore still 
prevailed under the NDP. However, new strategies were adopted in line with the 
government's aim to raise Malaysia's level of economic development. The argument 
is that although the new development planning was aimed at Malaysia's future, during 
the next ten years the country's outlook was still retrospective. This prevented the 
government from modifying its approach accordingly in order to balance the 
relationship between the actors in Malaysian IR. 
This chapter and Chapter Ten, which deals with the public sector, analyse the state's 
roles in IR during the next ten years under the NDP (1991-2000). Under the NDP, two 
fi\'c-year dc\'elopment plans were implemented that is the Sixth Malaysia Plan (MP6) 
(1991-1995), and the Seventh Malaysia Plan (MP7) (1996-2000). These analyses are 
separated into two differcnt chapters in accordance with the different roles played by 
the private and public sectors, respectively, in the 1990s. Under the NOP, the private 
sector was to become the backbone of the Malaysian economy (OPP2, 1991:57). In 
other words, in the 1990s there were two different IR policies, one for each sector. 
This analysis starts with a focus on the roles of the state as legislator, administrator 
and participant during the implementation of the NDP. This specifically looks into 
issues that relate to the labour laws, the role of the MoHR and the implementation of 
several supplementary policies by the federal government in the private sector. Then 
an examination of all the contending factors, as already identified in Chapter One, is 
made. These are internal forces such as economic development, political stability, 
socio-cultural and ethnic issues, trade unions and the employers, and external factors, 
such as the influence of globalisation process and international bodies. The chapter 
hopes to explore how the state has affected the private sector IR under the NDP, the 
forces that influenced its decisions and the motives behind them. 
9.2. The NDP, the Strong State and the Private Sector IR 
The discussion below explores the position of the state at the start of the NDP and the 
high expectation of the private sector in the Malaysian economy. The NDP, in line 
with the Second Outline Perspective Plan (OPP2) (1991-2000), built upon the 
achievement of OPP1, but with a wider framework to accelerate the process of 
eradicating poverty and re-structuring society again to correct social and economic 
imbalances: 
'National unity remains the ultimate goal of socio-economic development 
because a united society is fundamental to the promotion of social and political 
stability and sustained development. .. NDP take cognisance of the diversities 
of Malaysians- ethnic. linguistic, cultural and religious as well as regional-so 
that a hannonious, tolerant and dynamic society could be progressiyely 
created' (OPP2, 1991:3). 
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Again just like the NEP, its ultimate objective was 'national unity', which in the 
government's view would be achieved when the diverse communities live 
'harmoniously' and 'fully developed economically, socially and politically.7o Just like 
the NEP, the economy again became the catalyst and main instrument towards 
achieving this goal. 
While maintaining the basic strategies of the NEP, there were four new dimensions 
under the NDP. First was the shift in focus of the anti-poverty strategy towards the 
eradication of 'hardcore poverty' as well as 'relative poverty'. Second, there was a 
focus on employment and the rapid development of an active BCIC with a 
'meaningful Bumiputra participation in the modem sectors of the economy' (OPP2, 
1991 :4). The emphasis now was to provide a more stringent selection of participants 
when training them for important business positions (Milne and Mauzy, 1999:73). If 
under the NEP the strategy was to associate equity with wealth, under the NDP it was 
to strengthen the capacities of Bumiputeras in business. Therefore, the efforts to 
increase Bumiputeras ownership continued, with no specific timeframe, except to 
review its achievement in 2000 (OPP2, 1991:4). In other words, eliminating the 
economic inequalities between ethnic Bumiputeras and non-Bumiputeras was still a 
prominent issue. 
70 In OPP2, the government explained that Malaysia 'has to be fully developed in terms of national 
unity and social cohesion, in tern1S of its economy, in terms of social justice, political stability, system 
of gO\'ernment, quality of life, social and spiritual values, national pride and confidence'. In 2020, the 
go\'cnmlent envisions Malaysia as 'a united nation, \\'ith a confident Malaysian society, infused by 
strong moral and ethical values, living in a society that is democratic, liberal and tolerant, caring, 
economically just and equitable, progressiw and prosperous, and in full possession of an economy that 
is competitive, dynamic, robust, resilIent and socially just' (OPP2, 1991: 3-4). 
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Third, and more importantly, the NDP was to rely more on the private sector to be 
involved in the re-structuring of the Malaysian society, by creating greater 
opportunities for economic growth. This highlight the argument presented in this 
chapter that now the government exercised a different approach to private sector IR 
compared to that of public sector IR. Fourth, the NDP focused on HRD as a 
fundamental requirement for achieving the objectives of growth and distribution 
(OPP2, 1991 :4). The official policy, to place a larger responsibility on the private 
sector as the catalyst for the economy, drove the government to create at all times a 
favourable climate for greater capital investments. In the context of IR, it meant 
maintaining the present legislation, intensifying effective administration under the 
MoHR, and full participation in the form of supplementary policies to support the 
implementation of laws and the administration. 
Table 9.1. The World Competitiveness Report 1997. 
Survey Score 
(out of seven} 
Labour-employer relations are generally co-operative 5.529 
Work days lost to labour disputes per 1,000 employees 0.740 
Female and elderly labour participation is widespread 4.500 
Child labour in your country is strictly prohibited 6.059 
Workers in your country are highly productive 
compared to workers in other countries 4.412 
Unemployment insurance has a good trade-off 
between social protection and preserving working 
incentive 4.760 
Source: Buletin KSM, 1997: l. 
Although as discussed under subsections 9.3.1 and 9.3.2, Malaysia faced economic 
and political challenges during the latter half of the 1990s, statistically, labour unrest 
and industrial disputes in the private sector IR were being contained. A 1997 Geneva-
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based report ranked Malaysia as having the i h best IR system in the world (Buletin 
KSM. 1 August 1997; Interview: Zainorrashid, 5/3/1999). Table 9.1. shows the World 
Competitiveness Report, which highlights improvements in the workplace, higher 
wages and attractive labour regulations as contributing to the ranking. The Malaysian 
IR system was ranked 4th in Asia, after Singapore, Hong Kong and Japan. In terms of 
hiring and firing practices, Malaysia was highly rated for 'flexibility determined by 
employers'. The report stated that employers were prohibited from such practices 
unless permitted under the employment law which guaranteed protection to workers 
from any employer's malpractice. Malaysia was recognised as a 'no-strike' country, 
and scored high for its competency in resolving labour disputes with minimum 
economic losses. Relatively, Malaysia also scored the lowest points for work-days lost 
to labour disputes, the fifth lowest in the world after Singapore, Brazil, Hong Kong 
and the Czech Republic. Malaysia's unemployment rate was 2.59 per cent, also one of 
the lowest in the world. It claimed that Malaysian labour-employer relations were 
'generally co-operative' and, at 5.529 points out of seven, 'among the most 
harmonious in the world'. The collective bargaining power of workers of Malaysia 
was also rated highly. In 2000, the same World Competitive Report ranked Malaysia 
at a lower but still a good 13 th place (BT, 24/4/2000). 
However, these praises should be analysed in a critical light. Views of employees, 
trade unionists as well as employers should be taken into consideration before 
believing something that might be an imbalance picture of the whole situation in 
Malaysia. It is easy to understand the readiness of the Malaysian government to accept 
this very business-orientated indicator, that Malaysia has an outstanding IR system, 
because a good report indeed helped any developing nation such as Malaysia to bring 
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in or keep investors.7 ! However, the indicator did not offer any real insights into 
issues that envelop Malaysian IR today. What it achieved was quite naive, reporting 
the situation from raw statistics that served the need from the economic point of view. 
For example, it did not probe into what it termed labour-employer relations' co-
operativeness. Nor did it explore the reasons behind the low percentage of labour 
disputes in Malaysia at any given time. This chapter, therefore, explores all the aspects 
that ensured the claimed 'harmonious IR system' in Malaysia in the 1990s. 
Arguably, the presence of 'industrial harmony' in Malaysia was achieved through 
restrictive rules and regulations that discouraged industrial disputes. It was achieved 
with the support of the MoHR whose civil servants were known for loyalty since the 
British colonial time. The government also invested in several supplementary policies 
that further ensured the economic environment was conducive. In other words, the 
low occurrence of strikes and industrial disputes was an outcome of a system that 
made only the results as reported by the World Competitive Report possible. The 
contention here is the whole Malaysian IR system was indeed pursued by the 
government to bring out such results, especially because it is good for investors. On 
the other hand, the employees as discussed below, for various reasons apart from the 
restrictive legislation, but including fear of further suppression, were unable to break 
away from the traditional way of interaction with the government. The third actor, the 
employers, while benefiting from the pro-development approach of the government, 
also lobbied for several pro-employers' policies. On top of that, the Malay Agenda 
was still an important issue under the NDP, and support from the Malays was 
7\ FDI was a \'Cry important element for economic development not just to Malaysia but all ASEAN 
countries. along with political. social and economic stability. See Chia (1993:61). 
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expected. The government used statistics to support its view that they still needed 
such specific help under the NDP. 
This policy naturally received the support of the majority Malays, who, in the 1990s, 
still dominated the public sector after the NEP had succeeded in propelling them into 
mainstream economics. By the 1990s, they were already the dominant group in 
Malaysian trade unionism. The Malays' support either in the political arena or the 
public sector was a very important issue to the government, but seldom discussed by 
scholars. In fact, their support secured the government and its continuous policies. The 
government's aversion towards the Malays' political dissent resulted in its widespread 
campaign to warn them and the public sector, which was reminded that it was their 
duty to be loyal to the government of the day. Meanwhile, the Malays were reminded 
that only the Barisan Nasional could guarantee protection of their bright future and 
special position. The Barisan Nasional has ruled since 1957 with UMNO, the party 
for the Malays, still a dominant member. An UMNO president automatically became 
the Barisan Nasional president, thus in tum became the Malaysian PM. This practice 
was not stated in the constitution but was a tradition that was adhered to and never 
challenged. The government still preferred the same old 'elite accommodation 
system', except when some issues were too critical, like the constitutional crisis 
between the government and the Malay sultans.72 In 1992, Mahathir and his cabinet 
ministers went on a nation-wide tour to 'explain' these issues to the Malaysian people. 
7~ As discussed in Chapter Eight. there were crises with the Agong in 1983 and the judiciary in 1988. 
The fonner saw the office of the Agollg and his prerogatives to delay assent to a Bill enacted by 
Parliament curbed. The later saw the removal from office the Lord President of the Supreme Court of 
Malaysia and interference in the tenure and independence of Malaysian judiciary. See further arguments 
III l.l'e (1995). 
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A strong contender for the Asian ways, the PM introduced many policies and projects 
and saw them personally implemented. Political reasons therefore were just as 
important as economic reasons for Malaysia to hold on to its restrictive rules, 
including labour laws. 
The next discussion looks into the mechanism that has helped secure the state's strong 
position in the private sector IR during the NDP. The legislative framework, the 
MoHR, and other supplementary policies completed the government's dominance in 
the sector that ensured the official outcome of Malaysian IR was 'harmonious'. It 
does, however, interpret Malaysian IR in a rather different light from the World 
Competitive Report. 
9.2.1. The Legislative Framework 
The state ensured that the laws became an integral part of Malaysian 'harmonious IR 
system'. The argument here is that Malaysian IR was much determined by labour 
laws, apart from other mechanism and supportive policies implemented by the 
govemment. During the NDP, the restrictions under the TUA and IRA were retained 
to ensure the state's dominant position. One of the major issues that remained 
contradictory was the discouragement of unionisation amongst electronics workers, 
even the f01111ation of in-house unions, while the IRA under section 4( 1) clearly stated 
that it is the right of workers to form and join a trade union. 73 In 2001, the 
go\'cmment's ban on national unions for electronics workers was still in force 
7.1 Section 4( 1) of IRA 1967 states that 'no person shall interfere with, restrain or coerce a workman or 
an employer in the exercise of his nghts to form and assist in the formation of and join a trade union 
and to participate in its lawful activitit's'. 
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(Malaysiakini, 20/8/2001). The issue that spanned more than thirty years saw there 
were only eight in-house unions for electronics workers, representing 4,400 
employees, eight years after the government lifted the ban on unionisation in 1988 
(Malaysiakini, 20/8/2001). The total number of electronics employees was estimated 
at 140,000 in 1994.74 Meanwhile, the tedious process of the registration of trade 
unions, the restrictions on strikes and other industrial disputes, and the vast power of 
the DGTUA remained.75 One trade unionist commented: 
'One civil servant can determine which union workers can join or cannot join' 
(Interview: Rajagopal, 23/1/2001). 
Under Section 26(1) IRA1967, reference to the IR Court was provided only to solve 
disputes that had failed to be resolved by any other means. This provision succeeded 
in further discouraging industrial disputes. Once a dispute was referred to the court, 
either by the parties themselves or the Minister, strikes became illegal. This referral to 
court, however, was denied to any government service or those in the service of any 
statutory authority, unless he or she had the consent of the Yang Dipertuan Agong or 
state authority. This exemption meant that the private and the public sectors were 
treated differently. In fact, Parts II, III, IV, V and VI of IRA1967 do not apply to any 
government or statutory authority. 76 
Apart from that, the ISA, the Officials Secrets Act (OSA), the Printing Press and 
Publications Act, the Sedition Act and the Penal Code were also there, capable of 
74 International Herald Tribune (18/5/1994) estimated 200,000 electronics workers in Malaysia but 1\1 F 
(1995:3) estimated around 140.000. 
75 TUA section .3 states that the Director General has the 'general supervision, direction and control of 
all matt~rs relating to trade unions throughout Malaysia'. 
7() See Part X St:ction 52. IRA 1967. This issue is discussed further in Chapter Ten. 
invoking any restriction on the exercise of trade unions' rights or requiring police 
permission for public meetings (IFCTUAS, 1998). The fact was that the government 
would not tolerate any 'militant' movement, including that of trade unions, and this 
was admitted by a government official (Interview: Md Marzuki, 2/3/1999). One trade 
unionist summarised the government's reluctance to grant more freedom to trade 
unions: 
'Trade unions can form governments. If the trade unions were not controlled, 
they can become powerful and have political impact, therefore the law must 
remain restrictive' (Interview: Sivananthan, 2/2/1001). 
This view has its basis. During the NEP period, the relationship with the government 
worsened when trade unionists supported or sympathised with the opposition. After 
the MAS strike, the government resorted to ISA (See Chapter Eight). During the 
NDP, the unions never formed a real threat, and were far from being militant, but the 
government still kept all the restrictive legislation because it served the purpose, as a 
reminder that it was there in case needed. The negative effect of the laws on 
Malaysian society was reflected in the way it succumbed to the various restrictions. 
From past experience, the Malaysian people knew the government would not hesitate 
to use these laws in the name of 'national interests and security'. This was further 
proven when arrests were made under ISA during the 'reformation movement' that 
emerged after Anwar's sacking, and subsequently more arrests after Anwar was 
imprisoned.77 In line with the 'elite accommodation system', as discussed in Chapter 
Seven, Malaysians were accepting the fact that many issues were considered 
'sensitive' and therefore a crime to discuss in public. When the government claimed 
77 See Malaysiakini Online. which reported of these arrests. The report in this online web-page was 
more open and gave insights into the political side of the arrests than other national newspapers that 
reported the arrests as being 'for national security reasons' and claimed that the people \\-ho were 
arrested were militant. In fact. they accused them of being involved with the Mujahideen of 
Afghanistan_ See also MTlICAR,1997/98. 
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that these arrests were made for security reasons, the conviction became legitimate. 
Recently, Malaysia formed the Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) , and the 
families of the people arrested under the ISA at least now had a place to tum to. 78 
Unions and international bodies condemned the use of ISA as barbaric and against 
basic human rights. Introduced to curb communism in the 1960s, and used to protect 
the colonial government then, although now in the name of 'national interests', the 
government used the law to protect its own. Therefore, the whole ten years of NDP 
saw that nothing changed regarding the use of laws and the restrictions in labour laws. 
Wide-ranging interference in trade union affairs, and especially the powers of the 
Minister and the DGTUA, was retained.79 
The above discussion proves that through legislation, the government had ensured the 
trade union movement would not be a threat to its national planning programmes, 
especially to ensure the success of the NDP. However, as already mentioned, the 
system was also developed with the help of another means, the MoHR. 
9.2.2. The Ministry of Human Resources as Administrator 
The MoHR remained the ministry that was responsible for administering the above 
labour laws for private sector IR. As discussed below, as the most important ministry 
to oversee the smooth running of Malaysian IR system, through various departments, 
's While this study was being undertaken, the SUHAKAM was under attack from the government for 
coming out with a report condemning the police over an illegal demonstration by Anwar supporters 
(Malaysiakini, 20/8/2001). For further reading on SUHAKAM, see Rachagan and Tikamdas, 1999. 
79 All the trade unionists interviewed agreed that these restrictions became one of the factors that turned 
away those who were interested in forming unions because employees had to face both employers and 
the govenmlcnt (Interviews: Syed Shahir; Rajasekaran; AJ Patrick; Rajagopal; Sivananthan and 
,\runasalam) 
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it ensured that the administration of the EA 1955, IRA1967 and TUA 1959 were in line 
with the objectives of the NDP. 
The encouragement on in-house unions adopted in the early 1980s instead of national 
or larger unions, continued during the NDP. The TUA1959 did not state that only 
such unions should be registered but the policy that was in line with the LEP was 
continued by the TUAD, under the MoHR. By 1995 there were 364 in-house unions, 
making more than half of the total number of unions in Malaysia, with a membership 
of 299,618 (See Table 9.2). In 1985, there were only 52 in-house unions with a 
combined membership of 25,000 (Aminuddin, 1996: 81). In other words, the pro in-
house union policy adopted by the government succeeded with the help of the TUAD. 
The total numbers of unions in 1995 show an increase to 502, as compared to 369 in 
1985 (Aminuddin, 1990:23). The union density was only 8.86%, with a total 
employment of more than 7 million people. 
Meanwhile, the IRD, the most important department under the MoHR responsible for 
'industrial harmony', made sure disputes were settled through conciliation. As far as 
the government was concerned, conciliation was much more preferred, and strikes or 
any industrial disputes should be a last resort (Interview: Ismail Rahim, 17/1/2001). 
As discussed above, it has been shown that conciliation was used more than Industrial 
Court (IR Court) decisions or the minister's decisions and the IRD had officers trained 
to ensure this route was taken. They claimed that the system worked satisfactorily, 
based on a decreasing trend in trade disputes as seen in Figure 9.1. 
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Table 9.2: Trade unions in Malaysia (as of 30th September 1995) 
In-house Members National Members 
Private Sector 186 135,634 94 256,828 
Statutory Bodies 84 62,625 3 20,975 
and Local Government 
Federal Government 94 101,359 41 123,341 
Total 
Total employment 
Union density 
364 299,618 138 401 ,1 44 
Source: Trade Union Affairs Department, MoHR. 
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Figure 9.1 Trade Disputes, 1993-98 
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Figure 9.2. shows that 81 % of the cases referred to the IRD for 1997 were settled 
through the conciliation method, and only 2% needed the Minister's interference. 
Table 9.3 shows the number of industrial dispute cases in Malaysia for 1993-97, and 
the methods used to settle them. Most of the responsibility for settling disputes relied 
on the ffccti eness of the operation of the IRD. Here we would see a contradiction of 
VI 1.:\ from the govemment, as opposed to the union's side, regarding the IRD's role 
in the pr c . Th lRD perc i ed their roles and objectives in the \ hole system in 
lula in toda a en uring harn10niou IR in upport of the government's overall 
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NDP. Figure 9.2 meanwhile supports the government's claim that the minister s 
interference in disputes was minimal. In 1997, for example, the conciliation process 
solved 81 % of the total cases reported to IRD, while 17% was solved by the IR Court 
and only 2% decisions were made by the Minister. The DGIR claimed that through the 
conciliation process, the government was more sympathetic towards the weaker party, 
Table 9.3: Industrial Disputes: Cases and Settlement, 1993 - 1997 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Cases brought from last year No 169 170 128 171 250 
Cases reported No 534 503 511 476 463 
Cases seen to No 703 673 639 647 
Cases settled No 533 545 468 397 440 
% 75.8 8l.0 73.2 61.4 6l.7 
METHODS OF SETTLEMENT 
i. Cases settled through conciliation No 440 478 404 361 355 
ii. Cases referred to Industrial Court No 67 43 47 31 76 
iii. Cases not referred to Industrial No 26 24 17 5 9 
Court By Minister's Decision 
Total 533 545 468 397 440 
Source: IRD, MoHR 
Figure 9.2. Methods of Disputes Settlement, 1997 
Dispute Settlement,1997 
17% 2% 
81 % 
[C"ConClllatlon • Referredlo Industrial Court 0 Minister's decIsion I 
ouree: IRD, MoHR 
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the workers (Interview: Ismail Rahim, 25/1/1999). According to him, the role of a 
DGIR is not to decide, but to foster the relationship between workers and employers, 
and IRD officers must always be seen as neutral. Moreover, its role was to enable both 
parties to conciliate, with the law there for guidance. The process involved the 
disputed parties referring their case to the IRD. The IRD officers would try to help 
them reach an agreement. If that failed, the case would be referred to the Minister, 
who decided on the case or referred it to the IR Court. Compared to the LD, the DGIR 
claimed that the IRD is more human, since it always investigated into the reasons 
behind any dispute. Even in the IR Court, inquiries were made before any arbitration. 
Therefore, he also insisted that IR Court decisions favoured the workers. 
The DGIR's VIews were supported by the MEF, the most dominant employers 
association in Malaysia. Its Deputy Executive Director claimed that employers 
preferred disputes settled in the IRD rather than the IR Court (Interview: Shamsuddin 
Bardan, 14/12/1998). Apart from playing the 'policing role', which he claimed was 
played by the LD, he stressed that the IRD played the 'moderator's role'. To the 
MEF, both IRD and IR Court leaned more towards employees. 
' ... MEF perceived that they are leaning more towards employees, including 
the IR Court system. In fact the IR Court ... 85% is in favour of the employees. 
MEF feels that they are not objective enough' (Interview: Shamsudin Bardan, 
14/12/1998). 
It is interesting to note that it was the MEF top official who was representing 
employers, while the DGIR, represented the government, as when analysing the IR 
system, both were on the same side and both were of a view that the system was pro-
workers. However, this is not an uncommon stand, as from this study it has been 
found that the employers were not as disappointed as the employees. 
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Statistical figures seem to support the MEF's VIews. There were a much bigger 
number of cases settled in the IRD rather than in the IR Court from 1993-1997. The 
percentage of the settling of disputes at the IRD was always above 80%, while the 
cases settled at the IR Court was always less than 20% (refer Table 9.3.). It seems that 
the government could make a claim that the conciliation system of IR, based on a 
harmonious relationship between employers and employees, was achieved based on 
these figures. More conciliation meant more settling of disputes through discussion, 
rather than through the 'court of law', if that is what the IR Court could be called. 
Looking at figures from 1993 to 1997, it also reflects the lower percentage of 
interference from the Minister, since cases settled by him (and not brought to IR 
Court) were always fewer than cases settled by the IRD and even by the IR Court. In 
fact, the minister's decision in the settling of trade disputes was never more than 5%, 
judging by the figures of 1993-1997. In a way, the government could claim that its 
direct interference (through the minister's meddling in the trade disputes cases) is low 
as compared to the cases being settled by the system on its own (through conciliation). 
The IRD did not encourage the employees to go to High Court 'for their own 
interests' (Interview: Ismail Rahim, 25/1/1999). It also claimed that it was protecting 
workers' interests when it discouraged employees to refer any of their trade disputes 
to the IR Court. Towards the tendencies in the 1990s of workers preferring reference 
to High Court, the DGIR blamed the lawyers 'who only want to make money' 
(Interview: Ismail Rahim, 25/1/1999). He claimed 90% of the cases brought to the 
High Court were thrown out. While the sympathy towards rejection by the High Court 
could be genuine, the argument in this study is that the department, in line with the 
govcmment's 'industrial ham10ny' policy, did not like to see disputes go to any of the 
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courts at all. Conversely, it prided itself on reporting lesser strikes or any industrial 
disputes and cases settled at the IRD level. 
This could be traced back to the dislike of open conflicts by Malaysians in general and 
the various laws that could be used against any actions that could be perceived as 
being against 'the national interests', a view supported by a trade unionist (Interview: 
Arunasalam, 21111/2000). The government always viewed demonstrations as negative 
publicity for Malaysia and therefore damaging to its reputation to potential investors. 
However, the analysis so far has shown that the government preferred and succeeded 
in settling disputes in ways that did not create havoc, economically, politically or 
socially. The cultural factor that influenced the Malaysian people in general, further 
complicated matters, but helped the government's policy. Malaysian society still 
responded to non-confrontational ways and the government provided the conciliatory 
mechanism at IRD level to enable it to do so. Therefore, in this context, the IRD 
succeeded in playing its intended role in line with the Malaysian NDP. 
As sct under the NDP, the HRD became an important instrument to create and 
promote a productive and disciplined labour force (OPP2, 1991 :5). So, under the 
MoHR, an HRD Fund was set up, providing employees with opportunities to improve 
skills. The upgrading of technical training contributed to higher productivity output, 
especially in the manufacturing sector. Flexible regulation was also named as the 
cause for a better understanding between employers and their workers. The HRD 
Council, under the prO\'ision of HRD Act 1992, promoted programmes that helped 
employers to train or re-train their workers. Moreover, the HRDF showed some 
positive dc\'e!opment with employers gi\'ing co-operation, as seen in Table 9.4, 
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However, m 1999, the HRDF was already having difficulties in operating because 
employers were not keen to contribute to the fund, thus the government threatened to 
withdraw its assistance. The MoHR was given an additional responsibility in co-
ordinating manpower planning to ensure that Malaysia had a supply of multi-skilled, 
disciplined and efficient labour, an effort that started in 1986. If the effort succeeded, 
it would contribute to a better employee-employer relationship, and might replace the 
traditional role of the labour movement, which the government preferred. 
Another department in the MoHR, the LD, claimed it promoted several programmes 
for good relationship between employees and employers, encouraging 'self-
government in industry'. The department's direct Hot Lines saw customers provided 
with 'fast, easy and cheap communication' (Interview: Mohd Abdul Wahab, 
2/3/1999). 
Table 9.4 
Human Resource Development Fund, 1993-1997 
Numbers of Employers Registered with HRDC by Sector, and Levy Collected and 
Financial Assistance by HRDC 
Year Manufacturing services Levy Financial Percentage 
Collected Assistance Utilisation 
(RM million) (RM million) Of financial 
assistance 
1993 3.254 - 55.5 3.1 5.5 
1994 3,669 - 73.3 47.8 64.9 
1995 3,966 778 100,9 89.6 88.8 
1996 4,393 1,027 126.7 158.9 125.4 
1997 4,702 1,181 145 159.5 110 
Source: I Iuman Resources Development CouncIl, MInIStry of Human Resources. 
There was the Special Squad preventing the outbreak of conflicts and labour 
inspections to ensure compliance of laws where minimum standards and benefits were 
followed. The Labour Education Services and Promotional Visits were some of the 
programmes claimed to be working well. LDs all over Malaysia also tried to supervise 
the provisions of workers' housing, nurseries and other amenities, issuing labour 
pennits, offering advice and counselling. They enforced several related laws other 
than EA1955.8o A senior official claimed that the department became 'partners' to 
employers and employees, where emphasis was more on development, and less on 
penalty (Interview: Mohd Abdul Wahab, 2/3/1999). The department dealt directly 
with workers, employers and members of the public and worked closely with other 
related departments, including the IRD and TUAD. For example, through statutory 
inspections, cases of labour laws violation were referred to the Manpower Department 
while illegal workers were referred to Immigration Department. It also claimed to 
work closely with CUEPACS and MTUC in almost all events concerning IR. For 
example, its 'Sexual Harassment' workshop in 1999 was attended by 400 human 
resource managers, workers and representatives from MTUC and CUEP ACS 
(Interview: Mohd Abdul Wahab, 2/3/1999). Other than that, it claimed impartiality 
towards the handling of related affairs of labour with equal attention to employers and 
employees. 
All the officials interviewed at the MoHR agreed that the government did not have to 
ratify all the ILO Conventions or give in to international pressures. Sl They stressed the 
need for Malaysia to always choose its own course, one that suited the nation. The 
senior Director of Labour would not like to see foreigners 'intervene' again in 
so Other than EA 1955, the Labour Department oversee the implementation of Wages Council Act 1947, 
Workers Minimum Standard of Housing and Amenities Act 1990, Children and Young Persons Act 
1966. Workmen's Compensation Act 1952, Employment Restriction Act 1968, Employment 
Infomlation Act 1953 and the South Indian Labour Fund Ordinance 1958. 
81 Based on inten'lews with officials at the IRD, TUAD and Labour Department. 
342 
Malaysian affairs, like the MAS-AEU strike in 1980. To him, the 0.LAC was a good 
enough tripartite system that worked for the country. 
There were about 80,000 workers retrenched in 1998 alone, but there were almost no 
strikes in the private sector (Interviews: Mohd Abdul Wahab, 2/3/1999; Ismail Rahim, 
25/1 /1999). Industrial disputes increased during the seven months of 1998, with seven 
strikes involving just 933 workers, compared to four strikes involving 746 workers in 
1997 (Economic Report 1998/99: 154). A total of 1,479 man-days were lost as a result 
of these strikes, but this was lower than the 2,198 man-days lost during the same 
period in 1997 (Economic Report 1998/99: 154). The LD issued the guidelines for 
retrenching workers to be used by the employers as a reference. It was claimed to be a 
show of co-operation by employers to ease problems arisen from the difficult situation 
(Interview: Mohd Abdul Wahab, 2/3/1999). That would mean making less use of the 
EA1955, but more of the guidelines. From 1 August 1999, it became mandatory for 
employers to report to LDs before retrenching workers. Apart from the guideline, the 
government encouraged employers not to retrench workers, but instead re-train them, 
using the HRDF as one option. 
However, the MTUC was not satisfied at all with these measures and came out with a 
proposal called the National Retrenchment Scheme (NRS), that was opposed by both 
employers and the government itself (See 9.3.4.2). This issue showed the government 
siding with the employers at the expense of workers. Even though it claimed to be 
pro-active, and in a way succeeded, the government departments, such as the Labour 
Department provided only ad-hoc solutions. The fact was, without the enforcement of 
the law, employers had more freedom to treat workers unfairly, as shown in cases of 
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retrenchment during the economic crisis. As long as the reasons given by employers 
were taken as a final and binding factor, workers were left in the lurch, with nobody 
and no laws to protect them. This was the case when factories had to be shut down, or 
claimed bankruptcy and the workers just had to accept this decision especially if made 
by the Labour Court (Interview: Rajasekaran, 11112/1998). 
The argument above shows that even though the government had provided a 
'comprehensive system' as they claimed, the employees side, as represented by trade 
unionists' views, were dissatisfied. The MoHR, through its various departments, 
especially the IRD, TUAD, and LDs, ensured that outwardly the IR system seemed 
harmonious, as it was very important for the government to portray as such, for the 
benefit of investors. They had the backing of annual statistics to support their views. 
Overall, the employees' side, which was already served with the restrictive labour 
legislation, did not have much choice but to comply with the system. Therefore, the 
IRD conciliation system seemed to have worked, with the officials seemed to have 
played their neutral part, as seen by the number of cases settled by them and their 
claims that was supported by the MEF, that the IR Court also sided with employees. 
However, the system also revealed the other option denied to employees, that is direct 
negotiations with employers when faced with disputes. Here, it shows the 
government's interference with the IR system in Malaysia. Instead of leaving the daily 
affairs to be resolved between the disputing parties (which might have shortened the 
time that has to be spent on the dispute), the system enabled the government to ensure 
most disputes were solved on their terms. However, the most important thing was that 
it ensured disputing parties did not resort to actions that would smear the good image 
that the government protected, such as strikes. As will be discussed under 9.3.1, the 
economic crisis unearthed the flaws in the Malaysian IR system, and again put the 
employees at the receiving end. 
9.2.3. The State with Supplementary Policies 
The discussion below looks into the state's supplementary policies that completed the 
Malaysian comprehensive IR system. While the MoHR already ensured the 
administering of the government's labour laws, various policies to support the already 
strong position were introduced. The Vision 2020, the tripartite bodies, as well as the 
1975 Code of Conduct for Industrial Harmony, apart from old policies from the 
1980s, have ensured that the Malaysian IR was maintained. 
The government claimed to have a good tripartite system, where co-operation among 
the workers, management and the government was encouraged (Interview: Ismail 
Rahim, 2511/1999). The NLAC continued its role as the forum to ensure the Federal 
Government received input and feedback from employees and employers. The 
tripartite system was also extended to a number of bodies, such as the Wages Council, 
the Industrial Court, the Employees' Provident Fund (EPF), the Social Security 
Organisation (SOCSO) and the National Productivity Council (NPC). The Code for 
Conduct of Industrial Harmony of 1975 remained the underlying force in promoting 'a 
strategic alliance' with employers' and employees' organisations, both admitted by the 
employers' side and the government (Interviews: Ismail Rahim, 1711/2001; 
Shamsuddin Bardan, 1111211998). In other words, the government claimed the 
presence of a tripartite system where employees' views were considered. However, 
this \\'as not what the employees' side portrayed (Interviews: Rajasekaran. 
11/1211998, 23/2 2000). E\'cn though the system was tripartite in that there \\ere 
representatives of workers in the tripartite bodies, their actual contribution was 
questioned by unionists themselves (Interviews: Syed Shahir, 911/2001; Raj as ekaran , 
11/12/1998). All questioned the extent of the government's readiness to accept their 
views as 'true partners in development', and involving them in joint decisions as 
being claimed (Interviews: Rajasekaran, 11212001; Rajagopal, 231112001; Syed Shahir, 
9/1/2001). 
The MoHR did hold more dialogue seSSIOns and worked closely with industrial 
organisations and employers' associations. It also made attempts to encourage greater 
private sector participation and interest in skills development and upgrading, 
especially during the economic crisis (Economic Report, 1998/99: 152-153). There 
was co-operation on the placement of job-seekers, employment of part-time labour, 
increasing women's participation in the labour market, and helping school-Ieavers at 
SPM level (Malaysian Certificate of Education level) to be absorbed under 
apprenticeship scheme. The MoHR expanded the capacity and improved the quality of 
training programmes at industrial training institutes by adopting innovative and 
aggressive strategies to market customised courses. The staff of the Ministry were 
trained with managerial and organisational skills, including in-house training 
programmes which instilled greater team spirit, togetherness and co-operation. The 
Ministry aimed 'to encourage and co-ordinate the development of tripartite co-
operation between workers, employers and Government and to create a harmonious IR 
climate towards achieving the goals of Vision 2020'(HRM booklet). Again, in all the 
nine departments under this ministry, the underlying objectives were to attain 
industrial harmony through the human factor (Interviews: Ismail Rahim, 1711/2001; 
Mohd Abdul Wahab, 21311999; Izhar Harun, 16/112001). Another tripartite council, 
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the National Occupational Safety and Health Council (NOSHC), discussed studies, 
and investigated matters regarding the safety, health and welfare of workers at the 
workplace and advised the minister. Meanwhile, the Wages Council (WC) covered 
regulations on minimum remuneration and conditions of employment on only certain 
categories of workers. The toughest job was given to the IRD in ensuring 'the 
existence of a positive and harmonious relationship between employers and 
employees and between their respective trade unions' .82 The government has also 
produced the Guidelines on Wage Reform System, adopted by the NLAC on 1 August 
1996. The guidelines proposed to establish a closer link between wages and 
productivity so as to enhance competitiveness and employment. It also hoped to 
enable employers to develop a wider and more systematic approach towards 
improving productivity and wages, based on the active involvement and co-operation 
of their employees. The government claimed that this offered employees a fair share 
of the gains and contributed towards job satisfaction, but actually it acted out of 
awareness of a tight labour market situation faced by Malaysia due to full 
employment. It was also concerned about the rising of wages, which might make 
Malaysia less competitive to FDI. 
Unsurprisingly, unionists were not impressed with the steps taken by the government 
to better its relations with employers and employees in the private sector, claiming the 
efforts as 'not enough'. The idea of 'productivity-linked-wage-system' was also 
regarded as an effort to stop workers from enjoying pay rises under the collective 
bargaining system as practised now (Interview: Mustafa 10han, 2411211998). The 
~2 S 1 -' . h 1 I:L' Hlp: \\ww:">.Janng.my, Ipln 0 IL'Cti\'t'.ltm. 
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MTUC argued that if the present system was to be changed, then at least there should 
be a minimum wage regulation first (Interview: Rajasekaran, 1/2 /2001). However, 
while the unions disagreed, the idea was well received by employers, as represented 
by the MEF (Interview: Shamsuddin Bardan, 1111211998). The disagreement on issues 
such as these highlights the presence of conflicts between the government, employers 
and employees, with the employers clearly siding with the government. It shows that 
study on the Malaysian IR system cannot be based on the official statistic produced by 
the government. 
The NDP was introduced in line with the introduction of Vision 2020,83 which 
incorporated not only an economic goal to tum Malaysia into a fully developed, 
industrialised nation, but also a political goal, to become a master of its own economy. 
This referred to its aims for Malaysia to be united, peaceful, integrated and 
harmonious, where the society was secure, confident, respected and robust and 
committed to excellence. The country should by then be a mature, consensual and 
exemplary democracy of 'fully moral' citizens strongly imbued with spiritual values 
and the highest ethical standards, 'economically just, society with inter-ethnic 
economic parity' (Mohd Sheriff, 1993 :67; Gomez and lomo, 1999: 169). These 
objectives concurred well with the NDP, which was to attain 'a balanced development 
in order to establish a more united and just society' (OPP2, 1991 :5). Both policies 
strengthened the government's overall position to create a more conducive and 
8_1 Apart from the NDP, there already \\ere the National Education Policy, National Culture Policy, 
0iational Agriculture Policy, Look East Policy, National Industrial Policy, 0iational Population Policy, 
National Women Policy and National Labour Policy. This is besides other policies such as 1\ew 
Approach In Village and Rural Development, Leadership By Example, Clean Efficient and 
Trustworthy, Assimilation of Islamic Values In The Administration, Policy To Reduce Public Sector 
Expenditure, Malaysia Incorporated and Privatisation (Govemment Policies, 1991 and Dasar-Dasar 
1't'IIIhallgllllall Malaysia. 199~ _ INTA0I). 
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harmonious environment for the economy as well as the IR system. Both initially won 
substantial praise, even from the opposition. In fact, according to Gomez and lomo 
(1999: 170) there was some enthusiasm, especially among non-Bumiputeras for Vision 
2020. The policy seemed to forge a Bangsa Malaysia (Malaysian nation), 
transcending ethnic identities and loyalties that appealed to the Chinese and Indians. 
The NEP, by comparison, made them feel second-class citizens with special privileges 
given to the Malays and Bumiputeras. In a way, Vision 2020 and the NDP worked 
together to bring a certain degree of meritocracy in Malaysia, and thereby ensured 
another ten-year period of smooth running of the country and its IR. It was seen as a 
change in Mahathir's earlier ideas, especially from his 'Malay Dilemma' days. This 
was especially true in regards to his economic liberalisation encouraging the private 
sector with privatisation and deregulation (Jomo, 1999:85). 
However, his change did not include the shift concernmg labour issues. The 
electronics industries, still considered the biggest contributor to Malaysian economy, 
were still denied the right to form national unions. As in 2000, there were only 8 in-
house unions in the electronics sector, representing only 5,509 members (MoHR 
unpublished data, 2000). This was despite claims that there were more than 120,000 
workers in that industry (IMFI994/95 Report). However, the government's fear that 
investors would run away from Malaysia was quite genuine, as there were threats of 
pulling out of Malaysia from American companies in the 1980s, when the government 
voiced its permission to fonn national unions in the sector (discussed in Chapter 8). 
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There were also other developing countries that could become more interesting, 
offering advantageous such as low labour coStS. 84 
The above discussion shows that the government took a meticulously detailed 
approach in ensuring the private sector was protected from various forces that 
challenged it in the 1990s through a number of supporting policies, administered 
through the various 'tripartite' bodies. However, it was clear that the government 
expected all parties, especially trade unions, to understand that 'industrial harmony' 
was important above all else, in particular to ensure the smooth-running of the private 
sector as the catalyst for economic growth, which as it is was facing other challenges 
as well, such as from neighbouring countries. As discussed below, there were also 
other old and new forces that challenged the government's authority over IR, but not 
strongly enough to change its hold, and especially in the legislative areas. 
9.3. The Contending Factors and the IR Issues in the Private Sector 
There were several internal and external issues prevalent during the 1990s that 
influenced the role of the state in IR. Some were old issues that concerned economic, 
political and socio-cultural factors. Under the NDP, the government was more 
committed to sustain high economic growth, more dependent to the FDIs, and 
diversify its economic ventures. 85 To retain Malaysia as one attractive country for 
,4 Malaysia was aware of the competitive edge of the neighbouring economies like ASEAN, or even 
other developing countries in Asia. and Latin America. See Anuwar Ali (1994:718) and Ismail Mohd 
Salleh (1994: 657) who analysed that Malaysia may lose its 'competitive nature' and 'comparative 
advantage' respectively, to these countries. 
8~ In 1991. Malaysia was already gearing towards a manufacturing economy instead of agricultural-
based. Therefore. its dependence on private and foreign investments grew. Its objective under the :-:OP 
was to increase manufacturing exports to 81 % by the year 2000, therefore in comparison let agricultural 
e\pnrt decline to just 6"0 (OPP2. 1991: 21). 
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investors, the government believed that political and social stability was vital as \\·ell. 
Therefore it was committed to retain the restrictive legislation, the administrative 
mechanism, the pro-IR harmony policies, and the lopsided relationship with the trade 
unions, that would ensure this stability. However, Malaysia also experienced several 
challenges during this period, as it faced the process of globalisation, seen in the 
external forces that became prominent during this NDP period. For example, Malaysia 
was forced to join the growing number of states that had established special 
institutions dedicated to promote and protect human rights, by adopting the Human 
Rights Commission of Malaysia in 1999 (Rachagan and Tikamdas, 1999: 173). 
However, apart from that, the government was reluctant to change in many other areas 
that would have made a difference to its IR system. Mostly, this was because it still 
regarded high economic growth as the most important factor to ensure Malaysia 
achieves the status of a developed country, latest by 2020. Therefore, economic-
related factors were always a dominant force that influenced the state's role in IR. 
From this point of view, the 1990s could clearly be divided into two parts; the first 
half of the decade, and the second half of it. The former could be summed up by 
looking at the report of the MP6, while the latter by trying to examine the economic 
downturn faced by the Southeast Asia region that also hit Malaysia, especially from 
1997. As for political stability, the Barisan Nasional won the 1995 by a landslide 
majority and in the 1999 general election by two-third majority, ensuring their place 
as the only coalition government ever to govern Malaysia thus far. However, the 
political drama of 1998 saw the grip of the Malays' dominant party, UMNO, in the 
1999 general election, loosening on the ethnic Malays. By 1999, the government was 
already reporting that the Malaysian economy had recovered from 'the severe 
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deflationary impact of the regional financial crisis, which had resulted in a 7.5 % 
contraction of the economy in 1998' (Economic Report, 1999/2000: 17). The 
discussion below highlights these contending factors that influenced the state's roles 
during the NDP. 
9.3.1. Economic Growth as the Prime Factor to the State's Role 
The Malaysian economic scenario in the first half of 1990s, which is also the first half 
of the OPP2 and marked the period of implementation of MP6 (1991-95), was 
reported as 'a momentous period of rapid progress' (MP7, 1996: 3). In fact, according 
to official reports, Malaysia enjoyed a robust economy from 1988 to mid-1990s, with 
an average growth rate of over 8% per annum (Malaysia Human Rights Report, 1998: 
45). As early as 1993, the World Bank praised Malaysia as among the eight High-
Perfonning Asian Economies (HPAEs). They attributed this to 'careful policy 
intervention' (World Bank Report, 1993). The last year of the MP6 represents the 
eighth consecutive year of rapid growth, 'making the period the most buoyant and the 
longest sustained growth achieved' by Malaysia so far (MP7, 1996: 3). It was with the 
confidence that the strong fundamentals underlying the rapid expansion in the 
economy were already in place, together with a sound social and political 
environment, that Malaysia hoped to approach the second phase of its OPP2 with 
greater strength (MP7, 1996: 3). 
However, the second phase of 1990s was not such an optimistic picture. In 1995, 
while presenting the 1995 Bank Negara (National Bank) Report, the Bank Negara 
Governor said the Malaysian economy gre\\' at 9.5% as compared to 8.7% in 199..t. 
(The Star, 28/3/1996). The high gro\\,th marked the eighth consecutive year of growth, 
making it the longest period of sustained economIC growth. He claimed that the 
prospects for 1996 looked favourable but expected the economy to grow by a lower 
8.3% in 1996 (BT, 28/3/1997). The Malaysian current account deficit in 1995 was 
RM 17.8 billion (8.8% of GNP) as compared to RM 11 billion only or 6.2% in 1994. 
The services sector was expected to be new engine of growth in the overall plan to 
transform the Malaysian economy towards achieving an industrialised nation status 
(The Sun, 28/3/1996). In 1995, the government services sub-sector was the second 
largest employer, absorbing about 24% of the labour force in the services sector 
(11.1 % of total employment). From Bank Negara 1995 Report the FDI still showed 
strong inflow but already it was offset by the increase in outflows for overseas 
investment, mainly to Singapore, followed by Hong Kong, the US and Australia (The 
Sun, 28/3/1996). By June 1996 there were already worries over the downturn in the 
global electronics market. An automobile plant announced it was cutting its 3,323 
workforce by 30% as many positions in the company were said to be 'redundant' (The 
Star, 2417/1996). A large manufacturing plant in Johor released 560 employees in the 
same month. There were other increasing signals that the economy was heading 
downwards. Oblivious to many, between 1991-1994, the region's share in FDI had 
already dropped. The MITI commented that the region's rising labour costs had 
prompted foreign companies to look elsewhere for investment opportunities. Bank 
interest rates soared when the three major commercial banks in Malaysia raised their 
BLR from 8.8 to 9%. Malaysia, who did not intend to be labour-intensive 
manufacturer, had to improve its technology base to attract high-tech and value-added 
industries. By July 1997, Malaysia, like some of its East Asian neighbours, was hit 
hard by one of the worst economic crises, in particular the attack on its currency. 
Suddenly, Malaysia who had been described as the second-tier NIC, along with its 
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Southeast Asian neighbours Thailand and Indonesia suffered from it very badly, and 
drastic measures were taken by the government to counter the effects. 86 In its 1998/99 
Economic Report, the government admitted that the employment situation had 
deteriorated, the unemployment rate had increased to 4.9% as compared to 2.6% in 
1997, and companies resorted to rationalising costs through downsizing (Economic 
Report 1998/99: 148-149). A post cabinet meeting announced a special fund for 
certain selected Malaysians whose ventures in business were the hardest hit (Jomo, 
1998: 186-187). While certain quarters blamed Malaysia's mismanagement of the 
economy (Gomez and Jomo, 1999), the PM blamed Western currency speculators, in 
particular George Soros. Analysts started referring to 'Asia's Miracle' as 'The Myth 
of Asia's Miracle' with a sharp decline in FDI (Ngeow, 1998). With this scenario, it 
was almost inevitable that the government would be defensive and stand its ground 
over stale IR policies, even though the unions still tried to mount some pressure over 
certain issues thought to be their struggle for many years, as well as various new ones. 
Three examples given below, concerning the issue of minimum wage regulation, the 
foreign workers and the EPF, show that foe economic reasons, the government was 
reluctant to change its decision, even though under pressure from unions. 
9.3.1.1. Minimum Wage Regulation 
The issue of minimum wage regulation has been unsuccessfully fought for by the 
MTUC since fifty years ago. Trade union leaders have claimed the government has 
been reluctant in the fear of losing investors (Interview: G. Rajasekaran, 23/2/2000). 
80 See for example, lomo K.S (eds), 1998. By 3 September 1997, a special fund ofRM60billion were 
set up, and this help from the government faced strong criticism from observers, who saw it as a move 
to save . cronies'. Cronyism and nepotism then became a central issue brought forward by even the 
Youth Wing of UMNO, supported strongly by the then Deputy Prime Minister. Both the Youth Wing 
Leader and the deputy then lost their respective positions in UMNO. 
This was despite the country enjoying full employment and having no problems in 
attracting FDI prior to the economic crisis. 
The MTUC leaders claimed that in 1998 the PM agreed personally that a minimum 
wage for Malaysian workers should be RM1200. In January 2000, the PM said he had 
never promised as such, but had however 'dreamed' of such for workers one day 
(Interview: Rajasekaran, 231212000; MTUCAR, 1997/1998:3). MTUC leaders argued 
the government should back the suggestion of a proper minimum wage, which would 
show how much Malaysia had developed, and leave the economy to the nature of the 
market forces. 87 The private sector employers, as expected, were not in favour of this 
demand. The Executive Director of MEF argued that the Malaysian workers would be 
better off without a minimum wage. He asserted that 'MTUC has been overly silent 
regarding the level of minimum wage it feels appropriate for Malaysia' .88 Denying 
this, the MTUC claimed they had on numerous occasions called for a minimum wage 
of at least RM600. This figure was calculated in 1996 and was based on a worker's 
basic needs of food, accommodation, education, clothing, medical care, transport, 
social security coverage, recreation and social and cultural requirements. In fact, the 
MTUC IR Officer admitted that the 1996 figure was 'a pittance' compared to the daily 
increases in goods and accommodation. Earning RM600 per month would not qualify 
a worker for a low-cost housing loan of RM25,000 at the time (Interview: Premesh 
Chandran, 23/212000; MTUC Labour News, June 1999). 
~7 This VICW was based on interviews with G.Rajasegaran, 23/2/2000; Premesh Chandran, 23/2 2000; 
r'liustafa Johan, 24d2/1998; Rajagopal, 23 112001 and Vejaragavan. 3/3/1999). 
88 See Http: \\'\\'w.11ltuL'.org.myilssuesiminimum \\age necessalY for socia.htm). 
Malaysia's next door neighbour, Singapore, in a number of ways had influenced its 
policies. The country had no minimum wage regulation (Interview: Matthias Yeoh, 
2911 /200 1), but wages for production workers in Singapore started at S$950.00. 
Higher wages would push an economy beyond the labour intensive phase of 
industrialisation. An economy that relied on labour intensiveness would be challenged 
by economies with lower labour costs, like China, Indonesia and Vietnam, and this 
had already happened in the late 1990s. Industries inevitably had to evolve and adopt 
more capital and technological modes of production in order to produce a higher value 
of goods. Though a smaller skilled labour force might be needed, each worker would 
be able to enjoy higher returns for their jobs, and industry would remain globally 
competitive. Singapore and South Korea had taken this action, and Malaysian political 
leaders insisted this was the competitive edge Malaysia must retain. The PM was 
adamant that Malaysia would move into higher level industries, and capital intensive 
production but did not have to have a minimum wage regulation. Until today, the 
issue has not been resolved as desired by unions. 
9.3.1.2. Foreign Workers 
Due to the economic boom in early 1990s, the issue of foreign workers in Malaysia 
became more serious, creating unexpected problems that affected them and the 
Unions. By October 1996, reportedly there were a total of 449,565 legal or 
documented foreign workers in Malaysia (NST, 25 October 1996). It was the 
manufacturing sector that absorbed the bigger number of the foreign workers, a 
number that did not include the presence of illegal or undocumented workers in 
~ lalaysia. lomo and Kanapathy (1996: 13) argued that the actual number of 
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documented and undocumented workers in Malaysia amounted to one to two million, 
and this made up between 12.5% and 25% of official labour figures. 
The problem became severe because in many cases employers still preferred them to 
local workers (BH, 26/5/1998) mainly because they could be paid lower wages. There 
were cases where such workers were contracted by irresponsible agents to work either 
for non-existent companies or other than those mentioned in their travel documents. 
Since this practice was against Malaysian immigration law, the workers were subject 
to arrests, imprisonment or deportation. Either that or they found out that their 
contracts had different terms and conditions of service than those promised. Workers 
who were tied by debt to agents had no choice but to continue to work with less 
satisfactory contracts (Malaysia Human Right Report, 1998: 78). Employers or agents 
were also found to hold passports with consented papers signed by the workers. From 
January 1992 to July 1995, in one of the largest detention camp in Semenyih, south of 
Malaysian Peninsular, about 47,000 detainees were imprisoned or released, about half 
of whom showed that they were properly documented workers (Malaysian Human 
Rights Report, 1998: 79). 
Foreign workers who claimed of poor working conditions or unpaid wages found they 
were unable to seek help from Labour Courts if their documents were not with them 
as labour authorities could not intervene without seeing legal travel and work 
documents. When this happened, the available statutory grievance mechanism could 
not be used, and even when it was used, it was only in a small number of cases 
compared to the number of workers as can be seen in Table 9.5. The small number of 
cases could mean that there were difficulties faced by the workers in accessing 
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Malaysian labour authorities, even though there were 34 such labour offices all over 
Peninsular Malaysia alone (Interview: Mohd Abdul Wahab, 2/3/1999; Labour Office 
Report, 1999; Pamphlet, Labour Department). If we look at Table 9.5, from 1992 to 
1996 altogether there were 213 cases reported for various complaints, a number that 
was considered small if compared to the total of 449,565 legal or documented foreign 
workers. If this was really the case, then the percentage was only 0.047%. It therefore 
gave an impression that complaints from foreign workers were not an important 
enough agenda for the government to take action or amend labour laws, as demanded 
by the MTUC. From another angle, it shows the ineffectiveness of MTUC and NGOs 
in discussing this issue. The statistic gave grounds for officials to play down problems 
surrounding foreign workers as being a less important issue faced by Malaysia 
(Interview: Mohd Abdul Wahab, 2/3/1999). One claimed that since Malaysia put a 
heavier levy on employers, RM 1500 per worker, things have changed. He claimed that 
this new regulation has bettered workers' issue as a whole, giving locals a better 
chance in job opportunities (Interview: Mohd Abdul Wahab, 2/3/1999). 
However, the MTUC contested that the present labour law did not cover foreign 
labourers' rights effectively and urged the government to let them join the unions. 
Trade union leaders claimed that following the economic downturn in 1997, 
irresponsible employers brought down Malaysia's image internationally by 'shameful 
behaviour' (Interview: Rajasekaran, 11112/1999). By August 29 1999, MTUC called 
for the government to set up a special fund to pay retrenchment benefits, repatriation 
costs and unpaid wages to foreign workers in the country.89 
S9 Scc http:; Il1cmhers.\.oom.com/ :\J)( )\1 hJrakah~ semasa/ 1111 b.)cO(J.html. 
Table 9.5:Complaints involving Wages and Working Conditions of Foreign Workers 
(1992-June 1996) 
Issues Indonesia Bangladesh Philippines Thailand India Pakistan ~epal Total 
Unpaid 
wages 30 17 3 
- 2 - - 52 
Wage 2 9 - - 1 - - 12 
discrimination 
Discriminating 
wage contracts 3 9 4 1 - 2 - 19 
Workers' 
treatment towards 
foreign workers 4 13 - - - - 1 18 
Unsatisfactory 
housing 2 11 - -
- - - 13 
No accommodation 
provided - 4 - - - - - 4 
Exploitation 
by employer 6 3 - - 1 - 1 11 
Illegal 
work hours 1 1 - - - - - 2 
No medical facilities 2 3 - - - - - 5 
Dismissal 28 12 1 - 2 - - 43 
Illegal Deduction - 23 11 - - - - 34 
Passports/ 
Documents 
retained by 
employer 
- 14 10 - 5 - - 29 
Source: Mohd Abdul Wahab bin Mohd Salleh (1996) 
This need, according to MTUC leaders was urgent SInce there were increasing 
instances where employers ran away from their legal and moral obligations, 
encouraging foreign workers into crime to make ends meet (Interview: Rajasekaran, 
1/2/2001). He referred to an incident where 18 Bangladeshis had to leave the country 
without receiving their wages. In August 1999 only, the Labour Court ordered a sum 
of RM89,590 to be paid to the workers. but since the company was under 
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receivership, nothing could be done. In another case, a Technical Manager from Iraq 
was awarded a sum of RM90,OOO from his employer, Kulim Enterprises Sdn Bhd. But 
since the company was in liquidation, it refused to comply with the court order. 
The government resorted to ad-hoc policies, depending on the situation. From early 
1998, the repatriation of foreign workers was exercised (Economic Report 1998/99: 
148) while the last freeze on the hiring of foreign labour was lifted in April 1999 (The 
Sun, 7/4/1999). The government permitted the recruitment of foreigners in key 
industries such as plantation, manufacturing and construction sectors. Foreign workers 
were allowed into specific sub-sectors of the services industry where there were 
'difficulties hiring Malaysians who are not interested in the low wages offered' 
(Abdullah Badawi, cited in The Sun, 7/4/1999). Again, here we see the government 
prioritise economics over local workers who were asking for higher wages and perks 
by again encouraging foreign workers who did not mind the low wage. In fact, the 
DPM said: 
'To ensure there is no disruption in operations after the duration of service has 
ended, the government will allow one-third of these foreign workers (whose 
contracts are ending) to extend their permits for another year' (The Sun, 
7/4/1999). 
He also announced other moves to ease the recruitment process, such as new hiring 
procedures and identity cards for foreigners, issued by the Immigration Department. 
Employers no longer had to pay, except for passages, when hiring Indonesians. 'As far 
as the salary is concerned, it will also be up to employers to decide'. Moreover, they 
could keep the passports of the foreign workers which should be handed to the 
respective embassies should the workers abscond. Government departments were 
urged to find out the extent of the country's dependence on foreign workers, citing 
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that a reduction policy must be implemented from time to time. The number of legal 
foreign workers in April 1999 was said to be 713,821, down from 1,033,497 in 
January 1998. Hiring was allowed now in restaurants in Klang Valley, Ipoh, Penang, 
Malacca, lohor Bahru and Seremban, as well as for sanitary and cleaning services, 
cargo cleaning at ports and airports, golf-caddying and other sub-sectors, such as 
assistants in welfare and old folk homes (BH, 7/4/1999). However, the DPM insisted 
that companies still had to specify the types of jobs and positions before the 
Government would consider the applications (The Star, 7/4/1999). This was against 
the blanket approvals in the past whereby government-approved applications were 
based on the number of workers needed by a certain factory. This, he said, was to 
ensure certain jobs are reserved for Malaysians. As assurance that did not calm the 
unions, who thought the government should really prioritise local workers by making 
the jobs interesting and by providing minimum wage. Of course, that was something 
the government, until the end of the NDP, was reluctant to do. Therefore, foreign 
workers swarmed into Malaysia, and since the government was unwilling to amend 
the labour laws that included them, their problems and plights in Malaysia continued, 
with that the local workers also suffered. With the government applying flexible 
regulation for foreign workers to work in Malaysia, and their readiness to work with 
lower wages, unions found it harder to fight for basic causes, such as minimum wage, 
as the government can always tum to foreign workers when labour market was too 
tight. 
9.3.1.3. The EPF Issue 
Another issue that affected both the private and the public sector employees in 
f\lalaysia in the latter half of the 1990s concerned the EPF. The EPF issue emphasised 
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the failure of the tripartite system III Malaysia that concerned one of the most 
important aspects of employees' security after retirement. It agam highlights the 
powerful position of the government over unions in general, when even on an 
important issue such as this one, they failed to put up a strong and effective fight. The 
government's interference over the EPF issue also confirmed its readiness to ensure 
economic interests were protected, even though provoking unions. 
The EPF, the largest financial institution in Malaysia covered all employees, 
regardless of their salary, both in the private sector and those in the public sector who 
were not placed in the pensionable establishment. In 1997, its funds were around 
RM107 billion, with more than eight million members (NST, 12/2/1997). Another 
source said the EPF had 8.1 contributors with savings that amounted to RMl17.6 
billion or an average of RM14,500 savings per person (UM, 3/7/1997). In the second 
half of the 1990s, especially from 1996 to the end of 2000, there were many issues 
raised regarding the 'mismanagement and ineffectiveness' of EPF that concerned 
workers and their security after retirement.9o Issues related to the EPF concerned the 
Annuity Scheme, the withdrawal of disablement benefit under the EPF from 
maximum RM30,000 to a flat rate of only RM2,000 (Interview: Rajasekaran, 
6/2/2001) and mismanagement of the fund. The Annuity Scheme issues revealed a 
deep split between the MTUC President with its Secretary General, G. Rajasekaran 
'10 Another side other issue was the failure of employers to furnish full and complete infonnation about 
their employees (The Star, 111111996). There was also the EPF Investment Scheme at the end of 1996, 
a 'low risk' investment scheme, but it failed to interest eligible EPF contributors (The Star, 1111/1997). 
In 1997, cases of errant employers failing to contribute to the EPF were reported in many states all over 
\1Jlaysia (The Star, 31/511997; UM, 15,'8/1997, The Sun, 24/1/1997; BH, 22/311997). In the same year, 
issues regarding the withdrawals of the EPF were reported. Contributors were urging the EPF Board to 
consider higher withdrawals for housing, like the one adopted by Central Provident Fund (CPF) in 
Singapore (The Star, 1911/1997). 
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(Interview: G. Rajasekaran, 112/2001). The scheme saw the EPF permitting SIX 
insurance companies to manage the fund, a totally different system to the present one. 
The MTUC claimed the system did not benefit workers, while the MTUC President, 
Zainal Rampak urged members to accept it, causing a rift between him and other 
MTUC leaders (Interview: Abdul Halim, 23/2/2000). 
Meanwhile, the other issue was related to an amendment made to the EPF Act in 
1995, placing contributors' savings into three accounts; Account 1, where 60% of 
savings could be withdrawn upon retirement, with the contributor having option to 
take in a lump sum or make periodic withdrawals; Account 2 allowed 30% to be taken 
out for buying a house; and Account 3 was the 10% balance that could be used for the 
medical purposes of the contributor or his/her family members (SS, 16/0211997; NST, 
16/2/1997). On 1 t h February 1997, news broke that the EPF was carrying out a study, 
under the auspices of the United Nation Development Programme (UNDP), that 
proposed monthly pensions instead of lump sum after retirement, under the Social 
Insurance Scheme (NST, 12/211997). Under the scheme, contributors would receive 
about half the amount of their balance in their retirement fund (Account! which is 
60% of total savings), while the other half would be kept in a Central Fund. Retirees 
would receive monthly pensions for the rest of their lives. Trade unions and consumer 
organisations came out strongly against the 'part-pension' scheme (The Star, 
13/2/1997). Federation of Consumers Associations President, Hamdan Adnan claimed 
that this was a plan by the EPF Board to try and retain the people's money for a longer 
period. The MTUC Secretary General, G. Rajasekaran, claimed that the MTUC had 
perfom1ed a study on the idea seven years ago, and the majority of unions had 
opposed it. Instead of the social security scheme proposed by EPF, Rajasekaran 
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wanted the EPF to pay a higher dividend. CUEPACS Secretary General, Si\"a 
Subramaniam, said such a move would be a violation of a contributor's basic right of 
choice. The MTUC President, Zainal Rampak, said the MTUC wanted the EPF to 
conduct an opinion poll of its 8 million contributors to see whether they agreed to the 
proposed monthly scheme (BT, 13/211997; NST, 13/211997). As a whole, union 
leaders wanted the Social Insurance Scheme studied and made public so that 
contributors could decide (SS, 16/211997). Even though urged by unIOns, 
academicians and consumerists to ensure the EPF dividend in 1995 was nothing less 
than 8%, it was announced as 7.50%: the lowest in 15 years ( BT, 221211996; The 
Star, 27/1/1996). Despite objections from MTUC, CUEP ACS and FOMCA there was 
nothing done to stop the situation (The Star, 271111996; The Star 291111996). In fact, 
the Deputy Finance Minister said contributors should not take it for granted that they 
were entitled to 8% per cent, as enjoyed during high economic growth (The Star, 
7/2/1996). He referred to the EPF Act which stated that the minimum dividend was 
actually 2.5%. In 1996, it was marginally higher at 7.70, but in 1997 touched the 
lowest in 25 years, down to 6.70 (see Table 9.6). 
The PM defended the situation, arguing that EPF paid dividends and not interest, 
based on returns on its investments, and therefore it could not be fixed, even though 
there was high economic growth (The Sun, 8/2/1996). The MTUC threatened a nation 
wide picket against the EPF (The Star, 812/1996). It urged the government to review 
its investment management of EPF and requested that the dividend be given a higher 
Table 9.6. EPF dividends since 1952(%) 
1952-1959 2.50 
1960-1962 4.00 
1963 5.00 
1964 5.25 
1965-1967 5.50 
1965-1970 5.75 
1971 5.80 
1972-1973 5.85 
1974-1975 6.60 
1976-1978 7.00 
1979 7.25 
1980-1982 8.00 
1983-1987 8.50 
1988-1994 8.00 
1995 7.50 
1996 7.70 
1997 6.70 
Source: adapted from BT 21/0211997 ; BM 21311997; Labour Trends. 
percentage - at least 10%, so that it was consistent with the rapid economic progress 
of the nation (NST, 8/2/1996). The MTUC criticised the EPF's spendthrift attitude 
which saw the purchase of 12 new Volvo 940GL cars worth RMl.8million for its 
senior managers without first obtaining the Treasury approval (The Star, 12/2/1996).91 
The exposure prompted the Deputy Prime Minister (DPM), Anwar Ibrahim, to 
demand an explanation from the EPF Board. On 17/2/1996 the EPF Executive 
Chainnan announced a dividend pay-out of 7.5% for 1995 (The Sun, 18/2/1996). The 
DPM urged the MTUC not to picket (UM, 22/2/1996). They in tum welcomed the 
invitation by the DPM to discuss matters, especially when the DPM promised that the 
government would not allow the EPF to be involved in high-risk investment 
activities, adding that nearly half of its investments were in government securities 
(NST, 221211996). As expected, the MTUC postponed the picket (UM, 23/211996). 
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Demanding the attendance of the DPM's in its meeting with the EPF, the MICe 
urged the government to introduce a minimum wage for workers in the pri vate sector 
(NST, 28/211996; The Sun, 28/211996). In this case, actually public sector employees 
fared much better when the government set the minimum wage at RM512 (The Sun, 
28/211996). By 29/2/1996 the meeting was called off since Anwar was unable to 
attend (BT, 29/211996). This 'politicised' relationship, when it was based more on the 
personal relationship of union leaders with top political leaders, such as the PM and 
DPM, again highlighted the weak position that the MTUC was in. The union leaders 
admitted at the time they enjoyed a somewhat cordial relationship with Anwar 
Ibrahim (Interviews: Rajasekaran, 6/212001; Zainal Rampak, 3/311999), hoping that 
the union might gain from this personal relationship, which in tum did not materialise, 
since Anwar was dismissed from the government soon after. Moreover, it showed that 
it brought more setbacks than benefits for workers to rely on a relationship with the 
government forged on a political basis. 
Again, the EPF issue was put on hold, at the disposal of the government when it saw 
fit. Government officials, in commenting on the lower dividend received in recent 
years, gave a contradictory picture. Affifuddin Omar, the then Deputy Finance 
Minister said: 
'The EPF is not an investment fund .. .it provides security (for the workers). 
So, don't expect the EPF to be a fund that operates like the Perbadanan 
Nasiollal Berhad (PNB). PNB is an investment fund ... '(BT, 211211997). 
However, The Sun on 7/311997 reported the Finance Minister, who was also the 
DPM, Anwar Ibrahim, as saying the EPF was in 'the final stage of drawing up a 
ql The EPF Board was condemned for appro\'Ing purchases for officers not entitled to official cars (The 
Star. 12 211996). 
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programme to invest overseas' (The Sun, 7/311997). It was expected to choose foreign 
fund management companies established in Malaysia to manage its international 
investment, in order to boost the fund management industry. In fact, in March 1996, 
the government gave approval to the EPF to invest RMI billion in bonds and equities 
abroad to underline its commitment to develop the fund management industry in 
making Kuala Lumpur a regional capital market. EPF officials blamed the lower 
dividends on poor returns. The EPF Executive Chairman, Sallehuddin Mohamed, 
commenting on the 1996 dividend said the fund needed to invest almost RMl million 
just to pay a 1 % dividend (The Sun, 7/311997). The EPF puts its fund mainly in 
Malaysian government securities and money market instruments (64%), loans (21 %) 
and equities (13.8%). The Finance Minister said the government was moving to 
invigorate the fund management industry as the entire Malaysian capital market 
hinged on the efficient mobilisation and the intermediation of both domestic and 
foreign funds. The MTUC wanted a representative of workers on the panel of the EPF 
Investment Board (UM, 30/6/1997). The Deputy Finance Minister, in reacting to the 
demand, said it would study the possibilities and insisted that the EPF have already 
had panel members who were experts in investment. 
The above discussion revealed that the tripartite system, where there were trade 
unionists on the EPF Board, failed to benefit workers. Many of the EPF issues were 
argued in the newspapers, when in fact the MTUC and CUEP ACS presidents were 
traditionally on the Board. One trade unionist claimed that the EPF issue was caused 
mainly by the government trying to bailout their cronies (Interview: Syed Shahir, 
911/2001). The accusation was a very sensitive one and denied vehemently by the PM 
(NST, 23 /6/1998). Trade unionists claimed that since the economy was do\\"n, the 
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government used whatever means available even though it involved workers' rights 
and their future, such as the EPF (Interviews: Rajasekaran, 112/2001; Syed Shahir, 
9/1/2001). The EPF was used without first consulting the unions. In 1998, the EPF 
entered into an agreement with Kuala Lumpur International Airport Berhad (KLIA) to 
grant a loan facility of up to RM1.56billion. It was reported that this amount was in 
addition to two-tenn loans facilities worth RM3.5billion already extended to KLIA 
(MTUCAR 1997/98:12). The MTUC submitted a memorandum to the Finance 
Minister seeking a revamp of the EPF management structure, and expressed 
dissatisfaction over its failure to recognise the role of the MTUC in the appointment 
of workers' representatives to the EPF Board (MTUCAR, 1997/98: 12). The PM, on 
the other hand, defended the government's policies, and condemned those who 
accused it of 'nepotism, cronyism and capitalism' (NST, 23/6/1998). Faced with those 
claims by none other than UMNO's own Youth Wing, and also his deputy, Anwar 
Ibrahim, in 1998, Mahathir said government policies had benefited everybody, 
especially the Malays and Bumiputeras. 
9.3.2. The Malaysian Politics in the 1990s 
Political leadership has had a role in detennining Malaysian IR under the NEP, and 
again as discussed below, it became more prominent during the NDP era, which saw 
Mahathir Mohamad already into his tenth year in office. When the NDP was 
introduced, he produced another policy, Vision 2020,which ran concurrently with the 
NDP. The discussion below highlights how Malaysian political leadership, political 
culture and political scenario affected the government's decisions. 
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When Vision 2020 became part of the national development policies, it received a lot 
of attention and accelerated certain actions. In Malaysia, especially during Mahathir's 
leadership, the government was still the biggest initiator of big 'national' projects, and 
the PM always seemed to be where the ideas originated. Even though the pri\'ate 
sector was said to be the catalyst of economy, the state was still heavily involved in 
the running of every major policy. This was seen in almost all policies like 
privatisation, industrialisation, LEP and FDI. Instead of letting the market develop 
itself, the state monitored it, and took charge when things went wrong or when 
privatisation failed. This provoked a lot of criticism of the government. For example, 
its privatisation efforts were seen by some not to have benefited the majority of 
Malays, as it intended, but some small groups of people who were close to the 
politicians or those in power. Mahathir still regarded the old policies under the NEP as 
still important, and in fact, emphasised on them during his second decade in office. 
The argument is that since Mahathir came into the political Malaysian scene, the 
leadership factor needs to be analysed more since his political leadership superseded 
all the other level of leadership. Having said that it is easier to understand what is 
discussed below. 
As could be seen, Malaysia has been under the same administrative of Barisan 
Nasional since 1957. Since taking office, Mahathir has consistently offered the 
country new policies. Faced with an economic downturn that deprived Malaysia of a 
smooth development plan and continuous growth from the mid-1980s, Mahathir rose 
above it. as he did when faced with similar problems in the past, in particular the 
recession of 1985. A year after the 1997 crisis, Mahathir called for the people to unite. 
Leading newspapers reported the PM as saying that the people's support of 
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government's efforts in handling economIC uncertainties was vital (The Star, 
15/7 /1998; BH, 15/7 /1998). Specifically, he hoped the workers would not spark ci \'il 
unrest, riot, strikes or take other drastic measures in the midst of the current economic 
turmoil. 
Again in Malaysia, other political leaders quickly echoed the PM's VIew. The 
Malaysian culture of 'respecting' the elders or leaders, as discussed in Chapter Four, 
again appeared to favour the government in times of need, such as in the 1997 
economic turmoil. The DPM, (before he was sacked two months later) Anwar 
Ibrahim, in his welcoming speech to the Women and Youth Wing ofUMNO during 
the UMNO annual convention, stressed the need to 'unite and sacrifice' in facing the 
economic downturn (BH, 19/6/1998). However, the difference in essence of what the 
PM said to that of his deputy was that the latter named all parties as responsible in 
sacrificing their interests in order to achieve collective goals. Sacrifice to him was not 
a one-party affair, it had to come from every sector, including consumers, traders, 
workers, the corporate people, leaders and the ordinary people. He reminded the 
UMNO members of 'our agendas: Malay Agenda, economic agenda, social, religious 
and cultural agenda'(BH, 19/6/1998). Apart from that, he stressed the goals of Vision 
2020 and the 'caring society'. This was clearly a call to remind Malays especially of a 
common cause (UMNO members now are either Malays or Bumiputeras) and this call 
for unity has happened every time Malaysia has faced political, economic or social 
difficulties. Since 1969, this approach has almost always worked. After the 1969 
racial riot, people were asked to be more sensitive towards issues that might create 
disunity among multi-racial Malaysians. Since then there has been no serious racial 
dispute in Malaysia (except in 1999 when there was a reported racial clash at the 
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Kampung Medan, which was quickly played down by the authorities). Howeyer, the 
other factor is again the law. As discussed in Chapter Eight, those who breached this 
could find themselves detained under the ISA. 
The DPM also called for unity, 'not only among the people but also among ministers' 
(The Star, 14/6/1998), amid rumours of disagreements between him and the PM while 
facing the 1997 economic downturn. To him, if a minister was dissatisfied over an 
issue, he should voice his opinion during a Cabinet meeting. Any decisions made by 
the Cabinet had to be respected because it was a collective responsibility. In 
Mahathir's opening speech at the UMNO National Convention, he claimed that the 
'new capitalist' and 'foreign evil powers' were out to re-colonise Malaysia and this 
was the reason for the economic downturn (BM, 20/6/1998). On a bolder note, 
Mahathir also blamed George Soros, the US international financier, for the currency 
attack. His views were echoed by almost every leader in Malaysia, except a few 
including his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, who together with some of his 'followers' 
called for transparency in all economic bodies and markets (Asiaweek, 9/8/1998). He 
was of course sacked a month later, showing the extent to which Mahathir has been 
willing to go in suppressing dissent in Malaysia. Anwar was charged with misuse of 
power and sodomy and is now serving sixteen years in jail. 
During the economic crisis, the MTUC called to employers to heed the PM's advice to 
unite. In fact, as expected, both the MTUC and CUEPACS pledged support for the 
government as the crisis mounted, and both vowed to channel aid through several 
steps to overcome the present problems. The President of CUEP ACS promised not to 
make any claims \\·hile the country was going through economic difficulties and wait 
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for the economic recovery. The MTUC President, meanwhile, asked the members of 
affiliated unions to maintain industrial harmony. However. at the same time the 
MTUC persuaded corporate leaders to be concerned not only about the country but 
also problems faced by workers. The MTUC promised the government that it would 
endeavour to increase productivity and improve the quality of goods as well as 
encouraging people to buy locally-produced ones (NST, 1/1998). The MTUC pro-
government stance was caused by its dependence to the government, a trait inherited 
from the 1980s. 
Mahathir has not changed totally his VIews on workers' rights from his way of 
thinking in the earlier days (see Chapter 8, 8.4.2). In his own words, lower wages in 
Malaysia does not mean exploitation of workers. He claimed the cost of living is 
about one third of that of most developed countries. Also, the expectation of workers 
in the country was lower (this contradicts what trade unionists had said in interviews). 
Mahathir claimed that Malaysian wages were higher than many other developing 
countries, one reason why there were at least one million foreign workers in Malaysia, 
both legal and illegal (Mahathir, 1995: 59). To Mahathir, wages and working 
conditions could improve without resorting to industrial action. 'Merely by making 
conditions attractive to investments, it is possible to create a labour shortage which in 
turn will force employers to offer better wages and working conditions' (Mahathir, 
1995: 59). In his speech while tabling MP7 at the Dewan Rakyat, Mahathir talked 
about the 'significant progress' made under MP6 and the intention of the government 
to continue implementing the same strategies under the NDP. Claiming that a huge 
middle income had emerged while the lower income group had a higher spending 
power as a result of 'an impressive growth of the economy' during the MP6, Mahathir 
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urged trade unions to 'shift away from solely fighting for higher wages, irrespective of 
productivity increases' (BT, 7/5/1995). His consistent view on workers and the role of 
unions could again be seen when he stressed: 
'premature demands and agitations by the workers will merely lead to the 
failure of our industrialisation programme .... .it is the success of the 
industrialisation programme which has created labour shortage and 
improvements in wages earned. Failure of the industrialisation programme will 
have just the opposite effect, i.e. unemployment, inflation and declining 
purchasing power. The government's policy is to increase the earnings of 
workers so that they will enjoy a better standard of living. This can be done 
through the establishment of large-scale industries which employ a lesser 
number of more highly paid workers. Naturally these workers will need better 
skills in order to manage and supervise more sophisticated machines. 
Retraining is essential for this, as well as a greater sense of responsibility and 
discipline, as they will be looking after extremely expensive machinery and 
equipment. In order to get their members to earn more, unions should assist 
with training and instilling good work ethics. This is going to be more difficult 
than merely urging industrial action for more pay. Leadership quality of the 
highest order must be developed among union leaders' (BT, 7/5/1996). 
This speech clearly reflected Mahathir's view on IR as a whole. For the country to 
succeed, workers should give their full co-operation towards intensifying 
industrialisation, which, according to the government, benefited the workers 
themselves. Mahathir said that Malaysia Inc is the embodiment of 'Smart 
Partnership', which has enabled Malaysia to execute a number of successful projects 
(ST, 3017/1997). The trilateral co-operation among civil servants, the private sector 
and the political masters to him has yielded results. He insisted that labour should not 
regard employers as 'the enemy' (RH, 3017/1996). 
Following this, Malaysian politics saw a change of leadership at the second level. By 
1993, Mahathir had placed Anwar Ibrahim as his third deputy after his second deputy, 
Ghafar Baba, an UMNO veteran, declined an open challenge by Anwar in the UMNO 
election for the post of Deputy UMNO President (The first DPM, Musa Hitam 
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resigned following disagreements with Mahathir). A Deputy UMNO President would 
traditionally and automatically becomes the Malaysian DPM, qualifying himself as the 
next Prime Minister.92 The first half of the decade (under MP6; 1991-96) showed a 
positive economic outlook, while the second (under MP7; 1996-2000), and 1997 in 
particular was marred by one of the worst economic crises faced by Malaysia since 
Independence. On top of that, a political crisis erupted in 1998, which saw the sacking 
of Anwar, marking a 'reformation movement' led in particular by educated Malays 
and other ethnic-Malaysians against what was termed cronyism, corruption and 
mismanagement. By 1998, Anwar was already in jail and Ahmad Badawi had become 
the fourth DPM under Mahathir. So both economics and politics seemed important 
internal forces that need analysis. The contention here is that economic and political 
crisis should, as in the past, have left certain impacts on the state's roles in the 
Malaysian IR system. 
Meanwhile, the NDP still drew its policy based on ethnic lines. Firstly, as in the NEP, 
the reduction of poverty was to be achieved through increased wage employment for 
the poor, who were mainly in the rural areas. Most were in fact in the agricultural 
sector and were indeed pre-dominantly Malays. The NDP foresaw that by the year 
2000, the labour force would comprise of 58% Malays, 33% Chinese and 9% Indians 
(Khoo, 1994). Therefore, two features are noted: one is that, the sectors identified as 
absorbing a higher proportion of Malays are the manufacturing and transport, storage 
92 Anwar Ibrahim was a chosen candidate, groomed by none other than Mahathir to be a member of 
L':"I r.: 0, He was in fact an outspoken critic of the government, a founder of Angkatan Belia Islam 
\-lalaysia (ABIM). an Islamic youth movement. Anwar's acceleration in UMNO and the national level 
politics was rapid. causing rifts among more senior UMNO leader. and was in fact what caused the 
veteran Ghafar Baba to resign from his post. Until open conflict in 1998. Anwar's factor endeared 
l'\INO to mon: Islamic conscious and educated ;-'Iala),s, 
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and communication sectors, which hopefully will take up 66% employment for 
Malays. Two, in the year 2000, the administrative, managerial and, to a lesser extent, 
sales categories would still be dominated by Chinese. In the OPP2, employment by 
sector and ethnic group was still important. Even though now the creation of the BCIC 
now gave emphasis on quality of the Bumiputeras, it was still an important agenda 
under the NDP. If in the NEP the target for Malay wealth ownership was set at 30%, 
under the NDP the specific numerical target for any racial group was absent. 
However, in the case of Bum iputera , efforts were promised to be continued to ensure 
at least the 30% target. The NDP promised that the BCIC created under the NDP was 
viable and resilient, relying on skills for which the government promised to offer help 
in the training of Bumiputeras. The message was that the government recognised the 
necessity of strong economic growth, but at the same time the monitoring of the 
distribution of privileges to Bumiputeras would now be more vigilant, offered to 
' ... only Bumiputeras with potential, commitment and good track records ... '(OPP2, 
1991). The argument is that, even under the NDP, Malaysia still could not afford to 
turn their backs on Bumiputeras issues and preferences. 
In November 1999, Malaysia had its tenth general election, and again, as it has been 
since Independence, the Barisan Nasional won the two-third majority to enable it to 
administer Malaysia for another five years. That also made Mahathir the longest 
serving PM of Malaysia. As it is now, after almost twenty years, Mahathir has raised 
numerous issues and topics of discussions, which as it relate to IR, become our next 
analysis. Social and political stability are the two basic factors the state tries to 
prescr\'e. It believes that without these two, its policies will not succeed. The 
go\'crnment also belicves that these two are the most fragile factors and thus should be 
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preserved with laws. This is why any attempt to unbalance the status quo would be 
quickly related to attempts to destabilise both social and political equilibrium in the 
multi-racial country. In fact, these two factors have been used as an excuse for 
government moves to suppress any labour's struggles which are considered a threat. 
This trait again is seen in the 1990s, and especially in 1997. The relationship between 
this incident with IR per se is not that apparent, but the inclinations were clear. Once 
the economy is disrupted everything else fails. However, if people back the 
government, together the nation will heal itself and become stronger again, while the 
economy, social and political stability will complement each other. It is a very simple 
solution believed by many bureaucrats interviewed. 
On the 2nd September 1998, when the PM sacked Anwar Ibrahim, the move saw the 
worst personality clash between the long serving premier with his deputies, marking 
another political conflict in Malaysia. Mahathir cited reasons for the dismissal as 
Anwar being 'morally unfit', while Anwar and his supporters accused Mahathir of 
'the highest political conspiracy' to end his political career, which was seen as a threat 
to Mahathir's. Analysts also argued that the main reason for Anwar's sacking 
stemmed from the conflict in approaches between the premier and his deputy over 
many economic decisions. While this study has been in progress, the country is still 
politically divided with almost all the opposition parties behind Anwar. It was the first 
time in Malaysian history that a DPM was sacked from his post in the government and 
UMNO, motivating the people's movement against the government, giving birth to 
the 'gcrakall reformasi ' (reformation movement). Some analysts saw this as similar to 
th~ Indonesian 'refom1ation movement' when Soeharto was forced to resign. 
Howc\,cr, compared to the Indonesian one the Malaysian movement seemed more 
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controlled. Nevertheless, for the first time since 13th May 1969, the nation saw a 
movement that both alarmed and threatened the government, but was more inter-
ethnic in nature, calling for reforms and fighting against cronyism, corruption and 
mismanagement. There were mass demonstrations staged by Anwar and his 
supporters before his arrest. By Malaysian standards, the gerakan reformasi was very 
strong though the government at first tried to play it down. The mainstream 
newspaper only reported a small number of Anwar's supporters when, on the contrary, 
the KeAdilan (Just Party) recently formed by Wan Azizah, Anwar's wife managed to 
get 11 % of the votes in the 1999 November election. The strength could be seen in the 
extent of dissent towards the government, the consistency of the movement in airing 
their dissatisfaction and the rise of the Internet as an alternative medium 
communication among educated Malaysians. The supposedly high numbers of 
reformation movement supporters among public servants who were always portrayed 
as the government's backbone is also another threat taken seriously by the 
government. 
However, compared to Indonesia, whom Muslim Malaysians in the past usually 
considered as their 'brothers', the movement was still 'mild'. Violence similar to that 
Indonesian movement to topple Soeharto, was not apparent in Malaysia. The 
Malaysian gerakan reformasi was careful to give an impression of law-abiding 
citizens, although sometimes riots did breakout in demonstrations. The movement 
claimed that riots were caused by the police. In fact, demonstrations were not 
widespread as in Indonesia, and confined mostly to Kuala Lumpur, especially during 
the period of Anwar's trials at the Court. Anwar's issue caused the government to 
adopt a defensive stance, especially when it divided the Malays. The reference made 
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by the PM in his UMNO speeches and also at international level showed just how 
much the political tunnoil affected Malaysia. What made it seem worse was the 
international condemnation of the Malaysian judiciary system over Anwar's case. This 
incident brought Malaysia to a turning point and a period of political uncertainty. 
However, the government was under pressure to curb the negative image, or else face 
economic uncertainties as in Indonesia. So the Anwar issue was used to portray how 
bad open conflicts were and how they would backfire on ordinary people if they did 
not back the government. Slowly but surely the government's campaign worked, 
especially amongst non-Malays who were wary about the economic situation. The 
irony again here is how the Malaysian multi-racial community, when the chance 
presented itself, did not unite and oppose the government entirely on claims of 
corruption, nepotism and cronyism which were especially levelled at pro-Malays 
policy. It again shows how among non-Malays, economic stability remained 
important. The Chinese, being more dominating in the private sector, were not ready 
for a period of political instability which might jeopardise the status quo and the 
quality of life they had enjoyed. This was despite deprived of political supremacy, as 
they claimed, under the NEP. So in a way, this attitude among the Malaysians 
benefited the government and enabled it to continue and maintain all its policies and 
laws. 
9.3.3. The Socio-Cultural Factors and the Ethnic Issues 
The next discussion aims to highlight the significance of the socio-cultural factors in 
Malaysian IR and to analyse whether they were still important in the 1990s. In the 
past, these factors became the underlying forces that helped shaped the Malaysian IR. 
It explains the way Malaysians prioritised and reacted to crisis during the NOP period. 
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The contention here is that socio-cultural issues, such as ethnic cultural values and 
political culture, influenced the way IR was developed during this ten-year period 
apart from the dominant role of the state over its legislation, administration and 
implementation of policies, as already discussed above. Here, the question of ethnic 
that concerned the plural society is also raised, to see whether the government was 
influenced by that factor as well, in their decisions. In the 1990s, there was still a 
decreasing number of disputes even in times of economic and political crisis. The 
disputes decreased even after the first full year of economic crisis with to a lower 442 
in 1998, as compared to 476 reported in 1996 (economic boom). Only the disputes in 
the manufacturing sector slightly increased from 182 in 1997 to 216 in 1998, and this 
was not surprising as it was still the biggest sector in Malaysia, thus generated more 
disputes in times of crisis. However, the increase of industrial disputes in the private 
sector, as seen in Table 9.7, was still small. 
Table 9.7. Industrial Disputes 
Cases By Sector, 1993 - 1998 
CASES 
SECTOR 
1993 1994 
A~riculture, Forestry, Livestock and Fishery 150 146 
Mines and Quarry 9 2 
Manufacturin~ 203 198 
Construction 1 -
Electric, Gas and Water - -
Wholesale and Retail, Restaurant and Hotel - -
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business 105 81 
Service 
Community Service, Social and Personal - -
Transportation, Storage and Communication 66 76 
Others 
- -
Total 534 503 
Source: Industrial Relations Department. 
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1995 1996 1997 
95 66 70 
6 3 11 
175 210 182 
- 2 3 
- - 5 
- - 24 
114 86 21 
- - 17 
121 109 130 
- - -
511 476 463 
1998 
67 
11 
216 
2 
0 
20 
14 
11 
101 I 
- i 
i 442 
An explanation by Gomez and lomo (1999:4) helped give an insight on how \1alaysia 
was able to record a low percentage of industrial disputes even during economic 
crisis. They argued that from the 1980s, Malaysians were 'socialised' to accept and 
even appreciate authoritarian rule, norms and institutions. They cited Lucien Pye 
(1985) who argued about an 'Asian political culture' that emphasised loyalty to the 
collectivity over individual freedom and needs, shunned adversarial relations and 
favoured order over conflict. This explained the Malaysian IR situation too, as every 
now and then the government has used that as a weapon to call for unity to or support 
of its policies or decisions, or whenever threats towards 'national unity or national 
interests' occurred. It has been used by the highest level political leader, the PM, and 
even by government civil servants, such as the DGTUA or DGIR. References have 
always been made to the fact that Malaysia was a multi-racial society and therefore 
open conflicts will encourage a recurrence of l3 th May 1969. 
This view concurs with what Asma (1992) claimed as Malaysian ethnic values, which 
affected the way relationships are formed in Malaysian management system, which 
can also explain the IR scenario. Even though she claimed that there were different 
ethnic values between Malays, Chinese and Indians, generally they shared common 
values that in the context of this study helped explain the relationship between the 
government and employees, and unions for that matter. Because the government dealt 
more with the minority of trade union leaders from the MTUC, rather than individual 
unions, their relationship with these leaders, which represented the general character 
of the Malaysian workforce, explained how government managed to determine and 
retain the old IR system. Asma noted that the Malays, for example have 'respect for 
eIdcrs', 'friendly', 'polite', 'not aggressiyc', 'co-operative', 'obedient', 'compliance', 
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'accommodating' and most important of all in the context of this study, 'non-
confrontational' (Asma, 1992: 8). The Chinese were regarded as 'hardworking', 
'perseverance' , 'believe In meritocracy' , 'pragmatic' , 'risk-taking' , 
'entrepreneurship', but also 'respect for hierarchy' (Asma, 1992:8). While the Indians 
were 'modest', had a 'sense of belonging' and 'brotherhood', 'participative', 'loyal', 
'harmonious', but also could be 'champion of causes' (Asma, 1992: 8). Even though 
Asma was originally analysing Malaysian managers, her views related to the scenario 
that affected relationship between employers, employees and the government. She 
noted several general characters of Malaysian workforce that may be used to explain 
the 'docile' attitude of employees during the NDP period, even though when chances 
to change things for the better presented itself, such as during the economic and 
political crises. For example, Asma observed that generally Malaysian subordinates 
would not argue with their superiors, eager to please, difficult to say 'no', and while 
extremely dedicated to doing a good job, they may not insist on their rights. They have 
respect for hierarchy, can tolerate authoritarian style of management, prefer 
compromise to confrontation, seek consensus and harmony, and prefer collectivism, 
rather than individualism (Asma, 1992: 9). The lack of industrial disputes and the 
failure of the workforce to champion their causes when they had the chance can be 
related to these values. This is not to underestimate the importance of the legislation, 
the mechanism and policies implemented by the government as already discussed 
above, but as contended in this study, these factors have collectively influenced the 
development of Malaysian IR. 
The Senior Director of Labour believed that the government took into consideration 
the multi-racial society as an important influence in developing Malaysian IR system: 
3S1 
' ... no better way than uniting the society. The workforce population is based 
on the multi-racial components. Anything we want to decide we must 
emphasise on the three races and religions, Islam, Buddhists, Hindus .... Even 
the labour law was also to benefit the races and the religion, for example 
public holidays for Hari Raya (Eid Festivals for the Muslims), Thaipusam, 
Oeepavali and Chinese New Years, are based on these. Other influence is also 
from the (13 th May) 1969 ... this racial trouble made us think of unity as very 
important. In fact from 1969 until now we based on this .... even at school level 
we should give this as due consideration .... ' (Interview: Mohd Abdul Wahab, 
2/3/99). 
This view coincided with the government's action whenever problems regarding the 
economy or the nation arose. During the 1997, economic crisis the government called 
for unity and loyalty from the Malaysian people. This was not unique to Malaysia, as 
any country might call for its people to unite in times of crisis. However, in Malaysia, 
unity among ethnic groups was always crucial to ensure economic, political and social 
stability. The government was quick to relate the importance of unity as compared to 
the absence of it and its consequences. The 13th May 1969 incident again has been 
used for gaining the support of the Malaysian people. The political crisis of 1998 saw 
the government branding the dissent group as ungrateful. The people were often 
reminded that the 13 th May 1969 would recur if people succumbed to demonstrations 
or called for open debate on sensitive issues, which most appropriately referred to 
Malay and Bumiputera rights. 
The sacking of Anwar reflected two things: one, on how Malaysian society prioritised 
when faced with crisis; and second, that their reaction towards crisis of this kind 
reflected their overall attitudes towards the government, which could be translated to 
IR matters. The reason behind the reactions could again be attributed to beliefs in 
culture, politics, history, as well as social and economic stability. Even though there 
\vcre gcrakall rcformasi by Anwar's supporters and opposition parties, on the whole 
3S2 
Malaysian people took heed of the government's advice to stay calm and not to create 
any social dissent. Realising that both the political and economic status quo were at 
risk, Mahathir called for unity and support from the masses. Having both major 
unions that represented the private and public sectors on its side, the government 
continued in all its plans to revive the economy. In other words, the fundamentals of 
the Malaysian IR system were unaffected. After pledging loyalty to the government, 
the unions' efforts continued in the manner it knew best, through co-operation with 
the government. As we can see, the unions could make headlines or became vocal, but 
the outcome was really up to the government. 
However, the trade unionists rejected the idea that ethnic issues were important in 
Malaysian IR in the 1990s. Under the NDP, the Bumiputeras or basically the Malay 
issue, was continued with several efforts consistently monitored, such as the BCIC. 
However, the Malay issue was not really an important enough factor for the 
government to change the restrictive measures as seen under the IR system. Some 
trade unionists argued that if the government was really thinking of the Malays, it 
would have supported the MTUC's efforts to unionise electronics workers since most 
of the workers were Malay women, or return negotiating power to the public sector 
(Interviews: Syed Shahir, 9/1/2001; Arunasalam, 22111/2000). Their argument was 
that most of the Malaysian workers were not aware enough of the 13th May to be 
bothered with the outcome anymore and they were not aware of the need for the 
Bumipllteras to be helped to better themselves economically. To them the government 
created the fear, and used the 13th May to discourage industrial disputes to their 
advantage. The view that demonstrations would be too dangerous because Malaysia 
was multi-ethnic was rejected. It was seen as an effort that only benefited the 
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government (Interview: Syed Shahir, 9/1/2001). The government's argument that 
restrictions on strikes were in the 'national interests' was also strongly rejected. This 
was more so when all these companies were foreign investors and MNCs who did not 
have the Malaysian people's interests at heart, except making profits (Interview: Syed 
Shahir, 9/1/2001). 
To summarise, it is clear that socio-cultural factors were important in influencing the 
development of the Malaysian IR system during the NDP period, apart from the 
government's role through legislation, administration and policies. It is important to 
note that the Malays, who were described as 'non-confrontational' were now the 
majority of union members, in the private, and especially in the public sector. The 
political culture of Malaysians also affected the relationship between unions and the 
government and their employers, and this was seen by the small increase of disputes 
during the economic and political crises. However, the campaigns by the government 
were disputed by union leaders as baseless, especially when the government warned 
that upsetting the status quo might led to the end of pro-Bumiputeras policy, or the 
recur of racial clashes. Union leaders believed that some issues were only created to 
instil fear and to suppress dissent. Overall, the government was alanned by the impact 
of the economic and political crises on investors, since, as already discussed earlier, 
Malaysia depended on them to generate the Malaysian economy, and thus also created 
employment opportunities for Malaysians. Therefore, while unions accused 
government of creating false alann, the economic reasons at least looked genuine. 
9.3.4. Weak, Docile and Divided Trade Unionism 
The weak, docile and divided trade unionism during the NDP period gave the 
government a better chance to be dominant and suppressed any opposing views. The 
next discussion explored how the Malaysian trade union movement, faced with crisis 
in leadership and various unresolved issues, failed to sufficiently pressure the state in 
support of their causes during the NDP. Anned with legislation, a loyal 
administration, and several policies, the federal government retained the trade unions 
as they were during the NEP- weak, docile and divided. Meanwhile, internal conflicts 
such as the leadership crisis further weakened the movement and exacerbated the 
failure to solve old and new issues until the end of the NDP in 2000. However, even 
though the MTUC was not really a threat, its relationship with the government was 
not easy. 
Since the MTUC was not registered as trade unions as required under TUA1959, its 
effectiveness as a trade union centre could always be politicised when it was viewed 
as stepping out of line with the government. The threat of de-registration was not alien 
to the MTUC, as seen in 1993, when the Registrar of Societies gave notice asking it to 
show why its registration should not be cancelled over 'certain irregularities' at its last 
biennial delegates' conference, thereby forcing the congress to conduct fresh elections 
(MTUCAR,1993/94). As at January 1998, the MTUC had a membership of 130 
affiliating unions in the private sector (293,554 members) and 37 from the public 
sector (l09,609), with a total number of 403,163 members. In 1997, union density was 
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only 8.86%.93 By comparison to the total number of employment, numbers of workers 
organised were still very low. 
By the 1990s, the majority of active members of unions were Malay. This was in line 
with the increased participation of Malays in the commercial economy. The racial 
composition of the MTUC in 1999 was 64% Malays, 16% Chinese, 17% Indians and 
3% others (MTUC 50Years Report). The top leadership of the MTUC also saw the 
Malays as the majority, with the President, Zainal Rampak, at the helm from 1986 
(MTUC 45 Years). All the trade unionists interviewed denied ethnic factor was ever a 
problem in their struggle. However, Zainal, a Malay and now an UMNO member and 
senator, differed in views and actions compared to his Secretary General, G. 
Rajasekaran. Trade union leaders admitted that the relationship between unionists 
now were more formal than before (Interview: Syed Shahir, 9/1/2001). 'Brotherhood' 
as previously practised was gone. When an affiliating union, the NMMPEU, criticised 
the MTUC President and called for his resignation from the MTUC leadership over 
his failure to make an impact and raise awareness of the EPF blunders, Zainal sued 
them (Interview: Syed Shahir, 9/1/2001). Although the issue concerned workers and 
was not a personal attack, it was regarded as one. 
Meanwhile, from 1989 to 1996, the MTUC was challenged by the Malaysian Labour 
Organisation (MLO) as it tried to become another alternative as 'national labour 
centre', especially for private sector unions. However, apart from the National Union 
of Bank Employees (NUBE), the other 25 affiliates of MLO were small unions (The 
Q) See http://www'm(uc.orgl/l\'/\((I(i5(i('.l 'TRA DES'!,,[ 'SIONS%20/"%20MA LA }'SIA 
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Sun, 31/12/1994). The 'tug-of-war' between the government and the MTUC 
accelerated after three of its top leaders stood as opposition candidates in the 1990 
general election. In 1994, the government declined to recognise nominations made by 
the MTUC for its representatives to tripartite bodies such as the EPF Board, Socso 
Board and the NLAC, and chose their own representatives (The Sun, 21/11/1994). In 
1995, Zainal Rampak, the MTUC President faced court charges, which according to 
the secretary general, G. Rajasekaran was related to Zainal's comments and criticisms 
of the government at international meetings (The Sun, 7/7/1995). The MLO was only 
dissolved in 1996 when 18 of its affiliates returned to the MTUC. It should be a 
positive sign for the national labour centre but as discussed below, leadership struggle 
further weakened the movement in the late 1990s and some causes that were 
championed by MTUC since its formation more than 50 years ago remained unsolved 
at the end of 2000. 
The MTUC President admitted that he would like to see the MTUC regarded more of 
a 'partner' in the tripartite body NLAC, even though he still saw the relationship as 
'positive' when unions still had 'free hands to discuss issues'. He quoted the readiness 
of the government to accept the MTUC proposals towards amendments to the IRA. 
However, he admitted that more could be done to better relationship of unions with 
the MNCs, with a more open, transparent system between the three parties, to balance 
power between them. When the government regarded NLAC members from the 
unions as advisors, then decisions were actually up to Parliament. There were views 
by the NLAC that were overruled by the cabinet, such as certain amendments to the 
IRA 1967. The MTUC realised this as the government preferring FDls, therefore 
putting \\orkers interests after economic reason (Interview: Zainal Rampak, 7/1/1999). 
'-
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The union also took the initiative to fight for the public sector employees on a number 
of occasions, for example, concerning the issue of retirement age and the five non-
affiliated agencies (Interview: Premesh Chandran, 23/2/2000). By 1999, in 
conjunction with their 50th anniversary, the MTUC urged the government to hasten 
action on various outstanding matters that concerned workers and trade unions. In a 
memo sent to the PM, the MTUC asked for his urgent attention to tackle pressing 
issues such wages, housing, workers' rights to organise, inefficiencies in the 
privatisation programmes and to form the NRS (MTUC Press Release, 18/811999): 
'MTUC positively responded to the PM call to support government efforts and 
plan to effectively address the economic crisis. We are pleased to report that 
despite mounting pressure from union members, MTUC affiliates heeded our 
call to adopt restraint and maintained industrial peace. We are indeed pleased 
that the measures taken by the government has helped to tum around the 
economy within a short time. We therefore urge the government to take 
positive steps to address the issues affecting working people'. 
The MTUC called the government to revise the salary of civil servants every three 
years (instead of every 5 years as now). For the plantation workers, the government 
was urged to support a monthly wage scheme, while the employers were requested not 
to deny or delay collective bargaining negotiations. The PM was called personally to 
implement his pledge of introducing a minimum wage of RM1200 for all workers in 
Malaysia, a promise he had made earlier. The MTUC also wanted the government to 
set up a proper bipartite mechanism to discuss and decide on labour matters and tri-
yearly salary revisions in the corporatised agencies. It also urged the government to 
ratify ILO Convention 87 on the Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise 
and resolve the 20-year dispute on the unionisation of electronics workers. The 
MTUC called the government to bring all laws and government practices in line with 
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ILO Conventions 87 and 98. However, until the end of 2000, these calls were still 
unanswered. 
9.3.4.1. Leadership Crisis in MTUC 
Leadership split, as discussed below, became one of the reasons that further weakened 
the MTUC. It also reflects the underlying differences of perspectives among trade 
union leaders in the movement. During the 1997 economic crisis, the MTUC showed 
its willingness again to co-operate with employers, much to the disagreement of some 
of its own leaders, and officially went to pledge support and co-operation from 
employers to help each other. Some of the efforts were received favourably, like the 
MTUC's co-operation with another employers' federation, the Federation of 
Malaysian Manufacturers' (FMM) joint effort to find jobs for some 40,000 retrenched 
workers by setting up a joint database of vacancies and unemployment, and by an 
exchange of information for mutual benefits. FMM advised of existing vacancies in 
the industrial sectors, while the MTUC provided FMM with information on 
retrenched workers and new job-seekers. Both organisations sourced the necessary 
infonnation from their respective affiliates. The MTUC President claimed that the 
MTUC had moved on to another level of communication when it was able to co-
operate with employers too for the needs of workers. He claimed the centre had 
expanded its role and his appointment as an UMNO Senator to the Dewan Negara 
(House of Senate) has made him more effective as a union leader (Interview: Zainal 
Rampak, 7/1/1999), a view that was not shared by some others. This, and some other 
issues fUI1her weakened the effectiveness of the national labour centre during the NDP 
and contributed to the stronger position of the government, and also the employers. 
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The different stand taken by the MTUC leaders was always debatable, especially 
when the leadership became part of the government of the day. A Singapore Minister 
and senior trade unionist claimed the Singaporean workers had gained from a close 
relationship with the government (Interview: Mathias Yeoh, 29/1/2001). The MTUC 
President claimed the same benefit for Malaysian workers since he was now in a 
better position to be heard in the Dewan Negara. His enthusiasm, however, was not 
well received by his own colleagues in the MTUC, and his Secretary General did not 
believe that the movement had benefited since he had become a senator (Interview: 
Rajasekaran, 6/212001). He said two things remained the causes of bitter disagreement 
between them: the Annuity Scheme, and the withdrawal of disablement benefit from a 
maximum RM30,000 to a flat rate of RM2,000. The leadership split at the highest 
level of the MTUC in the 1990s, and especially between Zainal and Rajasekaran, saw 
the two taking different approaches to MTUC issues. While the Secretary General was 
more vocal locally and abroad, the President became more subtle in his actions. The 
Secretary General became the target of constant criticism from the government on not 
just one occasion. As an example, leading newspapers in Malaysia in May 1998 
reported the HRM Minister as angered by the Secretary General's criticism towards 
him as often setting aside decisions made by NLAC.94 He was accused of ridiculing 
the Malaysian IR system abroad and giving misleading information in an international 
forum that involved the World Bank and ILO in the United States in May 1996. 
In a more recent EPF issue, the President was again seen as giving a different opinion 
to the masses regarding the MTUC's stand on the Annuity Scheme. While he said the 
~4 See http: \\'\\\\.iaring.myibharianfri ne1002.htm. 
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MTUC members should accept it if it benefited them, the Secretary General was 
issuing press releases urging members to reject the proposal. One member in fact 
urged the President to resign for not recognising the negative impact of the proposal 
on fellow workers. The President, in reiteration, sued the unionist for RM200 million. 
Another more recent issue involving the EPF was an amendment that was made to the 
EPF Act that robbed workers of RM28,000 each (Refer 9.3.1.3). In 1997, members 
raised their frustrations over the matter of salary adjustment of EPF and another five 
non-affiliated agencies. The EPF, SOCSO, The National Savings Bank, Lembaga 
Urusan Tabung Haji and Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera complained of 
unfairness and injustice over the salary adjustment issue and urged the government to 
adjust their salary scheme, which since 1992, had been separately managed from the 
rest of the public sector, through the corporatisation policy. Another issue that became 
a contention was when the President was accused of concerns that were considered a 
'waste of efforts' (Interview: Kamaruszaman, 29/1/2001), such as when he ventured 
into issues of consumerism (Interview: Zainal Rampak, 28/1112000, 7/1/1999). Some 
unionists thought it was a wasted exercise while there was still so much that the 
MTUC should have concentrated on (Interviews: Syed Shahir; Kamaruszaman, 
29/1/2001; Abdul Halim, 23/2/2001). Many now thought the union should have a 
strong leader, one not 'used' by the government: 
'There were times when unions were ready but the leaders were not. When this 
happened, it only strengthened the state' (Interview: Syed Shahir, 9/112001). 
He claimed that workers gave concessions to the state but the state did not 
reciprocate. This was especially true in 1995 and 1996, when the economy was still 
good, yet nothing was gained by workers. However, during the economic crisis, the 
government called for the workers' help, understanding and loyalty, while when the 
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economy was good, workers rights' were still restricted (Interview: Syed Shahir. 
9/1/2001 ). 
These views present a picture of the ineffectiveness of MTUC, especially during the 
NOP and economic crises. This enabled the government to proceed its top-down 
management faster and without hassle from unions. In the case of the amendment to 
EPF Act, there were five representatives from MTUC who sat on the EPF Board, 
including the MTUC and CUEP ACS presidents. The argument is that the state 
contributed to the disunity of unions by 'buying' its leaders and thus further weakened 
the unions from becoming effective pressure groups to the government. During the 
economic crisis, MTUC and CUEP ACS leaders openly pledged support for the 
government and Mahathir (CUEP ACS Convention, 2nd December 1998 and MTUC 
Biennial Convention, 3rd and 4th March 1999). There were two issues here; either they 
felt they had to voice their support so that the unions would stay in the government's 
'good book' (for survival) or they were doing it out of self-interest. While the MTUC 
President was already a Data and a senator in the House of Senate (therefore he must 
first be an UMNO member), the CUEP ACS President recently also received the 
honorary title as an acknowledgement of his contribution to the society, from the one 
of the states' government. While both might clearly deserved the titles, their position 
as trade unions' leaders made the situation awkward, to say the least, while they 
themselves admitted that there were still a lot the unions should have achieved. 
9.3.4.2. I\ITUC Lost Causes 
The weaknesses of the MTUC were again, as discussed below, seen in several issues 
that remained unsolved for these ten years. The MTUC as a national labour centre 
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failed either to curb the powers of DGTU or change the tedious process of getting 
union recognition in the 1990s. In-house unions became a more prevalent 
phenomenon because trade unions failed as a pressure group, and workers' right to 
join a union of their choice remained severely restricted. The minimum wage issue 
remained as old as the existence of the MTUC itself, while new issues such as the 
NRS and EPF were totally beyond the MTUC's grasp. It was up to the government to 
determine changes in the MTUC, and this was not going to happen, as long as the 
government was committed to regard economic progress as the official development 
ideology. 
When faced with issues that concerned employers and employees, the MNCs were 
given priority by the government, as seen by the classic example that was still 
unsolved: the issue of the HATWU. The case dragged on from 1988 and is still 
unresolved until today (Interviews: Bruno Pereira, 26/1/2001; Izhar Harun, 16/1/2001; 
Mohd Zubir, 16/1/2001). This unique case, whereby the union had to change its name 
three times, had its officials intimidated, harassed, thrown out and persecuted 
highlighted the helplessness of the MTUC. It also revealed the weakness of unions 
when they were in-house unions, such as faced by the HATWU. High-powered union-
busting lawyers were brought in from the US to scheme up ways to destroy the union, 
and in fact religion was used as a strategy to instil fear so as to deny support 
(Interview: Bruno 26/1 /200 1; HA TWU Report). The union was also made to incur 
debts of hundreds of thousands of ringgit to face the company in a series of litigations 
at the IR Court, High Court and Court of Appeal. The unions' demands to negotiate 
on tem1S and conditions of employment were evaded (New Year's Message, 31 
December 1999). In other words, the unions' power was not on a par with the power 
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of the MNCs or in the HA TWU case, the electronics companies which were protected 
by the government's policies. It also showed that unless the government changed its 
legislation and policies to more favourable ones towards workers, the case might 
repeat itself. In fact, in the case of the HATWU, the DGTUA himself admitted that 
the government could not intervene as the case had became a court case (Interview: 
Izhar Hamn, 161112001). 
Meanwhile, another issue that concerned the Malaysian estate workers remained 
unresolved as they had struggled to be given monthly wages. On May 2ih 2000, at the 
MIC's 54th General Assembly, the PM made a commitment that had been agreed on 
by the Cabinet in principle. Then again, the government postponed its implementation 
until the end of the year. This prompted estate workers to lodge a police report against 
the MoHR on 3 June 2000. They claimed a study sponsored by the employers' 
association MAPA was unlikely to be sympathetic towards them. The other issue 
concerned the NRS, which was suggested by the MTUC as a result of the economic 
downturn in 1997, for each worker and employer to contribute RMl.OO a month to a 
fund to enable retrenched workers to get allowances from it if they did not secure jobs 
within three months. While the idea was received positively by the unions, employers 
and the government were not impressed at all. On 26th May 1998, the MTUC 
submitted a memorandum to the PM, for consideration of the government in view of 
the escalating levels of retrenchments in the country (MTUCAR, 199711998: 55). It 
argued that there were cases of companies voluntarily winding up their operations, 
closing down business without giving prior notice, and being put under receivership 
or relocated to other countries. These became issues when such companies reneged on 
their legal and contractual obligations to their workers by defaulting on statutory 
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contributions to the EPF or SOCSO, as well as payment of retrenchment benefits 
based on Employment (Termination and Lay-Off Benefits) Regulations, 1980. 
Sometimes it happened that terms and conditions stated in collective agreements were 
dishonoured (MTUCAR, 1997/98 Report). Since more than 85% of the affected 
workers were not union members, they could not mobilise any effective collective 
action to protect their interests. The MTUC claimed that enforcement procedures 
towards employers were often long, slow and inadequate. If the companies had 
relocated operations to other countries, had their assets foreclosed by creditors or 
directors or had been declared bankrupt, the chances for employees were even 
slimmer. Therefore, the MTUC suggested that the NRS to be managed by SOCSO, 
whereby the small contributions, together with 5 million SOCSO members, would 
yield RMIO million per month, and RM120 million a year. The Fund would be 
invested in government guaranteed securities and proceeds from these investments 
could be utilised to pay retrenchment benefits, or they could consider giving them a 
fixed monthly allowance to support their families until they found a new job. 
The FMM, although it promised to study the feasibility of the plan, was later rather 
apprehensive about the idea, and worried that it might be 'a social welfare scheme' 
(The Star, 29/6/1998). The employers claimed they did not want the employees to take 
time to look for jobs, or refused to adapt to the changing environment by not learning 
new skills, or worse still, if workers abused the system, by claiming joblessness 
despite finding new employment. By June 1999, the government had sided with the 
employers and rejected the idea of the fund. It claimed that the guideline called 'The 
Guideline on the Implementation of Retrenchment' was enough to solve retrenchment 
problems. The guideline again based its measures on ensuring 'industrial harmony', 
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therefore clearly putting the guideline under the government's terms. The MTUC was 
not impressed and criticised the PM who, in a, earlier meeting with them, 'appeared 
sympathetic and supportive' of the proposal. In fact, the cabinet was reported as 
having accepted the proposal and the Social Security Department was requested to 
carry out a detailed study on it. The MTUC then asked the government to reconsider 
its decision, but until today, there was no positive reversal to the government's 
decision. Just like the minimum wage issue, this was again MTUC failure that saw the 
reversal of government's promise. 
The electronics industries meanwhile, still the biggest contributor to Malaysian 
economy, were still denied the right to form national unions, and the permission to 
form even in-house unions were scarce. As in 2000, there were only 8 in-house unions 
in the electronics sector, representing only 5,509 members (MoHR unpublished data, 
2000). This was despite claims that there were more than 100,000 workers in that 
industry (IMFI994/95 Report). The government's fear that investors would run away 
from Malaysia was quite genuine, as there were threats of pulling out of the country 
from American companies in the 1980s, when the government expressed its 
pemlission to form national unions in the sector (discussed in Chapter 8). The term 
'electronics' remained very vague, and trade union leaders accused the DGTUA of 
having the power to determine whether an industry was 'electronics' or 'electrical' in 
order to grant the registration of unions, a claim disputed by the DGTUA (Interview: 
Izhar, 16/112001). He said it was up to another ministry, the MITI, to decide as such. 
The DGTUA could only decide on whether the industry deserved the recognition of 
the trade unions if the application fulfilled the criteria, and it did not matter whether 
the industry was electronic or not. However, he admitted that the government wanted 
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to give protection to enterprises that it thought needed it, such as the electronics sector 
(Interview: Izhar, 16/1/2001). Here, it was clear that the government gave priority to 
the national economic objectives, and the DGTUA was held responsible to guarantee 
this at all times. His position was to ensure the formation of unions would not affect 
the economy since Malaysia depended on the electronics industry and, as already seen 
in Chapter Eight, foreign investors disliked unions. Trade unionists supported this 
view andclaimed that applications were turned down by the DGTUA because the 
government wanted FDI to come to and remain in Malaysia (Interview: Mustafa 
Johan,2411211998). 
However, the DGTUA insisted that the rate of rejection for the registration of unions 
was very small, while in-house unions, even for electronics workers were still 
registered if they fulfilled the criteria set by the government (Interview: Izhar, 
16/1/2001). There was no record kept of how many electronics industries there were 
in Malaysia either by the ministry or the MTUC, making it harder to analyse the 
situation. However, by 2000, there were only 8 in-house unions registered for the 
electronics industries (Interview: Izhar, 16/1/2001; unpublished data from the TUAD). 
The DGTUA claimed that since the electronics industries were given pioneer status 
for five years and the workers were offered a collective agreement, the latter felt no 
necessity to form unions. With pioneer status, the companies gave better terms and 
conditions, further discouraging the workers from taking the initiative to form unions, 
and it was only when the relationship turned sour between managers and workers did 
they seek to form them. The argument was that it was up to the unions to ensure the 
unionisation of workers: 
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'If there were no actions from the unions, the government had no right to 
intervene' (Interview: Izhar, 16/1/2001). 
In other words, the better the management treated the workers, the less the need for 
workers to form unions. In this case, in-house unions had the advantage over national 
ones in that: 
'national union officials were in fact strangers to the workers, so if the 
management was okay, they (the workers) were okay' (Interview: Izhar, 
16/1/2001). 
However, the trade union leaders disputed this claim. One trade unionist claimed that 
the government had been consistently curbing unionisation, and especially from the 
electronics sector since the 1970s, and more so during the present government 
(Interview: Rajagopal, 23/1/2001). 
To summarise, it was clear that if trade unionism was ever to function effectively in 
Malaysia, it needed to be either strong as individual unions, where even without the 
MTUC they could function effectively; or have a very strong and effective MTUC. So 
far, they have failed to gain prominence in any area; as in-house unions they were 
small and weak and disunited, under the MTUC, the centre itself admitted it failed to 
effecti vely champion workers' issues. 
9.3.5. The Employers' Dominant Position 
By comparison, as discussed below, the employers were in a very strong position. As 
already emphasised earlier in the chapter, their position was protected by the 
government under the IRA, when their 'managerial prerogatives' could not be 
challenged, even by the courts. In the 1990s, several issues show an imbalance of 
power between employees and employers with the government almost always siding 
with them, a position that the employers had almost taken for granted. 
During the economIC cnsIs m 1997, retrenchment became a heated issue. Many 
companies closed down without giving prior notice of a month, as required under the 
EAl955 (The Sunday Star, 16/1/2000). In one case, the MTUC urged the MoHR to 
obtain a court order to stop the Applied Magnetics company's executives from leaving 
Malaysia following the sudden closure of the factory, until the welfare of the 2,400 
workers was resolved. The MTUC urged the Labour Department to auction off its 
assets to pay the workers. This was one of the loopholes under the EA1955 that 
benefited the employers. In 2000, against Section 9(4) of IRA1967, there were 
reportedly 40 cases where employers threatened to dismiss workers who refused to 
dissolve their unions, which had already been recognised by the MoHR (BH, 
31112000). The fact was generally, employers were not supportive of the formation of 
unions, even in-house unions. This was on top of the tedious process under the law 
whereby workers had to seek recognition from employers before a union could 
commence collective bargaining. The established practice was that unions had to have 
enrolled 50% plus one of the eligible employees as members before seeking 
recognition. In the event whereby the employer refused recognition, the one and only 
course of action open to the union was to report the matter to the DGIR (not directly 
to the DGTUA). If he failed to settle the dispute amicably, he had to refer it to the 
Minister, whose decision was final and conclusive. It could be a very long time before 
the decision was made. During the process, the concerned union was prohibited from 
resorting to strike action to coerce the employer to accord recognition. This 
discouraged trade unions activity, making it difficult and time-consuming (Interview: 
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\1ustafa lohan, 2411211998). The interference of the DGIR on top of the final and 
binding decision in the hands of the Minister, made the process even more tedious. 
Even so, employers complained of 'no benchmark' for productivity levels (of how to 
measure against wage), and they viewed the minimum wage issue as a 'no-no': 
'All employers close shop if the government force minimum wage' (Interview: 
Mohamed, 91212001). 
However, Malaysian collective bargaining exerCIses were already curtailed by 
'managerial prerogatives' under Part IV IRA 1967, as negotiations had to exclude 
matters of promotion, transfer, employment, termination of service, dismissal and 
assignment or allocation of duties. To the trade unionists, the government 'regulated' 
rather than 'facilitated' for economic reasons, basically for the FDI.95 Even with the 
advantage of employers over workers, the MEF as the biggest employers' federation 
in Malaysia still had some reservation over its relationship with both trade unions and 
the government. The MEF preferred the flexible wage system that was accepted by the 
NLAC in 1997 to collective bargaining (Interview: Shamsuddin Bardan, 11112/1998). 
It meant wages would depend on productivity and the economy. Unions questioned 
whether employers would give higher wages in times of economic prosperity (Mustafa 
Johan, 2411211998). In 1998, the MTUC reported cases of large companies that took 
the opportunity to deny workers their annual bonus rightfully due to them. These were 
the workers who trusted the management promises and accepted the 'productivity 
linked bonus system'. The case proved the MTUC's doubts and fears over the 
'IS This was based on interviews with Mustafa lohan Abdullah, Syed Shahir, A.H. Ponniah, K. George 
and G Rajasekaran. All opined that the government put the priority on economic development. 
However. all opposed the government's claim that it was for the people or national unity. as stipulated 
by the NOP. Instead they claimed that the government's priorities on the economy with pnvatisation 
and \'arious other policies benefited only a few close business people. 
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ineffectiveness of the flexible wage system favoured by employers and the 
government (MTUCAR, 1997/98: 10). 
The MEF did, however, offer training to members, focused on the compliance with 
the laws, two-way communication with employees and the use of 'humanity' when 
making decisions. This was in line with what the government called for, showing the 
mood for co-operation with the authority. Nevertheless, it still commented on the lack 
of consultation with the government and claimed that policies or decisions were 
already made before calling the MEF 'to talk' (Interview: Shamsuddin Bardan, 
1111211998). These were the same comments from unions, and marked the failure for 
the tripartite system such as the NLAC to function effectively (Interview: Mustafa 
Johan, 24112/1998). The MEF, however, claimed to have maintained good relations 
with the MTUC or individual unions, such as NUPCIW, which asked the federation to 
train them on labour law (Interview: Shamsuddin Bardan, 11112/1998). The MTUC, 
despite its comments over the imbalance of power between workers and employers 
caused by the government legislation, reciprocated the MEF opinion. The general 
feeling was that employers and employees in Malaysia, under their representatives the 
MTUC and MEF, tried to work things out within the system. Again, as a body that 
was recognised by the government as representing employers, the MEF, just like 
MTUC, was invited to tripartite bodies and asked their opinions by the MoHR 
(Interview: Shamsuddin Bardan, 1111211998). However, the MEF believed in 
maintaining a good and harmonious IR system in Malaysia by advising members 'to 
bc reasonable' when dealing with employees (Interview: Shamsuddin Bardan, 
1111211998). This stand by the employers' federation further strengthened the 
gt)\'clllment's position in Malaysian IR. 
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9.3.6. The External Forces 
The Malaysian government, as discussed below, retained its 'love-hate' relationship 
with external forces. When the government adopted HRD as a tool for producing 
skilled workers, and aimed to become a developed country by the 2020, Malaysia 
looked set to embrace international standards in labour relations as well. However, as 
further discussed, this was not to be. The ultimate objective of the NDP was still 
national unity, but the focus in the plan has changed. This shift was actually generated 
by internal pressure on the NEP as the government would lose votes of the other 
ethnic groups if it continued with the NEP without modification. Towards the end of 
its implementation, the NEP was criticised for its very pro-Malay policies (lomo, 
1994, 1995; Gomez, 1991). Therefore the NDP was also a political move, offering a 
different emphasis. It ventured into HRD, exploring the full potential of Malaysian 
workers through 'developing the necessary skills' (OPP2, 1991 :5). However, the catch 
was this was to be achieved by 'creating a productive and disciplined labour force' 
(OPP2, 1991 :5). This is the irony that creates the paradoxical situation faced by 
Malaysia in the 1990s, as seen from discussion on issues below. 
Malaysia was always against any intervention from international bodies to its internal 
affairs. During the 1990s, these challenges were stronger with the rapid globalisation 
process and the mushrooming ofNGOS in Malaysia (Rachagan and Tikamdas, 1999). 
The government did not like to admit that they had succumbed to some external 
influences. Nevertheless, both internal and external forces became more apparent as 
globalisation became a force that Malaysia had to contend with. In this case, the PM 
was seen trapped in his own policies. The Malaysian government initially encouraged 
Malaysia to respond to the global changes positively, and especially information 
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technology (IT). The government invested in education, emphasising on science and 
technology, while the age of IT spread the latest developments in global changes and 
hence information about anything, including IR development. The encouragement 
towards IT development saw the introduction of big projects such as the ~vlultimedia-
Super-Corridor (MSC) a la Silicon Valley in the USA. Aware of the effects of 
globalisation on Malaysians, the PM urged them to 'pick and choose' western values, 
and commented on the 'Asian democracy' (BT, 20/5/1995): 
'Some, of course, still equate modernisation with total Westernisation, total 
acceptance of all the norms and even the idiosyncrasies of the West. But the 
likelihood is that Asian countries of the future will be democratic but different, 
not only in relation to the West but even in relations to each other' (BT, 
20/5/1995). 
He made himself very clear over the right of strikes in Malaysia when he said: 
'Disruptive strikes and riots undermine the economy and make life difficult for 
the citizens ... But what is the basis of strikes? It is nothing more than a trial of 
strength between employers and employees, a trial to see who can withstand 
the most amount of damage' (BT, 20/5/1995). 
Both views emphasised the paradoxical trait of the PM, who while was welcoming 
modernisation and change, highlighted the authoritarian tendency of the government. 
His emphasis on Asians being different referred to the government's commitment to 
retain the old ways of managing the Malaysian IR. In fact, by 1999, the PM was 
having second thoughts over globalisation. He urged Malaysians to be selective, and 
choose only values that were suitable and would benefit them as Malaysians (BH, 
17/1111999). This general stand taken by the top leader confirmed the belief of 
unionists that now the government preferred the 'employer-employee relations', rather 
than the 'traditional functions of trade unions' (Interview: Sivananthan, 2/2/2001). 
Good employee-employer relations would definitely replace the trade union's 
traditional role. The globalisation process highlighted the significance of employer-
employee relations and the gO\'ernment embraced that as seen under the NDP. In 
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companson with its neighbouring countries, except perhaps Singapore, Malaysian 
workers were better off economically. Unwittingly, the MTUC looked more and more 
towards imitating Singapore's NTUC, except that it was not in the same league. In 
Singapore, the NTUC has become part of the government, even though this was 
denied by its leaders (Interview: Matthias Yeoh, 29/112001). One of the leader, 
Matthias Yeoh insisted that the NTUC used a democratic channel to be the workers' 
representatives and get elected, not 'chosen' by the government. The MTUC 
President, Zainal Rampak was chosen by the government as a senator, but insisted that 
he had 'a lot of inside information' since then (Interview: Zainal, 7/1/1999). The 
NTUC leaders became ministers in the PAP government and discussed 'sensitive 
issues' behind closed doors, much like the 'elite accommodation system' practised in 
Malaysia. However, in Malaysia, trade union leaders did not enjoy that level of 
relationship yet, and looking at the situation that the MTUC and CUEP ACS are in 
right now, it was a very unlikely scenario. However, Malaysian workers did enjoy a 
better position than Indonesian, Thailand or the Philippines workers. It is just very 
unlikely that the freedom enjoyed by Indonesian people in expressing themselves in 
the open was to happen in Malaysia. The only choice open to trade unions right now 
was to be totally accommodative to the government in the hope of becoming accepted 
and treated the way the NTUC was treated in Singapore. However, to do that they had 
to totally let go the old confrontational approach and drop their claims. 
The MoHR insisted that the ratification of core labour standards had to be in 
accordance with the spirit and intention of the Philadelphia Declaration, which 
acknowledged differential socio-economic realities and technical capabilities of 
member states. In 1997, the minister said Malaysia needed a more pragmatic approach 
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by the ILO to enable member states to ratify core labour contentions through technical 
assistance (Buletin KSM, 1 August 1997). He expressed regret when the ILO Director 
General proposed a number of initiatives 'which are inclined towards linking labour 
standard with international trade', an attempt by some quarters that was resisted by 
various member countries. To some trade unionists, the ILO was a 'toothless tiger' 
(Interview: Sivananthan, 22/2/2001). It failed to help trade unionism in Malaysia 
except perhaps by retaining its existence, therefore giving Malaysia a better image 
internationally. In 1997, Malaysia ratified two more, that is Convention No. 100 -
'Concerning equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal 
value' and Convention No. 138 - 'Concerning minimum age for admission to 
employment' (Buletin KSM, 1 August 1997). As in January 2000, Malaysia has 
ratified 22 ILO Conventions making it double the total of Conventions ratified in 
1984 (see Appendix II). However, a few core Conventions were not ratified. By ILO 
standards, there are seven 'Core' Human Rights Conventions. These are Freedom of 
association and collective bargaining (N087 and 98); Forced Labour (N029 and 
NoI05), Non-discrimination (No 100 and No111); and Minimum Age (N0138).96 Out 
of the seven, Malaysia has ratified three: Convention N098 in 1961, N029 in 1957 and 
No 100 in 1997. Malaysia still has not ratified Convention N087, which guarantees the 
right of workers to organise and engage in collective bargaining. This is despite the 
fact that 122 countries have ratified out of 174 ILO members, with even Indonesia 
joining the group in 1998. In fact, Indonesia has ratified the seven core conventions, 
receiving applaud from ILO. In a way too, it showed the government's resistance to 
succumb to external forces, such as the ILO. 
</h See http> \\\\\\.ilo.OIg public 'englisllfbllreall/infipr 1995 26.htm. 
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9.4.Conclusion 
The foregoing discussion revealed that the government still regard high economic 
growth as the most important factor to help Malaysia achieve other goals, such as the 
Malay issue, and the developed country status as envisioned by Vision 2020. 
Therefore it has given the private sector a higher position as a catalyst to generate 
growth, with the help from an efficient but acquiescent public sector. The NDP period 
saw the government gaining a stronger position, by keeping all the legislative 
framework, but with an enhanced campaign through the MoHR and other supportive 
policies. It highlights the irony of the situation, whereby the government was quite 
committed in bringing change to the private sector, for example by setting the HRDF 
and skills training, encouraging tripartite system with more dialogues, however, 
reluctant to liberalise the laws, or some other harsh policies, like discouraging 
unionisation in the electronics industry. The government was also reluctant to agree to 
the minimum wage regulation or to protect foreign workers in the Malaysian labour 
system, obviously for economic reasons. Meanwhile, political factors were also 
another consideration, and political stability was still deemed important. It still used 
reasons such as 'national unity' and 'national interests' for the restrictive labour and 
other laws that it vehemently defended. The restrictions were proven very beneficial to 
the government during the economic and political crisis in the latter half of the 1990s. 
It again proved that the preservation of the old legislative system was a wise decision 
for the government and helped it to curb open conflicts and political dissent, 
especially caused by Anwar's sacking. Since the private sector was viewed as the 
catalyst for economic growth, very low strike level and other industrial disputes, even 
during economic crisis, were good for the foreign investors. However, the 
go\,cmment's strong position as compared to unions was achieved not just through the 
406 
restrictive measures taken by the government as legislator, administrator and 
participant. Other factors, such as socio-cultural factors, the political culture, weak 
trade unions and dominant position of employers in the private sector all contributed 
to this. The imbalance of power between the government and employers of the private 
sector on the one hand and employees on the other should be borne partly by the trade 
union movement. The MTUC as the national body failed to unite with CUEP ACS to 
form a strong enough pressure group to influence the status quo. In fact, union leaders, 
no matter how 'aggressive' or vocal they were, claimed they believed in the 
conciliatory ways. The fear of confronting the government was partly genuine as past 
experiences showed that open conflict drove the government to use the ISA. However, 
during the NDP period, the capabilities of MTUC or any individual unions were not 
fully tested. This was either because the leaders really felt the unions might cease to 
function if the government took a totally anti-union stand, or because they were more 
concerned with their own personal interests. There were accusations that the top 
leaders of MTUC and CUEP ACS had failed the movement, and became too 
accommodative towards governments' policies for their own personal benefit. 
However, generally, unionists believed there needed to be effective two-way 
discussions, and industrial action, such as strikes, even as a last resort, should not be 
restricted as the case was at present. There was also no need for the government's 
discouraging stand over the formation of national unions, the unionisation of 
electronics workers, the tedious process of registration of trade unions or the vast 
powers of DGTUA or the minister. Other than that, the tripartite system had to be 
pro\'cd to be functioning, not just in name. If not, cases like the EPF issue would be 
repeated. 
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The next chapter analyses the public sector IR during the same period under the ~DP. 
The contention is, especially to strengthen the position of the private sector, the public 
sector has to be supportive, and therefore affected the development of its IR system. 
408 
CHAPTER TE:\ 
PLAYING THE SUPPORTIVE ROLE: THE PUBLIC SECTOR INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS UNDER THE NDP 
10.1. Introduction 
Chapter Nine showed that under the NDP (1991-2000), the government regarded the 
private sector as the engine of economic growth to accelerate the process of 
eradicating poverty and the re-structuring of the multi-racial society with an ultimate 
objective of achieving national unity. The NDP continued most of the NEP's planning 
but with new strategies to help Malaysia become a developed nation in its own mould, 
in line with Vision 2020. With that, the public sector's role was also re-defined under 
the NDP, to facilitate and create a conducive economic environment in which the 
private sector could play its role. This, as discussed further in this chapter, put the 
public sector in a supportive role, albeit an important one. 
This chapter examines public sector IR under the NDP from 1991 to 2000. It looks 
into whether there were actually changes in the government's approach, through its 
policies of corporatisation/privatisation and the introduction of the new salary system, 
the New Remuneration System (NewRS). Under the NDP there was a renewed 
emphasis on both the public and the private sector to play hand in hand to achieve the 
NOP's objectives under the 'Malaysia Inc' concept, which introduced in the early 
1980s. Here, the role of the PSD as an equi\'alent to the MoHR for the private sector 
is explored. The purpose is to examine the government's relationship with public 
sector employees, and its claim that there now existed a 'symbiotic working 
relationship' between them. The next discussion analyses the role of the Joint 
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Councils as another mechanism of communication between the government and the 
public sector employees. Also explored is the role of the PST until its demise in 1999. 
Lastly, the relationship between the government and CUEP ACS as the national union 
body for the public sector employees, and issues that concern CUEP ACS itself, 
become the focus of discussion. Here, the government's claim that the body of public 
sector employees was now its 'smart partner' is analysed. The discussion on the 1995 
claim for salary review by CUEP ACS and the political relationship between 
CUEP ACS and the government provide insights into the nature of the relationship 
between them. This chapter offers a deeper understanding of how the government 
played its role as an employer to the public sector employees under the next stage of 
Malaysian national development policy, the NDP, and at the same time explores 
factors that have influenced this role. 
10.2. The public sector under the NDP 
The sub-discussions below explore the affirmative action taken by the government to 
ensure the public sector IR was developed in line with the NDP. Here, the approach 
taken towards the sector for the ten-year period is analysed. Also analysed are the 
renewed emphasis on the corporatisation and privatisation policy, and the NewRS as 
two examples of the government's determination towards achieving the objectives of 
the NDP. 
10.2.1. The government's pragmatic approach 
The discussion below focuses on the administrative approach taken by the government 
towards the public sector for the ten-year period under the NDP. Since the 1960s, the 
Malaysian go\'cmment has claimed that it has taken a 'pragmatic approach' towards 
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the public service's role (PSDAR, 199111992). This study shows that the sector was 
developed in line with every stage of Malaysian development planning. In the 1960s, 
it was a 'maintenance administration', while in the 1970s it was orientated to 
'development administration' where all mechanisms in the public service were aimed 
at achieving the NEP target. In the 1980s, still under the NEP, its role was 
strengthened to help the smooth running of the many developmental policies, such as 
the Malaysia Inc, Privatisation and Industrial Master Plan, among others. During the 
NDP, as discussed below, again the government tried to ensure the public sector 
worked in line with the major development planning amidst the various factors that 
influenced this role. Therefore, it is interesting to note how this affected the public 
sector IR. 
Under the NDP, the public sector was to be 'facilitative, supportive, advisory, 
coordinating, regulatory, monitoring and evaluating' (PSDAR, 1991/1992). This 
actually reveals part of the 'corporatist' nature of the Malaysian state. In other words, 
the government wanted it to be more supportive towards the private sector, which has 
been entrusted with a heavier role. In line with that, in 1991 the government 
introduced the Special Committee of the Cabinet on Salaries for the Public Sector 
(SCCSPS, 1991) and shortly afterwards the NewRS, a new productivity-linked wage 
system. Throughout the NDP there was a more intense privatisation policy, as well as 
a commitment to reduce the sector, make it more efficient, highly developed and 
modern.97 The new role of the public sector was outlined clearly both in the Cabinet 
97 The general perception in Malaysia was that the quality of public service was poor compared to the 
pm'ate sector. In 1999, it was rnealed that the public sector had yet to achieve the IS09000, the 
standard already achit?\'ed by the private sector a few years back (BH, 28/4/1999), 
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Committee Report and under the NDP (SCCSPS, 1991: 18). The public sector's 
structure, roles, capabilities, process and procedure were now developed to ensure the 
private sector was given all the support to play a dominant role in the Malaysian 
economy. To the government, the private sector had a competitive edge to playa more 
dominant role, therefore the public sector was to help in co-ordinating, regulating and 
monitoring it (SCCSPS, 1991). The idea of mutual co-operation between the private 
and the public sectors, as already envisaged by the Malaysia Inc concept, was given a 
new emphasis in the 1990s. In 1996, the PM said: 
'But if privatisation is to succeed, cooperation from the civil service is 
essential. They must be prepared to re-examine their roles and their way of 
doing things. They have to put the interest of the private sector above those of 
the bureaucracy. They have to remove bureaucratic impediments to the success 
of privatised entities ... ' (Mahathir, 22/4/1996). 
From that speech it was clear that the government took privatisation and the private 
sector seriously as the catalyst for economic progress. The importance of economic 
progress under the NDP still was inextricably linked to the ethnic issues, to overcome 
the Bumiputeras economic impediment. Even though the ND P stated new strategies, 
the ethnic question was nevertheless a central issue when the OPP2 still emphasised 
the creation of a BCIC: 
'An efficient public sector will be able to continue to play an important role in 
the effective implementation of programs aimed at eradicating poverty, 
reducing regional imbalances and creating a viable BCIC. In this regard the 
public enterprises are expected to playa more effective role in creating and 
supporting the BCIC' (OPP2, 1991 :20). 
Again, the government regarded the public sector as a mechanism to achieve the 
objectives of the NDP, which still had the Bumiputeras issue at heart. The government 
expected the public sector to support this policy. At the same time, it was committed 
to reducing public expenditure and encourage efficiency in the economy, thereby 
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intensifying the privatisation of a number of government agencies and public sector-
owned commercial entreprises (OPP2, 1991; MP7, 1996:200). The government hoped 
to achieve higher efficiency in the public sector and ensure its resources were 
distributed to implement the high priority programs under the NDP (OPP2, 1991 :20). 
In the 1990s, the Bumiputeras still formed the majority of the public sector 
employees, making up of about 560,300 (65.9%) employed in the government 
services as compared to 214,800 (25.3%) Chinese and 69,300 (8.2%) Indians (OPP2, 
1991). At the end of the NDP, the Malaysian public service was still more than 
850,000 strong, and the government remained the biggest employer in the country 
(Interview: Bagh Singh, 1111212000). This was despite its effort to cut more than 
100,000 employees from the public sector through the Privatisation policy (See 
) 98 10.5.2 . From 1983-1996, it was reported that 53 government agencies with 
108,431 employees had been privatised (UM, 5/1 0/1999). The intention was to reduce 
the sector, so that it was not burdened with financial problems, as it had once faced 
during the policy of expanding public enterprises in the 1970s.99 
Apart from that, the government tried to improve its services in the 1990s, following 
criticisms from the public. 100 It started with programs to enhance the capability and 
image of its agencies in providing quality services. 101 It was within this campaign that 
98 See h!tp:llvs02.tvsecme.coml-vs021 bS/faqs/PrivatisationQ&A.html, an official web-site of the 
Malaysian National Economy Action Council (NEAC). This one here contains an interview between the 
Director General of the Economic Planning Unit, Iskandar Dzakumain Badarudin with NEAC on the 
implementation of Privatisation policy for the last two decades. 
~'l See Gomez and Jomo (1999: 75- 116). It explored on the privatisation policy and related it to the 
issue of Bumiputeras, patronage and politicisation of the policy. 
100 Therefore several programs to improve the quality of its employees, regarding their service to 
customers were taken. For example, in the 1990s, programs introduced include the Manual of Office 
Procedures and Desk File, Improvement in the Quality of Counter Services, Quality Control Circles 
(QCC). Micro Accounting System, Total Quality Management (TQM) and Clients' Charter. 
101 In 1996. the governnlent circulated the 'Guidelines for implementing MS ISO 9000 in the Civil 
Semcc' to all Secretaries General of \1inistries. Heads of Federal Departments, Heads of Federal 
413 
the government expected the 'employee-management' relationship to flourish. In the 
major outline of OPP2, no mention was made of the role of the trade unions. Instead, 
the government set up programmes to enhance HRD, and encouraged the private 
sector to provide greater on-the-job training so that changes in the structure of output 
were accommodated by retraining and not through retrenchment (OPP2, 1991: 91). A 
'closer partnership' between the public and private sector in formulating training 
courses was promoted. The government expected both sectors to play their roles in 
line with the 'bigger picture', the national development planning objectives. This was 
emphasised by constant encouragement from political leaders towards the 'smart 
partnership' between the private and the public sector, which became more evident 
during the economic and political crises from late 1997 onwards. 
The above discussion shows that the government launched a massive and meticulous 
plan to transform the public sector within the wider spectrum of the NDP. The salary 
system was changed, privatisation revived and campaigns increased on a 'symbiotic 
working relationship' and 'smart partnership' basis to encourage closer relations 
between the private and public sectors, and for them to regard the country as one big 
company. This was a pro-Japanese management view, in line with LEP, as already 
discussed in Chapter Nine. This coincided with a new emphasis on training, the roles 
played by the PSD, PST and the Joint Councils, while at the same time maintaining 
the present legislation, therefore ensured government's success. It showed a 
government fully committed to achieve its goal to bring Malaysia to a higher level of 
economic development. As discussed in earlier chapters, the government believed that 
Statutory Bodies. State Secretaries and Local Government Authorities (Development Administration 
Circular 211996). 
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after the 13th May 1969 racial riot, a more just, economic distribution between the 
multi-racial population must be continued. The belief that the private sector was able 
to help to accelerate that process encouraged the government to intensify the 
corporatisation and privatisation of the public sector under the NDP. 
10.2.2. Corporatisation or Privatisation? 
The discussion looks into how the government renewed its efforts to corporatise and 
privatise during the NDP, and how the policy affected public sector IR. From the start, 
public sector unions voiced their concerns over the policy, especially in terms of 
assurance over employment benefits. In the 1990s, especially in 1995, when the policy 
was accelerated, it became a bigger issue. The idea of corporatising institutions of 
higher learning, starting with the University of Malaya, the oldest one in the country 
became a heated issue until end of the NDP. The plight of five corporatised bodies 
also worsened the issue, revealing a lack of preparedness on the part of the 
government over its own policy and also the weakness of public sector unions to 
counter the issues. 
The government stressed the economic benefits that it could reap that could only be 
achieved through privatisation. By 1994, it claimed that 120 projects had been 
privatised including 80 government-owned ones, 29 new projects and 11 public 
entreprises, thereby it saved RM47.95billion (RM5.05billion operational expenditure, 
RM42.9 billion capital expenditure) and proceeds of sales of government interests in 
privatised entities contributed RMIO.8billion. Moreover, the government wage bill 
shrank since 92,700 civil servants joined the private sector. As for market gains, 17 
pri\atised entities were listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), resulting 
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in a market capitalisation of some RM132billion (as at the end of October 1994) (BT, 
26/11/1994). Besides relieving the government of its financial burden, the mo\'e also 
helped to meet the NEP's, and from 1991, the NDP's targets. Again, this pointed to 
the efforts to restructure the society, and helped the small and medium-sized 
industries through 'vendor' and 'umbrella' development concepts. This clearly 
referred to the Bumiputeras in particular. The argument put forward here is that there 
existed other reasons behind the government's policy, apart from purely economic 
ones, and in this case again the ethnic issue referring to the Bumiputeras arises. The 
government's IR policy thus was closely related to this underlying objective to 
ultimately help the Bumiputeras. In other words, to fully understand Malaysian 
government's policies this ambiguous concept should always be looked into as well. 
In 1994 too, while the PM praised the privatisation policy and emphasised the 
government's determination to continue he revealed: 
'Since the government allots a majority of the shares to Permodalan Nasional 
Berhad (PNB) and other Amanah Saham Bumiputera (ASB) companies, the 
privatisation programme has enabled three million Bumiputeras to be 
shareholders in giant companies ... 'The project has also brought out the 
commercial and management ability of Bumiputeras which is on a par with 
non-Bumiputeras ... '(NST, 9/9/1994). 
The determination to continue with policies that were pro-Bumiputera was heavily 
influenced by the continued belief in the need to preserve their support politically as 
well as preserving their constitutional rights as embodied in the Malaysian 
constitution. The importance of Bumiputeras' political support was never taken lightly 
and should not be underestimated in this context of this study. It meant ensuring the 
majority of votes that will guarantee the continued status quo, which was the 
UMNO/Malay political domination in the country. The general acceptance was that 
UMNO must remain the dominant party in the Barisan Nasional for it to remain as 
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the de facto party in Malaysian politics, a place jealously guarded since Independence 
in 1957. 
In 1995, encouraged by the high economIC growth, the government declared its 
intention to accelerate the process of privatisation to include more than 250 
government agencies (NST, 19/9/1995). The PM assured workers that the Malaysian 
way of privatisation did not involve a termination of services, but an increase in 
salary. In fact, they were given the choice of whether to accept this or opt to remain in 
the old scheme. However, the ones opting for the old scheme would not get the 
benefits that came with privatisation such as bonuses and the facility to buy shares. 
The PM claimed that unlike other countries, there was no opposition from employees 
in Malaysia towards corporatisation or privatisation. This, however, was not true. In 
Kota Baru, in the eastern state of Kelantan, 500 workers from the water supply 
division of the Kelantan Public Works Department staged a workout during a briefing 
on privatisation by the management in August 1995. The privatisation of the Lembaga 
Bekalan Air Kelantan was scheduled for October 1995, and should have been carried 
out by Kelantan Water Sdn Bhd, a joint venture company between the Kelantan 
Darulnaim Foundation and Thames Water, a British firm (BT, 22/8/1995). Due to this 
protest, the then Deputy PM, Anwar Ibrahim, urged state governments to conduct a 
feasibility study for every privatisation project and to give special emphasis to the 
interest of workers. In 1995, too, the Rubber Products Employees Union called on 
consumer associations and other NGOs to pressure the government not to the privatise 
health service (The Sun, 30/3/1995). The plan to corporatise the government health 
sCI\'ice actually started in 1985 (BT, 14/8/1999). In 1995, when the matter was again 
raised by the gO\'t~mment, an NGO, the Consumer Associations of Penang (CAP), 
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issued a statement calling upon the Ministry of Health to reconsider its plans to 
privatise government health services (NST, 2/311995). In July 1999, the MTUC joined 
hands with CUEPACS in condemning the government's intention to privatise 
government's hospitals. The Nurses's Association, Malaysia Medical Associations 
and Estate Assistant Hospitals' Association also voiced their worries over the matter 
(UM, 261711999). In August 1999, the government dropped the plan (BT, 14/811999) 
and instead promised to step up investments to improve the facilities of government 
hospitals and clinics. In a way this again showed that a concerted effort by NGOs and 
unions could playa positive role in offering to check and balance the government's 
policy. The government, on the other hand, was not friendly towards the 
mushrooming of NGOs in Malaysia, especially when they slowly but surely 
intervened in policy matters. The implementation of corporatisation and privatisation 
policies became another government's political tactic to monitor the public's response 
towards their policy, especially in sensitive areas such as health and education. When 
confronted with opposition, the government was not totally averse to change their 
stand. Here, it depended on how far the other party was ready to pursue their causes. 
There were contrasting views on the benefits of privatisation with the PM making 
promises that once privatised, public sector employees had the right to choose 
between the government and company pay-schemes. They would face no 
retrenchment and enjoy wages at par with the private sector (NST, 3017/1996). The 
PSD claimed that the income of lower level government servants, inclusive of various 
allowances and perks, was comparatively better than that of their counterparts in the 
private sector (The Sun, 17/5/1997). CUEPACS claimed otherwise, saying that the 
130,000 \'acancies in the public sector, mainly on the technical and professional side 
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had not been filled up due to the government's failure to offer perks and other 
incentives, as this has forced workers to tum to the private sector (BH, 3/5 11997). The 
government, in response ordered a comparative wage study but excluded union 
representatives, much to the disappointment of CUEP ACS (NST, The Sun, The Star, 
17/5/1997). This incident marked one of the weaknesses of CUEP ACS, whereby 
financially it could not afford an independent study of its own, but depended on the 
government to let them be part of the study team (NST, 18/5/1997). That being the 
case, CUEP ACS remained reactive and mostly responded to issues that concerned 
public sector employees in a submissive way. 
CUEP ACS lost many members because of the privatisation of public sector agencies. 
As membership also ensures strength and solidarity, this brought certain negative 
effects on CUEPACS. Union members on the industrial side, for example, the Malaya 
Railway Workers' Union and the Government's Printing Department Union, were 
lost. The government also privatised certain units of government agencies, much to 
the dissapointment of CUEPACS. The privatisation of individual units of government 
agencies, such as the Vehicle Examiner Unit in the Road Transport Department and 
Alam Flora (a company) which had taken over the collection and demolishment of 
waste from the Kuala Lumpur City Board (UM, 2/9/1997) was opposed by 
CUEPACS. The union strongly requested to be included in negotiations in the 
corporatisation or privatisation of government agencies (The Star, 20/1 0/1997). The 
non-package privatisation of several agencies was already a loss to trade unionism as 
only part of the agencies were corporatised or privatised, thus making it difficult for 
unions to be established. 
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The other issue raised from this policy was the lack of understanding by public sector 
employees over the difference between privatisation and corporatisation. One trade 
unionist claimed that there were government officials who were still confused over the 
term, making it more difficult for employees who should be given a full understanding 
before agreeing to a particular salary scheme after their department or unit were 
corporatised/privatised (Interview: Mohd Jamil, 2911211998). Generally 'privatisation' 
referred to total change of ownership from the government to firms that engaged in 
commercial activities, where the employees were given private-sector based salary 
schemes. Apart from that, terms and conditions of service were now subjected to 
collective agreements or the EA1955, while their trade unions were allowed to claim 
for recognition, and unionised employees were given rights to negotiate and arbitrate. 
This, in contrast, differed from 'corporatised' bodies, where the agencies' identities 
and entities did not change in function, but they now operated commercial activities 
with the intention of gaining maximum profits (Mohd Jamil, 1996). The salary 
structure was still subject to the public sector scheme, only alienated. The terms and 
conditions of service should have been better than while serving as public sector 
employees, but still monitored by the PSD. The trade unions, however, were not 
allowed to claim for recognition, and employees still did not have the rights to 
negotiate or to arbitrate. The only change was that they were offered better salary 
schemes because the agency had now become financially self-reliant, even though not 
totally free from the government's authority. The 'commercialisation' of the 
agencies's activity did not imply the presence of employees' rights like in the private 
sector. 
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As an example, discussed in the issues of corporatisation of the educational sector and 
the five statutory bodies below, the government continued a policy of top-down 
management, despite its proclaimed policy of 'smart partner' and a 'symbiotic 
working relationship' . 
10.2.2.1. The Corporatisation of the Educational Sector 
As already discussed in chapter Eight, through the NEP quota system, Malay students 
gained places in local public higher institutions, and mostly enjoyed government's 
scholarship. Therefore, the issue to corporatise national universities was bound to be 
met with a special interest by the community. Corporatisation of the educational 
system meant higher costs for students, thus the worry was that Malays who came 
from poor backgrounds could now not afford them, as fees were clearly going to be 
higher. On the part of employees, concern naturally fell on terms and conditions of 
service. The discussion below explores the government's handling of the matter and 
how it reflected the true nature of Malaysian public sector IR. 
In 1995, the government stressed the need to reform the educational sector in line with 
the nation's objective to be developed by 2020. The government passed a number of 
educational bills and amended existing ones, such as in the Universities and 
University Colleges (Amendment) Act 1995; Private Higher Education Institutions 
Act 1996; National Council on Higher Education Act 1996; National Accreditation 
Board Act 1996; and Institute of Technology MARA (Amendment) Act 1996 (Ahmad 
Zaidee, 1997). In 1995, the Minister of Education defined the objective of the 
corporatisation of higher learning institutions by stating that: 
'As far as the government is concerned, the idea of corporatisation of 
universities is to provide for quality university education with modern 
education facilities yet at affordable cost' (Najib Razak 1995 as quoted in 
Ahmad Zaidee, 1997). 
The government wanted higher learning institutions to be able to increase efficiency in 
their management; to be more accountable to the stakeholders; optimise utilisation of 
resources; and to operate with less funding from them. They should be more 
customer-focused and market-driven where courses offered must be relevant to the 
needs of industry. The overall goals would see an efficiently managed organisation, 
with staff having a better scheme of service, the students could expect quality 
education and at the same time, the industry could count on well-trained graduates. 
Corporatisation here must not be confused with privatisation as the bodies still 
belonged to the government. The government tried to impress upon the public the 
difference between the two, most of all the corporatisation of the education sector, an 
aspect that to most Malaysians, especially the Malays, was held dear. The Malays 
were the ones who were more concerned since most of them were government-
sponsored students who attended public universities. The government wanted an 
administration that would imitate the private sector in terms of competitiveness, 
efficiency, and profit. Apart from that, other incentives such as the appointment, 
salary and promotion of its employees would be dealt with according to the private 
sector competitive factor. A prominent Malaysian scholar, Rustam A Sani, stressed 
that to be able to do this the government must also offer a 'public sector' reward or 
salary scheme. Only then, the best candidates would offer themselves in the 
corporatised departments of the public sector and the government would achieve its 
goals (UM, 6/6/1994). As discussed in depth below, corporatisation of the government 
education sector was more di fficult then other government agencies, because it was 
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regarded as more than just an economIC matter, but also included Issues of the 
indigenous community, especially the Malays. 
The corporatisation of the University of Malaya met with substantial opposition by the 
public. When the idea first arose, the PM assured the public that the go\'ernrnent was 
not about to release the corporatised institutions. In 1995, the University of Malaya 
Student's Association delivered a memorandum to the Education Minister, urging the 
government to give ample time to students, academicians and the university staff to 
discuss the matter and to be given the right to participate in the decision-making 
process. This was beyond the student grasp as decision-making for corporatisation, as 
with other policies was a top-down policy. The Vice-Chancellor of the university then 
broke the news that a near seven-fold increase in fees would have to be paid by 
undergraduates under a corporatisation plan. Much higher fees were also to be paid by 
Masters and Ph.D. degree candidates (The Star, 5/511995). Aware that many Malays 
were affected by the move and could afford the fees, the PM insisted that the 
corporatisation of universities would ensure academic staffs higher pay in line with 
their colleague in the private sector. He promised that students who could not afford 
to pay the higher fees would be helped by the government through scholarships, loans 
or financial assistance (UM, 8/811995; MM, 231711995). The government planned to 
push ahead with the plan in January 1998, despite opposition from academic and non-
academic staff (The Star, 11711997). The three University Malaya unions and 
associations; the UM Academic Staff Association, UM General Staff Union and the 
University Hospital Staff Union expressed their dissatisfaction over the new 
remuneration package, besides complaining of not having ample time to study it 
before being finalised. The 20 to 22.8 per cent increase \\'as compared unfavourably to 
423 
other corporatised government agencies like the Inland Revenue Board, which saw a 
salary increase between 27 to 34 per cent. The first time the management met the three 
unions was in April 1997, two years after the idea materialised (The Star, 10/411997). 
However, these agreed plans between management and employees were disrupted by 
the economic downturn at the end of 1997. The cabinet withdrew the new 
remuneration package which meant that the option papers distributed to the University 
of Malaya's staff about a fortnight earlier, some of which have been signed and 
submitted, may have been invalid (The Star, 1811211997). 
The Education Minister explained that it was not 'right' to go ahead with the 17.7% 
agreed pay rise 'when governments servants in the Group A and B had had their pay 
frozen' due to the economic downturn. The university staff were urged then 'to remain 
calm and accept the government's decision in good faith as it was unfortunate, 
unavoidable, unimaginable, unthinkable and done under most extreme circumstances' 
(The Star, 18/1211997). This is one classic example of the 'special relationship' 
established between the Malaysian government and the public sector employees as 
proposed by the researcher. Again, the government servants showed restraint, 
perseverance and acceptance in the face the sudden decision to put the programme on 
hold after much publicity that it was about to be implemented and promises of better 
salaries and perks. They were only saved by the economic downturn, proving that 
economic considerations was again a deciding factor in the government's moves. 
Pleas and threats by public sector employees, their unions and even students failed, 
but the economic downturn abruptly put the programme on hold. There were no 
aggressive and militant moves by public sector employees as again they showed 
restraint and \'oiced their united stand behind the government to take any positive 
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moves towards restoring the economy. The same pattern recur during another issue 
that affected public sector employees, also as a result of corporatisation, as discussed 
below. 
10.2.2.2. The Plight of the Five Statutory Bodies 
The discussion below highlights the misunderstanding caused by corporatisation and 
the weakness of CUEP ACS to champion the public sector employees causes. Here, 
five statutory bodies, the EPF, SOCSO, the National Savings Bank, the Lembaga 
Tabung Angkatan Tentera (Armed Forces Fund Board) and the Tabung Haji (Pilgrim 
Fund Board) were separated from the rest of the public sector in 1992 with the start of 
the corporatisation programme (Interview: Mohd Noor, 3/3/1999). These five bodies, 
with 10,050 employees, were financial institutions which did not directly rely on the 
taxpayers to pay the salaries of their employees. Instead they invested funds and a 
portion of the income paid for their wages. Without explanation they were not given 
their salary adjustments/increases along with the rest of the public sector who received 
theirs in 1996. So they went to the MoHR with their predicament and threatened to 
resort to industrial action such as picketing if the government did not take any quick 
measures. The Minister promised to take the matter to the Cabinet, asked the PSD to 
look into it and urged them not to picket. 
As discllssed before, in 1971, the government appointed a Royal Commission to 
standardise the salaries, as well as tern1S and conditions of service of employees in all 
Statutory Bodies and Local Authorities. The criterion given to the Commission 
required that when making recommendations, to bear in mind the salaries and 
allowances that were being paid to government employees at the time (refer Chapter 
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Eight). The Commission nevertheless made certain recommendations, which were 
more favourable than those given to government employees. When the Cabinet 
Committee made upward salary adjustments for all employees in the public sector in 
1995, including employees in Statutory Bodies and Local Authorities, the five 
'corporatised bodies' were left out. The result then was that all employees in the 
public sector were paid the same salary for doing the same type of work (NST, 
18/3/1999). In March, the Chairman of the informal Joint Council of Unions of the 
Non-Affiliated Agencies expressed his frustrations over the delay and asked for help 
from the MTUC, instead of CUEP ACS (Interview: Mohd Noor, 3/3/1999). In protest, 
the employees wore tags, demanded settlements and threatened industrial action, such 
as picketing again (NST, 2/3/1999). The PM himself directed the PSD to prepare a 
report on the demand as soon as possible (UM, 5/3/1999) but here, the PM's 
intervention was evidence that it blurred the relationship between the government's 
existing machinery and the unions. CUEP ACS however welcomed this interference. 
Even though there was no positive outcome as yet, it had already commended the 
Cabinet's move to discuss the matter (Utusan Melayu, 6/3/1999). The Minister even 
protested over the wearing of the badges to work by the five agencies, but the 
chairman argued that the move did not affect work and threatened to continue as such 
until the government showed some positive development (Utusan Melayu, 6/3/1999). 
In April 1999, the government promised that the issue would be settled before June 
(UM, 28/4/1999). However, until the year 2000, the matter had not been resolved, yet 
the unions did not picket, showing the ineffectiveness of the formal or informal 
mechanism in the public sector IR. 
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To summarise, it was shown that both CUEPACS and the MTUC failed in their bid to 
champion the workers' course in the corporatisation issue. The government took its 
time in handling the matter and employees, in their ignorance left it in the hands of 
CUEP ACS and the MTUC. The two issues revealed that the government was able to 
practice 'trial and error' with new policies without worries of serious opposition from 
public sector employees. The lackadaisical attitude was simply the natural outcome of 
public sector employees who were denied means of threatening actions like staging 
strikes. Even threats to picket were withdrawn, enabling the government to make the 
final judgement. In these two cases, the government's most deciding factor was based 
economic considerations. On both issues the government's reluctance to succumb to 
public sector employees was influenced by financial calculations. This was again seen 
in another unilateral decision to alter the salary system of the public sector for good in 
1992, with the introduction of the NewRS. Here, financial considerations, coupled 
with the weakness in its implementation saw public sector employees again subjected 
to the government's unilateral management. 
lO.2.3.The New Remuneration System 
The NewRS was a brave attempt by the Malaysian government to structurally change 
the salary system of the public sector. It was a productivity-linked wage system, 
introduced to coincide with the new role of the public sector under the NDP as a 
supporting mechanism to the private sector. It marked the government's effort to 
upgrade the standard of the public services by giving due acknowledgement to hard 
work by deserving public sector employees. The radical change was deemed necessary 
to create a more reliable, efficient, committed and forward-looking public sector. It 
was an integrated system and the most radical of the revisions thus far, bringing about 
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many changes to the structure, system and processes in the public service, such as a 
greater degree of flexibility in areas of salary progression and promotion, and also in 
job functions. The government regarded this change as acknowledging the diverse 
labour force, who were becoming more educated and qualified. Moreover, it was a 
reward system to maintain quality workers in the public sector (Interview: Bagh 
Singh, 1112/2000). Generally, trade unionists agreed that the system was goOd. 102 
However, it turned to be a controversial issue among the public sector employees. 
With the implementation of the NewRS, the salary structure was changed. The 
previous salary scale of the entire public service was based on a fixed one-line salary 
system where the entry requirements were very rigid i.e., the emphasis was more on 
academic qualifications alone, rather than on skills or talent. In other words, the old 
scheme was said not to give due recognition to those who possessed special skills and 
talent when deciding the initial salary at the point of entry into the service, or when it 
came to promotions. There were 574 schemes of services and an equal number of 
salary scales. Salary structures overlapped between schemes. In short, there was over-
specialisation, over-complexity and inflexibility. The new scheme of service under the 
NewRS now was reduced to 274 only. In addition, it introduced a Matrix Salary 
Schedule (MSS) to replace the old linear salary scale (Interview: Bagh Singh, 
1112/2000).103 This allowed various salary progressions, depending on performance. 
Under the NRS, there were now only three main categories of public servants, i.e., the 
102 Interviews with trade unionists in the public sector revealed that they generally agreed on the 
philosophy that deserving and more able workers should be rewarded accordingly_ The NRS was 
accepted with enthusiasm initially, but the acceptance waned after a few years when many felt heads of 
departments were not objectives in their appraisals, and the percentage put on those \\-ho would achieve 
the vertical or diagonal salary progression which made a difference in their yearly increment were a 10\\ 
5%) and 2%, respectively_ That discouraged workers from working and achieving high marks as it did 
not make any difference once the 2% or 5% limits were met. 
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Top Management Group, the Management and Professional Group, and the Support 
Group. Consideration for promotion, salary increments, training, placement (of 
officers) were to be more directly based on factors such as performance-on-the-job, 
contribution towards department objectives and the public service in general. Thus, 
the foundation of NewRS changed from the old scheme that was based more on 
seniority to one that valued performance. 
To realize the ultimate goal of the NewRS, i.e., to motivate public officials to be more 
productive and to produce quality output, a new Performance Appraisal System was 
introduced, effective on 1 st January 1993. The new appraisal method, described by the 
Service Circular No.4 of 1992, encouraged positive competition among public 
officials, as part of the effort to improve the quality and the productivity of the public 
service. It introduced a more systematic, transparent and reliable measurement of the 
performance system, lessening SUbjective elements in these crucial management 
activities of making performance appraisals, awarding promotions, or determining 
responsibilities. There were five components to be assessed, based on activities and 
contributions, work output, knowledge and skills, personal qualities, and 
interrelationship and co-operation. I04 In line with the basic principles of the NewRS 
which emphasise a performance-based pay system, higher marks of 70 out of 100 
were given to the work output over other components. The rest went to activity and 
103 Mr Bagh Singh Sandhu was one of the officials directly involved with the drafting ofNRS. 
104 For Activities and Contributions, recognition is given for involvement in voluntary activities outside 
official duties such as sports, professional associations and other social activities beneficial to the 
organisation, society and the country. Work Output is the aggregate output produced by an officer that 
(an be measured quantitatively and qualitatively. This is an important criterion which relates to the 
achieving of organisational objectives. For knowledge and skills, an officer is appraised for hislher 
knowledge and skills as well as for the \\'isdom utilizing that knowledge and skill. Personal Qualities 
refers to personal charactenstics and values of an officer such as Integrity, Commitment, Caring, 
Faimess, Discipline and Leadership. As for Interrelationship and Co-operation, good personal qualities 
such as team spirit. an ability to close ranks when appropriate \\'ould be recognised and appraised, 
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contribution (5%), knowledge and skill (10%), personal quality (l0%) and 
interrelationships and cooperation (5%). 
Annual Work Target (A WT), Mid-year Review and Actual Work Achievement were 
three important also factors considered when appraising the performance of staff. 
A WTs were discussed and mutually agreed on between the appraisee and the 
appraiser after taking into account the department's work plans. It took the form of 
work plans such as projects, activities, goods and services that were measurable either 
in terms of quantity, quality, cost effectiveness and/or timeliness. Therefore, the 
A WTs had to be reasonable, measurable, achievable and realistic (Interview: Bagh 
Singh, 1112/2000). The A WT for every officer was established after the Head of 
Department determined the organizational goal, objectives, strategies, and programs 
and activities of each division, section and unit of the department. The determination 
of departmental goals, objectives, strategies and programs took into account national 
policies, plans, financial and manpower resources, and other factors. Here, again the 
bigger picture of the government's objective was never far away from its 
implementation by the heads of departments, again giving the heads of departments 
that extra authority when making decisions. Though the process looked exhaustive, it 
was more comprehensive and transparent than the old system of an automatic yearly 
salary rise. The work targets set at the beginning of the appraisal were reviewed mid-
year to gauge an officer's progress. This served as an early warning system should 
there be shortcomings during implementation. In circumstances where work targets 
were unrealistic, the A WTs could be rectified. The appraisee had to record all 
amendments to be made to the content of the A WT form. At the end of the appraisal 
system, the appraisce was required to record the actual work achievement against the 
430 
A WTs. If the work targets were partly/not accomplished, the appraisee was required 
to explain. The government claimed there was objectivity and transparency of the 
system, saying it was comprehensive and closely linked to overall corporate planning. 
It was mutually agreed A WT and a clearly developed and precise assessment criteria. 
However, there were weaknesses and drawbacks mainly due to human factors. The 
most obvious was the element of subjectivity which was difficult to totally eliminate 
and it could only be minimised.!05 The Performance Appraisal System provided four 
types of performance-based salary-movement or progressions, i.e. static, horizontal, 
vertical and diagonal. Public sector employees complained of favouritism by heads of 
departments in giving marks to employees, thereby discriminating against who 
deserved the much-sought vertical or diagonal progression. This was made worse by 
limits placed on both salary movements i.e. 5% for vertical and 2% for diagonal, for 
every department or unit. Therefore, many of those who achieved very high marks still 
failed to achieve those two salary progressions. By 1994, CUEPACS had enough 
evidence about weaknesses of the NewRS and especially of the Performance 
Appraisal System. The PSD refused a proposal to form an appeal body to handle 
appeal cases over the appraisal officer's decision. The argument of the PSD was that 
the department could not afford to handle such cases if they arose in masses. On 19th 
September 1994, a new proposal was sent to the government, urging it to consider that 
the appraisal system should not be related to salary increases, instead it should just be 
used to detemline strength and weaknesses of the officers. It was suggested that the 
appraisal should also be used to give a yearly reward and other incentive payments. 
105 Steps suggested for example-continuous appraisal throughout the year, do not refer to previous 
year's performance, do not appraise hastily, no favoritism, not too strict or too lenient, avoid central 
tendency-i.e. awarding points on a moderate scale and do not focus too much on recent incidents/events 
that may distort the overall appraisal system. 
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CUEP ACS wanted the government to stop the internal agreement whereby officers 
were rewarded on a rotation system. Instead CUEP ACS suggested that those who 
achieved the target should be given the reward and the 2% quota system should be 
abolished. 
Other proposals included a chance for those who failed to achieve the target to defend 
themselves. Moreover, no officers of the same grade should appraise another. Also, an 
officer who had been unjust in his appraisal should be brought to a disciplinary 
hearing. In the CUEPACS Convention, 29th March 1995, a resolution was made that 
while it understood the government's intention to upgrade the quality of work of 
employees and also encouraged positive competition among them, the system de-
motivated the majority of public sector employees. CUEPACS wanted the NewRS 
abolished since after three years of implementation it showed no positive change. 
Again, the PM was urged to intervene. CUEP ACS in fact threatened to picket but the 
government was adamant that the system was the best to determine performance. The 
Remuneration Director defended the NewRS system as saying that: 
'anything that is new has its weaknesses. At least it should take 10 years for 
us to see it ... The NewRS is one of the kind! excellent system in the world. It 
will lead to quality and productivity and encourage workers to work harder, in 
line with paying for performance' (Interview: Musa Taib, 24/2/2000). 
On 21 st February 1995 the PM promised to look into the matter but by the 30th 
October 1995, he announced that the system was to stay. In 1996, the PSD suggested 
a '360-degree assessment' where in addition to the superior, colleagues would also 
contribute to assessing the officer. CUEP ACS was quick to praise the suggestion, 
saying that it fit the current situation (UM, 15/9/1999). The difficulty in implementing 
the NewRS and the 'subjectivity' of its appraisal system was admitted by the 
government (Interview: Musa Taib, 2412/1999). In fact, there were departments that 
succumbed to the 'alternate system' or 'take tum' systems (Inten'iew: Musa Taib, 
24/2/1999). He blamed the heads of department who sometimes, while understanding 
the philosophy behind NewRS, 'were not objective' enough. However, this is quite 
debatable as even with the most objective superiors, there must be some degree of 
subjectivity. This debate still went on until the end of this study. 
To summarise, here was one attempt by the Malaysian government to entirely change 
the structure of the public sector. If it became a success, the aim to reward better 
employees would certainly benefit the sector which had the biggest number of 
employees. However, looking at the weakness in its implementation and the failure of 
the authority to win the trust of public sector employees, the NewRS was already in 
jeopardy. At the end of this study, the NewRS became a major factor that de-
motivated public sector employees who felt cheated by its failure to deliver its 
promise that it would reward deserving employees. The government's admission over 
its weakness but its slow response to change exacerbated the employees' 
disappointment in the government and CUEP ACS as their representative. The 
NewRS, just like corporatisation, need to be improved, and for a start, the government 
could begin by considering the feedback from the public sector employees themselves. 
In other words, the problems faced could be lessened if the policy was more of an 
outcome of the tripartite system, either at the NLAC, or the PSD level. 
10.3. ·Symbiotic Working Relationship'? 
From the start of the NDP in 1991, the government claimed that it had promoted a 
'symbiotic working relationship' with its employees through the PSD, the Joint 
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Councils and also its relationship with CUEPACS. The discussion below explores this 
relationship and how it affected CUEPACS as the sole representati\'e of public sector 
employees. The discussion offers insight into the nature of the power-play within 
public sector IR during the NDP. The system initially showed that it coincided with 
what Ozaki (1988) observed as 'the intermediate system', one that provided 
machinery for joint consultation between public servants and the government, in the 
absence of the recognition of the workers' right to bargain collectively. 
10.3.1. The Public Service Department 
The PSD is the most important federal agency, which serves as the 'human resource 
department' of the federal government and therefore oversees every aspect of public 
sector employees' working life and even thereafter (Ayadurai, 1998: 236). At the start 
of the NDP, the government was already planning changes to the Malaysian public 
service as the outcome of outside global influence and demands from public sector 
unions and staff associations (PSDAR, 1991192; Interview: Musa Taib, 24/2/1999). 
Here, an examination on the role of the PSD as the most important mechanism 
entrusted by the government to implement its policies as well as serving the needs of 
the public sector employees is made. 
As noted earlier, employees in the public sector may group themselves in unions or in 
associations and still enjoy some of the benefits of union representation (unlike in the 
private sector where they must group themselves in trade unions to enjoy any benefits 
of union representation). Thus, at the time, all public sector employees, regardless of 
whether or not they were members, automatically enjoyed any negotiations or 
arrangements worked out by CUEPACS. In the wider context, Malaysia was facing 
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new challenges from globalisation. There was the rapid change in the domestic 
environment as well as a growth in new technology, IT, telecommunication and 
multimedia, which encouraged the pragmatic government to consider changes in the 
public sector. It chose to preserve the present legislative framework but widened 'two-
way discussions' and conciliation with representatives of the public sector employees, 
in particular CUEP ACS as the recognised national union body. Instead of regarding 
the public sector unions and staffs associations in a confrontational manner, now it 
claimed that it opted for a 'strategic alliance' with them. It was clear that the 
government wanted to create a positive image internationally, which was important 
for foreign investment, and that it expected the public sector employees to embrace 
this change with enthusiasm and without question. The government talked of the need 
for them to understand how their unconditional and full support played the most 
important role to ensure the success of the government's policies as drafted under the 
NOP. It was stressed that the ultimate objective was to create a just, united and 
developed multi-racial Malaysia. Therefore, negative reports in the ILO conventions 
or any other international events, by foreigners, or worse still by local trade unionists, 
were resented. 
To achieve the new level of relationship, in the mid-1990s, several mechanisms for a 
'symbiotic working relationship' were instituted' .106 There were forums allocated for 
two-way communications between employees and management, through the Joint 
Councils, the NJCs and the DJCs. However, this was only within the context of the 
present law, and calls from CUEPACS to amend several provisions in the TUA and 
lOb See 8agh Singh (1999) and also an interview with him, 1112/2000. He is the Deputy Director, 
Remuneration Di\"ision at PSD, also lI1\"oh'ed WIth the drafting of the New Remuneration System. 
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IRA were still ignored. The PSD, which was originally established to service only the 
federal public services, then serviced the entire public sector (except for anned forces 
and, to a certain extent, the police force). It administered the wages system, and 
oversaw the operation of the Joint Councils. 107 The National Institute of Public 
Administration (INT AN), the public sector training institution conducted courses for 
all levels of public servants, carried research activities, provided consultancy services 
to ministries and departments, and acted as a think-tank unit for the government. The 
Remuneration Division fonnulated and interpreted principles and policies regarding 
salaries, allowances and other benefits and advised the Federal Cabinet as well as 
implementing all cabinet decisions on these matters. It also looked into the operation 
of the NJCs and the DJCs and officers from this department represented the federal 
government in all three NJCs. This department was directly involved in the 
determination of wages and conditions of service of the public sector employees, 
managing the public sector IR, making it by far the most important division as far as 
public sector IR was concerned (Interview: Mohsin Mohd Khir, 4/2/1999). The 
Negotiation Division conducted 'negotiations' with individual public officers or 
public sector trade unions and staff associations over anomalies allegedly arising from 
the implementation of the recommendations of various salary commissions and 
1117 The other departments under the PSD are the Administrative Divisions, which looked into the 
administrative part of the PSD while the Service Division formulated, implemented and interpreted 
personnel policies in the public services generally. That covered recruitment, promotion, transfer, 
discipline, tennination and re-employment of public sector employees. The Training and Career 
Development Division was given the task to perform acquisition of trained professional required by the 
public sector. It conducted manpower development surveys and planned manpower development. In-
service training courses, awarding of scholarship and fellowships to public sector employees to either 
further studies locally or abroad also fell under their management. The Establishment Division 
evaluated requests or proposals by ministries or departments to create or re-grade posts, and ensured 
posts were properly graded and categorised. It also formulated the schemes of service in the public 
sector, besides evaluating and recognising degrees and diplomas vis-a-vis the public services. The 
Pensions Division was responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies on 
superannuation benefits and accident and death-in-service benefits and also responsible for the 
disbursement of pensions, and resolved all related problems. 
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committees. It represented the government in any dispute over an alleged anomaly 
referred for arbitration to the PST. In short, the PSD became the most important 
agency for the government in catering for the needs of public sector employees, from 
their recruitment to their retirement. More and more, it became the agency that 
ensured the 'harmonious relations' between employees and the government. 
However, the PSD lacked authority in making decisions and during the NDP became 
a body that ran daily affairs rather than determining the machinery for the public 
sector. It did not reflect the comprehensive nature of the department with its various 
divisions, a fact worsened by the absence of bargaining rights. Moreover, the PSD 
never made decisions for demands that concerned salaries, or terms and conditions of 
service. That was left to the higher authority, the Cabinet, or to be more exact, since 
the 1980s, the PM. The Director General of the Remuneration Department admitted as 
such: 
'the big cases CUEPACS could always go directly to Daim (the First Finance 
Minister) or the PM ... the smaller ones to NJC' (Interview: Musa Taib, 
24/212000). 
This approach altered the relationship between CUEP ACS and the government to one 
that was much more political. A trade unionist summarised the PSD attitude towards 
the public sector employees as: 
'I know what is good for you, you don't know what is good for the nation' 
(Interview: Jama1udin Mohd Isa, 30/1/2001). 
In other words, the government's claim that there was 'symbiotic working 
relationship' between the two was questionable. Again, CUEP ACS was resigned to 
the idea that to survive at all they had to confoml to the govemment's decisions. 
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Denied the right of collective bargaining, they relied on the PSD in matters that they 
thought could be resolved at that level. Meanwhile, they used the personal relationship 
with the higher authority, in this case usually the PM, to solve bigger issues. So far, 
apart from regaining the collective bargaining right for public sector employees and 
relaxing some of labour laws or other restrictive legislation, CUEP ACS' personal 
relationship with the higher authority did not totally fail. However, as discussed 
below, it kept CUEPACS always at the receiving end and forced it to maintain leaders 
that appealed to the government in order to benefit from the relationship. 
10.3.2. The Joint Councils 
The discussion below concerns the role of the Joint Councils as the government's 
mechanism to promote a harmonious relationship with public sector employees and 
the effects of the re-structure made by the government on the NJCs in 1992. 
Services Circular No 2 1992 was effectively implemented on 1 st January 1992, 
replacing the previous NJCs, in accordance with the implementation of the NewRS. 108 
Instead of the former five grouping of public employees as before, there were now 
only three broad categories of public sector employees; Group 1, The Top 
Management Group; Group 2, The Management and Professional Group; and Group 
3, The Support Group. With this announcement, the five groups of NJCs under the 
previous Services Circular No 2 1979 were dissolved. The change, claimed the 
government, was to make the function of the NJCs more effective (Working Paper, 
108 See Services Circular No 2, 1992. Before that the proposal was tabled by the PSD to the Co-
ordination Conunittee (Staff Side) of the NJCs. See Working Paper, 1/92 on the proposal to reshuffle 
the NJCs from 5 groupings to only three, in line with the Ne\\'RS. 
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1/92). The three new NJCs now represented employees in the Management and 
Professional Group, with the other two representing the lower Support Group in the 
Science and Technology Group and the General Workers' Group. Even though it was 
said to make the NJCs more effective, the functions were quite similar to the old ones: 
'1) to give views and discuss the principle of salaries, allowances, perquisites, 
terms and conditions of service for employees in the public sector. The 
discussions are of general nature and not on individual employees; and 
2) to enable the employer to put forth suggestions and provide information 
about recent changes and developments and solicit views of the employee 
representatives before being taken for consideration by the Government 
'(Circular, 2/1992). 
In other words, it was clear that the NJCs were still just there for giving views and 
were not a negotiating machinery. The PM chose the Officer Side, representing the 
government, and the unions affiliated with the respective NJCs chose representatives 
for the Staff Side, representing the employees' side. The other members ofNJCs were 
the Secretary-General of Ministries, Heads of Department and Secretaries of State 
Government as well as Heads of Statutory Bodies and Local Authorities. Fifteen 
government officials were appointed to every NJCs. The Director General of the PSD 
was the President of the NJCs whilst the Remuneration Division provided the 
secretariat service. The Deputy President was the head of the employee 
representatives/Staff Side of the respective NJC. The Joint Secretary for NJC on the 
Officials' Side was the Director of the Remuneration Division, whilst the Joint 
Secretary on the Employees' side was chosen by the respective employee 
representatives. The NJC members were elected for two years and could stay in the 
posts until new members were chosen or elected. The NJCs allowed for affiliation 
from the biggest number of public sector union/staff associations based on their 
respective Service Classification. The structure of NJCs at this level reflects that the 
interests of all services were represented. To facilitate the operation of the Secretariat 
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of the Staff Side, the government allowed six positions to be seconded with costs 
borne by the government (Interview: Bagh Singh, 1112/2000). This allocation by the 
government raised two issues. One, it showed the thoughtfulness of the government in 
tackling issues concerning its employees and management side, the other shows how 
far the government would go to ensure the 'special relationship' between government 
and the unions was established. There were now two representatives for the NJC for 
Employees in Management and Professional and Employees in Science and 
Technology (Support Group), with three representatives for the Employees for the 
NJC for Employees in Support Group. These representatives were chosen by the 
union, but approved by the PSD, after obtaining approval from their own heads of 
departments. They would hold office from two to a maximum of six years, paid by the 
government and had their offices at the CUEP ACS building in Kuala Lumpur. With 
the NJCs representatives paid by the government, it was almost impossible for them 
not to be acquiescent to the government. Here, the famous Malaysian Malay proverb 
that says 'never bite the hands that feed you' accurately reflects the situation faced by 
these seconded representatives. With the limited term (two to six years in office) 
allocated to them, it was not worth being on the confrontational side. It also shows the 
effectiveness of the government's system in ensuring that the employees/Staff Side 
used the mechanisms made available to them by the government, so that nothing on 
the employees' side escaped its knowledge. 
However, this does not mean that the NJC was not advantageous to the employees' 
side at all. In its limited capacity, the NJC for the staff side tabled 188 working papers 
from 1993 (the start of the new NJCs) until 1999. Out of that, the NJC for 
Management and Professional tabled 59 working papers, with 53 papers completed. 
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Out of the 53 papers, 17 proposals (29%) were accepted by the government, 25 (42%) 
rejected, 3 postponed (5%) and 8 dismissed (14%) (Ramona, 1999). For the I\'JC for 
Science and Technology, 48 working papers were tabled, out of which 32 papers were 
completed (67%). Out of the 32 proposals completed, 16 (33%) were accepted by the 
government, while 11 (23%) were rejected and 5 (11 %) dismissed. For the NJC for 
the General Group a total of 81 working papers were brought to the NJC. 56 papers 
were completed (69%), and out of that, the government accepted 24 proposals (30%), 
while the same number was rejected. 2 (2%) were postponed while 6 (7%) were 
dismissed. Admittedly, the average period needed for the Official Side to settle issues 
took between two to five years (Interview: Zainal Rahim, 2/211999; Ramona, 1999). 
Despite a very high percentage of attendance by the Staff Side, that of the Official 
Side was just 'satisfactory'. This was especially true when referring to attendance by 
officials who came to NJC meetings in their own capacity. The Chief Secretary of 
Ministries and Director General of Departments delegated their subordinates to the 
meetings. However, the Director General of the PSD and the Director of 
Remuneration Division recorded a 100% attendance. Their attendance, however, was 
inevitable since both were the Chairman and the Secretary ofNJCs respectively. 
Many trade unionists criticised the NJCs functions as being only an avenue for 
consultation, not negotiation (Interview: Ahmad Nor, 61212001). There was no 
negotiating right, and decisions were already made before being brought to discussion 
in the NJCs. The helpless state of the NJC was evident when looking back to the 
Salary Review of 1995 that was agreed between CUEP ACS and the PM, and which 
totally defeated the purpose of the NJCs. According to the ex-General Secretary of 
ell EPACS, A.H. Ponniah, the very reason for the direct consultation and discussion 
with the PM was to regam the 'collective bargaining' power (Interview: A.H. 
Ponniah, 2211/2001). However, he admitted the tactic soured the relationship with the 
PSD as the secretariat of the NJC (Interview: A.H. Ponniah, 22/1/2001). 
The DJC was maintained under the MinistrylDepartment/Statutory BodieslLocal 
Authorities, as long as there was a Head of Department taking care of the 
administrative affairs of the department, the control over employees, and financial 
affairs. Any MinistrylDepartment/Statutory Bodies/Local Authorities who applied to 
have a different kind of DJC, apart from the ones suggested by the PSD, could do so. 
Any head of departments who had just formed their DJCs could always send a copy of 
the Constitution to the PSD with the names of their members. The Head of 
Departments referred to the PSD any indecisive matters or decisions made by the 
DJCs that differed from the government's decisions. In comparison, there was no 
change at all for the structure of the DJCs in the Circular 211992 with the instructions 
for the formation and running ofDJCs in Circular 211979. 
The DJCs functioned primarily to secure the greatest measure of co-operation between 
the ministry/department/statutory body/local authority involved and its salaried 
officers over matters relating to work efficiency and staff welfare. Second, it became 
the machinery for dealing with issues affecting conditions of work; and third, 
generally it collated the points of view of the employees concerning those of the 
official representatives of the ministry/department/statutory body/local authority. It 
discussed and decided on matters affecting conditions of work which had a bearing on 
the administration concerned, except any matter affecting individual employees. It 
also provided employees with greater opportunities for participation and 
responsibilities as regards matters affecting their work and observance of the 
conditions under which their duties were to be performed. Apart from that, it was to 
encourage employees, through participation in discussions, to expand their knowledge 
of the administration of the various departments. Lastly, it provided the means for the 
improvement of office machinery and organisation, and the opportunity for the 
consideration of suggestions and recommendations made by the staff on this subject. 
Membership of DJCs varied, but were usually equally divided between the Official 
and the Staff sides. The two sides, the chairman, the vice-chairman and the joint 
secretaries were selected for the NJCs, but the DJCs were required to hold meetings at 
least once every three months. Decisions reached by the NJCs had to be arrived at by 
agreement between the two sides. The decisions then had to be implemented by the 
ministry/department/statutory body/local authority concerned, unless it affected other 
departments or contravened government policy, in which case it had to be referred 
either to the department(s) concerned or to the PSD (Interview: Bagh Singh Sandhu, 
1112/2000). 
The above discussion showed that the government widened the scope for two-way 
discussions but clearly the Joint Councils, either the NJCs or the DJCs, were just 
forums for discussions not negotiations. They did not decide on matters pertaining to 
employees of the public sector as they should have done. Even though there was a 
significant number of working papers approved by the government, they were not 
major issues, like the question of salary structure or increase, or the pension scheme. 
The more important issues were tackled by unions outside the Joint Councils. Their 
role therefore followed the Service Circular 211992, confined to gi ving views only, 
with the higher political authority in the government deciding on those important 
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issues. Even the authority to discuss within its scope was limited. For example, while 
the NJCs might discuss the principles affecting remuneration and allowances, they 
could not discuss the salary structure set out under the CCR. The absence of authority 
to negotiate on salaries and other tenns and conditions of service became a reason for 
unions to urge the government to revise the machinery. However, the government 
insisted that the Joint Councils were an effective enough tripartite body. Efforts by 
trade unionists to change the function of the Joint Councils and regain their 
negotiating right did not materialise. It showed that public sector unions were 
outmanoeuvred by the government even when the councils were represented by the 
leaders of CUEPACS. In the late 1990s, the CUEPACS President headed the Support 
Group, while two more from other CVEP ACS affiliating unions headed the other two 
NJCs. The PM turned out to play a very significant role instead of leaving the 
discussions for wages, allowances, facilities and conditions of the services of the 
public sector to the available mechanism, the PSD and the NJCs. As long as he was 
the deciding factor, issues of the public sector employees always grew more political, 
subject to the government's considerations, and always at their expense. This made 
the NJCs ineffective as mechanisms to solve public sector issues. 
10.3.3. The Demise of the Public Service Tribunal 
The discussion here centres on the role of the PST as a mechanism to solve 'anomaly' 
cases for the public sector employees. Despite its shortcomings, the PST had for some 
time functioned as the Industrial Court for public sector employees until its demise in 
1999, 'when all the cases were solved' (PST Bulletin, 1977-1999). Its jurisdiction 
while still in operation was urged to be expanded, to resolve trade disputes in the 
public sector. 
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In 1996, the Secretary General of CUEP ACS aired his dissatisfaction over the role of 
the PST which only functioned to solve cases such as grading or anything that arose 
from the Cabinet Committee Report or the Salaries Commission (NST, 11/1/1996). 
He agreed with the PM that there should be either a third party with a new law, or they 
should amend the IRA 1967 or the PST Act 1977. This would allow public sector 
employees to appeal to a higher authority if they were not satisfied with arbitration. 
Although the IRA 1967 allowed a public servant to seek redress in the IR Court, one 
could only do so ifhe 'gets the approval from the King ifhe is a Federal civil servant, 
or the Sultan in the case of a state civil servant. .. However we (public sector 
employees) have never been given the approval so far' (Interview: lamaluddin Md Isa, 
30/1/2001). Nevertheless, from 1977 to 1999 the government reported that the PST 
had solved more than 600 anomaly cases, arising either from the CCR or NewRS 
(PST Bulletin, 1977-1999). It consisted of a chairman and a panel of persons 'who 
have experience and knowledge in matters of administration', appointed by the King, 
and removable from office only by him. Once a dispute was referred for negotiation or 
arbitration, the PST Act made it unlawful for any 'aggrieved person', or for any 
member of a trade union or staff association which is an 'aggrieved person', to go on 
strike or to do anything described in the Act as a 'proscribed industrial action'. This 
provision worked along the same lines in the private sector, when a dispute once 
referred to the IR Court made strikes illegal. The decision made by the PST was 'final 
and conclusive, and shall be binding on the Government and on all parties to the 
anomaly, and (shall not) be challenged, appealed against, reviewed quashed or called 
in question in any court'. The PST had considerable powers to summon witnesses to 
give evidence or produce documents in their possession, including the power to issue 
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an arrest warrant if any person failed to appear. It could also receive any evidence, 
written or oral, that it thought necessary or desirable, even if such evidence were 
inadmissible in a court of law. Just like the IR Court, in making decisions the PST Act 
required the Tribunal to have regard to 'the national interest, the financial implications 
and the effect of the decision on the economy of the country'. The Act also declares 
that: 
'No public officer shall be liable to produce any document in proceedings 
before the Tribunal, which in the opinion of the government is not in the 
public interest to produce. The decision of the government in this regard shall 
not be liable to be questioned or reviewed by the Tribunal or any court or any 
authority' . 
It was clearly an effort for the government to stop any official information to be aired 
in public. There were also other matters which the Act construed as 'managerial 
prerogatives', which could not 'be raised or be made a subject-matter of any 
negotiation or any reference to the Tribunal by any aggrieved person', namely a) the 
creation and grading of posts; b) the creation and grading of schemes of service; c) the 
promotion of a public officer from a lower grade to a higher grade; d) the transfer of a 
public officer; e) the appointment of any person in the event of a vacancy arising in 
the public service; f) the termination of the services of a public officer by reasons of 
redundancy or re-organisation; g) the dismissal and re-instatement of a public officer; 
and h) the assignment or allocation of duties in the public service. 
However, the PST, just like the IR Court, was not a court of law and therefore was not 
the final authority on questions of law. Hence it was subject to the supervisory 
jurisdiction exercised by the law courts over subordinate courts and tribunals. To help 
the public sector employees, in 1992, and in accordance with the implementation of 
446 
NewRS, a guide was issued by the PSD on how to claim for anomaly cases under the 
PST Act. 109 After its demise, the government considered the idea to establish an 
arbitration tribunal for the public sector (UM, 21/1/2000). The only avenue left for 
public sector employees now was the PSD, which, as already discussed, failed to 
deliver the most sought after function by public sector unions, to negotiate on behalf 
of their members. This forced public sector unions to rely on CUEP ACS, rather than 
on individual efforts which, as discussed below, though at times succeeded, made the 
relationship with the government more political than ever. 
IO.4.The State and CUEPACS, 1991-2000 
Barbash (1984:75) noted that: 
'Management and union differ not only in their interests; they differ 
organizationally. The union is primarily a bargaining organization; if it isn't 
that, it's nothing'. 
With that view in mind, the next discussion explores the relationship between the 
federal government with CUEP ACS as the national union body for trade unions in the 
public sector. It analyses the government's claim that it acknowledged the importance 
of CUEPACS as 'smart partners', despite the absence of any bargaining power or 
negotiating right, working together towards achieving the national objectives. It also 
explores factors that concerned trade union leadership, and the government's general 
policy that seriously dominated the relationship during the whole of the NDP. As a 
senior government official remarked: 
'In the public sector, it is more an employee-management relationship and not 
IR' (Interview: Mohsin Mohd Khir, 4/2/1999). 
10" See . A. Guide to claim for anomaly under the Public Sen'ices Act 1977, Public Sen'ices Act 
:\mended) 1992 on New Remuneration System'. 
447 
He viewed the relationship differently from the private sector employees view their 
employers, as for one thing, no industry was involved (Interview: Mohsin Mohd Khir, 
4/2/1999). Public sector employees, he insisted, were dealing with government who 
made policies for the general public, and therefore the foundation of the relationship 
could not be compared with the private sector, which was more profit-oriented. The 
government, he said, only had the interests of its people at heart and so it deserved the 
support of public sector employees. Therefore a good employee-management 
relationship was more appropriate for the government-employees, rather than the 
traditional confrontational approach. While what he claimed was true, there existed a 
working relationship between the government and its employees which offered 
rewards in financial terms and a high expectation of quality service from the 
employees. This expectation was more evident during the NDP, especially the second 
half of the 1990s, after Malaysia faced economic and political crises. CUEPACS, on 
the other hand, at the end of the NDP in 2000, had yet to win its struggles over several 
issues, most important of all, the right for collective bargaining. 
As in the private sector, the government stressed again the need for employees to 
remember the bigger picture; the national development plan that was designed to 
solve Malaysians' socio-economic problems. They were urged to always remember 
the nation's ultimate objectives in adopting the NDP. In fact, the expectations were 
much higher of the public sector employees. They were expected to be loyal, and 
support the government's policies without question. The government expected the 
trade unions to conduct their demands in a non-confrontational way and to focus on 
other issues, not only on salary and conditions of service. In his 1992 speech to the 
CUEPACS COI1\'Cntion, the PM urged trade unions to also be aware of and sensitive 
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to issues of the economy, productivity, quality, consumerism and environment. He 
also askedtrade union members to be aware of the market economies, and the 
developed nations' pact 'to obstruct economies of the Third World and other 
developing nations, including Malaysia'. The understanding is important he said, 
since the Malaysian economy which relied on the international market, would suffer 
and the nation's income would diminish and affect the income of workers in the 
public or the private sectors. 
In 1992, CUEP ACS amended its Constitution to enable the affiliation of unions from 
the statutory bodies and local authorities (Suara CUEPACS, 1994). CUEPACS in fact 
had tried to increase its membership from 1989. At least with the new membership 
from Sabah and Sarawak and the Statutory Bodies and Local Authorities, things 
improved a little. In 1994, ANULAE, the biggest statutory bodies union, which 
actually embodied several other unions, joined CUEPACS. This clearly delighted 
CUEP ACS since automatically about 21,000 union members were brought in (Suara 
CUEPACS, 1994). ANULAE thus became the second major member besides the 
NUTP, which brought in 50,000 members. ANULAE however was 'alienating itself 
from 1992-1994 that is from the period NRS was introduced, since 'there was no 
council especially for them' (Suara CUEPACS, 1994). ANULAE also had no 
intention to affiliate with CUEP ACS from 1992 to 1994. Since ANULAE was not a 
splinter union, and CUEP ACS also could now help the statutory bodies directly, this 
affiliation benefited both parties. By 1995, CUEPACS membership soared to 183,000 
with III unions, as compared to 89,544 with 54 unions the year before. 
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On 29 March 1995, CUEP ACS threatened the government that it would picket if the 
Performance Assessment System of the NRS was not abolished. CUEP ACS wanted 
the government to calm the discontent and dissatisfaction among public sector 
employees and insisted that the PM intervene (CUEPACS Triennial Report, 
1992/1995). However, this picket did not materialise. In 1998, the five statutory 
bodies that were alienated from the 1995 salary increase for public sector employees 
also threatened to picket when their demands were denied by the government. 
However, after the government promised to discuss the matter, the picket was not 
realised. The two incidents proved how altered the attitude of public sector employees 
could be when faced with certain issues compared to the era under Ahmad Nor in the 
early 1980s. The reluctance to proceed with industrial action benefited the government 
but made CUEP ACS more hesitant to act on its threats in the future. In fact, there was 
no serious threat at all during the NDP. 
There was, however, a difference following the 1997 crisis whereby there was an open 
debate as to whether the crisis was also political as well as economic. It was a well 
known fact that Anwar, the DPM was more in favor of IMF prescriptions on how to 
save Malaysia from the crisis. His stance differed from the PM's views, causing 
rumours that that had become one of the reasons for his sacking from the government. 
The relationship between the government and CUEP ACS was dragged into the 
political arena when their loyalty to the government of the day was called for. Three 
sub-discussions below highlight the relationship between CUEP ACS and the 
government during this challenging period. They are based on the government 
proclaimed policy of 'smart partnership' with its employees, the 1995 salary review, 
and the political factor. All three re\"caled the nature of the relationship and factors 
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that shaped the employee-management relationship between government and public 
sector employees. 
10.4.1 'Smart Partner' 
As mentioned earlier, in 1996, the government announced that it acknowledged 
CUEPACS as a 'smart partner', a proclamation well received by CUEPACS leaders 
(Interviews: A. Rahman Manan, 9/1/1999; Siva Subramaniam, 4/1/1999).110 The 
analysis below explores how both the government and union perceived this idea, and 
whether it actually materialised. 
The government pledged that under the tripartite system in Malaysian IR, unions were 
one of the partners working together for mutual progress. Therefore, from 1996 there 
were union representatives in government trade missions to foreign nations, 
alternately between CUEP ACS and MTUC. As a member of the tripartite body 
NLAC, CUEP ACS, like the MTUC was involved in discussions between the 
government, employees' and employers' representatives over matters pertaining to 
labour. They were also made 'partners' on the EPF Board and National Economic 
Action Council (NEAC) apart from the Joint Councils. This, and the absence of a 
deadlock, prompted some trade unionists to conclude that the relationship between the 
government and public sector employees was 'good' (Interviews: Abd Rahman 
Manan, 9/1/1999; Siva Subramaniam, 4/1/1999; Mahendraraj, 10/1/1999). Some were 
indeed satisfied with the ongoing two-way dialogue between CUEP ACS and the 
government. 'Issues such as the NewRS were still open for discussion' (Interview: 
Mahendraraj, 18/1/1999). This view was held despite the fact that CUEPACS 
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received a number of complaints about the NewRS. Some belie\'ed it should be 
abolished altogether while others hoped its implementation, especially regarding the 
appraisal system, should be improved (Interview: Jamaluddin Isa, 30/1/2001). The 
'good' relationship meant that CUEPACS was the party at the receiving end, where 
most policies concerning public sector employees were implemented first before being 
discussed by the tripartite bodies. The CUEP ACS Secretary General revealed the 
nature of relationship between CVEP ACS and the government: 
'CUEPACS would try to understand the government's position in making 
demands ... we hope the public sector will work in line with the government's 
policy ... all the final decisions are taken by the Prime Minister, he played an 
active role in decisions ... normally there is freedom to decide but the final 
decisions depend on him because he is accountable to the government' 
(Interview: Abd Rahman Manan, 9/111999). 
This submissive stance infuriated some veteran trade unionists who thought that 
CUEPACS leadership today was much wanting and weak (Interviews: A.H. Ponniah, 
211/2001; Ahmad Nor, 6/2/2001; K. George, 7/2/2001; AJ. Patrick, 112/2001). 
However, they admitted that one of the reasons that eVEP ACS was under pressure 
was the strong leadership in the government, particularly the present PM, Mahathir 
Mohamad, who was generally considered not to be in favour of unions, and would not 
hesitate to act on aggressive union leaders. This was experienced by Ahmad Nor who 
gave 24 hours' notice and resigned as CUEP ACS president in 1986, and A.H. Ponniah 
who was called 'radical' by the PM in 1996, the year he left as the Secretary General 
of CUEPACS (Interviews: Ahmad Nor, 6/2/2001; AH Ponniah, 22/1/2001). Ponniah 
infuriated the PM over the wage issue and was pressured by the MoHR, attacked by 
colleagues in CUEPACS conference, and forced to leave (Interview: A.H. Ponniah, 
nll/200t). The fate that befell Ponniah showed the 'eager to please' attitude of the 
110 Abdul Rahman Manan is CUEPACS Secretary General. while Siva Subramaniam is the President. 
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bureaucrats In MoHR and of his own colleagues in CUEP ACS who, instead of 
rallying behind him, sided with the PM. Several felt that the present trade union 
leaders were pressured to 'satisfy' Mahathir's wishes and vision for \1alaysia, thereby 
demolishing the democratic institutions and participative views by unions and 
bureaucrats who were accused of being 'eager to please' the government as well. This 
view was proven when trade union leaders steered their attention away from the core 
issues of workers, such as regaining the negotiating right for public sector employees 
and the fight to have equal rights as enjoyed by private sector employees. To be 
effective as a labour centre for public sector employees, CUEPACS needed to re-think 
its priorities in its struggle against the strong government. They also needed to have 
strong, committed leaders and try to reach out to the working community at large. 
However, an ICFTU-APRO official felt that Malaysian IR were not as bad as some 
other Southeast Asian countries, though culture plays a part in influencing the 
relations between government and employees: 
'Malaysian IR stands much better compared to other South east Asia countries 
such as Indonesia, Philippines or Thailand, where unions were oppressed ... 
Since we are Asians, we have the tendency to be more feudalistic, we don't 
like arguments and like to implement policies directly, that is the only problem 
in Malaysia, and the mishandling of the Deputy Prime Minister (Anwar)' 
(Interview: Sabur Ghayur, 112/2001). 
That 'only problem', however, cast doubt over CUEPACS capability as a 'smart 
partner', as claimed by the government. The view that generalised Asians as people 
culturally adverse to arguments or open conflicts was agreed on by Malaysian trade 
unionists (Interview: lamaluddin Isa, 30/112001; see also Chapter Nine). However, the 
reluctance to upset the status quo was more prevalent in the present public sector. The 
453 
effect was CUEPACS' failure to WIn its oldest struggle, to uphold the collectiye 
bargaining rights, as well as relaxing several restrictions on public sector employees. 
In fact, CUEP ACS under the NDP became a promoter of government policies. In 
1997, CUEPACS welcomed the government's call for unions to put a new clause into 
their constitutions, that was to increase productivity in line with the Malaysia Inc 
concept (UM, 917/1999). When the economic crisis broke out in 1997, the government 
exercised salary cuts, first to ministers (10%) and top civil servants (3%) (The Star, 
1311211997). CUEP ACS quickly supported the move to cut the entertainment 
allowance and overtime claims of officers on the Super Scale A and B Group because, 
as acknowledged by its President, 'we in CUEPACS understand the current economic 
problem faced by the government' (cited in NST, 15/12/1997). In 1997, in line with 
the implementation of the 'Electronic Government' concept, and the move to the new 
administrative centre at Putrajaya, as part of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) a 
la Silicon Valley project, the government launched a comprehensive information 
technology training scheme (NST, 14/611997). This massive project was implemented 
in phases; to train 133,500 civil servants to be computer literate, able to use the 
Internet, word processors, power point, spreadsheets and statistical packages. As a 
comparison, therefore, the government proved to be quicker to silence criticisms from 
its employees, as it proved again to be a forward-looking government, committed to 
bring positive change to Malaysia as a whole, as promised under the Vision 2020. 
CUEPACS consoled itself by building a good rapport with the PSD and maintained a 
good relationship with other labour centres and NGOs, such as PEMADAM (An NGO 
for anti-drug abuse), Institute for Strategic Studies (ISIS), National Trade Council and 
National Council of Women Organisation (NCWO). Internationally, CUEPACS was 
affiliated to the Public Services International (PSI) and the International Federation of 
Building And Woodworkers (IFBWW) (Triennial Report, 199211995). Relationships 
with other international organisations, such as the Commonwealth Trade Union 
Council (CTU) and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) were maintained. Through 
cooperation with ILO, CUEP ACS gained the opportunity to form relationships with 
other nations in the education and skills training programs. Such relationships had 
some positive influence on CUEP ACS but not as much as they wished. With PSI and 
IFBWW, CUEPACS could not afford to pay its membership fees, and this therefore 
affected their chances in training, conferences and other international activities. Other 
CVEP ACS affiliates were also free to form their own affiliation with IFBWW III and 
PSI. Several have already done so. One such a union is the Malay Forest Officers 
Union (MFOU), which has about 2500 members on the Malaysian Peninsular. I 12 The 
MFOV, while affiliated to CUEPACS and NJC, is also affiliated to IFBWW. Through 
its relations with the international body, it learned about sustainable development and 
succeeded in persuading the government to acknowledge an organization called 
International Tropical Timber Organization which is headquartered in Tokyo. The 
government then formed the National Timber Certification Council to administer and 
ensure contractors in Malaysia followed criteria set by this organization. Assessors 
were appointed to 'check the ground' and if the standard criteria were not met, the 
III IFB\VW now represents 11 million workers all over the world, from 124 member countries and 284 
trade unions. See IFBWW News (24 /112001) IFBWW. No.!. 
II~ Interview, Jamaluddin Mohd {sa, 30/1/2001, the Executive Secretary of MFOU, who has been 
lI1\'ol\'ed with trade unions in Malaysia since early 1960s. He has been the General Secretary of;\lFOU 
for 27 years (1964-1991). Now the executive secretary since 1991, he was the Secretary General of 
CTFPACS 1967-1986, Secretary for Staff Side NJC 1970-1986, panel member of the Industrial Court 
1970-1986. 
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buyers could refuse to purchase Malaysian timber. The main importers of Malaysian 
timber were Japan and South Korea (Economic Report, 1999/2000). In a way, it 
showed a positive sign by the government who, in 1999, exported RMI ,648.5 million 
sawn logs and RMl,628.2 million sawn timber from a total of RM24,834.0 million 
worth of primary commodity exports for the period from January to August 1999 
(Department of Statistics). This individual venture by the MFOU was the type of 
activities encouraged by the government, since it did not pose any kind of threats to 
the status quo, but instead contributed to Malaysian development programmes 
generally. 
The financial restraint faced by CUEP ACS affected its ability to function effectively 
and independently from the government. It tried to change by proposing to those 
unions affiliated to international bodies through CUEP ACS to pay their fees or 
contribute a certain amount (not necessarily a full amount of the fees) to CUEPACS. 
However, this was opposed, as has been admitted by its present Secretary General 
(Interview: Abdul Rahman Manan, 911/1999). With just a meager RM1.80 as the 
yearly fee for each member from a union (with a maximum for a union of RM7500 to 
be paid to CUEP ACS no matter how many the members were) it was hard to imagine 
that CVEP ACS could survive until today. This reluctance to pay an extra or higher fee 
can be traced back to the people who actually were trade union activists today in 
Malaysia. Under Section 27 TUA1959, there were restrictions imposed on public 
sector employees, such as the police, prison service, the army and officers engaged in 
a confidential or security capacity, or holding posts in the managerial and professional 
group to join unions. This discouragement of managerial and professional group to 
join unions has been a cause for eoneem among trade unionists or workers in 
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Malaysia in general. However, trade union leaders were either ignorant of the fact, or 
they were quite happy without 'interference' from public officers or people from 
Group A, who were actually enjoying a higher salary and perks as compared to the 
lower group. From the government's side, less participation from Group A employees, 
who at least had to be graduates from higher learning institutions, was indeed a 
blessing to it. Most active trade unionists were now from the lower groups who, 
though very experienced, would benefit if actively supported by employees with a 
higher educational level. In the midst of that flaw, the government made it clear that it 
was up to CUEP ACS to manage themselves (Interview: Mohsin Mohd Khir, 
2/2/1999). This was the same view adopted by government officials regarding private 
sector employees. The stance was that the government had given the avenues for 
CUEP ACS to become involved in the tripartite decision-making process that 
benefited all members and non-members alike. CUEP ACS was regarded as able to 
deal with discussions and 'negotiations' with the government regarding their demands 
(Interview: Zainal Rahim, 2/2/1999). However, government officials admitted that 
CUEPACS still needed to be educated to be 'more intelligent or more globalised since 
members of CUEPACS are normally from the lower rank ... '(Interview: Zainal 
Rahim, 2/2/1999). He insisted that the government's intention were genuine as it 
could not afford to have bad relations with unions as 'they are assets to the 
govemment' (Interview: Zainal Rahim, 2/2/1999). What this implied was that while 
admitting that public sector unionists were of the lower rank who could benefit from 
the contributions of higher educated ones, if permitted or encouraged by the 
govemment, it has no intention to do so. 
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In 1998, the PM again stressed that the right to organise and take industrial action was 
important only in the old capitalist system where workers were oppressed (~lahathir, 
211211998). The speech, a year after Malaysia was hit by the economic crisis and a 
few months after the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim, warned CUEP ACS delegates of the 
'new-capitalism' as more dangerous than the old colonial and traditional one. 
Mahathir claimed that 'new capitalists' just needed a handful of people to help them 
gather such a vast amount of wealth and thereby destroy other nations' economies, 
turning millions of workers jobless, and hence worse than those old capitalists who 
came and built factories and created jobs for locals (Mahathir, 211211998): 
'Faced with these new phenomena, trade unions should use a new method. 
They should work together, hand in hand with the employers, vice versa, to 
save the industries and the nation's economy. The government should also 
contribute to this co-operation. With this approach, a strong foundation is 
established to prevent the attacks from the money traders and short-term 
investors who never cared for the workers ... ' 
Mahathir urged trade unions to play only a constructive role and be on the same side 
as the government. The public sector workers were praised for not turning to 
industrial action in times of crisis. The people's united stand behind the government 
was regarded as paramount to ensure the economy bounce back to its level in the years 
before the crisis. While the present CUEP ACS President felt the system was 
satisfactory, some felt unions had become meaningless without a collective bargaining 
right and a court to hear public sector disputes (Interviews: Siva Subramaniam, 
41111999; K George, 7/2/2001). Some viewed the parliamentary democratic system in 
Malaysia as incomplete without public sector basic rights (Interview: Mustafa Johan, 
2411211998). Others felt union leaders had to resort to 'begging' and when the 
government refused, they had to accept it without question as the government 'knew 
best for the people' (Interview: K George, 7/212001). The government did not agree 
when unions urged that high economic growth become the foundation for a salary rise 
but it had no hesitation in freezing or cutting salaries during the economic downturn, 
as it did in 1998. This further encouraged the political method that CUEPACS 
reverted to every time unions felt they needed to make a point over any issue. 
Even so, the unions had limited success. Any pressure from CUEP ACS was more 
likely to succeed if seen as a concerted effort made by all the other parties, such as 
individual unions, staff associations, NGOs and the like. However, that seldom 
happened as more often that not, unions had different agendas and priorities. This was 
evident through the rivalry between CUEP ACS and the MTUC. While the MTUC felt 
the need to be aggressive (to a certain extent) about their issues, CUEPACS had 
conformed to the 'discussions' culture. This was because CUEPACS leaders felt that 
was the only way to win over the government in the midst of restrictive laws and 
regulations, like the General Order and the IRA imposed on them. CUEP ACS' 
submissive stance and refusal to seriously challenge the government encouraged the 
latter to regard it as part of the government's machinery. The honorary titles conferred 
to both trade union leaders confirmed their positions as part of the government 
machinery and inevitably make it harder for them to be neutral from the government. 
Some viewed the post and title as a way for the government to silence confrontational 
views from union leaders (Interview: Syed Shahir, 9/1/2001) Some agreed that while 
thc provision of no strike in the public sector was justified, a collective bargaining 
right must be returned with the provision that any dispute could be settled by a 
tribunal or an arbitration (Interview: K. George, 7/2/2001). Without that, the claim 
that there exists now a 'smart partnership' between government and public sector 
cmployees remains a political rhetoric. 
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10.4.2. The Claim for Salary Review 
After five years of the last review, CUEPACS proposed to the government Claim For 
Salary Review in 1995, to demand a more justified salary for workers in the lower 
income group (Triennial Report, 1992-1995). Among others, CUEP ACS demanded a 
few amendments to wages, a wage review every three years instead of five and a 
review of the pension and housing allowance for the rest of the public sector that had 
not enjoyed it before. Where wages were concerned, CUEP ACS demanded that for 
the years 1992 to 1994, since the officers in charge could not practice an efficient and 
just appraisal system, the government should not relate the performance appraisal with 
a yearly increment reward. Since the government did not approve this demand, 
CUEP ACS asked for a neutral committee to be its representation. It made a point that 
under the new revised scheme the lower income group did not really benefit from it. 
The new scheme changed the yearly increment from between RM10 to RM200 to RM 
11 to RM940. In this case, CUEP ACS asked for an increase of at least RM30 for the 
minimum. In the claim for the D Group, CUEP ACS made a comparison to the highest 
paid group in the public sector. Under the NewRS, the lowest paid group received 
RM324-RM498 (as compared to RM300-RM450 under the old scheme). The 
allowance they received was RM65. The highest pay in the public sector was 
RM7770-RM10,340 with an allowance ofRM10,500. To make the comparison clear, 
let us look at Table 10.1 that illustrates the starting pay of both groups from 1970 to 
1992: 
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Table 10.1 Comparison between lowest and highest paid group 
In the Public Sector, 1970-1992(Pay) 
Starting pay Starting Pay 
Lower income group Highest Income Group Rates 
1970 RM140 RM425 0 30times 
1976 RM195 RM5350 27times 
1991 RM300 RM6460 21 times 
1992 RM324 RM7760 23times 
Source: Triennial Report, 1992-1995 
As a comparison too, Table 10.2 shows us the difference m allowance. Clearly, 
CUEP ACS argument has its basis. It proved that the gap between the highest and the 
lowest income in the public sector has risen and not lowered under the NewRS. 
Indeed, in the privatised government agency, the pay level for the lowest income 
group was higher than the ones paid by the government. CUEP ACS then insisted on a 
rise to RM60 for all Group D. In the claim, CUEPACS demanded an across-the-
board increase of RM80 for all categories of employees in the public sector. 
1970 
1976 
1980 
1991 
1992 
Table 10.2 Comparison between lowest and highest paid group 
In the Public Sector, 1970-1992 
Allowance, Allowance 
Lowest paid Group Highest Paid Group Rates 
- RM 600 -
RM30 RM 600 20 
RM35 RM 4,500 128 
RM65 RM 4,500 69 
RM65 RMI0,500 161 
Source: Triennial Report, 1992-1995 
However, the PM on ::wth February 1995 criticised CUEPACS for referring to the 
inflation rates faced by the country. The PM's remarks showed his attitude of 
ignorance towards the plight of CUEPACS. Without having any foundation (like 
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economIC considerations) to base their pressure on the government, CCEPACS 
position was at the government's disposal. 
Among the most prominent demands made by CUEP ACS was a change in the 
calculation for the pension scheme. CUEP ACS wanted the maximum 300 months for 
calculating the pension for the public sector to be abolished and replaced with a new 
formula: 1I600x total months in service x the last pay. While for reward, CUEP ACS 
agreed to lower the percentage from the 20% raise to only 7.5% since the government 
only allocated 2 billion for the whole 1995 Claim for Salary Review. CUEPACS also 
demanded that the government consider a housing allowance of RM85 for all 
employees in the public sector, until now only enjoyed by the Top Management 
Group, in the top Management and Professional Group and the am1Y, police, fire 
brigade and the prison officers. In making this demand, CUEP ACS promised not to 
make another until 1998. 
Actually, as early as March 1994, CUEP ACS had already made a claim for a pay rise, 
especially for Group D, for a minimum wage of not less than RM500. The Director 
General of the Public Services gave an answer that there was no pay revision in the 
NewRS and it reminded CUEPACS that these were managerial prerogatives. Thus, 
CUEPACS went to the Prime Minister instead. This 'special relationship' with the 
PM began during the Abdul Razak era, when the CUEPACS representative went and 
met him over wage claim (refer Chapter Seven). Though the PSD was the department 
that administered the public sector IR, CUEPACS knew that the final decision was in 
the PM's hands, which became more evident during Mahathir's era. The direct 
relationship that CUEPACS enjoyed with the PM was not always smooth. During the 
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20th February 1995 meeting, CUEPACS was criticised for the making demands that 
pay rise should be based for the increase of prices of goods. In that particular meeting, 
the PM promised to abolish the Performance Appraisal System, which was related to 
the Yearly Pay Increment in the NewRS, one persistent complaint by the public sector 
employees. The PSD made an estimation of 12 billion over the CUEPACS 1995 new 
demand, and claimed that this would push the government almost to bankruptcy. 
Therefore, CUEP ACS was asked to produce lower estimates, to which they responded 
with a new claim worth RM4billion. The government asked CUEP ACS to again send 
a new memorandum, which the union did on the 15t August 1995. The PM gave the 
answer that the government could only allocate RM2billion. CUEP ACS again sent a 
counter proposal of RM3billion to the government on 20th October 1995. A meeting 
between CUEPACS and the PM on 30th October 1995 saw the government stand with 
the RM2billion offer. At this stage, the PM, the Minister of MoHR and the 
Government Financial Adviser asked CUEP ACS to accept the RM2billion offer. It 
also asked CUEP ACS to make a bigger allocation to the lower group if it felt that this 
needed to be done. In other words, it was up to CUEP ACS to solve the problems of 
allocation as long as it was RMN2billion as offered by the government. The only 
option left to CUEPACS was to accept the offer. On 7 November 1995, the union sent 
a letter of acceptance to the Prime Minister. On 28th November 1995, CUEP ACS sent 
the PSD a calculation on costs and sent a letter regarding the same on 14th December 
1995. This was despite CUEPACS receiving feedback from member unions who were 
dissatisfied with the outcome of the demand. After a meeting and a national forum, 
CUEPACS asked the government to validate claims that had been given due 
consideration. The PM and the Minister of Human Resources claimed that the delay 
\\'as because CUEPACS did not accept the government's offer. This shocked 
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CUEPACS, since they had given feedback to the gO\'ernment's proposals and had 
submitted details and had yet to receive an answer from the government. This meny-
go-round revealed the flaws within the system and the need for real negotiations 
power between CUEP ACS and the government. It showed the need to change the 
nature of relationship to make the PSD or the NJCs the negotiation machinery instead 
of relying on meetings with either the PM or other ministers. In fact, as discussed 
above, the PSD, especially the Remuneration Department was very capable, provided 
the government trusts them with the task. What the 1995 claim revealed was that 
public sector union leaders needed to maintain the good rapport with political leaders 
to 'succeed' in their dealings. Unless the negotiating right was returned the political 
relationship would prevail. 
Finally, CUEPACS accepted the government's offer of RM2billion. The government 
added another RM96 million to it and CUEP ACS, who originally insisted on at least 
RM3 billion, said 'it was an offer one could not refuse' or the 'deal of a lifetime' (The 
Sun, 4/2/1996). There were several details that pleased CUEPACS and the public 
sector. For example, the government agreed to the idea that more should be given to 
the lower group. 88% was in fact allocated to the lower group and a minimum basic 
salary of the public sector employees was set at RM500 (The Sun, 6/2/1996). That 
caused the MTUC President Zainal Rampak (The Star, 2/2/1996) to ask government 
to also extend the minimum wage to the private sector (the minimum wage is one of 
the main issues that the private sector unions had failed to resolve). 
However, there were objections regarding the pension scheme. The NJC for Staff Side 
(Science and Technology) under its Secretary, S. Santhasamy had prepared for the 
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proposal of a new penSIOn scheme in 1993. The pensIOn scheme has not been 
reviewed since 1976, when it was only to continue at the 1970 rate (The Sun, 
7/4/1996). Santhanasamy's effort was incorporated into the CUEPACS memorandum 
for the Salary Revision. On January 31 st (after two years of 'negotiations') CUEPACS 
agreed to the government's offer of RM2.096million, a moment hailed as 'history' 
and 'success' for the public sector employees. 315,000 pensioners were to enjoy the 
benefits as well, since the ceiling of period of service was extended. Instead of the 
pension formula being calculated up to the 25 th year of service, there would be no 
limit to years of service. On February 1 st 1996, the then Secretary General of 
eUEP ACS, Siva Subramaniam confirmed that pensioners who had served for more 
than 25 years, regardless of when they retired, were eligible for the new pension 
formula. That means, most pensioners (except ones with less than 25 years who would 
receive the present rate of payment) could look forward to additional increment to 
their pension (between RM50 to RM200) as early as July 1996. However, this joy was 
short-lived as within weeks after the concluded and already made public 
announcements, the PSD 'suddenly realised' that something was wrong with the 
calculations for pension. The government now claimed the pension bill expected 
for1999 would be RM3.133 billion. By scrapping the new formula, the government 
could reduce the cost to RMl.656billion for 1995 and RM2.638billion for 1999. 
Therefore the government would save RM1.964billion over the next four years. The 
eUEP ACS leaders, despite not having a consensus of its members over such an 
important matter, agreed to the government's decision. In April 1996, pensioners and 
members alike criticised CUEPACS leaders. The president, Mohamad Mat Jid, when 
asked why it was carried at the pensioner's expense had this to say: 
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' ... because the Congress does not only concern with itself but the welfare of 
everybody, including the government' (The Sun, 7/4/1996). 
The mistake made by the PSD and the CUEPACS leaders' decision to succumb to the 
government was senseless in itself. It only further enhanced the view of how weak the 
leadership and the union were as a whole and how easily manipulated they could be. 
The President argued that dissenting CUEP ACS affiliates had to abide by the 
'majority decision' (The Star, 4/4/1996). This was one area that became the concern 
of veteran trade unionists who claimed that in their years of service to CUEP ACS 
such a mistake would not be tolerated (Interview: Jamaluddin Md Isa, 30/1/2001). The 
PSD Director General of the time, Mazlan Ahmad, admitted that the government had 
failed to realise the 'full financial implications of the formula, which no longer limited 
the years of service when calculating the pension' (The Star, 2/4/1996). If 
implemented, he claimed it would equal the national salary allocation for five years. 
The National Union of Government Office Workers and the Malaysian Pensioners 
Associations were among the unions against the idea (NST, 11/6/1996). In CUEPACS 
itself, major unions affiliated to CUEPACS such AUEGCAS, ANULAE and MNU, 
together with other 30 affiliates, teamed up together to prepare for a memorandum to 
the government. It was chaired by the ex-General Secretary of CUEPACS, A.H. 
Ponniah (The Sun, 6/4/1996). However, by 14 April 1996, the PSD declared that the 
'pension issue is closed' and would not entertain anymore attempts to revive it. 
CUEP ACS again accepted the decisions. 
This incident once more proved several points that concerned public sector IR. The 
absence of a collective bargaining right, the failure of the PSD to function as the 
negotiating table for CUEPACS, and the demise of the PST, had all contributed to the 
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weakening of CUEP ACS to its lowest level. The only choice left depended on a good 
rapport with government leaders, a relationship that was fragile and totally depended 
on the balance of power between the two, which as already discussed were always in 
the hands of the government. It was almost impossible for CUEP ACS to win in any 
'negotiations' on their terms against the strong government. So what was revealed 
through the 1995 Salary Claim was totally expected, and in fact accepted as a 
'success' by some CUEPACS leaders. The fact remains that they did not really have 
any other choice, apart from taking a more aggressive stance, a view that no one since 
Ahmad Nor's short era was willing to take. 
10.4.3. The Political Relationship 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, political considerations were also one of the 
priorities that influenced the government's role in IR. The economic and political 
crises of the second half of 1990s saw the political leaders making concerted efforts to 
win people over to their line of thinking, to support the government, acknowledging 
the fact that the sacking of Anwar brought a split in loyalty, especially among Malays. 
The leaders focused on trade unions to gain support and loyalty, especially from 
public sector employees whose majority were MalayslBumiputeras. The next 
discussion explores how politics has sometimes influenced Malaysian public sector 
IR. 
During the crisis, Malaysian political leaders made nationwide tours to explain the 
situation to the people. In September 1999, while in Sabah, in East Malaysia, just two 
months before the general election, the PM praised the Malaysian army and police for 
t111'ir loyalty to the government of the day. He said this reflected their professionalism, 
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even if 'some of those in the administration may be inclined to certain parties ... ' (The 
Star, 18/9/1999). The fact was anny and police personnel were denied access to 
unions, and therefore there was never really any threat, as this prevented them from 
creating any industrial unrest. In fact, throughout Malaysian history the anny and 
police have stayed loyal to the government of the day. The government's bigger worry 
was obviously other groups in the public sector that were capable of bringing pressure 
on the government, especially trade unions and NGOs. Amongst the education 
community, dissent was more evident. The government was alanned by reports in the 
media over criticisms of government officers, especially teachers, lecturers and 
professors. He urged them to be loyal to the government, to maintain their 
professionalism and to ensure each government plans were implemented for the 
people's benefit, 'thus at the same time avoid tunnoil in the country' (BR, 22/9/1999). 
The PM slammed teachers, lecturers and professors who instigated students to hate 
the government and influenced them towards opposition parties. The students were 
instead urged to be grateful for the government's contribution to them and be 
responsible towards the society. He reminded the civil servants: 
'When government programs fail, it is the rakyat (people) who will suffer' 
(NST, 22/9/1999). 
Teachers, upset that they had become the targets of attacks by 'overzealous 
politicians', pledged their loyalty. The President of the National Union of the 
Teaching Profession (NUTP) , Abu Bakar Shaukat Ali, denied that teachers were 
involved in anti-government activities and declared that 95% of the 280,000 teachers 
were in the clear. The NUTP, the biggest teachers' union, with 90,000 members, 
promised to investigate every allegation even though it was sure that those implicated 
Wcre in fact pri\'ate religious schoolteachers (The Sun, 8/9/1999; UM, 8/9/1999). 
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However, in October, it was reported that twenty teachers had been reprimanded for 
spreading their political views in schools (The Sun, 1511 011999). In one particular 
incident, a teacher who used names of politicians and certain people in his monthly 
test questions defended it as only a joke, but the government was not amused. The 
Deputy PM was in the opinion that it was a big offence and the teacher would be 
indicted under the Officials ACt.!!3 This highlights the government's aversion towards 
not just open conflicts, but any implication towards conflicts itself, especially if they 
came from public sector employees, such as shown by teachers. 
The tradition to invite the PM to the CUEP ACS Conventions was in itself ironic. It 
was like inviting any multi-national company CEO to officiate at MTUC conventions 
and just showed the eagerness on the part of CUEPACS to maintain the 'special 
relationship' with the government, which brought contradictory views from trade 
unions themselves. While some cherished the 'close relationship', others thought 
CUEP ACS should distance itself from the government and be a 'real' trade union 
(Interviews: K.George, 7/212001; Ahmad Nor, 6/212001). However, CUEPACS was 
not in a position to distant itself from the government without having the foundation 
that enabled it to negotiate, so for the whole of the NDP period, it has become more 
and more accommodative. 
111 The 'serious' offence by the teacher happened in the Prime Minister's own state of Kedah, whereby 
he mischievously inserted names of politicians and people involved in the Anwar- related issues in the 
monthly mathematics test for the Fonn Four and Five pupils. He also related questions to the injury 
1Illlicted on the ex-deputy Prime Minister and his claims of being poisoned in prison (BH, 25/101999). 
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It appeared that Mahathir's speeches in the 1990s made less reference towards racial 
harmony and race relations in general. However, the ultimate goal of the OPP2 and 
the NDP was national unity. However, what the government actually meant by that 
was quite vague as there were no concerted efforts made and implemented towards the 
achievement of such, apart from using economic growth as an instrument. One thing 
was certain though, looking at the NDP's objectives, it was obvious the government 
was still trying to achieve the 30% Bumiputeras' shares in the nation's wealth, as 
envisioned in the old NEP. The foundation then was the same, that as long as the 
Bumiputeras were not functioning in the modem economy, the government would 
continue helping them. Though the shift in strategy happened, the fact is 'more 
attention would be given towards strengthening the capacities of the Bumiputera to 
effectively manage, operate and own businesses rather than on achieving a specific 
numerical targets of equity restructuring and ownership' (OPP2, 1991). 
This belief in the need to correct economic imbalances between Bumiputeras and non-
Bumipllteras is an historical-based issue and a very political one as well. Though 
outwardly the IR policy showed no direct relations with the issue of socio-politics, 
racial or history, the NDP highlighted a government that was committed to maintain 
its status-quo politically. In the broader economic plan, the question of race persisted. 
For example, in order to encourage more Bumiputeras to partake in the mainstream 
economy, the Privatisation Policy was further enlarged. The direct effect on the public 
sector was when government agencies and departments were privatised or 
corporatised, and the Bumiputeras were automatically brought into the private sector, 
thereby giving them chances for better perks and wider opportunities to venture out in 
the open economy. Under the NDP, the pri\'ate sector, which had the competitive 
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edge, was regarded as the catalyst for economic growth in the country. Therefore even 
though privatisation was criticised by CUEP ACS as the reason it lost the more 
lucrative agencies to the private sector, the government's intention to make the public 
sector smaller but more effective and efficient was generally accepted. 
The last confrontational approach taken by CUEP ACS was when Ahmad Nor was the 
President in 1985. The succeeding presidents seemed to outdo each other in showing 
their allegiance to the government and the PM never failed to praise COEP ACS for 
any effort they showed in support of government policies. In the same vein, the PM 
also never failed to condemn trade union leaders whom he thought went out of line. 
For example, in the CUEPACS 19th Convention, the Prime Minister praised 
CUEPACS for its effort in 'maintaining the good IR' with the government, 
acknowledging 'responsible, mature, considerate, not extremists' CUEPACS leaders, 
who were sensitive towards the national interests. In the same speech, he berated those 
leaders who were 'more interested in politics and willing to ignore the nations' 
interests' : 
'Therefore they slander their own country among international trade unions. 
They did not care whether their action affected the economy or the Malaysian 
workers' (Mahathir, 22/6/1992). 
It was obvious that the Prime Minister was commenting on the MTUC as some of its 
leaders, especially the Secretary General of that time, V. David, had been vocal in 
their opinions over the government's attempts to split the labour movement (MTUC 
Biennial General Council Report, 1991192). During early 1991-1992, the MTUC 
faced a challenge by the MLO, the government-backed splinter union (see Chapter 
Nine). The then CUEPACS General Secretary, lamaludin Mohd Isa, also did not 
471 
agree to the approach taken by V. David (Interview: Jamaludin Mohd 1sa, 30/1/2001). 
He preferred to discuss with the government any issues regarding the workers' 
problems, and not abroad in front of 'foreigners', such as the 1CFTU-1LO. He also 
disapproved of the era when the MTUC leaders were courting the opposition parties. 
Needless to say, he was an UMNO man. It seemed to be in the tug-of-war game 
between the MTUC and CUEPACS to win the government's recognition, in which the 
latter has won the government's approval. The wrath shown by the government 
towards the MTUC whenever it went out of line taught CUEP ACS a lesson or two. 
Without the collective bargaining power, and the government as its employer, 
CUEPACS chose to be on the safer side, that is, the government's side. However, 
Mahathir's speech further divided the relationship between CUEPACS and MTUC, 
which, while a loss to CUEP ACS, was a gain to the government. When Mahathir 
praised CUEP ACS and condemned MTUC publicly, he was giving a clear warning to 
CUEP ACS not to resort to means that the government were averse to. Also, when in 
1992, Mohamed Mat Jid, the MLO President was elected as the new CUEP ACS 
President, the chances of reconciliation between CUEP ACS and MTUC were further 
eroded. As such, the trade union movement in the 1990s looked set to remain weak, 
docile and divided, and therefore receptive to government's manoeuvrings. 
In 1996, the PM again highlighted the 'Malaysia Inc' concept that encouraged close 
relations between the private and the public sector. He commented that while the 
Communist, the Socialist and the 'welfare state' systems were still highly regarded by 
the West, Malaysia had moved on to privatise government departments and agencies. 
Malaysia has implemented the NEP, eliminated tax on luxury imported goods, and 
pre\'cntcd traders from marking up prices as they wished. These radical moves 
contributed to the economic growth enjoyed by the government until the second half 
of the 1990s. The PM urged trade unions and employers alike to replace strike and 
lock-outs with a 'more civilised' method, i.e. the arbitration by a third neutral higher 
party, with an option to refer the case to a higher authority if that still failed. He was 
therefore only referring to the available mechanism in the private sector. However, 
while the private sector had collective bargaining and collective agreements that could 
be reviewed every three years, the mechanism was absent in the public sector, and the 
salary review could only be performed every five years. Even that, as was argued 
earlier did not necessarily depend on the economic environment of the nation. 
In 1998, following the economIC cnsIs, CUEP ACS and MTUC Presidents were 
appointed as council members of the NEAC. CUEP ACS was headed by the President, 
and each of the thirteen states was represented by a union representative, except 
Kelantan (the state under the opposition party) (CUEPACSAR, 1995/1998). This, and 
the opportunity to join the international trade missions, was regarded by CUEPACS 
leaders as an honour and a mark of the government's sincerity to make trade unions a 
'smart partner' in the tripartite system (Interview: Abd. Rahman Manan, 9/1/1999). In 
fact, both MTUC and CUEP ACS leaders regarded the appointment as an honour 
(Interviews: Siva Subramaniam, 41111999 and Zainal Rampak, 71111999). With trade 
union leaders now invited to participate in many of the government's other policies, 
'there are now more ways to state trade unions' views ... '(Interview: Siva 
Subramaniam, 4/1 /1999). The present CUEP ACS President believed that the 
relationship with the government was 'quite close' (Interview: Siva Subramaniam 
4 1/1999). He claimed that the government recognised the trade unions ' ... in a 
society like Malaysia, we have to be careful with our ways of doing things ... ' 
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(Interview: Siva Subramaniam, 41111999) and dismissed claims that accused the 
present trade unions as less aggressive: 
' ... the discussions are always heated discussions ... the relationship is 
good .... sometimes both agree to differ ... politicising is bad for the nation' 
(Interview: Siva Subramaniam, 4/1/1999). 
He believed that the relationship with MTUC was also good and that both 'CUEP ACS 
and MTUC now are led by good leaders ... but before ... when CUEPACS was under 
the leadership of Ahmad Nor, that was different' (Interview: Siva Subramaniam, 
411/1999). What the president implied was that in a plural society such as Malaysia, 
open conflicts should be avoided. He was in fact using the same line of thought as the 
government, who always highlighted the 13th Mayas an example that Malaysia 
needed to preserve 'harmony' between races, and therefore avoid open confrontations. 
When he commented that politicising was bad for Malaysia, he failed to see that that 
had exactly been the relationship that was established between the government and 
CUEPACS. 
The present Vlew of the CUEP ACS President and its Secretary General clearly 
influenced the way CUEPACS dealt with public sector employees' issues. In February 
1999, the MTUC President Zainal Rampak called for the government to review 
salaries and expedite terms and conditions of service for public employees of the five 
alienated bodies 114 now that the economy was back on track, as promised by the 
government in 1995 (UM, 211211999). When confronted by reporters on CUEP ACS 
stand over the matter, the CUEP ACS President took a more lackadaisical approach. 
114 This centres on issues of the Armed Forces, EPF, SOCSO, Pilgrimage Fund and the :'\ational 
Sa\'lI1l'.s Bank ~ . 
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He stressed that 'CUEPACS understood the current situation, especially the economic 
downturn that brought the Ringgit value 60% lower as compared to the US Dollar' 
(UM, 22/2/1999). 'CUEP ACS did not want to create a hue and cry over the matter as 
it was aware of the economic situation and the problems faced by the people' (The 
Star, 22/2/1999). He stressed that CUEPACS would only propose a salary review at a 
suitable time to avoid financial strain on the government (Utusan Melayu, 22/2/1999). 
This 'deep understanding' over problems faced by the government should be looked at 
from other angles. First, it was clear that CUEP ACS wanted to distance itself from the 
MTUC in terms of its approach with the government. Also, it did not want to be 
upstaged by the MTUC, which represented mostly private sector unions (apart from 
some affiliating unions from the public sector) as the spokesperson for the public 
sector. CUEPACS was adamant to keep the 'open line', with the government free 
from elements that might sour the relationship. It was aware that the government 
abhorred ultimatums or confrontational approaches, and believed that discussion was 
the only available mechanism. This approach has been proven more fruitful in its 
limited capacity than the confrontational manner. As the union federation for the 
public sector, CUEPACS liked to be seen in a better light than the MTUC, ensuring 
its members that the union's top leaders said the right thing at the right time, 
especially when the government (its employer) was faced with political and economic 
tumloil. 
So serious was CUEP ACS in defending its position as the sole spokesperson for the 
public sector employees, that in early 2000 it urged the MTUC to stop representing 
separate claims on any issues that concerned public sector employees. The Secretary 
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General said the umon would appreciate it if the MTUC would 'support' any 
memorandums over claims by CUEPACS to the PSD: 
'CUEP ACS is the national body for the public sector in their dealings with the 
PSD. What is proposed by CUEP ACS are the inspiration and wishes of its 
members collectively. If there are two claims then it will confuse the 
government and complicate efforts to get settlements since there seems to be 
conflicting issues ... ' (UM, 3111/2000). 
He was referring to the MTUC proposal to the government that public sector 
employees' retirement age should be raised from 55 to 60 while CUEPACS was 
making proposals that the age should be raised but to 58 (The Sun, 311112000).115 This 
'love-hate' relationship between CUEPACS and MTUC had gone on since their 
earliest existence as two bodies that each represented the public and the private sector. 
When the two most important trade union bodies were not united in voicing their 
opinions regarding the employees' plight, the situation most definitely benefited the 
government. So bad was the relationship that in 1997, CUEP ACS considered asking 
20 of its affiliates to leave the MTUC, though in its recent elections, several principal 
CU EP ACS officers won key positions in the former union. The President at the time, 
while denying any problems said: 
'But we have to consider in the long term whether we will still be able to 
maintain our identity and fight for causes without being overshadowed' (The 
Star, 17/111997). 
Not all agreed with the idea as some felt that it was against the principle of freedom of 
association as unions have the right to choose. However, there were views that 
principle officers of CUEP ACS should refrain from holding on to major posts in the 
MTUC so as to prevent conflicting interest. However, here again it showed that 
II ~ In September 2001. the government agreed to raise retirement age for public sector employees, but 
only to 56. 
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personal bickering between CUEPACS and MTlJC leaders further damaged the 
chances for employees in Malaysia to be united and win their causes. 
The Malaysian government abhorred pressure from unions, as shown in the way it 
responded to the question of a yearly bonus to public sector employees. CUEP ACS 
argued that since the economy had been good for many years, it was time to introduce 
a yearly bonus rather than make an ad hoc decision (it has been awarded once in 
1975). The government refused, again saying strong economic growth should not be 
the basis, and a bonus should not be accepted as part of pay, but in recognition of 
good work. However, in 1993 and 1994, the government's servants received a half a 
month pay bonus. Things improved when the government gave a month's bonus for 
the years 1995,1996 and 1997, with a minimum that also increased from RM500, 600 
and 700, respectively. However, in 1998 there was none due to the economic crisis, 
except RM400 to help with 'school children's needs'. In 1999, just before the 
election, while the country was still said to be suffering from the economic crisis, a 
month's bonus was given in four installments (with a minimum of RMIOOO). This 
prompted accusations of political buy-out, which were strongly denied by the 
government. However, in 2000, when the economy was said to be better and after 
much debate, only a half-month bonus was given. It again caused criticisms that the 
1999 bonus offer was indeed political, especially when there was a lot of 
dissatisfaction, especially among the Malays (the majority of public sector employees) 
over Anwar Ibrahim's sacking from the government and his subsequent jailing. 
Again, even though the government dismissed the relation between its policy and 
political influence, the e\'cnts that unfolded in Malaysia during the crisis proved 
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otherwise. In September 1999, the government gave incentive allowances to police 
personnel and reinstated allowances for civil servants that had been cut because of the 
1997 economic crisis (The Star, 18/9/1999). The Chief Secretary to the government 
brushed aside accusations that the government was fishing for votes in the general 
election and insisted that the economic recovery was the sole reason for the 
reinstatement. However, it can not go unnoticed that the government's announcement 
for approval of the long overdue incentive for nearly 10,000 police personnel serving 
with the General Operations Force and Federal Reserve Unit coincided with the 
November 1999 general election. Nor the fact that until 2000, Malaysia was still 
struggling to regain its once high economic growth. 
10.5. Conclusion 
The above discussion revealed several important conclusions regarding the public 
sector IR in Malaysia during the NDP period. Just like the private sector, the public 
sector was developed in line with a more macro-based development planning, the 
NDP. It has been shown that because the NEP had still not achieved its targets, the 
government planned to continue with the same under the NDP, but with new 
strategies and emphases. With that, it went on to outline the public sector roles in line 
with the NDP, starting with the legislation, its administration and its policies. As the 
biggest employer, the government has shown that it has managed to ensure that public 
sector employees, and especially CUEP ACS leaders, understood its aims and 
objectives. CUEPACS has shown that it has accepted the government's way of 
dealing with them, i.e. a lot of discussions, some through the tripartite bodies, and the 
more important ones through direct relationship with the higher authority in the 
govemment, but still no negotiation. With that, CUEPACS was In a subservient 
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position. This was not helped by the fact that CUEPACS maintained its rivalry with 
MTUC, instead of making it its own 'smart partner'. Weak finances and a lack of 
strong leaders further compounded its position. 
The PSD on the other hand functioned as the government's extended arm, to ensure 
that both its officials and employees abide by the government policies. The 
mechanism it offered, the NJCs and DJCs, and later with the demise of PST showed 
that the PSD was no other than what the government ascribed them to be, to make 
sure that all the policies were enforced, and they did. In other words, the PSD has 
proven to be the government's strong arm as compared to the CUEPACS failure to its 
members. Several issues discussed showed that CUEP ACS was not left with much 
choice, either they accepted the government's offer or had nothing at all. This was 
especially the case for the claim for a salary review in 1995. Other decisions were 
unilateral, like the NewRS, which until now had not been satisfactorily solved. It 
again showed the ineffectiveness of the tripartite bodies, which became more of 
instruments for the government to hear views of the employees through their 
representatives, but they were under no obligation to accept these views. All 
throughout the NDP, the government consistently used the reasons it had always used 
before in the NEP. It stressed the help towards the MalayslBumiputeras, especially to 
silence opposition towards privatisation and other policies, leaving not much choice 
for the Malays who were the majority in the public sector. For the Malays to oppose 
the government was like a betrayal of its own people. However, the recent political 
and later economic crisis, especially the Anwar issue, succeeded in putting the 
government in the defensive against accusations that they had been practising 
cronyism, nepotism and mismanagement. There was now a lot of attention directed 
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towards reform, especially in the public sector. The cnses also showed the 
government that they had made some wise decisions in retaining all the restrictive 
rules, the culture of top-down administration and its pro-harmonious relationship 
policies. It paid off in that there was no dramatic rise in disputes during times of 
economic and political turmoil, either in the private or the public sector. 
The next chapter offers a comparative analysis on the role of the state in the private 
and the public sector IR in Malaysia for the whole period under study. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE 
AND PUBLIC SECTOR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN MALAYSIA 
11.1. Introduction 
One of the objectives of this study was to compare the state's policies towards private 
and public sector IR. The foregoing discussions in Chapters Nine and Ten showed that 
the state implemented different IR policies to each sector during the NDP period, 
primarily because of the pivotal role given to the private sector in the Malaysian 
economy. The government maintained an official development ideology that high 
economic growth was an important factor for Malaysia to achieve its ambition to 
become a fully developed nation by the year 2020. This view affected the 
government's relationship with employers and employees in both sectors, and 
subsequently its IR policies. Since the private sector was increasingly regarded as the 
engine of economic growth, the public sector was expected to play second fiddle, as a 
supportive role to the private sector, further affecting the development of IR in both 
sectors. 
This chapter looks back to compare the development of private and public sector IR in 
Malaysia during the period under study. Thus, the next analysis focuses only on the 
comparative element of the role of the state in the private and public sector within 
this. Here, the focus is on two issues: one, on the balance of power in both sectors; 
and two, on the factors that influenced the development of IR within these. 
11.2. An Analysis on the Balance of Power in Both Sectors 
The most important finding on the analysis of the public and private sector IR in 
\1alaysia is the increasingly dominant power of the state, especially in the public 
sector. The state's dominant role in IR was very much influenced by its active role in 
the economic development of the country, which started after independence, but 
became more prominent during the NEP. The state's active role in the economy 
encouraged its subsequently more restrictive roles in IR in both sectors, especially 
through legislation, administration and various policies. 
The state has continually used economIC, social and political reasons for its 
interventionist role in the economy, especially after the 13th May race riot. The most 
controversial part of the NEP was the affirmative action taken to correct the economic 
imbalance between races, and especially between the Malays and Chinese. The active 
role of the state in the economy, and the repressive and paternalistic IR policy during 
the NEP, and also later, was possible because there has only been a single ruling 
government from independence in 1957, the Alliance/ Barisan Nasional government. 
This factor is significant in ascertaining continuity to the development of Malaysian 
IR, in private, and particularly in the public sector, since the government is the sole 
employer. A strong, stable government, fully in charge of the legislative framework, 
administration and also other supporting policies, enabled it to woo both sectors to 
support the official view that strong economic growth was important for Malaysia to 
achieve its economic objectives, and therefore helped solve other socio-political 
issues. The development of IR policies in both sectors was also influenced by an 
increasingly authoritarian government, which abhorred open conflicts. 
The state's dominant position was much ensured by its political strength too, as in 
2000, the Barisan Nasional coalition government was still composed of racially-based 
parties, the most dominant of which was still UMNO, the position it gained after the 
13th May riot. It now represented the Bumiputeras interests instead of just the Malays, 
therefore giving it the advantage of broad-based political votes. The Malays' 'special 
rights', which were brought to the fore when the government officially spelled out the 
second prong of NEP to 're-structure the Malaysian society', were continued in the 
NDP. The reason was that the objective of 30 percent corporate wealth ownership was 
not met, therefore the policy was to be maintained, but on a subtler level than the 
NEP. Therefore, to ensure continuity in economic policies, legislation was a crucial 
instrument to face any opposition to the government's official views. Clearly, 
economic objectives were still viewed as important to achieve economic-parity 
between races, and the ultimate objective, of 'national unity'. In both sectors, 
therefore, the state ensured that IR policies were in line with the national development 
plans. The discussion below analyses the comparative element of the state's policy 
towards both sectors. 
The NDP period confirmed the establishment of two different IR policies for each 
private and public sector in Malaysia. The different roles expected of them 
exacerbated the situation, making united action by unions impossible. While the 
private sector was given a larger and heavier task, the public sector was to be 
supportive so that the NDP's objective was achieved. In other words, even though the 
NDP showed some new strategies to achieve a developed Malaysia, the government's 
stand towards IR in general did not change at all. The only change was seen on the 
adl11inistrati\'l~ and policies sides. There were more talks, campaigns, forums and 
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'involvement' in tripartite bodies, but it was pale in comparison to what was actually 
needed by Malaysian employees in general, that is, the right to negotiate in the public 
sector, and overall more liberal trade union rights for both sectors. It is clear that since 
the NEP and the NDP, the balance of power, especially in the public sector. fell 
increasingly into the hands of the government. In the private sector, the government 
conceded to the pressures from the capital, such as the restriction on electronics 
industries, where the government clearly favoured employers (FDI) oyer local 
workers. Under the NEP, and the NDP, public sector employees were more subjected 
to the government dictation, while the Malays, who bore the bulk of government 
servants to the government, were specifically affected. The contention here is that the 
state, especially the independent one, imposed policies that were thought to help uplift 
the Malaysian economy. High economic growth, more so after the 13th May riot, was 
thought to be the primary answer to bring Malaysia together to unite and prosper, and 
for all races to be able to live together harmoniously. Although there were many 
scholars who were cynical towards the government's effort, the fact that the NEP and 
NOP were implemented along this line proved that it was committed in its belief that 
economic prosperity would solve part of Malaysia's problems. Moreover, the 
government believed that a strong economy would win people over, especially in a 
multi-racial community such as Malaysia, where racial sensitivities were ever present. 
However, the state was not immune to other internal and external forces that 
encouraged it to retain some policies while it improvised or eliminated others. On the 
whole, the state retained a dominant hold over the development of Malaysian IR in 
both sectors. 
484 
The government's strong position during the NEP and the NDP was achieved through 
a long process of amending laws, administration and policies. By 2000, the voluntary 
system in both sectors, as once practised during the colonial period, was long gone. 
Now the system has become compulsory, while in the public sector, it has become a 
totally different system altogether. The present government has preserved the 
legislative framework, which originated from a desire to control militant labour 
movement, especially the Chinese and Indian immigrant workers. If, during the 
colonial period, ensuring political stability was prioritised, it still is now, but with 
different aims. 
The public sector employees seldom showed strong labour movement during the 
colonial period, as compared to the private sector ones, and this trait has been retained 
until today. Since losing their collective bargaining rights, they increasingly relied on 
their personal relationships with top political leaders in the country, hence the 
politicised relationship, which depended largely on a good rapport with the 
government. Therefore, the public sector employees, now collectively represented by 
CUEPACS have 'preferred' to preserve the 'cordial' relationship, rather than 
upsetting it. They have seen the extent to which the government was prepared to go if 
it thought the labour movement had become a 'nuisance', such as resorting to the ISA. 
The tradition that public sector employees need not be members of unions to enjoy the 
benefit of negotiations contributed to another reason why they were reportedly quite 
ignorant of their rights and depended more on the 'negotiations' that CUEP ACS had 
with the government. This attitude further strengthened the government's position in 
the relationship with public sector employees. The tripartite bodies, like the NJCs and 
the NLAC. and the mechanism available, like the PSD, functioned more as forums for 
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discussions where umon VIews were heard, but not necessarily accepted. The 
decisions that related to public sector employees in general were mostly unilateral. 
In part, Malaysian history, and especially the experience of the 13th May encouraged 
the increasing power of the government, enabling it to use the law to restrict labour 
movement in times of social and political uncertainties. Apart from the laws, the 
government was supported by its own media mechanism, which was incomparable to 
the strength of opposition or unions. Once a moderate labour movement replaced 
militant unionism during the colonial period, the increasingly restrictive legislation in 
the name of 'national security' was used and reinforced by the independent 
government so that the labour movement, either from the private or the public sector 
never again became a threat. There was a real fear of open conflict shown by the 
government, so a strong labour and other legislation, like the IS A, ensured events such 
as the 13 th May would be very unlikely to occur again in Malaysia. Without strong 
opposition and an effective labour movement as pressure groups, the government 
could ensure 'social and political stability', both considered as very important to 
guarantee that the economic environment was conducive for investors. In tum this 
provided capital for industrialisation, which was becoming an increasingly important 
tool in the Malaysian development process. 
In the early years of independence, the industrialisation process was left more to the 
private sector, but now the government was committed to encourage FDI and MNCs 
to stay in Malaysia, especially when it was being challenged by other countries in the 
region. The TUO 1959 ensured that there were no large federations of trade unions of 
general character, which might threaten the economic environment with industrial 
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disputes. Moreover, the government has managed to prevent the fonnation of large 
strong unions, especially through a policy of in-house unions in both sectors, as well 
as from preventing left-wing unions altogether. The DTUA and the ministry wide 
discretionary powers, to the extent of defining companies as 'electronics' or 
'electrical', were retained. Clearly, the independent government had no intention of 
liberalising labour laws inherited from the British, but instead emphasised the 
restrictions, based on its present needs. There were of course a number of social and 
political reasons to support government's actions. In 1965, now using the Indonesian 
Confrontation as one reason for amendments, several more restrictions were imposed 
on labour. This time 'essential services' were prohibited to take strike action, which 
included government servants. Even though these regulations were subsequently 
withdrawn, the Essential (Trade Disputes in Essential Services) Regulation 1965 was 
promulgated, which retained, restricted and ultimately ended the British voluntary 
system. Compulsory arbitration now became the order of the day, in the name of the 
'nation's interest', as well as economic and political stability. When the IRA 1967 was 
passed, all previous laws concerning industrial disputes were now consolidated. 
Meanwhile, the Act excluded several important provisions from applying to public 
sector employees, thereby already differentiating between the two sectors. It also 
meant that the public sector employees were denied the rights enjoyed by private 
sector employees, which further restricted their chances to be involved in the IR 
process. IRA 1967 effectively excluded Section 49 of the original IRA, Parts II, III, IV 
and V from applying to government service. These included the rights to fonn unions 
and to take part in collective bargaining with an employer. The right to strike, and 
other chief provisions such as recognition, organization, conciliation and arbitration 
were denied to them. Public ser\'ice disputes no\\' needed the Agong's consent (the 
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King) to be referred to the Arbitration Tribunal (synonym with IR Court for private 
sector), a right they never exercised. Their terms and conditions of service were 
centrally determined by Salaries Commissions or Committees, which without the 
negotiating right meant a unilateral decision and largely depended on the government. 
On the whole, the public sector IR lost more than the private sector in the course of 
'national interests'. 
11.3. An Analysis on Factors that influenced the Development of the Public and 
Private Sector IR 
Generally there were three broad factors that have influenced the development of the 
public and private sector IR during the period studied, namely politics, social issues 
and economics, but as analysed below, the factors were often intertwined. Political 
factors refer to political stability and political leadership. To ensure political stability, 
craved especially after 13 th May 1969, labour laws tended to be more restrictive. 
Meanwhile, political leadership, especially under Mahathir, was shown to be a 
prominent factor as well. The stand taken by each political leader tended to become 
the nation's official position, and compelled the unions to accommodate. Meanwhile, 
social factors, including ethnic and cultural issues also aggravated some of the matters 
faced by Malaysian IR. In addition, economic factors, which refer to the government's 
obsession with economic growth, further influenced the development of IR in both 
sectors. The economic issues proved to be a dominant and obvious one, since 
officially and publicly, this had been emphasised by the government to win over 
~lalaysians to its way of thinking. So, even though Malaysian IR practiced tripartism, 
effective participation from employees especially was much needed. On top of that, 
Malaysia still depended heavily on FDI and MNCs, and was therefore forced to ensure 
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a conducive economic environment and keep labour costs low. As a fast developing 
nation, it was also open to external forces, such as the process of globalisation. All 
these interrelated factors, as analysed below, influenced the development of both 
sectors. 
During the British colonial era and the Japanese short occupation, economic and 
political factors merged to influence the government's policies more than social 
factors, even though both colonial powers had already acknowledged the Malays 
'special position'. The immigrants were regarded as temporary workers, and even 
after the Malayan Union 1946, and The Federation of Malay States 1948, when ethnic 
issues, especially citizenship and economic disparity between Malays/non-Malays, 
were debated, there was no policy to unite the emerging plural and complex society. 
To be able to gain as much economically, the British, and the Japanese to a certain 
extent, maintained a stable political environment in Malaya. After 1957, the 
independent government also had the same considerations, but now the social issues 
had become central. Under UMNO, the Malays gained much after independence, as 
the more politically dominant force, and the British supported this. Ethnic issues, 
particularly involving the relationship between the Malays and Chinese over time, 
proved fragile. Therefore, it is contended and proven in this study that this was one 
key historical factor that has influenced the government's policies. The Malays were 
threatened by the economic prosperity gained by the Chinese in the short time they 
were in Malaya, particularly their domination of commercial activities. The Chinese 
on the other hand, were not satisfied with the pro-Malay policy implemented by the 
British and later their political dominance after Independence. Over time, the 
relationship worsened, exacerbated when the Japanese also imposed a 'pro-Malay' 
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policy compared to their treatment towards the Chinese. This saw the racial clash 
immediately after the war by the dominantly Chinese MCP. The Malays opposed the 
Malayan Union idea, as although it would unite Malaya for the first time into a 
centralised entity, it would also cancel the 'special position' of the Malays and 
reduced Malay rulers to figureheads with no authority. What alarmed the Malays most 
were the liberal citizenship regulations towards the immigrants and the equal rights 
proposed to all those who considered themselves as Malayans. The Malays, for the 
first time, wholly opposed this and from thereon UMNO emerged as the Malays' 
champion, a position that it was committed to retain to this day. Even though UMNO 
was conservative and led by English-educated Malays who believed in maintaining 
good relationship with the British, it believed that the Malays 'special position' should 
be preserved. With the 1948 Federation of Malaya, the traditional role of the Malay 
Sultans was restored, while the Malays and non-Malays settled for the 'ethnic 
bargain'. The Malays accepted that those qualified under the new agreements would 
be Malayan citizens while the non-Malays accepted that the Malays were indigenous 
peoples with 'special rights'. These provisions were later included in the 1957 
independent Malayan Constitution. However, the 'ethnic bargain' did not please the 
left, who gained support from the trade unions for a few years before going for the 
'guerilla warfare'. The British enforced strict labour laws, and encouraged 'new 
unionism'. This slowly saw the erosion of support from the Chinese towards trade 
unionism. Thus, from then on Malayan trade unions were dominated by the Indians, 
and much later, by the Malays. 
The social factor, particularly the ethnic issue, came to the fore again after the 13 th 
May 1969, which became a \\'atershed in modem Malaysia's history. The NOC used 
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the argument that the riot was caused by the dissatisfaction of the Malays over their 
economic backwardness, and that with that, 'national unity' was impossible. This 
argument legitimised the government's move to implement the NEP which, even 
though it contained many resolutions to economic problems in Malaysia, had a 
specific plan to help the Malays overcome their economic backwardness. This became 
another major setback in the Malaysian economic plan and race relations as it saw 
opposition from the non-Malays/non-Bumiputeras. It was during the NEP that the 
government took affirmative action to bring the Malays into mainstream economy, 
either through 'positive discrimination' in the public or the private sectors. When this 
objective was not fully met, it drove the government to continue with the pro-
Bumiputeras clause in the NDP, even though there were a few changes, which placed 
more on economic development in general as well as a larger role to be played by the 
private sector. This proved that the government still considered a historical-based 
factor to influence its policy. However, political considerations were also significant, 
whereby the government knew from feedback that the non-Bumiputeras were wary of 
the pro-Malays affirmative action plan. Thus, the NDP stressed more on enhancing 
Malaysia as a developed and united nation, especially in line with Vision 2020. 
Nevertheless, it did not mean the Bumiputeras issue was discarded, as it still received 
considerable attention, but not as much as under the NEP. This was a positive 
forward-looking policy held by the government. However, in its obsession to rely on 
economic growth to solve other socio-political problems as well, the private sector 
was given one even heavier task of uplifting the economy. This highlighted the 
government's reluctance to permit the same rights to public sector employees, even 
though the Malays formed the bulk of the public sector. The government was adamant 
that public sector employees enjoyed more benefits and privileges than those in the 
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private sector, even without the negotiating right. It was also averse to open conflicts 
that might destabilise the status quo, and discourage investors, especially the FDI. 
Here we saw that ethnicity was not an issue anymore (since the majority of the public 
sector employees were Malays), but economic and political stability was. 
So, it is apparent here that the economic factor was an important influence in the role 
of the state in Malaysian IR. However sometimes, there were exceptions. For 
example, just before the 1999 general election, the government showered public sector 
employees with a month's bonus and a 10 per cent across the board salary increase, 
even though the economy faced the worst downturn after many years and had not 
totally recovered. There were accusations from the opposition parties that the 
government was buying votes from public sector employees, although the government 
denied this. However, it confinned the politicised relationship faced by CUEP ACS 
with the government as employer, and showed a pragmatic government, which would 
resort to any policies that solved the problem at hand. It also showed the fundamental 
need for CUEP ACS to regain its lost negotiating power. 
During the three Emergency rules experienced by Malaysia, the government officially 
named socio-political stability as a reason for the restrictive labour laws that applied 
to both sectors. The first Emergency (1948-1960) saw the restrictive labour laws 
implemented under the TUO 1948, and during this time there was a real threat from 
communist influence. Again, restrictive measures were taken during the Indonesian 
Confrontation in 1964. The 13 th May 1969 racial riot also gave another reason for the 
government to implement emergency rule and to strengthen control over labour issues, 
proving that political and social issues were closely interconnected. Political 
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leadership as an important factor was more apparent during Mahathir's years, made 
possible by his long years as Premier. Several of his decisions affected the direction of 
Malaysian IR, proving that political leadership had become a strong determinant in 
Malaysian IR. It was also encouraged by the political culture in Malaysian politics 
which discouraged open conflicts, and was more submissive. Mahathir consistently 
aired his views on labour issues and stressed terms such as 'nation building' and the 
'nation's interests' to gain support from unions. He made no distinction between 
public servants and government employees, expecting total loyalty. 
A tripartite system existed in Malaysia, but decisions were often top-down. In the 
private sector, the MoHR was given considerable power to monitor IR, while the PSD 
had a more limited role, because of the absence of the negotiating power of unions in 
the public sector. The machinery in the PSD functioned more on daily issues rather 
than policy matters, which over time were decided upon by top political leaders, 
especially the PM. CUEP ACS therefore did not succeed in functioning as champions 
of public sector union issues. From the very beginning, it failed to be a free 
independent union, partly because the authoritarian government was the employer, but 
partly also because of its own weaknesses. To survive, CUEPACS learned to be 
accommodative in order not to jeopardise its existence. On top of that, it lacked the 
financial resources to be freer, therefore limiting its independence from the 
governnlent. CUEPACS also did not have independent leaders who were able to lead 
away from the government's influence, partly because they themselves were 
government servants subjected to all the rules and regulations set by it. MTUC, on the 
other hand, managed to administer its own affairs quite freely financially from the 
govcrnment. Howcver, the state was always dominant in the power play between the 
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three parties In the private sector, except In a few incidents. In the electronics 
workers' plight, the government was happy to play 'second fiddle' to the employers, 
when it let the issue drag on until today and played the helpless 'victim' to the 
situation. This in fact showed the government's dependence on foreign investors and 
thus its victimisation of local employees. While in another issue, in 1978 and 1979, 
the government showed that it was ready to use whatever means available to counter 
dissent from MAS employees, even resorting to the ISA. However, internal politics 
was another challenge that impaired the MTUC. When leaders were accused of having 
their own agendas, and power was in the hands of a small number of trade union 
leaders, the MTUC failed to realise its full potential as a national labour centre. It also 
did not manage to manipulate its relations with CUEPACS to the workers' advantage. 
In other cases, the MTUC was just as dependent on the government as was 
CUEP ACS, when this should not have been so. This was more evident during the 
NDP, when the MTUC President, at least in the eyes of his own colleagues, 
disappointed the movement. Based on several issues, such as the EPF and the annuity 
scheme, he was accused of conceding to the government. His readiness to accept the 
post as senator, (and therefore he had to join the UMNO, the dominant party in 
Barisan Nasionaf) further fanned such accusations. The MTUC was more than 
accommodative to the government giving it full access to both labour unions in the 
public and the private sectors. In fact, the MTUC and COEP ACS both fell into the 
govemment trap during the MLO affair. The government, either unbeknown to them 
or intentionally, had played CUEP ACS against the MTUC. Even though when MLO 
merged into the MTUC, the movement never managed to manipUlate the affair to 
workers' advantage. 
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During the NDP, in both sectors, political factors were important considerations that 
influenced the state's roles. A stable political environment was believed to be one 
crucial factor for encouraging foreign investors, and therefore it was kept at all costs. 
This makes it more evident how political and economic factor were intertwined, 
whereby only through political stability could the investors be thOUght interested to 
come and invest in Malaysia. This led the state to retain old legislation because it 
worked in guarding against unwanted conflicts, which was beneficial for attracting 
investors. In other areas, such as administrative and participative policies, the 
government made efforts towards a better private and public sector IR. However, 
because the legislation was mostly unchanged, the outcome of efforts in the 
administration and IR policies was dampened by the imbalance of power between the 
state and the other actors, namely the employees and their representatives. Apart from 
that, because public sector employees lacked several rights given to private sector 
employees, they were impaired, and their relationship with the government as their 
employer was more political than the private sector employers, and in fact more 
complicated. 
11.4. Conclusion 
Ironically, it is the independent state and not the colonial one that imposed two 
separate IR policies on both the Malaysian public and private sectors IR, whereby it 
was the independent state that stopped the negotiating right once enjoyed by public 
sector employees. After the 13th May 1969, the government felt the need to protect the 
Malaysian economy from influences that it thought would jeopardise economic 
growth, which was considered the most important weapon to achieve 'national unity' 
for the multi-racial community. During both the NEP and NDP, the government 
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placed a high priority on economIC development, and therefore influenced the 
direction of IR in both sectors. In 2000, there were already two systems of IR in 
Malaysia, one for each sector. This was seen by the different legislation applied to 
each sector, the different mechanism used in administration, and also the different sets 
of IR policies. Increasingly, the government prioritised economic growth, placing it in 
the hands of the private sector. Because of that, it was obvious that the government 
was capital-friendly and protected the employers' position using legislation, 
administration and IR policies. This, as already discussed, impacted upon both the 
private and public sector IR. In the private sector, even though employees did have 
some rights, such as covered under the TUA and IRA, several restrictions, obviously 
to protect a conducive economic environment from unwanted industrial disputes, put 
them in a weak position. In the public sector, even though there were efforts to 
improve relations by involving unions in the tripartite bodies, the government's 
reluctance to relax several restrictions imposed on them defeated the purpose. The 
absence of a negotiating power for public sector unions mocked their presence in all 
the tripartite bodies, and made the relationship with the government very political, 
especially during the NDP. This was partly due to the strong political leadership under 
Mahathir Mohamad, but partly also because public sector unions were left with no 
choice. The success of the relationship depended heavily on a 'good rapport' with the 
government and the willingness to co-operate with it even though at the expense of 
workers. The government argued that public sector employees enjoyed a better 
package than private sector ones. This referred to the period of economic downturn 
when retrenchment was prevalent in the private sector but not in the public one. 
However, this is a lame argument, an excuse for not agreeing to the basic right of a 
negotiating power for the public sector. The fact was, in a very authoritarian 
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government, freedom for the public sector is quite rare. In this case, the private sector 
unions were left on their own as long as their movement did not go beyond the line set 
by the government. Here, legislation was already present to ensure such limitations. If 
they crossed the line, the government had no hesitation to counter such moves, 
especially in the name of the 'nation's interests'. During the NDP, it has been proven 
that the MTUC never crossed the line anymore and therefore the relationship was 
quite 'cordial', even if at the expense of workers. 
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12.1. Introduction 
CHAPTER TWELVE 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding chapters have discussed and analysed the development of Malaysian IR 
based on the themes and issues relevant to the role of the state, covering from the 
earliest period of wage labour until 2000. This chapter first presents an overview of 
the study. Second, five key findings of the research are presented. Third, there are 
three sections that focus on the contributions and limitations of the study, and some 
directions for future research on Malaysian IR in particular, and developing countries 
in general. 
12.2. Overview of the Study 
As noted in Chapter One, the study has six objectives. The first is to analyse the 
state's roles in Malaysian IR from the colonial period until the end of the last major 
national development plan, the NDP, in 2000. In this context, the roles explored use 
Ayadurai's (1998) categorisation, that is, as legislator, administrator, participant, and, 
in the public sector, as employer. The contention here is that the current state and 
trends of Malaysian IR cannot be analysed without knowledge of its historical 
evolution and its social, political and economic context. Second, the study examines 
all the factors that influenced the role of the state, especially non-economic ones, as 
mentioned briefly in all previous studies on Malaysian IR. Third, it examines the 
changes in the role of the state during the period studied and if any, how this can be 
attributed to internal and external factors. Fourth, this study makes a comparative 
analysis of the state's policies towards the private and the public sectors' IR. Fifth, the 
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study detennines certain factors that have changed or remained unchanged over the 
years, and lastly, it examines the balance of power between the state and the other two 
primary actors of lR, the employers (as represented by their institutions) and 
employees (as represented by their unions' centres). 
Wu (1995:xix) notes that 'many characteristics of the IR system of Malaysia are 
rooted in the past' and part of the initial interest in this study was encouraged by such 
views. Previous scholars of Malaysian IR (J omo and Todd, 1994; Arudsothy, 1990, 
1994) agreed on the significant role of the state in the development of Malaysian IR. 
However, only Jomo and Todd (1994) attempted to offer a clearer and more 
comprehensive picture of the role of the state, though related purely to trade unions. It 
confirmed that the state played the most significant role in Malaysian IR but it did not 
analyse the significance of historical factors, as attempted in this study. While 
Arudsothy gave a more critical analysis of the evolution of Malaysian IR system, he 
did not relate to the 'diminishing autonomy of trade unions' and 'the growth of 
authoritarian corporatist tendencies' to the Malaysian socio-political system 
(Arudsothy, 1990: 327). 
Generally, there has been a lack of research and debate on the development of 
Malaysian IR and therefore much less discussion of the link between its past and 
present. However, there were some studies that suggested new ideas, such as 
Sharma's (1985) 'stages of development' model and Kuruvilla's (1995,1996,1998) 
'shifts of industrial strategy' as points of departure for exploring IR in de\'eloping 
countries in South East Asia. Both ideas belied the view that the role of the state was 
shaped by the history of each countries, as argued in this study. However, Shamla's 
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and Kuruvilla's views are not ignored as they help us understand certain aspects of 
Malaysian IR, especially its obsession with 'stages of economic development' through 
'industrialisation', as seen with its lSI, EOI and heavy industries strategies. Like most 
developing countries, Malaysia incorporated both stages of development and 
industrialisation into its national development plans, the NEP and NDP. Nevertheless, 
it is too simplistic to analyse the development of Malaysian IR without looking at the 
country and its people's experience as a whole, which this study did in Chapters Four 
and Six. The difference between Malaysia and other ASEAN countries was that 
Malaysia had 'legitimised' its 'historical past' in national development plans, which 
have brought considerable strength to the nation's economy and enabled it to become 
one of the NICs in the South East Asia region. The Malays' 'special positions' were 
incorporated in both the NEP and NDP, which encapsulated other national policies, 
including IR. This position, later politically termed BZII11iputera rights, is another 
legacy of the British colonial administration, which was retained although it remained 
a 'thorn in the side' of the fragile race relations, especially between the Malays and 
Chinese. It is therefore important to see whether the historical-based pro-Bumiputeras 
policy also became a factor that shaped the development of Malaysian IR. 
This study has ambitious objectives, since it attempts to cover all the major turning 
point periods in Malaysian history up to the end of the NDP in 2000 (see Chapter Four 
which outlines these major turning point-periods). In addition, it offers a 
comprehensive view of the development and processes of Malaysian IR and addresses 
the research questions. However, it was made possible only by selecting themes and 
issues that were relevant and which have affected the development of Malaysian IR. 
Therefore, to cover such a long period of time, the chapters were based on only these 
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important events. The approach taken has enabled the researcher to analyse issues and 
themes from the colonial era when the relationship between the state, employers and 
employees first became significant in terms of wage labour and commercial activities 
(1874-1957). Next, emphasis was placed on the twelve years (1957-1969) of 
independence before the watershed of 1969, the year the race riot occurred, changing 
Malaysian history and legitimising the Malays 'IBumiputeras , special position in the 
subsequent national development plan, the NEP (1971-1990). The last two chapters 
highlight the NDP years (1991-2000), still with pro-Bumiputeras policy, but with 
some new pro-active strategies. The discussions and analyses have highlighted 
Malaysia was a pragmatic and forward looking country, but at the same time 
retrospecti ve. 
12.3. Key Findings 
Five major findings presented below address the research objectives of this study. The 
first reveals that the historical factors, whether economic, social or political were 
important to the development of Malaysian IR. Second, the study agrees with 
Arudsothy's (1990) view that Malaysia has a corporatist IR system. Third, the state, 
for mostly economic reasons, applied a different policy to its private and public sector 
IR. The fourth finding highlights the contending factors that influenced the state' roles 
in IR, emphasising the complexity of the Malaysian multi-racial society, one of the 
foundations behind the state's national economic policies. Here, the finding also 
answered another research question that the contending factors changed or remained 
unchanged, depending on the situation that Malaysia faced. The fifth finding 
highlights the balance of power among IR actors in Malaysia, which as contended, 
remaincd in the govcrnment's hands. 
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However, generally three intertwining issues have emerged in this study that explain 
the nature of the development of Malaysian IR. First, the continued active and 
interventionist role of the state in the economy resulted in it heavily influencing the 
development and direction of Malaysian IR. Second, the largely unchanged attitude of 
the government towards the labour movement as a whole for the period under study 
was much contributed by the continued authoritative political system which still saw 
the political dominance of the Malays under UMNO, that enabled the continuance of 
policies. Third, the Malaysian political system and its status quo remained because 
each community in the plural society was determined to preserve its individual traits 
and interests, and has 'supported' the racially-based parties in the coalition 
government until today. With the government actively involved in determining the 
direction of the Malaysian economy and 'nation building' in a plural society, where 
each community jealously guarding its interests, the Malaysian IR system is unlikely 
to change. On the whole, the development of Malaysian IR was very much influenced 
by its past and present social, political and economic factors thus ensuring its 
continuity. 
12.3.1. The Importance of the 'Historical Past' in the Development of the Role of 
the State in Malaysian IR 
This study has shown that Malaysia's historical factors, including its social, political 
and economic experience, influenced the role of the state in IR more deeply than 
acknowledged by previous scholars. One of the most important issues was the 
definition that the MalayslBumiputeras are the 'indigenous' people, and therefore 
deserving of the 'special rights'. 
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Undoubtedly, this has contributed to the complexity of Malaysian society, and has 
complicated government policies, especially economic ones as the major development 
policies, and therefore also JR. Rather than let go and treat Malaysian citizens as 
equals, the clause has influenced the government's policies, especially under the NEP, 
and later again under the NDP. Some of the effects were direct, such as the pro-Malay 
policies implemented under the NEP that saw the emergence of the Malays as 
important contributors in the economic sphere, and especially as public sector 
employees. Indirectly, but just as important, the desire and capability of the dominant 
party in the coalition government, UMNO, to retain the clause, affected the unchanged 
political system, which was preserved without effective opposition (except in 1969). 
Because of the strong, stable government, the JR system inherited from the colonial 
era was only improvised to suit the county's need at the time, especially its legislative 
framework, because it was seen as effective to suppress dissent. The TVA 1959 today 
is more restrictive than TU01948, implying that the government believed its 
usefulness would counter industrial conflicts and protect a conducive economic 
environment. Political stability was increasingly deemed very important, while fragile 
race relations were protected using laws, campaigns and supportive public sector. The 
13th May 1969 event became a historical landmark, not just because there were 
amendments to labour laws, but also because the watershed year saw the government 
taking full charge of the economy with the implementation of the NEP, and with the 
affirmative action that legitimised the MalayslBumiputeras 'special rights'. Before 
that, the IRA 1967 encapsulated all previous regulations on JR, and from then on IR 
and labour issues in Malaysia were very much regulated. The ISA, originally 
established to control and counter communism, and in fact, originated from the 
Emergency Regulations, was retained, e\'en though that issue and other political 
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threats, such as the Konfrontasi, were long gone. In other words, even though the 
government, and this was emphasised by the officials interviewed, provided the 
democratic ways and two-way discussions, the restrictive legislation had to be kept as 
a pre-emptive measure to counter attempts to disrupt the status quo. With the state 
now playing an enlarged role in the economy (the NEP and later NOP), with greater 
political and bureaucratic control, it is clear that Malaysian IR was an outcome of a 
system quite similar to its political one, which, despite democratic institutions, was 
quite authoritarian. 
The NEP and the NDP affected other Malaysian national policies, including IR, with 
the NEP using the history-based factors, that is the Malays 'special position' as the 
indigenous people, to implement a twenty-year affirmative action plan to correct 
economic imbalances between races, especially between the Chinese and Malays. For 
twenty years, Malaysia's other complementary policies were encapsulated by the NEP, 
with the main objectives for the Malays to acquire 30 per cent corporate wealth. In 
1990, statistically there was some positive development, but only 20.3 per cent was 
achieved (OPP2, 1991: 12). However, the Malays had already made some progress 
with more participation in mainstream economic activity, especially in the public 
sector. The fact that the Malays formed the bulk of public sector employees after the 
affinnative action of NEP should not go unnoticed. It was a crucial factor that has 
enabled UMNO (the dominant Malay party in the coalition since 1957), to remain in 
power and also influenced the public sector employees' attitude towards government 
policies, in particular its IR policies in the public sector. Again, the Blll1lipliteras 
clause was included in the NOP, though with a few new strategies that won the 
support of Malaysians, such as a focus on HRD. Moreover, the Bllmipllteras clause 
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showed that the pro-Bumiputeras policy was continued. The argument here is that, 
because both the NEP and the NDP were core policies, their objectives affected the 
transformation of the Malaysian IR system. Even though there were other factors that 
contributed to the role of the state, Malaysian politics were very much influenced by 
this historical-based factor. After the l3th May, the government adopted the official 
line that strong economic growth was the answer to all Malaysian problems, 
especially the tension between races. Based on that, until today Malaysia has been 
enmeshed in its own belief that the nation has to preserve its own IR system for it to 
be able to become a fully developed country, but 'in its own mould'. Herein lies the 
contradiction. As much as Malaysia was committed to 'change' and 'development' 
and having its own identity, the significant foundation of the system left by the British 
colonial state, that is, its legislation and administration, were retained. This simply 
confirmed the pragmatic stand taken by the coalition government towards problems 
that it faced, especially race relations. However, that was only possible with the 
preservation of a very strong dominant government, and Malaysia has proven that 
with a continuous hold over the country by the same coalition Alliance/ Barisan 
Nllsiollal party since independence in 1957. Even though Malaysia has aimed to be a 
fully developed country by latest 2020, the Bumiputeras clause remained. The old 
argument was that only when the economic imbalance between races has been met 
and redressed will there be 'national unity', the official and ultimate objective. As 
discussed in Chapters Eight to Ten, both the NEP and NDP affected the way IR 
policies were implemented in that they were developed to ensure the success of these 
economic plans. 
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The 'politicised' relationship between the state and unions, especially in the public 
sector, was also another British legacy, which started after WWII, when the colonial 
government 'tamed' the militant labour movement. To marginalise and replace them 
permanently, the government encouraged moderate trade union leaders to participate 
in the government. Their efforts to incorporate trade unions into the mainstream 
community succeeded in that the unions proved to be more accommodating towards 
the government. This generally supportive attitude of trade union leaders either in 
MTUC or CUEP ACS continued during the NEP, with a few exceptions when the 
relationship soured. But subsequent union leaders, for personal or inevitable reasons, 
again developed a 'cordial' relationship with the government. The trade union leaders 
fully understood the imbalance of power between them and the state, and the practice 
of the Malaysian political culture. Being confrontational did not bring the desired 
result, as the state already ascertained that the legislative framework would take care 
of any dissent. The Malaysian public was continually reminded of the effects of 
economic, social or political instability, as experienced in 1969. Therefore, the 
amendments made to TUA and IRA have has always been related to 'national 
interests' . 
In this imbalanced relationship, CUEP ACS had more to lose from sour relations, 
therefore it became more and more accommodative towards the government. In 2000, 
CUEPACS depended on its 'cordial relations' with the government to survive, thereby 
eliminating any chance of regaining its once-enjoyed collective bargaining or 
negotiating rights. As for MTUC, its limited role as the centre for mostly private 
sector unions was also restricted by the various laws and regulations. It failed to bring 
its position to prominence, much less to unite with CUEPACS and become a major 
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labour force in the country. In fact, both let the government pit them against one 
another, and therefore ensured its dominance. At the end of 2000, only these two 
labour centres were recognised by the government. MTUC, however, enjoyed 
affiliating unions from the public sector, while CUEPACS retained itself only for 
public sector unions. While CUEPACS and MTUC savoured this position, it actually 
gave individual unions a far less relevant roles where making decisions was 
concerned. While the government gained tremendously, individual unions lost out in 
the power play, unless they were united under the two main ones. Without having to 
counter many federations of trade unions, it was much easier for the government to 
control the two main labour centres. With ordinary union members showing 
lackadaisical attitudes towards unionism, the government's good rapport with union 
leaders benefited them greatly. On the other hand, these leaders who were anxious to 
retain their hold as office bearers seemed to have returned the government's favour by 
being less confrontational and more agreeable on important matters. Both labour 
centres, especially CUEP ACS, also faced their own limiting problems, such as 
financial strain, forcing them to adopt a more co-operative attitude towards the 
government. 
12.3.2. The Corporatist State 
No matter how hollow it may sound for Malaysia, the government has succeeded in 
incorporating the actors into a 'corporatist system', and this move began with 
Independence. This study has shown that the Malaysian government as legislator, 
administrator, participant and in the public sector as employer has created a new 
Malaysian IR system that was thought to suit the country based on its own political, 
social and economic experience. With an increasingly authoritative political set-up, 
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especially during the latter half of the NEP and the whole of the NDP, the corporatist 
system has looked set to remain. 
Sharma (1996) has argued that the 'least-industrialised countries' adopt a 'political-
paternalistic pattern' of IR. If we follow Sharma's arguments, Malaysia, as a country 
that has moved to a 'semi-industrialised' nation status, should adopt a 'repressive-
confrontative pattern'. However, based on evidence and analysis presented in this 
study, this was not the case for Malaysia, for its IR remained close to the first pattern, 
that is, 'political-paternalistic'. Here, the government has succeeded in incorporating 
the employers, represented by MEF, and the employees, represented by CUEP ACS 
and MTUC into its own 'tripartite system'. All trade union leaders, MEF and the 
government officials interviewed revealed that these parties believed in the relevance 
of the system, but admitted there needs to be change for it to function effectively. 
Therefore structurally the system has changed, but because of the nature of the socio-
political system in Malaysia, the change has been more in form, rather than in 
substance. The government's position is that economic parity between races must be 
achieved first before any structural change occurs in the present economic plans. 
Therefore, since the NEP, privatisation, FDI and industrialisation have been 
increasingly important and regarded as the catalysts of economic growth. This 
accounts for the government's reluctance to concede to the unions' demands. 
Therefore, some issues from the past remain issues in 2000, such as a minimum wage, 
the establishment of national unions for electronics workers (or even in-house unions), 
and the absence of negotiating rights for public sector employees. Terms such as 
'national interest', 'national unity' and 'nation building' ha\'e been consistently 
stressed. 
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The government's official development ideology was that economIC progress \\'ill 
ensure that other national development's objectives and socio-political problems are 
solved. This was made very clear in both the NEP, and the NDP. Ho\\,ever, the 
underlying principle was that trade unions and industrial disputes are viewed as 
'detrimental' to economic progress. In line with this ideology, a low wage, for 
example, is good for investors, therefore the reluctance to alter the minimum wage 
policy. The reluctance to change on the part of the government was also facilitated by 
the unchanged political leadership. Since 1957, the same government has ruled a 
stable Malaysia, only disrupted by the 13th May 1969 racial riot. Since then, apart 
from a few global recession and the recent economic crisis, Malaysia has generally 
enjoyed a robust economy, an important factor to help guarantee stable socio-politics 
in a multi-racial society. From 1981 to 2000, Malaysia has had the same PM, who has 
shown his determination to bring out the best in Malaysia and Malaysians, especially 
the Bumiputeras. His views on trade unionism and workers' rights from his early days 
until today have been consistent, further contributing to an influence on the balance of 
power in Malaysian IR. That explains why some old issues fought by the MTUC are 
still current issues after 50 years (such as minimum wage and housing for workers). 
The government has enjoyed support from the employers, particularly their biggest 
employer's union federation, the MEF. 
The same government with the same political leader in power has been able to sustain 
support from bureaucrats in the civil service, with unwavering support from the 
defence system and the police. The PM, Mahathir Mohamad, has been perceived by 
many as always ahead of time, very pragmatic and more importantly, has \\'on over the 
non-Malays' trust as a visionary Malaysian leader. He has been seen as able to inspire 
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people to regard Malaysia as a company that needs loyalty to succeed, forming part of 
his Look East policy. When he has talked of the 'national interest', 'nation building' 
and the need for 'national unity', he has actually asked for total agreement with the 
government of the day. For him, the elected government of the day must be given the 
full mandate and full support to implement policies that were meant for the Malaysian 
people. The outcome of the interviews of the officials at PSD and MoHR has reflected 
the bureaucrats' belief and full endorsement of the system, in line with the concepts of 
'industrial harmony', 'industrial peace', 'national interests' and 'nation building' that 
were promoted by the state. It only confirmed the government's dominance as 
administrators of and participants in its own policies. Mahathir has had an 
uncompromising stance over the roles that should be played by workers, and 
emphasised this with his Look East policy, which urged Malaysians to regard the 
country as a 'company'. His consistent view was that workers should make sacrifices 
for national development. During Mahathir's era, the extent to which the government 
was prepared to go in order to maintain the status quo in general and IR policies in 
particular, was proven. The MAS strike in 1979 that saw several trade union leaders 
arrested under the ISA, more restrictive amendments to TVA, and the more arrests 
made during gerakan reformasi era in the late 1990s proved this. With the strong 
support of the civil service, the defence and police, the legislative, administrative and 
participative policies ran rather smoothly for Malaysia, even in times of economic and 
political crises, as shown in 1997. 
It is suggested here that the Malaysian corporatist IR system meant that the trade 
unions 'agreed' to restrain their pursuit of their members' interests as part of a strategy 
to further 'national interests'. The government succeeded in moulding the labour 
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movement into its goals and aspirations. Since the development of moderate unions 
after WWII, either MTUC or CUEP ACS failed to be independent from the 
government's influence. Moreover, in the 1970s, they were encouraged to be involved 
in business. Trade union leaders were given 'concessions' as members of almost all 
tripartite bodies in Malaysia, even though the extent of their effective participation has 
been questioned even by union members. At the end of 2000, Malaysian trade 
unionists had cordial relationship with the government. They can be very vocal, but 
have not presented a threat to the state. Publicly, the state's aspirations have been 
regarded as their own aspirations, enabling the former to proclaim success on the 
'smart partnership' and the 'harmonious IR system'. With that, it was only acceptable, 
and in fact expected, to have fewer strikes and other industrial disputes in the country, 
even in times of economic hardship, as in the second half of the 1990s. 
In retrospect, an economic and political crisis need not necessarily bring change to the 
present Malaysian IR system. For a dramatic change to materialise, both the 
government and unions need to contribute towards it, which, by looking at the most 
recent crises, did not happen in Malaysia. One of the biggest factors that dampen 
change is the reluctance of each community to let go of their interests, particularly the 
Malays of their political dominance. As the politically dominant group, the Malays 
were able to protect their interests through policies that were based on history, such as 
their position as indigenous people. As long as that position is protected within the 
Malaysian Constitution, the political and administrative system looks very unlikely to 
change. This has been shown by the government's success in c1aming the Malaysian 
society through one of the worst economic and political crises during the latter half of 
the 1990s. After three years (1997 to 2000), the government regained its ground and 
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Malaysia continued with its old economIC and political processes and systems. 
Malaysia simply lacked the conditions needed for the change to happen, such as 
experienced in Indonesia, where independent unionism have emerged out of its own 
reformation movement. The social cohesion, where there was the culture of deference 
and the presence of loyalty to the status quo, much influenced by each community's 
interests, ensured the government's strong hold over many policies in Malaysia. Like 
many fast developing countries, Malaysia faced opposition with the presence of, for 
example, the Alternative Frontl16 , but the national objectives as championed by the 
government were shared by many Malaysians, and under the present condition, 
inevitably, also by trade unions. The legislative framework, and the propaganda 
mechanism owned by the government was no match for the disunited, 'docile', and 
ignorant labour force. There was no ideology-based party, like the Labour Party, for 
example, to represent workers' issues. The government is staunchly anti any left-wing 
movement, real or imagined, which until today have been oppressed. Moreover, there 
was no avenue for any legitimate oppositional ideas to prosper in Malaysia, therefore, 
'left-wing' ideas, or any ideas not in line with the national objectives have no ground. 
Trade unions, with the history of militant movement under the British, were 
constantly reminded and warned not to resort to the 'old ways', which were 
considered detrimental to Malaysia's future. Moreover, the people were continually 
reminded of the need for the country to become an independent, respected nation in 
the region, as compared to some of the more unstable ones, like Indonesia or the 
lib The Alternative Front is a coalition party, formed by almost all opposition parties in Malaysia after 
the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim in 1998, but is \'ery much under the influence of PAS and KeAdilan 
(Adil) party, both Malay/Muslim-dominated, Recently, in October 2001, the DAP (Chinese dominated 
'multi-racial' opposition party) pulled out of the coalition over a disagreement on the 'Islamic State' 
concept. It is very unlikely that multi-racial parties in the true sense of the word would gain prominence 
in i\lalaysia. as Malaysians generally still believe they need to be 'protected' by their O\\TI race-based 
partlcs, such as UM1\'O, MeA and MIC. 
512 
Philippines. All these campaIgns by the government, coupled with the factors 
discussed above, ensured the continuation of the present system. 
12.3.3. The Different Policy towards the Private and the Public Sector IR 
One of the objectives of this study was to examine the state's policies towards the 
public and private sectors. Ironically, but unsurprisingly, it is the post-independence 
state that changed the policy towards each sector, more prominently during the NDP. 
At the end of the NDP, in 2000, Malaysia already had two IR systems, one in each 
sector, with increasingly different legislation, administration and policies. As the 
private sector has now been given a more important role in the Malaysian economy, 
the public sector has to playa supporting role, and this therefore has affected their 
relationship with the sole employer, the government. As argued already in Chapter 
Ten and Eleven, the relationship between the government and public sector 
employees, in the midst of the absence of rights for negotiations, has become more 
and more 'political'. 
12.3.4. The Contending Factors 
This study has revealed that economic considerations have remained the most 
important factors that influenced the role of the state in IR. The general view that 
there was a very close relationship between the economy and IR is especially true in 
Malaysia. However, such were also influenced by the socio-political ones. Officially, 
Malaysia has taken the stand that high economic growth is the most important fact to 
be achieved first before others. However, there have been times when the socio-
political considerations have overridden the economic considerations, especially when 
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the government thought it important for wmnmg political votes, as m the case 
sometimes with CUEP ACS. 
The complexity of Malaysian history and the plural society has directly, or indirectly 
affected the development of Malaysian IR. The government has been accused of 
fishing for votes in particular from public sector employees, who were predominantly 
Malays. Moreover, the government was able to manipulate the relationship because of 
the absence of negotiating rights in the public sector, which diminished for good in 
1979, causing the relationship between them to become more political. Even the 
MTUC was trapped into this type of relationship. The effect was that after 40 
independent years, trade unions have failed to exert effective pressure on the 
government to change several restrictive labour laws. Political stability has officially 
been regarded as significant by the government, to be preserved at all costs, despite 
the fact that there were accusations of the over use of the term as a political rhetoric. 
Ostensibly, the government used the argument (to ensure support from the masses 
towards their top-down and unilateral decisions) that without their full support the 
nation would lose its sovereignty to outside forces, using terms such as 'new 
colonialists'. Even trade union leaders fell for this, and either genuine or based on 
their vested interests, were more than eager to voice support for the government. The 
accusations that they actually have vested interests rose when the leaders were 
criticised by their own colleagues. In the case of public sector unionism, their position 
was more fragile than the private sector trade unions. The fact that as trade union 
leaders they have gained a better position in society encouraged them more to retain 
their hold over trade unions, even though it was shown that the interest of the masses 
towards the latter has not really increased since independence. The way trade union 
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leaders managed the unions largely affected unionism, making them dependent on the 
government, even for their survival. Even though Malaysia has been independent for 
many years, whereby changes have occurred in the economy and employees have 
become more skilled, the labour movement has not changed significantly from its 
state in the early years. Today, its role is diminishing as a pressure group or a 
champion of workers' issues as there is no dividing line between them and the 
government. In fact, CUEP ACS has increasingly acted in line with the government, 
while the MTUC, which should be freer, has failed to bring the role of the private 
sector unions to prominence. This has enabled the government to continue with its 
old, repressive legislation and unilateral IR policies and change only when it suited 
them, for example to gain political votes. 
Social factors explored in this study concern certain ethnic and cultural issues. The 
study has demonstrated that race relations, especially between Malays and non-
Malays, as well as, after the 13th May 1969 and NEP, between Bumiputeras and non-
Bumiputeras have influenced the government's development policy. Political culture 
has also influenced the relationship of unions with the state. When Malaysian politics 
have practiced an 'elite accommodative system' it has affected other areas of 
Malaysian life, most particularly in this case the way IR actors have based and 
conducted their affairs. Open confrontations with the state have been avoided, and in 
the public sector there was the GO that ascertained the public sector's submission to 
the government, encouraging their ignorance of IR issues that affect them. Even 
during economic and political upheaval, such as faced by Malaysia in 1997-2000, the 
unions failed to manipulate the situation to their advantage. In fact, both public and 
private sector unions are more accommodative now towards the government. The 
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contention here, therefore, is that as long as the Malaysian political system is 
preserved, the IR system also stays. This study has proved that the state has succeeded 
in moulding Malaysian IR into its own model that it thought to be 'suitable' for 
multiracial Malaysia. 
The employers' position was enhanced because the government believed that strong 
economic growth was only possible with their active intervention in the economy, and 
therefore offered them a lot of leeway and managerial prerogatives. It was shown that 
there were times the private sector employers abused this position. In the public 
sector, the government was more repressive, and the bilateral relations ensured that 
employees were not able to free themselves from its dominance. FDI is still regarded 
as very important to the Malaysian economy, thus the government's reluctance to 
permit national unions, for example, in the electronics industry. The MEF, 
representing private sector employers, has supported the government's stance over 
many IR issues simply because these have benefited them. The present imbalance of 
power between the employers and employees in both the public and private sectors is 
largely attributed to the government's unilateral policy. 
New influences, such as HRD, globalisation and the NGOs have affected the private 
sector more, but still failed to make any significant inroads. The government, whether 
they like to admit it or not, has succumbed to some pressures, but its dominant 
position was never seriously threatened. The attitude of Malaysian workers who were 
docile and for the most part ignorant, and the union leaders who failed to bring union 
movement into prominence, have all contributed to the continued dominance of the 
state. Being a very pragmatic and forward-looking government, Malaysia planned to 
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become a fully developed nation by the year 2020 at the latest. During the !\TIP, the 
government was under pressure between the obligation to satisfy local demands and 
the need to please the private sector, which was dominated by the MNCs and the 
FDls. Therefore, though the government never admits it, their IR decisions were 
influenced by both these internal and external forces. Nevertheless, the public sector 
was affected more, having the state as their employer, with the NDP's designed to 
place preference on the private sector for a more important role in the economy. This 
saw the retention of all the legislative frameworks, but, ironically at the same time, 
introducing several policies aiming at creating a 'harmonious IR' with the public 
sector employees who were denied basic negotiating rights as enjoyed by private 
sector employees. This paradoxically led to a more bilateral relationship with more 
unilateral decisions, even though tripartite institutions existed. 
Crouch (1996) has argued that a government can become more responsive and more 
repressive at the same time. He argues that in Malaysia, both democratic and 
authoritarian characteristics are inextricably mixed. This was the case in Malaysia, 
which has an essentially democratic political system, where elections are held 
regularly, parliament is upheld and the judiciary is constitutionally independent. But 
the democratic framework is accompanied by a wide range of authoritarian controls 
that make it difficult for opposition to defeat the ruling party. When the Alliance was 
in power, the promise to uphold a strong, free and democratic trade union movement 
became merely lip service. The MTUC, already regarded as the representative of 
private sector unions, became the government's machinery to counter any militant 
labour movement. Even though there was then the tripartite body, such as the NJLAC, 
the roles played by unions were dictated by the government. 
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The coalition Barisan Nasional government has held on to power until today. The 
argument in this study is that the same long political system has considerably affected 
the development of IR system. In addition, the relationship between the state, 
employers and employees has been affected by how the political system in the country 
has been run. Moreover, regarding the political system, it has been discussed in 
Chapter Four and several chapters after that, that since the Tunku's era Malaysia has 
practised the 'elite accommodation system', where discussion behind closed doors has 
been preferred to open conflict. The dislike of open confrontation was a cultural issue 
and this was seen in other aspects of life, even in the workplace (Asma, 1992; Asma, 
1996).117 It has affected the way the public sector IR has been managed more than the 
private sector because of the direct relationship with the government as the sole 
employer. The bilateral relationship in the public sector, compared to the tripartite one 
in the private sector, affected the former more than the latter sector, partly explaining 
the politicised relationship between the two. So the contention of this study is that the 
public sector was more affected by the Malaysian political system than was the private 
sector. Meanwhile, since the government prioritised the private sector as the catalyst 
for economic growth, especially during the NEP and NDP, employers were 
represented by large corporations like the MNCs or the FDls. 
117 Asma Abdullah wrote extensively on the Malaysian management and how culture affects the 
alaysian workforce. See Asma (1992) and Asma (1996) for further discussions on the cultural 
dimensions of Malaysian society. 
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12.3.5. Balance of Power 
The study has shown that the state has played a prominent role in the Malaysian 
economy, which, as argued above has subsequently influenced its dominance in 
Malaysian IR. Thus, the balance of power between the state and the other two actors, 
employers/management, and employees/trade unions, in Malaysian IR is quite 
unequal. Compared to employees/unions, employers/management have enjoyed a far 
more influential position because the state gave them a higher priority in the economy. 
This was especially during the privatisation process, which officially started in the 
1980s and accelerated during the NDP. Because FDI was always considered 
important, the 'managerial prerogative', suppression of industrial disputes, wider 
power of the DGTUA and the Minister as stated in IRA 1967, even though opposed by 
MTUC, remained in place. The argument that has been developed in this study in 
Chapter Eleven, emphasised that high economic growth had to be sustained at all 
costs, even when it meant extending less or no power at all to employees, particularly 
in the public sector. During the NDP (1991-2000), this policy was further emphasised, 
when the private sector was officially given the leading role in the economic 
development. 
12.4. Contributions of the Study 
This study makes several contributions to the broader literature on the role of the state 
in developing countries in general and the role of the state in IR in particular. 
First, it offers an insight into the expenence of a very fast developing nation. It 
confinns the arguments of modemisation theory as proposed by Hoogvelt (1997: 35) 
that relate to problem-solving and policy-oriented theories of social change and 
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economIC development. Malaysia has planned and implemented very structured 
development policies, in an attempt to achieve a developed, diversified and 
sustainable economy, using industrialisation as an important tool. However, this study 
has also confirmed another argument of modernisation theory, that the transplantation 
of capital and technology alone would not succeed in bringing the desired change in 
economic development unless accompanied by wider and consistent social, cultural 
and political changes. This was one area clearly lacking in Malaysia. The government 
experimented with a Look East Policy, as discussed in Chapter Eight, but after twenty 
years, the policy was no longer at the centre of government policies, and regarded as 
'political rhetoric', rather than a genuine effort towards change. This shows that to 
effect change in a developing society, especially when it involved diverse culture and 
world views such as held by ethnic groups in Malaysia, understanding and acceptance 
by these groups is gained first, and not 'forced' upon them. The failure of the Look 
East Policy, and other policy initiatives by government, such as the 'Clean, Efficient, 
and Trustworthy' campaigns, were frustrated by the negative role that traditional 
culture plays, as argued by Hoogvelt (1997, 1997: 35). The Malaysian government 
under Mahathir Mohamad had several attempts at cultural diffusion and introducing 
new technology from the outside world, but up to the end of the period studied, the 
government admitted that more should have been achieved in this respect. However, 
as this study has contended, the 'comprehensive social and economic change' that is 
needed in Malaysia is almost impossible without change in political culture, which is 
very unlikely, given how significant historical factors still are for the Malaysian 
people, especially the Malays. The reluctance of Malaysia to adopt a comprehensive 
change that involves political change probably marks the end of the significance of 
modemisation theory for understanding Malaysia. The Malaysian experience does not 
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support the view proposed by modernisation theorists that ultimately less-developed 
societies will converge with the advanced industrial economies of the \Vestern world. 
This study also offers a comprehensive analysis of the development of an IR system in 
a post-colonial society, and how the legacy of colonialism impacted on the future of a 
developing country. This partially explains why Malaysia has not moved on from its 
'political-paternalistic' pattern of IR to a 'repressive-confrontative' pattern, as argued 
by Sharma (1996), even when its stages of industrialisation have changed. It shows 
that a generalised application of modernisation theory for developing countries is not 
possible without examining the different experience of each country. This thesis has 
attempted to do this and show that different experiences result in different outcomes, 
again indicating that convergence theory is of limited applicability. 
The study explores and analyses significant issues that concerned the role of the state 
in Malaysian IR from the earliest period until the end of the second major 
development plans, the NDP. Therefore, it contributes to a wider timeframe that 
enables an overall analysis of possible factors that influenced the role of the state in 
Malaysian IR. It explores non-economic factors that were only mentioned briefly by 
previous scholars, but which made a significant contribution to the development of 
Malaysian IR. As argued in Chapter One, it is premature, for example, to generalise 
and draw conclusions about Malaysian IR without looking at the major historical 
turning-point periods, and analyse the contending factors that affected and influenced 
the development of the role of the state in Malaysian IR. 
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This research confirms that for economic reasons primarily, during the NDP period, 
the last Malaysian long-term development plan, the government implemented a 
clearly different IR policy for the public sector. It reveals that even though the 
government was planning for a fully developed nation with new approaches under the 
NDP, and less emphasis on ethnic-based issues, it was not ready to relax the 
restrictive legislation, especially for public sector employees, whom it regarded as the 
pillar of the government's strength. It was ready to forge a better relationship with 
employees using several pro-industrial harmony policies, but not amending the 
legislation. Therefore, the measures taken to improve the relationship with employees 
in the tripartite bodies, and various campaigns aimed towards 'industrial harmony' 
was more in form than in substance and will remain so until the legislative framework 
is relaxed and liberalised. 
12.5. Limitations of the study 
However, like all studies, there are some limitations. First, this study has purposely 
concentrated on the role of the state, therefore placed less emphasis on the roles of the 
other two primary actors, the employers/management and employees/unions. 
Especially lacking is an analysis of the role of employers in the development of the 
Malaysian IR system, which, as has been noted in the study, is a very significant 
player, when directly or indirectly they have pressured the government to concede to 
their demands. This was shown in the reluctance of the government to permit the 
unionisation of electronics workers, even in the form of in-house unions. Therefore, 
this aspect could be explored further, and in this case, it can be divided into at least 
two sub-areas: the MNCs, which are mostly foreign companies; and the small and 
medium industries' employers, which are mostly local. It is also important for future 
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research to conduct case studies to test the generalisations made about the role of the 
state in IR in developing countries. 
There are also some methodological limitations due to the broad nature of the study. 
This arose from the large amount of data collected, from primary and secondary 
sorces. Since the study covered a long period of time, the large data set gathered posed 
analytical problems when using qualitative techniques. This was despite dealing with 
the data as early as possible by using categorisation (by coding and thematic analysis) 
as discussed in Chapter Five. Nevertheless, it was still a tedious process, which, in 
hindsight, could be assisted by using programmes such as Nudist. 
The researcher had to be aware at all times of biases arising from interviewees as key 
informants that this study relied largely upon, particularly IR policy makers from the 
various government agencies, who tended to represent the view of government. Even 
though when compared to the PSD officers, the MoHR officers who dealt more with 
private sector IR were willing to talk more openly, generally they were anxious about 
going 'over board' or giving away information that was considered 'sensitive' or 
'government's secret'. Therefore, their line of argument did not really differ from the 
officers in the PSD, in that the policies implemented, no matter how flawed or in need 
of change, are necessary to achieve the broader Malaysian national objectives as 
outlined by the government. Even trade unionists, either in the private sector, or more 
so in the public sector, generally were influenced by the official line promoted by the 
government, that practices in Malaysia suited local needs. The researcher has had to 
deal with this by probing further, and using other sources to triangulate the claims 
made. Other a\'ailable sources were also limited and mostly from government-
523 
influenced and controlled sources such as the media, including newspapers, which this 
study relied upon quite substantially. Therefore, future researchers should also try to 
gather and use more primary data including minutes and proceedings and not just 
interviews, as this contains biases that a researcher should always be aware of while 
analysing the data, in order to minimise validity threats. 
12.6. Directions for Future Research 
As stated above, one of the areas that could be studied further is the role played by 
employers in the development of Malaysian IR in particular, or developing countries 
in general. The major IR players would benefit from such research, especially if it 
concerned multi-national corporations, which are the dominant investors in 
developing countries. With case studies based on companies, the IR system in practice 
would clearly highlight the significance of the role of employers found in studies such 
as presented here. 
This study has offered insights into the development and processes of Malaysian IR 
focusing on the role of the state. It therefore contributes to a better understanding of a 
very fast developing country, which adds to the limited literature on these countries. 
This study has implied that Malaysia has a different system that was very much 
influenced by its own historical experiences, and distinguishes it from, for example, 
Singapore or Indonesia. Therefore, it would be beneficial if in the future, a 
comparative analysis could be conducted, either between Southeast Asian countries, 
Asian countries, or with any other developing countries. This could provide a broader 
understanding of the similarities and differences between these countries and support 
or refute some of the generalisations made in this study. 
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Appendix I 
Interviews 
Abdul Halim Mansor. MTUC Deputy Secretary General. MTUC Headquarters, 
Subang Jaya (23 February 2000). 
Abdul Rahman Manan. Secretary General CUEP ACS. CUEP ACS Building, Kuala 
Lumpur (9 January 1999). 
Ahmad Abdullah. Chairman NJC. CUEPACS Building, Kuala Lumpur. (22 January 
2001 ). 
A.H. Ponniah. MTUC General Council 1971-1997. Vice President of CUEPACS 
1973-1976. General Secretary of CUEPACS 1989-1996 ( 22 January 2001). 
Ahmad Nor. Former President CUEPACS. DAP Vice President (6 February 2001). 
A.J. Patrick. Former Vice President 1980-85, Former Deputy President 1985-1988, 
Member of General Council 1980-present. Petaling J aya (1 February 2001). 
Azlan Mohd Yusof. Senior Director of Industrial Relations. Industrial Relations 
Department. Ministry of Human Resources. Kuala Lumpur (27 February 1999). 
Bagh Singh Sandhu. Deputy Director of Remuneration. Remuneration Division, 
Public Services Department, Kuala Lumpur (11 February 2000). 
Bruno Pereira. Former President of RCA WU, General Secretary (1993-present) of 
RCA, HSS, HATWU (26 January 2001). 
Ismail bin Haji Rahim._Director General of Industrial Relations. Department of 
Industrial Relations, Human Resource Ministry, Kuala Lumpur (25 January 1999, 17 
January 2001). 
Izhar Harun. Director General of Trade Union Affairs Department. Kuala Lumpur. 
(16 January 2001, 15 June 2001). 
Jamaluddin Md Isa, Former General Secretary CUEPACS 1967-1986, Secretary for 
Staff Side NJC 1970-1986, Panel Member of Industrial Court 1970-1986 (30 January 
2001 ). 
Kamaruzzaman Mansor. MIEU President. Vice President MTUC (29 January 2001) 
K. George. Ex-Vice Pesident of CUEPACS 1965-1971. Kuala Lumpur (7 February 
2001 ) 
Mathias Yeoh. Deputy Secretary NTUC (Singapore). Minister Without Portfolio, 
Prime Minister's Department (Singapore). Petaling Jaya (29 January 2001). 
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Md Marzuki Ismail. Deputy Director. Trade Union Affairs Department. Human 
Resource Ministry. Kuala Lumpur (2 March 1999). 
Mohd Abdul Wahab bin Mohd Salleh. Senior Director of Labour, Labour Department 
Of Malaysia, Human Resource Ministry, Kuala Lumpur (2 February 1999). 
Mohd Azlan Mohd Yusof. Senior Director of Industrial Relations. Department of 
Industrial Relations, Human Resource Ministry, Kuala Lumpur (27 February 1999). 
Mohd Jamil Ismail. Former Secretary General National Joint Council (NJC), 1992-
1998 and Former Deputy Secretary General CUEPACS. (29 December 1998, 6 
January 1999). 
Mohd Noor Abdullah. Chairman of Joint Council of Non-Affiliate Agencies of Public 
Sector.MPP J Civics Centre, Petaling J aya , Selangor (3 March 1999). 
Mohd Yusof Hermainshah. MTUC Vice President. Vice Chairman NJC (Science and 
Technology). MPPJ Civics Centre, Petaling Jaya, Selangor (4 March 1999). 
Mohsin Mohd Khir. Former Director of Remuneration Division. Public Services 
Department. Kompleks JPA, Kuala Lumpur (4 February 1999). 
Mohd Zubir Mohd Basri. Senior Director of Trade Unions. Trade Unions Affairs 
Department. (16 January 2001, 15 June 2001). 
Muchtar Pakpahan, Council of Central Leader, Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia 
(SBSI), (16 June 2001). 
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Mustafa Johan Abdullah. MTUC Education and Training Officer. MTUC 
Headquarters, Subang Jaya, Selangor (24 December 1998). 
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Rajasekaran. G. MTUC Secretary General. MTUC Headquarters, Subang Jaya (11 
December 1998, 3 March 1999, 23 February 2000, 1 February 2001, 6 February 
2001). 
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Sin Chek Neng. Deputy Director of Trade Unions Affairs. Trade Unions Affairs 
Department, Ministry of Human Resource Ministry, Kuala Lumpur (22 July 1997). 
Siva Subramaniam. President of CUEP ACS. WISMA KPPK. Kuala Lumpur (4 
January 1999). 
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Somasundram slo Karupaya. Chairman of Postal Uniform Staff Union. MTUC 
Headquarters, Subang Jaya, Selangor (6 February 2001). 
Syed Shahir. President of NUTE (National Union of Transport Equipment and Allied 
Industries Workers) and General Council Member of MTUC. Selangor. Malaysia (9 
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Vijayaragavan S/O Gopal, General Secretary, Electrical Industry Workers' Union, 
Petaling J aya, Selangor (3 March 1999, 23 January 2001). 
Zainal bin Rampak. MTUC President, TWU Building, Petaling Jaya, Selangor (7 
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Appendix II 
Interview Schedule 
General Questions 
1. What is the position of the industrial relations in Malaysia's economic objectives? 
2. Is there a relationship between the state's policy towards industrial relations and its 
industrialisation stage? 
3. The role of the state in industrial relations in Malaysia in general 
4. The role of the trade unions and employer federation in industrial relations system 
in Malaysia 
5. The role of the state in industrial relations before Independence 
the role of the state in industrial relations after 1957 until the present government 
(based on different leadership) 
6. The present role of the state in industrial relations in Malaysia 
7. The development of policies of industrial relations under different leadership 
8. The differences and similarities of issues in the past and at present 
9. The differences and the similarities of the role of the state in industrial relations (in 
managing the issues) 
10. Factors that affect/influence the role of the state-intemaVextemal factors 
11. Roles of other players/actors in industrial relations system in Malaysia and their 
significance 
12. Role of the non-governmental organisation( also their development from the past 
to the present) 
13. How government manage conflict among parties involved in industrial relations 
the relationship between the government, the employee and the employer 
14. Malaysian industrial relations system-collective bargaining system, etc. 
15. The reasons on why the government play such a role in industrial relations system 
in Malaysia 
Set 1 
(Human Resource Ministry officials) 
A. On the role of industrial relations in general 
1. Is there a relationship between industrial relations system and the economIC 
objectiveslindustrialisation process in Malaysia? 
2.How do you explain the relationship? 
3. What is the role of industrial relations in Malaysia? 
-+. Who are the key players in the industrial relations system in Malaysia? 
5.What are the factors that influence the industrial relations system in Malaysia? 
B. On the role of the Ministry/the department in industrial relations system in 
I\lalaysia 
I.Please describe the role/roles of this Ministry/department in the industrial relations 
system in Malaysia. 
2.Why do you have these roles? What are you trying to achieve through the 
objectives? 
3. Who are the parties involved in this process within the ministry/outside the 
ministry? 
-+.How do you describe the relationship of this ministry/department with the other 
parties involved in industrial relations in Malaysia? 
5.How does the role of this ministry/department being operated? 
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6.How do trade disputes managed? 
7.Please describe the process and the development of collective bargaining. 
8.Please explain the significance of the role of the specific department/officials. 
9.What are the factors that influence the role of this ministry/department in industrial 
relations system in Malaysia? 
C. On the role of the state in industrial relations system in Malaysia 
1. What are the factors (internaVexternal) that influence the role of the state m 
industrial relations in Malaysia? 
2.How do you describe the present role of the state in industrial relations system in 
Malaysia? 
3.Do you think the state is influenced by any models of industrial relations system? 
4.0r do you think the industrial relations system in Malaysia is distinctively a 
Malaysian model? Why do you say so? 
5.Some scholars claim that Malaysia pursues a certain kind of industrial relations 
policy. Industrial relations system is said to be determined by the dependence on 
foreign direct investment and Malaysia's plan to become a developed country by the 
year 2020. What do you think of that statement? 
6.Are there differences/similarities on the role of the state in industrial relations based 
on different leaders? Is leadership an important factor m determining 
policy/approaches in industrial relations in Malaysia? 
7.Are there differences/similarities on policies/approaches taken by different leaders 
of the state? Why? 
8.Are the issues concerning industrial relations the same/different in the past, 
compared to the ones under the present government? 
9.What are the present issues concerning industrial relations in this country? 
10.How do the government manage the conflict among the parties involved? 
II.Why do you think the government needs to act the way it does in Malaysia? 
Set 11 
(Trade unions, employer federation and other regional trade unions figures) 
A. On the role of industrial relations in general 
I.Is there a relationship between industrial relations system and the economIC 
objectives !industrialisation process in Malaysia? 
2.How do you explain the relationship? 
3. What is the role of industrial relations in Malaysia? 
4.Who are the key players in the industrial relations system in Malaysia? 
5.What are the factors that influence the industrial relations system in Malaysia? 
B. On the role of the organisation in industrial relations system in Malaysia 
I.Please describe the role/roles of this organisation in the industrial relations system 
in Malaysia? 
2. Who are the parties involved in this process within the organisation? 
3.How do you describe the relationship of this organisation with the other parties 
involved in industrial relations in Malaysia, especially the state? 
4.What role does the government want them to play (the government's expectation) 
5.How does the role of this organisation being operated? 
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6.Please explain the significance of the role of this organisation in industrial relations 
in Malaysia. 
7.What are the factors that influence the role of this organisation in industrial relations 
system in Malaysia? 
C. On the role of the state in industrial relations system in Malaysia 
1. What are the factors (internal/external) that influence the role of the state In 
industrial relations in Malaysia? 
2.How do you describe the present role of the state in industrial relations system in 
\1alaysia? 
3.00 you think the state is influenced by any models of industrial relations system? 
Or do you think the industrial relations system in Malaysia is distinctively a 
Malaysian model? Why do you say so? 
4.Some scholars claim that the Malaysian state pursues a certain kind of industrial 
relations policy. It is claimed that policies regarding industrial relations are 
determined by the dependence on foreign direct investment and Malaysia's plan to 
become a developed country by the year 2020. What do you think of that statement? 
5.Are there differences/similarities on the role of the state in industrial relations based 
on different leaders? Is leadership an important factor In determining 
policy/approaches in industrial relations in Malaysia? 
6.Are there differences/similarities on policies/approaches taken by different leaders 
of the state? Why? 
7.Are the issues concerning industrial relations the same/different in the past, 
compared to the ones under the present government? 
8.What are the present issues concerning industrial relations in this country? 
9.What do you think of the way the government manages the conflict among the 
parties involved in industrial relations in Malaysia? 
10. What do you think of the industrial relations system in Malaysia as a whole? 
11. Why do you think the government needs to act the way it does in industrial 
relations in Malaysia? 
Set 111 
(Other key informants besides the above) 
A. On the role of industrial relations in general 
I.Is there a relationship between industrial relations system and the economIC 
objectiveslindustrialisation process in Malaysia? 
2.How do you explain the relationship? 
3.What is the role of industrial relations in Malaysia? How do you describe the 
development of industrial relations in Malaysia? 
4.Who are the parties involved in the industrial relations system in Malaysia? 
5.What do you think of the role of the other parties, except the state? 
6. What influences/determines their roles? 
7.What are the factors that influence the industrial relations system in Malaysia? 
B. On the role of the state in industrial relations system in Malaysia 
1. What are the factors (internal/external) that influence the role of the state In 
industrial relations in Malaysia? 
2.How do you describe the present role of the state in industrial relations system in 
Malaysia? 
3.Do you think the state is influenced by any models of industrial relations system? 
Or do you think the industrial relations system in Malaysia is distinctively a 
Malaysian model? Why do you say so? 
4.Some scholars claim that the Malaysian state pursues a certain kind of policy. It is 
claimed that policies regarding industrial relations are detennined by the dependence 
on foreign direct investment and Malaysia's plan to become a developed country by 
the year 2020. What do you think of that statement? 
5.Are there differences/similarities on the role of the state in industrial relations based 
on different leaders? Is leadership an important factor In detennining 
policy/approaches in industrial relations in Malaysia? 
6.Are there differences/similarities on policies/approaches taken by different leaders 
of the state? Why? 
7.Are the issues concerning industrial relations the same/different in the past, 
compared to the ones under the present government? 
8.Are there other factors that influence the roles that the state play in Malaysia? 
9.What do you think of the present issues concerning industrial relations in this 
country? What causes them? How should they be solved? 
10. What do you think of the way the government manages the conflict!issues In 
industrial relations at present? 
11. Why do you think the government needs to act the way it does in Malaysia? 
Interview Questions-Public Service Department 
Public Sector Industrial Relations-The role of the State 
I.Please describe the role/roles of this department/PSD in managing the industrial 
relations in the public sector in Malaysia. Why do you think the department! PSD play 
these roles? 
2. Could you explain how the system presently used in managing tenns and 
conditions of service in the public sector work to the best of interests of the employee 
in the public sector? 
3. Could you comment on the situation of the industrial relations system in the public 
sector in Malaysia in general? 
4. What is your opinion on the effectiveness of the National Joint Council as one of 
the machinery used in the management of public sector industrial relations? Is the 
NJC meant only as forums for discussion, and not for negotiation (as is available in 
the private sector)? 
5. Please describe the role of the Public Service Tribunal. What is your opinion on 
the suggestion that the functions of public service tribunal had to be strengthened to 
meet the demands of the public sector, as recently discussed by CUEPACS and The 
f\linister of the Prime Minister's Department? 
6. Based on the department's recent experience, do you think the national economic 
do\\'ntum has any effects oyer the public sector industrial relations? Why do you say 
so? 
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7. What are the most recent issues that arose in the public sector industrial relations? 
Do these issues differ from issues in the past? 
8. Can you comment on the New Remuneration System? Do you think the NRS is a 
better scheme compared to the Cabinet Committee Report (CCR)? What changes 
could be made to better the scheme? 
9. In general, what is your opinion on the role of the state in the industrial relations 
system in Malaysia? 
10. Do you think there is a difference of policy in the industrial relations system 
implemented by the state towards the private sector as compared to the public sector 
industrial relations in Malaysia? Why? 
11. What is your opinion on the role of CVEP ACS as the main body of affiliated 
unions in the public sector industrial relations in Malaysia? Based on recent 
developments, do you think CUEP ACS has played roles that benefit both the 
employees and the state? In what terms would you describe the cooperation between 
CVEP ACS and PSD? 
12. In your opinion, are there certain aspects of the public sector industrial relations in 
Malaysia that should be changed! re-structured? 
13. What do you consider as achievements of the public sector industrial relations 
system in the past few years? 
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F.S. Circular No. 28 of 1950 
BENHAM COMMITTEE REPORT 
Appelldix III 
It has become apparent since the publication of the Benham Report that its recommendations 
are not acceptable to certain sections of the Public Service. The government has therefore 
decided in accordance with its declared view that rates of remuneration are properly a matter 
for collective bargaining between employer and employee that an opportunity should be 
afforded to any service to give formal notification of its desire to negotiate its own salary 
scales in preferring to accepting whatever decisions may be arrived at by the Legislative 
Council. The recommendations of the Benham Committee in respect of any such service will 
be deleted from any motion moved in Council on the Report. 
2. It is to be clearly understood that this offer negotiation IS subject to the following 
conditions: 
a)The negotiation will be de novo and will be conducted on the basis of the recommendations 
in respect of the particular service made by the Benham or any other Committee which has 
reported on salaries in the last three years. The officers affected will remain on their existing 
salary scales and whether or not any improvement is made on those scales will depend on the 
outcome of negotiations. 
b) Negotiations cannot be entered into with individuals or groups of individuals. They will 
only be conducted with representatives bodies which are duly constituted as unions or 
associations and which include their objects of associations the advancement of the conditions 
of employment of their members. 
c )The Government must be satisfied that any union or aSSOCIatIon electing to adopt this 
procedure is sufficiently representative of the staff comprising the service on whose behalf it 
purports to act as to justify recognition of its claim to negotiate on behalf of the service as a 
whole. Wherever such recognition is accorded the election will be deemed to be made for all 
the staff comprising that service including non-members of the unions or associations 
concerned. If any such services is organised in State, Settlement or regional unions, prior 
agreement must be reached between all such unions before the application is made. 
d)There will be no negotiation on the date of implementation of any agreement reached. This 
will follow whatever resolution is adopted in Legislative Council on the Report of the 
Benham Committee. 
e) If a number of services elect to negotiate, it will not be possible to set up the necessary 
machinery for all such services at the same time and while every effort will be made to press 
on with the matter, some delay must be expected. The resources of the Government are fully 
extended during the present Emergency and there is a limit to the staff which can be diverted 
to organise and undertake such negotiations. 
3. SUbject to the above conditions, any union or association representing a particular service 
(or any organised body representing two or more such unions) which elects to negotiate 
the salary scales applicable to that service in preference to accepting any award may so 
notify the Chief Secretary by filling up and forwarding the attached form. To give time 
for unions to ballot their members the closing date for receipt of applications will be the 
15 th November 1950. It is important that the form should be accurately and completely 
filled up. Copies of all applications received will be published for information in the 
Gazette. 
4 The offer made under this Circular does not extend to staff on the Malayan Establishment 
who are not employed solely by the Federation Government whose terms of service are a 
matter of wider concern not does it apply to the Malay Regiment or the Police. 
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5 Heads of Departments are requested to ensure that the contents of this Circular are 
brought to the attention of all salaried staff in the Government Service. 
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E.B.David 
Acting Deputy Chief Secretary. 
16th October 1950. 
Federal Secretariat Circular No.6 of 1951 
Report of the Benham Committee 
Appendix IV 
As a result of F.s. Circular No. 28 of 1950 a large number of applications for negotiation on 
salary scales have been received from different Services. It is apparent, from the volume of 
work which will be involved in preparation for, and conduct of, the negotiations which have 
been asked for and the very small staff which can be made available for this work at the 
present time, that a considerable period oftime must elapse before they can be completed and 
that many officers would be forced to wait a long time before receiving any change in salary 
scale if revision is to await the conclusion of the negotiations. 
2. It has, therefore, been decided that new salary scales in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Special Committee on Salaries, as accepted by resolution of 
Legislative Council on 23rd November, 1950, shall be introduced forthwith for all officers 
paid from votes in the Federal Estimates, 1951, with the exception of certain appointments in 
Divisions I and II, of common concern to the Federation and Singapore Governments, on 
which a decision has not yet been reached. The introduction of the Benham scales will be 
without prejudice to any further amendments that may result in consequence of any 
agreements reached by negotation. 
3. It is also clear that, in view of the work involved, the Government cannot commit itself at 
the present time to entering into full and formal negotiations with any but the larger services 
whose applications were made under F.S. Circular No. 28 of 1950. This will not preclude the 
consideration of representations, whether in respect of individual officers or of groups of 
officers, and in any case in which adequate grounds have been shown for adjustment, subject 
to the provision of the necessary funds, such adjustment will be made. This considerations 
will proceed concurrently with the conduct of the negotiations referred to above. 
4.In compliance with the original resolution as amended in Legislative Council on 23 rd 
November 1950, the effective date of the introduction of the new scales will be: 
a) 1 st July 1950, for all officers in Division I of the Public Service and for officers in Division 
II who are holding posts scheduled on the Malayan Establishment, 
b) 1 sl August 1949, for those services listed in sub-para (I) of para 3 of the Minority Report on 
the Effective Date, and 
c) 15t January 1950 for all of other officers. 
5.The negotiations accepted under F.S. Circular No 28 of 1950 will be conducted, after the 
new rates have been introduced, as quickly as available staff allows and as soon as the many 
outstanding problems arising from conflicting claims made by different organisations on 
behalf of the sae officers, from doubts as to the representative nature of organisations which 
have submitted chams and from other similar difficulties presented by the applications, have 
been resolved. It is stressed that these negotiations will be concerned with basic salaries and, 
in accordance with the resolution of Legislative Council, the negotiations will be conducted 
on the basis of the principles set out and in relation to the general level of salaries proposed in 
the Report. 
6.Full instructions regarding the implementations of this Circilar will be issued seprately. 
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By command, 
E.B. David, 
Acting Deputy Chief Secretary 
Federal Secretariat 
Kuala Lumpur, 18th January 1951. 
Appendix V 
Conventions Ratified By Malaysia (as at January 2000) 
Convention Country Ratification date Status 
C7 Minimum Age(Sea) Malaysia 3.3.1964 denounced 
Convention, 1920 (Sarawak) 
Cl1 Right of Association Malaysia 11.1.1960(Malaysia) ratified 
(Agriculture) Convention, 1921 (Peninsular) 3.3. 1964(Sarawak) 
Cl2Workmen's Compensation Malaysia 5.6. 1961(Malaysia) ratified 
(Agriculture) Convention, 1921 (Peninsular) 3.3. 1964(Sarawak) 
C 14 W eeklyRest(Industry )Convention, Malaysia 3.3.1964 ratified 
1921 (Sarawak) 
C 15 Minimum Age(Trimmers and Malaysia,(Sa-bah and 3.3.1964 denounced 
Stokers) Convention, 1921 Sa-rawak) 
C16Medicai Examination of Young Malaysia 3.3.1964 ratified 
Persons(Sea) Convention, 1921 (Sabah)and Sarawak) 
C 17W orkmen' sCompensation( Accide Malaysia 11.11.1957 ratified 
nts) Convention, 1925 (Peninsular) 
C19Equality of Treatrnent( Accident Malaysia 11.11.1957 Ratified by ratified 
Compensation) Convention, 1925 (Peninsular) Malaysia(Sarawak)on 
3.3.1964 
C29 Forced Labour Convention, 1930 Malaysia 11.11.1957 ratified 
C45 Underground Malaysia 11.11.1957 ratified 
Work(Women)Convention, 1935 (Peninsular) 
C50Recruiting of Indigenous Workers Malaysia 11.11.1957 ratified 
Convention, 1936 
C64 Contracts of Malaysia 11.11.1957 ratified 
Employment(Indigenous 
Workers)Convention, 1939 
C65Penai Sanctions(Indigenous Malaysia 11.11.1957 ratified 
Workers) 
C81 Labour Inspection Convention, Malaysia 1.7.1963 ratified 
1947 
C86Contracts of Malaysia(Sabah) and 3.3.1964 ratified 
Employment(Indigenous Workers) (Sarawak) 
Convention, 1947 
C88Employment Service Convention, Malaysia 6.6.1974 ratified 
1948 
C94Labour Clauses(Public Contracts) Mala ysia( Sabah) and 3.3.1964 ratified 
Convention, 1949 (Sarawak) 
C95Protection of Wages Malaysia 17.11.1961 ratified 
C97 Migration for Employment Malaysia(Sabah) 3.3.1964 ratified 
Convention(revised), 1949 
C98 Right to Organise and Collective Malaysia 5.6.1961 ratified 
Bargaining COI1\ ention, 1949 
CI05 Abolition of Forced Labour Malaysia 13.10.1958 denounced 
Convention, 1957 
C119 Guarding of Machinery Malaysia 6.6.1974 ratified 
Convention, 1963 
C123Minimum Age( Underground Malaysia 6.6.1974 ratified 
Work) Convention. 1965 
C 1 OOEqual Remuneration Convention, Malaysia 9.9.1997 ratified 
1951 
C138Minimum Age Convention. 1973 Malaysia 9.9.1997 ratified 
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